Influencing corporations through shareholder activism: the case of three NGO-led campaigns in the UK by Ivanova, Mila R.
 INFLUENCING CORPORATIONS THROUGH 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: THE CASE OF THREE 
NGO-LED CAMPAIGNS IN THE UK 
 
 
by 
 
Mila R. Ivanova 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy of Cardiff University 
 
Management, Employment and Organisation Section  
of Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University 
 
 
September 2015
i 
 
 
  
 
 
DECLARATION 
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently 
submitted in candidature for any degree. 
Signed ………… ………………………………………………. (candidate)   
Date ……25.09.15…………………… 
 
STATEMENT 1 
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
…………………………(insert MCh, Md, MPhil, PhD etc, as appropriate) 
Signed ……… …………………………………………………. (candidate)  
Date ………25.09.15………………… 
 
STATEMENT 2 
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. 
Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references.   
Signed …………… ……………………………………………. (candidate)  
Date …………25.09.15……………… 
 
STATEMENT 3 
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-
library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. 
Signed …………… ……………………………………………. (candidate) 
Date………25.09.15…………………
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Modern day corporations are not only economically and politically powerful, but they also 
have a significant impact on society and the environment. Due to their relevance, once 
solely focused on government, non-governmental organisations are increasingly engaging 
in private politics and making corporations the targets of their campaigns. The recent 
economic crisis has highlighted the role of the financial market for changing corporate 
actions and, as a result, shareholder activism – a campaigning tactic which is comparatively 
new, has rapidly grown in popularity among the third sector community. The term can be 
defined as the use of ownership rights to actively shape corporate policy and behaviour. 
The research is based on three campaign case studies which provide a detailed exploration 
of how UK-based NGOs use various shareholder activist strategies to realise their 
campaign objectives: the campaign against Vedanta Resources‟ operations in India, the 
campaign against Shell‟s involvement in the Niger Delta, and the Tax Justice campaign 
targeting FTSE 100 companies. Based on the premise that companies should consider the 
interests of different stakeholders, the main aim is to explore the shareholder activist 
strategies used by NGOs, to determine their impact on the investor community and the 
targeted companies, and to examine what are the main challenges faced by campaigning 
organisations. The study adopts a multi-method qualitative approach encompassing 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. It draws on a 
wide range of literature to explain and build upon the findings – social science literature, 
but also social movement, pressure group and financial accounting literature. It has been 
discovered that shareholder activism can potentially be a very effective tactic and that 
NGOs‟ use of this strategy is on the rise – NGO share campaigns more than doubled in the 
period 2003-2013 compared to 1990-2002. One of the main conclusions is that NGOs are 
increasingly using business case arguments when engaging with companies and investors 
as this method enhances campaign effectiveness. Based on the case study findings, a 
theoretical model which attempts to explain the factors contributing to the overall impact of 
campaigns has been developed. The findings also have implications about the nature of 
corporate governance and the democratisation of business. Shareholder activism has been 
seen as a tool which democratises corporations through opening the door to private politics 
to a wider range of stakeholders such as citizens, pension savers, and voluntary 
organisations. In addition, the nature of a „successful‟ campaign has been reinvented and it 
has been suggested that the overall impact of an intervention should be regarded from a 
„delayed gratification‟ point of view and the symbolic outcomes of campaigns should not 
be discarded as irrelevant. 
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Early one Saturday morning, there was a man walking down the sandy 
beach next to where he lived. He was taking his usual leisurely stroll after a big storm had 
passed and found the beach littered with starfish as far as his eyes could see, stretching in 
both directions. Off in the distance, the man noticed a young boy approaching. The boy‟s 
fragile figure was leaning forwards and bending, then standing straight up again and 
extending one arm towards the ocean. Repeating the same movements every so often, at 
distance it seemed as if the boy was dancing. As the boy came closer, the man realised that 
what he had seen was not a dance – rather, the boy was picking up the starfish one by one 
and throwing them back into the ocean. „Why are you doing this? There must be hundreds, 
if not thousands of starfish on this beach. Throwing ten back into the water will not make 
much difference‟ – the man remarked when the boy was standing right next to him. The 
boy bent down again and picked up a starfish. Then he turned, smiled at the man and said: 
„It makes all the difference in the world to this particular starfish!‟, before throwing the 
starfish as far as he could into the water.   
Adapted from „The Star Thrower‟, by Loren Eiseley (1979)  
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PART ONE: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
 
2 
1. Introduction 
Shareholder activism is not a privilege – it is a right and a 
responsibility. When we invest in a company, we own part 
of that company and we are partly responsible for how that 
company progresses. If we believe there is something 
going wrong with the company, then we, as shareholders, 
must become active and vocal. 
 (Mark Mobius, 2010) 
This research aims to explore how non-governmental organisations (NGOs, hereafter) use 
shareholder activism to advance their campaign goals, what impact they achieve among the 
investor community and the targeted companies, and what challenges they face along the 
way. This introductory chapter of the thesis starts by arguing that there has been a shift in 
NGO focus away from campaigning exclusively for public policy reform and toward 
targeting corporations. The chapter then proceeds to explain the reasons behind this change 
and to explore the traditional strategies used by NGOs to challenge corporations. The 
effectiveness of these strategies is discussed with reference to the academic literature and it 
is concluded that the propensity of such tactics to have a significant influence over 
corporations is hotly debated. A comparatively recent campaign mechanism – shareholder 
activism – is put forward as an approach which can provide NGOs with the leverage they 
need. The term is defined and the chapter provides some background details on socio-
ethical shareholder activism. The final section of the chapter extrapolates the gaps in the 
literature, albeit relying on the method of problematisation, and justifies the purpose and 
value of the present study. It also provides an overview of the contents and structure of the 
thesis. 
1.1. The Role of NGOs for Influencing Corporations   
Corporations – NGOs’ New Targets 
In the early days of NGO activity, protesters targeted what they perceived as the obvious 
source of power – the governments that permitted unethical practices to continue without 
any sanctions being imposed. However, although still relevant, this dynamic of activism 
has been increasingly supplemented by pressure directed at multinational corporations. The 
contemporary conception of civil society organisations, which dates back to the late 20
th
 
century, distinguishes between the state and the market economy and regards civil society 
as balancing the power of both, responding to consumer and citizen needs where 
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governments and companies have failed at mitigating some of the social problems resulting 
from the excesses of capitalism. Among others, Cohen and Arato (1994), Mathews (1997), 
Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001), and Colas (2002) are prominent proponents of this 
perspective. NGOs are a subset of civil society organisations and can be described as 
organised, private, self-governing, non-profit and voluntary groups (Salamon et al., 1999). 
This definition summarises the ideas behind civil society itself and therefore the two terms 
(CSOs and NGOs) will be used interchangeably throughout the paper (see Section 1.7. for a 
more detailed definition of the term „NGO‟).  
But what is it that renders companies important for NGOs? The logic is infallible since the 
modern corporation‟s rapid rise in power and influence – power that has prompted Bakan 
(2005) to refer to business as the „world‟s dominant institution‟ (p.139) – has meant that 
corporations can wield a disproportionate amount of economic influence, particularly in the 
developing world. In 2000 Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh reported that the sales of 
the top 200 corporations accounted for over a quarter of the world‟s economic activity. A 
comparison between the income of the twenty-four largest multinationals and that of 
national states reveals that only five states have incomes higher than those of the top nine 
multinationals (Forsythe, 2000). As Spar and La Mure (2003) suggest, if such influence can 
be used to trigger political action by governments, then the best way to change a country‟s 
practice may be through targeting the multinational that invests there.  
Second, the strategic decisions of large corporations inevitably involve social as well as 
economic consequences (Mintzberg, 1983) and their impact on society is hardly 
contestable. Corporate actions draw the line between positive economic development and 
exploitation of resources (most pronounced in third world countries); between fair wages, 
access to training, forced child labour, and inequality at work; between sustainable living 
and environmental disasters. The valuable resources and management capacities that 
organisations possess have led many to think of business as capable of making a substantial 
contribution to social life (Davis, 1973; Klonoski, 1991). Precisely this ability of companies 
to impact on societal welfare makes them relevant to NGOs as a focus for campaigning. 
Third, the numerous environmental disasters (the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Deepwater 
Horizon spill, the Bhopal incident) throughout history reveal that corporations have, on 
various occasions, underestimated the huge potentially detrimental impact they can have on 
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the environment. Such significant disasters make the companies involved relevant to NGOs 
with environment related missions. Herein, due to the significant economic, political, social 
and environmental impact of companies, NGO shareholder activism is seen as an essential 
mechanism for holding business to account for its actions or inaction.  
NGOs’ Traditional Strategies 
The ways in which NGOs have tried to exercise influence over corporations have been 
examined extensively in the literature, leading to the advancement of a variety of different 
classifications that seek to encompass the strategies and tactics employed by the third 
sector. A closer look at the field of NGO-firm relations reveals that authors often talk about 
the main tactics, classifying them in two polar categories that reflect the broader approach 
to engagement of specific NGOs. For example, den Hond and de Bakker (2007) talk about 
reformative and radical NGOs who use either symbolic gain or symbolic damage strategies 
(positive or negative publicity) and either material gain or material damage strategies 
(boycotts or buycotts); Frooman (2003) classifies strategies into coercive (negative in 
nature; involve the threat to reduce a benefit or increase a cost to a firm)  and compromise 
(positive in nature; either reduce a cost to the firm or increase a benefit), and the 
withholding and usage strategies described by Frooman (1999)  are examples of coercive 
and compromise strategies.  
Articles on stakeholder pressure and NGO tactics are often influenced by – and seek to 
critique and expand upon – Frooman‟s (1999) theoretical work (examples include Hendry 
2005; Frooman and Murrell, 2005; Huijstee and Glasbergen, 2010), which identifies four 
strategies used by stakeholders to gain influence (direct withholding, direct usage, indirect 
withholding, indirect usage) and classifies them in accordance to power and 
interdependence. When there is low interdependence between the stakeholder and the firm, 
the former uses a withholding strategy (a key resource is withheld from the firm in order to 
initiate change) and when there is a high interdependence, the stakeholder uses a usage 
strategy whereby a resource is still supplied by the stakeholder but there is negotiation 
involved with the firm. When the stakeholder has greater power over the firm, the former 
selects a direct method of influence. Conversely, when the firm is not dependent on the 
stakeholder and has greater power over him, the stakeholder chooses to use an indirect 
strategy whereby he works through a more powerful ally (Frooman, 1999).   
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An interesting work that departs from the predominant categorisation of strategies as 
engaging v. confrontational is that by Smith (1990) who distinguishes between indirect and 
direct form of action and, within the broader category of direct action, between direct 
violent and non-violent action. The table below summarises the strategies outlined by 
Smith (1990): 
Table 1: Smith’s Classification of Different NGO Strategies 
 
 
Type of Action  
 
 
 
 
Description and Examples  
 
 
 
Indirect 
 
Involves the organisation doing research and 
communicating to other stakeholders the issues that are 
of relevance to it. Examples include research reports, 
policy briefings and provision of data. 
 
 
 
 
Direct Violent 
 
 
Often illegal but generates a lot of publicity. An 
example is the campaign against vivisection by Stop 
Huntington Animal Cruelty (SHAC) in the late 1990s 
that saw investors, employees and others connected to 
Huntington Life Sciences (a UK-based drug testing 
company) being threatened, verbally abused and at 
times even physically assaulted by activists.  
 
 
 
Direct Non-Violent - Demonstrations and marches. 
- Protests. 
- Boycotts. 
- Occupations. 
- Non-violent sabotage and disruption. 
- Stunts. 
- Picketing. 
Source: Smith (1990) 
Effectiveness 
So far academic assessments of the effectiveness of NGOs in influencing corporate 
behaviour have been at best mixed (for example, Spar and La Mure, 2003) and 
predominantly negative in nature. Among all the strategies described above, boycotts are 
probably the most commonly used type of action. Yet their effectiveness is far from 
universally proven.  In a study that reviews consumer boycotts in the US between 1970 and 
1980, Friedman (1995) concludes that only a quarter of ninety instances of boycotts were 
successful. Koku et al. (1997) compare the effect of announcements of boycotts on firms‟ 
stock price with the effect of announcements of boycott threats and find that stock prices 
rose upon these announcements.  
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In addition, boycotts have attracted a variety of criticisms. For example, Smith (1990) 
suggests that mass support for boycotts (a crucial element of an effective boycott) seems 
rare in Western society. Second, external factors such as market structure or a firm‟s 
business model are crucial determinants of boycott effectiveness. Consumer boycotts are 
less likely to succeed under monopolistic conditions since there is no good substitute for 
switching consumption (Delacote, 2009). Similarly, many issues cannot be resolved by 
ethical purchase behaviour because, due to their business model, the firms involved are not 
susceptible to it. For example, cigarette companies cannot be targeted as there is no such 
thing as ethical cigarettes and consumers have a choice of whether to buy the product or 
not. Delacote (2009) argues that the reason behind boycott failures stems from the fact that 
they encourage free-riding behaviour and rely on consumers with small boycotting costs, 
whose boycott however has no impact on the targeted firm‟s profit.  
Another way of influencing business is by promoting the adoption of voluntary codes of 
conduct and self-regulation regimes. Kolk and van Tulder (2005) compare the codes drawn 
up by a range of international organisations, NGOs, companies and business associations. 
The authors argue that the codes developed by NGOs are sophisticated in terms of 
specificity and compliance mechanisms, but also have low compliance likelihood. They cite 
a report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2003) which suggests that apparel 
and retail companies are not so advanced in the implementation of codes of conduct – a fact 
that puts into question their usefulness and impact. Doh and Guay (2004) examine the role 
of NGOs in the development and enforcement of twelve international agreements and 
conclude that „the role of NGOs on codes of conduct is mixed in terms of influence and 
outcome‟ with third sector organisations having greatest influence in codes sponsored by 
them and weakest in codes sponsored by intergovernmental organisations. Simons (2004) 
reviews the language, human rights content and compliance mechanisms of the voluntary 
codes of conduct or policies developed by a number of companies, intergovernmental 
initiatives, industry groups and multi-stakeholder initiatives.  The author concludes that 
existing self-regulation regimes are „at best minimalist and at worst ineffective‟ (p.130). 
Moreover, some doubt the ability of NGOs to be comprehensive code monitors (Mayne, 
1999) and many think that codes of conduct on their own, without traditional political 
processes, are unlikely to lead to improvement in corporate behaviour (Haufler, 2001; 
Locke, 2013). 
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In recent years, NGOs have favoured a move away from traditional confrontational tactics 
and towards cooperation with business – a trend marked by a significant increase in 
collaborative partnerships between NGOs and corporations (Murphy and Bendell, 1997; 
Lober, 1997). However, such partnerships are not without their limitations. They are often 
thought of being fraught with complexities and paradoxes that make them unstable and 
strategically risky (Hartman and Stafford, 1996). Moreover, close corporate ties may 
undermine public trust and put the credibility and legitimacy of NGOs under question 
(Dowie, 1995; Burgos, 2013). Arts (2002) argues that green alliances (between 
environmental NGOs and corporations) are weak as they are not embedded in the core 
operations of companies and in the creation of formal public policy regulation on the 
environment. 
New Politics of Engagement: The Financial Market As A Campaign Tool 
As the previous section has revealed, the literature on NGO campaigning tactics portrays a 
rather sceptical picture of the propensity of such strategies to have a significant influence 
over corporations. However, shareholder activism may be a new tactic that can provide 
NGOs with the leverage they need. The origins of NGO shareholder activism can be traced 
back to the 1970s when, in a high-profile media campaign, NGOs and their supporters used 
Annual General Meetings as a mechanism to publicly embarrass those corporations 
operating in apartheid South Africa
1
. Although the academic research devoted to the topic 
has been scarce, the phenomenon has been on the rise over the past three decades, 
especially in the US and the UK (see Section 1.3.). Third sector organisations are now 
increasingly aware of their ability to use the financial market and their shareholder status to 
call for change in corporate actions (Sjostrom, 2007).  
In recent years, shareholder activism has been adopted by NGOs such as Friends of the 
Earth (FoE, hereafter), Amnesty International, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF, hereafter), 
Greenpeace, to name but a few. In the UK context, prominent cases of NGO activism have 
included: the resolution submitted to Balfour Beatty (a UK construction company) in 2001 
by FoE, the Kurdish Human Rights Project and The Corner House; Oxfam‟s 2006 „Patents 
vs Patients‟ campaign aimed at securing the availability of affordable generic medicines in 
                                                 
1
 For example, in 1977 the End Loans to South Africa Campaign filed a resolution at the AGM of Midland 
Bank. 
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developing countries; ShareAction‟s 2012 JustPay! campaign and others. The following 
section describes in more detail the nature and characteristics of shareholder activism. 
1.2. Shareholder Activism – Setting The Scene 
The recent financial crisis has given a new impetus towards rethinking the fundamental 
principles of corporate governance. It has brought to the forefront the failure of institutional 
shareholders to monitor the behavior of executive managers and boards in the banking 
sector and has served as an example of the existence of what Berle and Means (1932) call 
separation of ownership and control. The economic crisis has emphasised the need for more 
active engagement by shareholders in the management of their companies, highlighting the 
role of the financial market and shareholder activism for changing corporate actions.  
Companies depend on shareholders who provide their primary source of income by keeping 
their share prices up through buying stock. As owners and primary stakeholders, investors 
have the right to engage with companies in order to express dissatisfaction with 
management decisions and to hold organisations accountable for their actions. Therefore, 
the potential of shareholder activism for bringing about corporate change is vast. The term 
can be operationalised as the use of ownership rights to actively influence corporate policy 
and behaviour (O‟Rourke, 2003). The range of avenues through which shareholders can 
influence the activities of a company varies significantly. It encompasses techniques such 
as the selling of shares (or the so called „Wall Street walk‟), informal dialogue with 
management, letter writing and posing a question at an annual general meeting (AGM, 
hereafter), media campaigns, filing of resolutions (or shareholder proposals), and lawsuits.  
Shareholder activism can cover a broad spectrum of activities. According to leading global 
law firm Mayer Brown (2010), one strategy increasingly employed by UK campaigning 
groups is the purchase of shares in a company with the aim of gaining the direct right to 
participate in AGMs and resolutions – what is labelled by Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003) 
as a direct micro approach. Contrary to Waygood and Wehrmeyer‟s (2003) argument, vast 
financial reserves are not a necessary prerequisite for wielding significant direct ownership 
influence. ShareAction‟s JustPay! campaign, where the purchase of a single share in a 
number of different companies gave the NGO access to these companies‟ AGMs, is a case 
in point (see Ivanova, 2012). In a broader sense, shareholder activism by NGOs also 
involves what Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003) call an indirect micro approach, namely, 
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lobbying existing investors to exert their power as owners of the corporation to bring about 
change in policy or behaviour. 
Marinetto (1998a) makes a useful comparison by suggesting that there are two types of 
shareholder activism: that which has instrumental objectives and that driven by socio-
ethical considerations. In the former case, investors express discontent about corporate 
governance practices and feel that management is not acting in their best financial interests 
– common concerns include lowered stock market price and return on dividends, excessive 
chief executive pay, inadequate strategic direction of the company and others. In the latter 
case, investors‟ demands are related to some aspect of the ethical, environmental or social 
practices of the corporation. In reality, the underlying genuine motives of activist 
shareholders (both investors and NGOs) can often remain hidden – they may engage in 
activism on social, ethical and environmental (SEE, hereafter) issues with a view of 
accruing reputational and financial benefits, or they may use instrumental arguments to 
advance social motives. As such, the boundaries between instrumental and socio-ethical 
shareholder action can often become blurred.  
The present study aims to explore socio-ethical activism sparked by the underlying SEE 
motivations of campaign groups
2
. The research is based on the stakeholder view of the 
corporation and rests on the premise that companies should take into consideration the 
interests of different stakeholders. Such a position is justifiable on both instrumental and 
ethical grounds. From an instrumental perspective, the recent financial crisis has revealed 
that serving the interests of different stakeholders could represent a more sustainable model 
of corporate governance. From an ethical point of view, the stakeholder approach and 
shareholder activism advance democratic participation in corporate affairs, addressing the 
problem of representational injustice (see Fraser, 2005; Fleming and Spicer, 2007).  
However, the view of the corporation as balancing the interests of a constellation of 
different stakeholders is far from universally accepted. The financial activism research 
stream, for example, whose theoretical foundation draws from agency theory, embraces 
shareholder primacy and advocates for the maximisation of shareholder value as the only 
                                                 
2
 Marinetto (1998a) distinguishes between two types of shareholder activism – „instrumental‟ and „socio-
ethical‟. Investors and NGOs engaging in socio-ethical activism can be motivated by three types of concerns – 
environmental, social, or ethical (SEE). Therefore, the term „socio-ethical shareholder activism‟ is a broader 
term used to encompass engagements on SEE issues and to differentiate these from the other type of 
shareholder activism – „instrumental‟ activism. 
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legitimate consideration of a corporation (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Thomas and Cotter, 
2007). Sundaraman and Inkpen (2004) argue that taking into account the interests of 
multiple stakeholders creates the potential for confusion in managerial decision making and 
distorts entrepreneurial risk taking incentives. These criticisms go back to the classical neo 
liberal position about the main duty of firms as stated by Milton Friedman (1970) – namely 
– that firms are to pursue economic as opposed to social objectives. The following section 
explores socio-ethical shareholder activism in more detail by tracing its development 
throughout time, starting with the very first court decision that paved the way for 
engagement on SEE issues. 
1.3. A Short History of Socio-Ethical Shareholder Activism – 
Emergence, Current Trends, Campaign Examples and Reasons 
Behind the Upsurge 
Although shareholder activism has always formed an integral part of U.S. corporate 
governance, a new set of laws and regulations
3
 introduced by the Congress in the early 
twentieth century limited the ability of active investors to participate in corporate 
governance (Gillan and Starks, 2007). However, in 1942 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC, hereafter) adopted a rule that paved the way for the current rule 14a-8 
and first allowed shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion on corporate ballots. The 
first three decades following the enactment of the rule saw shareholders submitting 
proposals mainly aimed at improving corporate governance and performance (Gillan and 
Starks, 2007). It was not until the 1970s when, as a result of a federal court decision, a 
shareholder proposal aimed at stopping the sale of napalm by Dow Chemical was filed, that 
other proposals on social responsibility issues began to appear (Gillan and Starks, 2007). 
This marked the emergence of socio-ethical activism – a trend followed a decade later 
(during the 80s) in the UK. The existence of the phenomenon can partly be attributed to the 
serious environmental disasters in the 80s (ex. the Exxon Valdez oil spill) which alerted 
banks and insurance companies to the liabilities they could be incurring by financing 
environmentally hazardous businesses (Marinetto, 1998b). 
Since then socio-ethical shareholder activism has started to gradually gain prominence 
throughout the 1990s in the US, the UK and other parts of Europe. However, it is only in 
                                                 
3
 Refers to the Glass Steagall Act, as well as regulatory reforms that followed the 1929 stock market crash. 
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recent years that there has been an upsurge in the number of investors taking an active role 
in the management of their companies. Voorhes (2005) reports that, according to data from 
the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC, hereafter), throughout the period 1973-
2004, more than 15,000 proposals on a range of SEE and governance topics were filed at 
U.S. corporations – one-quarter of which were filed in just four years, or 2001 through 
2004. The number of submitted shareholder proposals on environmental and social topics 
has been at an all-time high, with 417 SEE resolutions being filed during the most recent 
2014 proxy season in the US – a figure which can be compared to the 216 resolutions filed 
in 2012 (Welsh and Passoff, 2014; Mathiasen and Mell, 2012). A report published by FSG 
in 2013 explains that: „shareholder activism has morphed from an occasional threat facing 
corporate management and boards to a sweeping trend that has spread to companies in all 
sectors and of all sizes, and increasingly, across all geographic regions‟ (Khorana et al., 
2013, p.1). Such an increase in the level of shareholder activity can be explained by the 
realisation that corporate social responsibility (CSR, hereafter) issues can have an 
enormous impact on shareholder value (Voorhes, 2005) and by the fact that the 
encouragement of activism has been on the legislative agenda in both the UK and the US 
(for example, the Stewardship Code, the changes to the 1995 Pension Act in the UK) 
because of the increased sensitivity of authorities to the risk implications of environmental 
issues (Owen et al., 2006; Tonello, 2010).  
In the UK context, recent high-profile examples of socio-ethical shareholder activism 
include Shell and BP (by a coalition of NGOs, trade unions and investors lobbying for a 
risk assessment of tar sands projects in Alberta, Canada), Vedanta Resources (by Aviva 
Investors lobbying for an improvement in the human rights, environmental and health and 
safety track record of the company), Tesco (lobbying for better working conditions of 
Tesco‟s clothes manufacturers in Asia) and others. Having outlined how socio-ethical 
activism first developed, as well as how and why it became increasingly prominent in 
recent years, the following section traces the changes in the identities of shareholder 
activists over time.  
1.4. The Identities of Shareholder Activists  
A shareholder can be anybody who owns a percentage of, or a share in, a certain company. 
Shareholders are classified in two groups – individual investors or institutional investors. 
Individual investors finance the acquisition of shares with their own personal savings – 
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examples include members of NGOs who buy shares to attend an AGM, or pension and 
individual savers who, through their own savings, have a stake in the capital markets. 
Institutional investors, or financial institutions, are organisations such as banks, pension 
funds, insurance companies, investment companies, or other bodies that trade in large share 
quantities and invest money on behalf of shareholders who are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the ownership
4
.  
The identities of shareholder activists have undergone a continuous change throughout the 
years. From 1942 through the end of the 1970s, the activist landscape in the U.S. was 
dominated by individual investors. By contrast, the 1980s saw a rise in the involvement of 
institutional investors, at first predominantly public pension funds (Gillan and Starks, 
2007). The historical development of the ownership structure of the UK stock market 
follows similar trends. Figure 1 (below) reveals that, while fifty years ago individuals were 
the predominant shareholders of UK equities, from the 1960s onwards institutions 
substantially increased their equity exposure. Moreover, in the wake of an ever more 
globalised world, UK equities held by foreign institutions have seen a sharp increase post-
1994.  
Figure 1: Historical Trends in Beneficial Ownership
5
 in the UK (Percentage of UK 
Stock Market Owned by Value) 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2012). 
                                                 
4
 For the purposes of this study, the terms „institutional investor‟, „shareholder‟, „investor‟, „shareowner‟, 
„asset owner‟ and „financial institution‟ are used interchangeably to denote the same meaning.  
5
 Here „beneficial owner‟ is defined as the person or body who receives the benefits of holding the shares, for 
example income through dividends. 
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It should be taken into account that the heading „Institutions‟ in Figure 1 incorporates data 
for pension funds, insurance companies and other financial companies such as hedge funds 
and banking groups and, although providing data for the largest institutional investors, it is 
not representative of all groups that can be labelled as an institutional investor. At a more 
granular level, Table 2 below explores the historical stock market ownership patterns of 
some of the biggest investors such as pension funds and insurance companies.    
Table 2: Historical Trends in Ownership (UK): Insurance Companies, Pension Funds, 
and Financial Institutions (Percentage of Stock Market Owned by Value) 
 
 
1963 
 
1975 
 
1981 
 
1991 
 
2001 
 
2008 
 
2010 
 
2012 
Insurance 
Companies 
 
10 
 
15.9 
 
20.5 
 
20.8 
 
20 
 
13.4 
 
8.8 
 
6.2 
Pension 
Funds 
 
6.4 
 
16.8 
 
26.7 
 
31.3 
 
16.1 
 
12.8 
 
5.6 
 
4.7 
Other 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
11.3 
 
10.5 
 
6.8 
 
0.8 
 
7.2 
 
10 
 
12.3 
 
6.6 
Source: ONS (2012) 
By the 1990s pension funds and insurance companies were the most prominent holders of 
equity, accounting for more than half of the total (see Table 2). Although their ownership 
stake in the market has decreased
6
, they still hold a significant proportion of shares, 
compared to individuals. Furthermore, since the late 1990s, hedge funds (which form part 
of „other financial institutions‟) have become prominent actors in the shareholder activist 
arena (Greenwood and Schor, 2009). However, they focus on corporate governance rather 
than on ethical issues and pursue activism as a profit making strategy (Kahan and Rock, 
2006). Hedge funds engage with company directors with the objective of unlocking 
shareholder value and advocate for management replacements, executive compensation 
cuts, disbursements of cash reserves to shareholders via dividends, mergers, acquisitions, 
and others. 
                                                 
6
 This can be attributed to regulation and the maturity of pension funds, as well as to the outsourcing of 
investment by insurers and pension funds to asset managers. 
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1.5. From Gaps in the Literature to Problematisation – the 
Contribution of the Study  
Despite the recent ascendancy of social, environmental and ethical activism, the number of 
studies examining the phenomenon, both empirically and theoretically, remains limited. 
Academic interest has tended to focus on activism driven by instrumental concerns. As Lee 
and Lounsbury (2011) argue, the study of instrumental shareholder activism (activism on 
corporate governance issues) has garnered much more attention. Undoubtedly, the upsurge 
in the occurrence of activism has generated growing academic awareness and analysis of 
the phenomenon – according to Sjostrom (2008), a search in the SSRN database on 
„shareholder activism‟ rendered 123 hits in November 2007, compared to 331 hits in 
October 2012. However, as an indication of the proliferation of research in the area of 
instrumental activism, the papers on SEE issues represented roughly a little less than one 
eighth of all the studies. The fact that the research field of socio-ethical shareholder 
activism is relatively young and vibrant (Goranova and Ryan, 2014), coupled with the 
growing incidence of the phenomenon in the UK and across the world, as well as its 
potential benefits for society as a whole, renders future investigation into the topic 
necessary. 
Furthermore, researchers have traditionally directed their efforts towards: examining the 
effects that socio-ethical activism has on corporate social performance (CSP, hereafter) 
(David et al., 2007; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006); researching one specific shareholder 
activist tool, namely, the filing of proposals (Vogel, 1983; Graves et al., 2001; Tkac, 2006; 
Monks et al., 2004, among others); testing the causal link between different variables such 
as activism and financial returns, activism and shareholder value (Black, 1998; Gillan and 
Starks, 1998; Karpoff, 2001; Becht et al., 2010). 
Despite the growing influence of NGOs as corporate watchdogs since the 1980s (The 
Economist, 2000) and despite their emerging role as shareholders (Mayer Brown, 2010; 
Sjostrom, 2008), there is little research examining how they engage in shareholder 
activism. As Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003, p.373) contend: „There is a dearth of 
academic literature looking into the area of NGO capital market interventions‟. This 
statement is even more true for the UK context as most of the academic literature, including 
the literature on NGO shareholder activism, has originated from the U.S. and covers 
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activism there (see Clark et al., 2008; Hoffman, 1996; Proffitt and Spicer, 2006 and others). 
The adoption of a UK perspective would be beneficial given that shareholder action is very 
much embedded in country-specific macro structures (such as legislative framework, 
political clout and economic landscape) which put into question the possibility for 
generalisation beyond the U.S. context. Furthermore, Black and Coffee (1994) compare the 
UK and the US and argue that the former is an ideal institutional setting for investor 
activism, because it provides more legal tools to shareholders than the US
7
. The regulatory 
environment in the UK is also conducive to shareholder engagement (see p.27), which is 
reflected in the number of shareholder activist campaigns occurring in the UK when 
compared to other countries: 
Figure 2: Breakdown of Campaigns Outside North America Since 2006 
 
Source: Khorana et al., 2013. 
Apart from finding the gaps in the literature, the current study is also interested in what 
Alvesson and Sandberg‟s (2011) call developing a „problematisation‟ argument. The 
                                                 
7
 A fundamental difference between the US and UK law is the ability of UK shareholders to change the 
company charter by shareholder vote without securing the agreement of the board and to remove directors – 
to be elected a director must receive a majority of the „yes‟ votes cast (excluding abstentions). In addition, 
shareholders in the UK have the power to call extraordinary general meetings if they hold at least 10 per cent 
of the voting share capital (Becht et al., 2010). 
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authors review 52 articles from four management journals and conclude that the most 
common way of formulating research questions is to spot „gaps‟ in the literature. However, 
they suggest that gap spotting is unlikely to lead to the development of interesting and 
influential theories. Therefore, Alvesson and Sandberg (2011, p.256) propose a 
problematisation technique as an alternative, whose main purpose is to challenge the 
established assumptions in a particular field with a view of creating intriguing insights: 
„Problematisation research typically involves a more narrow literature coverage and in-
depth readings of key texts, with the specific aim of identifying and challenging the 
assumptions underlying the specific literature domain targeted‟ (p.256). 
As the paragraphs above have revealed, the positive effects of private politics (direct 
engagement between NGOs and companies) on corporate behaviour are debated, with 
authors expressing criticism with respect to prominent NGO tactics such as boycotts, codes 
of conduct and business-NGO partnerships. In sum, there has been a large volume of 
studies discussing the limitations of NGOs in exercising power over corporations. 
Shareholder activism as a tactic can have the potential of being an influential and forceful 
way of initiating change at company level. In view of the critical accounts in the literature, 
what this study aims to achieve is to look at how and to what effect can the third sector use 
shareholder activism as an avenue for change. 
1.6. Purpose of the Study 
One of the aims of the present research is to update the chronology of NGO capital markets 
(CM, hereafter) intervention in the UK developed by Waygood (2006) and encompassing 
the period between 1990 and 2002. Focusing on shareholder activism, rather than CM 
intervention more broadly speaking, the study refines Waygood‟s (2006) model of NGO 
CM intervention (also discussed in Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003) and explained in 
Section 2.6. and Section 4.1.). The model is used to create a chronology of shareholder 
activist campaigns undertaken by UK based NGOs between 2003 and 2013. The 
chronology is then analysed with the aim of discerning certain patterns in the evolution of 
NGO strategy and comparing them with Waygood‟s (2006) findings encompassing the 
period 1990-2002 (see Chapter 4 for the findings from this analysis). The chronology 
constitutes the first ever record to trace and systematically display NGO interventions in the 
sphere of shareholder activism since 1990. Such historical analysis exploring changes over 
time contextualises the three campaign case studies and adds depth to the research (see 
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Layder, 1993).  It also adds a longitudinal dimension which in turn facilitates a more 
holistic understanding of shareholder activism.  
Second, given the inefficacy of other NGO tactics described in the literature, and the under-
researched field of NGO shareholder activist intervention on SEE issues, especially in the 
UK context, this thesis aims to contribute to knowledge by focusing on three case studies of 
local, national and international NGOs operating in the UK. The main objective of the case 
study analysis is threefold – to adequately portray the array of divergent NGO shareholder 
activist strategies, to discuss the effectiveness of the interventions and to analyse the 
challenges faced by campaigning groups. There has been a considerable volume of research 
devoted to examining the effectiveness of activism for enhancing financial performance. 
However, with the exception of a small number of mainly UK-based MSc theses (De 
Kleijn, 2007; McLaren, 2002), no consideration has been given to the mechanisms of 
engagement and no systematic analysis has been carried out with the intention of 
ascertaining the circumstances determining the effectiveness of an NGO shareholder 
activist campaign. Furthermore, an analysis of the extent to which NGOs try to shape the 
broader macro environment, the rules of the capital market and the attitudes of investors 
with the aim of facilitating shareholder activism would serve to illuminate the role that 
NGOs play for the advancement of shareholder democracy.  
In addition to providing theoretical insights on the subject of shareholder activism, the 
findings of this study will serve to inform practitioners and institutional investors of the 
modern day challenges to activism and how these can be circumvented. Having 
extrapolated the main gaps in the literature and outlined the objectives of the study, the 
following section aims to operationalise the term NGO as used in this thesis. 
1.7. NGOs – A Definition 
When conducting a critical examination of NGOs‟ shareholder activist tactics, it is essential 
to understand what is meant by the term „NGO‟ since there is considerable contradiction 
and confusion in the various definitions advanced. By definition, a non-governmental 
organisation is, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, „an organisation not belonging 
to, or associated with a government‟. However, this rather broad interpretation can 
encompass a number of different institutions aspiring to achieve a broad range of aims. In 
order to provide clarity to the question of NGO definition and to illustrate the breadth and 
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diversity of NGOs, McIntosh and Thomas (2002, p. 31) group them by scope, type, 
structure, focus and activities, and offer the following diagram: 
Fig. 3: Diversity in NGO Characteristics: Scope, Type, Structure, Focus and Activities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 above demonstrates how diverse NGOs can be in their scope, type, structure, focus 
and activities. While the above classification is consistent with the NGOs covered in this 
thesis, the specific purpose of the NGOs under investigation is captured in a definition 
advanced by Teegen et al. (2004, p.466): „NGOs are private, not-for-profit organisations 
that aim to serve particular societal interests by focusing advocacy and/or operational 
efforts on social, political and economic goals, including equity, education, health, 
environmental protection and human rights‟. The NGOs of interest for the purposes of this 
study are those who use the financial market in some of their campaigns for non-
commercial gain in order to pursue their aims either directly through buying shares or 
indirectly by persuading other stakeholder (such as investors and pension savers) to act, as 
well as by lobbying for changes to public policy. 
 
NGOs 
Type 
Community group 
Campaign group 
Research organisation 
Business association 
Religious group 
Trade union 
Technical body 
Structure 
Informal 
Formal 
Co-operative 
Professional 
Entrepreneurial 
Network 
 
Focus 
Natural environment 
Social issues 
Development 
Poverty alleviation 
Human rights 
Animal welfare 
Activities 
Academic research 
Market research 
Policy research 
Information provision 
Campaigning 
Protests and demos 
Boycott co-ordination 
Scope 
Individual 
Grass-roots 
Local 
Regional 
National 
Transnational 
Global 
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NGOs differ from social movement organisations in a number of ways. When compared to 
a social movement, in a hierarchical and more formal organisation such as an NGO, 
authority resides in individuals as opposed to in the collective; charters and rules are more 
binding than substantive ethics of the organisation; cooperation is replaced by delegation 
and control; personal trust cedes way to instrumental relations; the organisation is 
characterised by a strong division of labour as opposed to minimal division of labour; 
recruitment based on competence, rather than shared values, is the norm (Rothschild and 
Whitt, 1986).  
McCarthy and Zald (1987) discuss the professionalisation of social movements and suggest 
that they have increasingly started to adopt NGO characteristics, turning as a result into 
more professionalised and effectiveness-oriented groups. It could be argued that the reverse 
process of NGOs adopting some of the characteristics of social movements is also 
underway. NGOs have become much more proactive in organising protest, as well as 
organising third parties to put pressure on governments and companies. Historically they 
have had a campaigning role, but are increasingly becoming interested in extra-institutional 
methods of action usually employed by social movements.  
1.8. What Does Success Mean in the Context of NGOs and Shareholder 
Activism? 
Every discussion of a particular campaign‟s success, impact or effectiveness8 should be 
accompanied by a definition of what exactly is meant by success. The study adopts the 
view that there are three different forms of success – a goal defined, a delayed gratification 
and a symbolic form. The goal defined form occurs when the predefined goals of 
campaigners are achieved in their entirety and the company cedes to their demands. When 
addressing the question of the effectiveness of shareholder activism, the majority of 
academic work to date has searched for signs of this goal defined type of success, following 
stringent quantitative procedures with the aim of analysing the relationship between 
shareholder activism and corporate social and financial performance in a specifically 
defined point in time (for example, a period encompassing 1, 2, 5, 10 or more years). 
However, this paper expands the narrow definition of success and defines it in terms of 
delayed gratification and symbolic outcomes.  The delayed gratification view of success 
                                                 
8
 These three words are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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emphasises that shareholder activist strategies may take a long time to be realised 
(sometimes years) and building relationships with investors and companies is a long-term 
process. Therefore, the outcomes of a particular campaign may span beyond the period 
studied by researchers and, as such, the lack of achievements at a particular point in time 
should not be regarded as a failure (see Chapter 11, Section 11.3. for a further discussion). 
The symbolic view of success suggests that in certain circumstances, success is perhaps less 
about achieving a particular goal and more about running a campaign and raising 
awareness. According to this view, even small and incremental changes are welcomed as 
they still make a difference to, for example, the communities affected by a company‟s 
operations. 
1.9. Organisation and Contents of the Study 
This study is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the thesis. It positions shareholder activism 
with respect to other campaigning strategies adopted by NGOs, operationalises the 
terms used in the study, briefly discusses the history of socio-ethical shareholder 
activism, explains where the contribution of the thesis lies, and examines the 
purpose of the study. 
 Chapter 2 critically evaluates and groups the previous literature in four themes 
relating to shareholder proposals, the effectiveness of shareholder engagement, the 
role of institutional investors and papers on the use of shareholder activist tactics by 
NGOs. The chapter also examines the missing perspectives in the literature.  
 Chapter 3 outlines the main research questions, the scope of the study and its 
philosophical orientation, as well as the research methods, data collection and 
analysis techniques used. The chapter also provides a justification for the selection 
of the three case studies and the methodology. 
 Chapter 4 marks the beginning of the empirical findings. It creates a collection of all 
UK-based NGO shareholder activist campaigns (or, in other words, a chronology) 
between 1990 and 2013. The chronology details the different strategies employed in 
each campaign. These are analysed to reveal patterns over time and to make 
conclusions about how has NGO activity in the area of shareholder activism 
evolved since its origins during the 1990s.  
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 Chapter 5 begins by detailing the historical context in which the three case studies 
developed. It then draws on social movement literature and analysis of documents to 
explore the various injustice frames advanced by the campaigning NGOs with a 
view of gathering support for their cause. 
 Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 both discuss the indirect strategies (those that enlist the 
support of third parties) used by NGOs in their campaigns. Chapter 6 considers 
those strategies that seek to leverage the shareholder power of financial institutions, 
while Chapter 7 analyses tactics which mobilise the support of non-institutional 
actors (pension savers, individuals, the media). 
 Chapters 8 and Chapter 9 consider two shareholder activist direct strategies – 
namely – attendance at an AGM (Chapter 8) and filing of a shareholder resolution 
(Chapter 9). 
 Chapter 10 evaluates the impact the three campaigns have had on the investor 
community. It also makes use of Zadek‟s (2004) five stages of organisational 
learning framework in order to determine the impact of the campaigns at company 
level. 
 Chapter 11 compares and contrasts the three case studies. It also discusses four main 
external challenges faced by NGOs using shareholder activist tactics and provides 
an alternative interpretation to what is meant by a successful campaign in the 
literature.  
 Chapter 12 summarises six main organisational and strategic internal challenges 
faced by NGOs. It advances an explanatory theoretical framework which aims to 
highlight those causal mechanisms that maximise the overall impact of shareholder 
activist campaigns. 
 Chapter 13 provides a conclusion, summarising the findings and discussing the 
contribution of the study, its implications and future avenues for research. 
Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has briefly explored a variety of traditional NGO strategies for 
influencing firms and their effectiveness. Given the scepticism emanating from the 
literature in relation to NGOs‟ ability to trigger lasting changes in corporate behaviour, the 
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rapidly growing in prominence and use tactic of shareholder activism is proposed as a 
strategy that could potentially yield better results. The chapter has defined the concept of 
shareholder activism, arguing that it transfers influence through ownership rights into the 
hands of the real owners of corporations, namely shareholders, who can, through 
shareholder activism, hold companies accountable for their actions and incite change in 
their behaviour and policies. The different tactics for expressing dissatisfaction with the 
state of company‟s affairs have been briefly outlined and an important distinction between 
instrumental (focused on corporate governance issues) and socio-ethical shareholder 
activism (focused on social, ethical or environmental issues) has been made. It was 
established that the focus of the present study will be on the latter form of activism. 
Furthermore, the history of the phenomenon was discussed in brief, discussing its rise in the 
U.S. with the adoption in 1942 of the rule (see Section 1.3., p.10) that first allowed 
shareholders to submit proposals on corporate ballots. The emergence of socio-ethical 
activism can be traced back to the first submitted proposals on social and environmental 
issues during the 1970s in the U.S. and a decade later in the UK and can be attributed to a 
series of environmental disasters and corporate scandals. The chapter also highlighted a 
trend of rising shareholder action in recent years, reflected in the increased number of 
investors taking an active ownership role, the proliferation of SEE proposals filed at 
companies in the U.S. and the recent high-profile examples of socio-ethical activism in the 
UK. A discussion of the identities of shareholder activists throughout the years has revealed 
a shift from individual investors (active in the field between the 1940s and 1970s) to 
institutional investors such as pension funds (played a prominent role in the 1980s) and to, 
more recently, hedge funds and foreign institutions.  
The emergence of a new prominent actor in the shareholder activist arena, namely the 
NGO, who has increasingly used the financial market to advance its value driven goals has 
been emphasised. It has been established that companies have significant economic and 
political influence, as well as the ability to impact on the environment and on society as a 
whole – these factors render businesses relevant to NGOs. In addition, the growing trends 
towards financialisation and privatisation, which are a feature of modern life in the current 
neoliberal era, make firms more vulnerable to shareholder influence and therefore activism. 
Following Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003), it has been demonstrated that NGOs can have 
influence over companies using the power of share activism via two mechanisms: 
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1. A direct micro approach – the NGO uses its own influence to change corporate 
policy through buying shares and becoming a shareholder. This action entitles it to 
certain shareholder rights such as attendance at the AGM of a company and filing of 
a resolution. 
2. An indirect micro approach – the NGOs seeks to use the power and influence of 
large institutional investors and other shareholders in order to change corporate 
policy indirectly via their shareholdings. 
This chapter thus outlined the missing perspectives in the literature and identified the main 
objectives of the thesis. It has been suggested that while finding gaps in the literature is a 
legitimate and worthwhile activity (see Eco, 2015), it is not enough in itself and, as a result, 
the problematisation approach described by Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) has been 
adopted. The under-researched nature of socio-ethical activism in general and NGOs‟ 
interventions in the area in particular, the proliferation of shareholder activist campaigns in 
the UK (highest number of campaigns outside North America), coupled with a conducive 
regulatory and corporate governance environment, make the analysis of UK based NGO 
socio-ethical activism a worthwhile endeavour. The main research questions of the study 
are as follows: 
1. What shareholder activist strategies do NGOs use to advance their goals? 
2. What impact do NGOs achieve among the investor community and the targeted 
companies? 
3. What are the main challenges faced by NGOs? 
The findings are said to have implications for both NGOs considering to initiate 
shareholder campaigns in the future and for practitioners and investors, as the conclusions 
highlight some of the main challenges to activism and propose solutions for tackling them. 
Finally, this chapter defined the meaning of the term NGO as used in the thesis and briefly 
outlined the structure of the study. 
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2. Surveying the Literature 
Given the weight of their votes, the way in which institutional 
shareholders use their power to influence the standards of 
corporate governance is of fundamental importance. Their 
readiness to do this turns on the degree to which they see it as their 
responsibility as owners, and in the interest of those whose money 
they are investing, to bring about changes in companies when 
necessary, rather than selling their shares.  
(The Cadbury Report, 1992, p. 50) 
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesise, critically analyse and discuss the academic 
literature on socio-ethical shareholder activism. The literature evaluation adopts both a 
thematic and a chronological approach – different papers are grouped in key themes and 
presented in a chronological order within each theme, starting with the earliest studies and 
progressing towards the most recent ones. In order to identify relevant academic articles, 
the research has relied on a number of databases: SSRN, Wiley Interscience, JSTOR, 
Science Direct, Emerald Insight and Google Scholar. Searches in these databases were 
based on the following key terms: shareholder activism, shareholder engagement, investor 
activism, investor engagement, active ownership, and shareholder pressure. A detailed 
content analysis was conducted with the aim of discerning those papers that covered 
activism on social, ethical and environmental (SEE) issues – articles on traditional, 
instrumental activism were excluded from the review since the thesis has a specific focus 
on environmental, social and ethical dimensions. Furthermore, the reference lists of the 
articles were examined in order to identify additional papers that might be of relevance. The 
chapter presents a comprehensive review of the key pieces of literature which, though by no 
means exhaustive, focuses on those articles that are most prominent and most relevant to 
the scope of the study. 
The review begins with a historical overview of the main trends within the literature and 
also explores the developments that have led to the increased academic interest in socio-
ethical shareholder activism over the past decade. What follows is a brief outline of the 
broader literature on ethical or socially responsible investment to position shareholder 
activism with respect to it. The comprehensive literature search conducted in the area of 
socio-ethical activism revealed that academic interest can be grouped in four main themes 
and this chapter provides a detailed discussion of each. The first incorporates a number of 
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studies which examine the topics and voting results of SEE shareholder proposals filed by 
investors at AGMs in the US. These studies also try to identify which companies are among 
the most targeted by activists. Second, a number of papers evaluate the effectiveness of 
shareholder activism for influencing corporate policy and behaviour, as well as its impact 
on financial returns. A third tranche of academic articles explore institutional investors‟ 
propensity to engage in activism more broadly and focus on the role of one very powerful 
and prominent type of investor as a shareholder activist – namely – the pension fund. 
Fourth, there are a few important studies which outline the role of NGOs in mobilising and 
organising shareholder activism. Finally, the chapter discusses the missing perspectives in 
the literature and the methodological approaches which would contribute most to the 
currently accumulated body of knowledge in the area. These insights help to determine and 
clearly articulate the contribution of the current research project. 
2.1.  Historical Overview of the Literature 
Prior to embarking upon the detailed discussion of the literature, the following figure 
provides: 1.) a visual representation of the key themes and the extent to which they have 
been researched and 2.) a historical overview of how the academic interest in the field has 
developed over the years (the number of articles per theme per year is shown). 
Figure 4: Number of Articles per Decade and Theme 
 
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of the literature review search. 
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The emergence of socio-ethical activism was marked by a legal ruling in a lawsuit in the 
US regarding a social issue proposal in 1970
9
. A shareholder resolution or proposal is a 
written demand by shareholders which is voted upon in the annual general meeting and 
requires from the company, or its board of directors, to take action with regard to a certain 
issue. Low academic interest in the first two decades can be explained by the fact that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission sought to limit meaningful shareholder access to this 
mechanism by adding layers of conditions to rule 14a-8 during the 1980s when neo-liberal 
governments in the West came to prominence. In 1984, the SEC granted no action letters to 
78 per cent of those corporations that requested them – this meant that company executives 
were allowed to exclude socio-ethical proposals from their AGMs. The SEC was granting 
no-action letters when it came to all proposals but those related to selection, compensation 
and accountability of managers. This trend towards restricting the rights of shareholders 
continued into the next decade (see Telman, 2011). 
The sharp increase in the number of papers published between 2001 and 2010 can be 
attributed to a number of factors. To begin with, towards the end of the 20
th
 century, active 
ownership by institutional investors began to rise as a result of, perhaps most importantly, a 
number of corporate scandals involving reputable companies such as Enron, WorldCom 
and Parmalat and, more recently, the global financial crisis. These factors have led to a 
greater recognition of shareholders‟ responsibilities as owners and have resulted in 
examples of attempts on their part to enhance corporate performance through corporate 
governance and monitoring activities. Coupled with that, shareholders now have larger 
stakes in companies than ever before and this makes exit (divestment) less attractive than 
voice (active ownership). Divestment, or the traditional „Wall Street Walk‟, became less 
attractive for large shareholders since it cannot be done without depressing the share price 
and incurring losses (David and Thompson, 1994; Gillan and Starks, 2000). Furthermore, 
because the market for corporate control was in decline in the early 1990s, shareholders 
                                                 
9
 The ruling mentioned in section 1.3. The Medical Committee for Human Rights proposed a shareholder 
resolution expressing opposition to the selling of napalm by Dow Chemical – a substance which, when 
combined with gasoline, can be used for chemical warfare. The company excluded the resolution from its 
proxy statement on the basis that its concerns were political rather than economic and that it related to 
ordinary business operations. The Medical Committee appealed in the Court of Appeals,  which 
acknowledged that these two arguments can be applied to exclude almost any shareholder proposal on the 
grounds that it is either too general or to specific. The court stressed that Dow‟s exclusion of the proposal 
contradicted the purpose of rule 14(a)-8 which was „to assure to corporate shareholders their right – some 
would say their duty – to control the important decisions which affect them in their capacity as stockholders 
and owners of the corporation‟ and ruled that management should not be permitted to „place obstacles in the 
path of shareholders‟ (Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 1970). 
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could no longer rely on a takeover, thus activism became the only way of addressing 
inefficiencies in corporate performance (Admati et al., 1994). The SEC‟s decision to 
change the rules in 1992 also facilitated shareholders‟ ability to collaborate and work 
together on voting, allowing them to share resources and seek support for their actions from 
others
10
.  
When it comes to the UK context, in recent years, the UK government has been very 
supportive of the use of investor influence, both for the more traditional instrumental 
shareholder activism and for socio-ethical engagement. For example, section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006, which sets out directors‟ duties, was designed to promote more long-
termist, responsible behaviour at company level and requires directors to have regard to 
wider factors such as employees, effects on the environment, suppliers and customers. 
Furthermore, in July 2000, the UK Pensions Act was amended to make it compulsory for 
pension funds to disclose in their statements of investment principles (SIPs) the extent to 
which they use social, environmental and ethical criteria in their investments (United 
Kingdom, 1999). According to the UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance, 
„institutional investors have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes‟ and 
„they should be ready, where practicable, to enter in dialogue with companies‟ (Committee 
on Corporate Governance, 2000, p. 4). A series of reviews and reports commissioned by the 
government have aimed to incite active ownership behaviour and to reform the financial 
market so as to make it more conducive to activism: 
- Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992) – suggested institutional investors should 
encourage regular one-to-one meetings with directors of their investee companies 
and should use their voting rights. 
- Myners Review of Institutional Investment (2001) – recommends that „the 
government should legislate for shareholder activism‟ (Higgs, 2005, p.15), making 
intervention in companies a duty for fund managers, as long as it is in shareholders‟ 
and beneficiaries‟ interests. 
- Institutional Shareholders‟ Committee (ISC, 2002) – in response to the findings of 
the Myners Review (2001), the ISC issued a statement of the responsibilities of 
                                                 
10
 For example, until 1992, a group of shareholders, engaging with management collaboratively, would 
become subject to elaborate filing requirements, if they owned more than five per cent of the company‟s 
shares.  
28 
institutional investors. It argued that shareholders should have a clear statement of 
their policy on activism; they should monitor performance, intervene when 
necessary, and evaluate and report on their activities.  
- The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making (Kay, 
2012a) – the review aims to improve the quality of investor engagement with 
companies. It concludes that short-termism is a problem in UK equity markets and 
that the principal causes are twofold: decline of trust and misalignment of incentives 
throughout the investment chain.  
- The UK Stewardship Code (Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 2010) – revised in 
September 2012 (FRC, 2012). Aims to improve the quality of engagement between 
institutional investors and investee companies. Serves as a best practice guide and 
operates on a „comply or explain‟ basis. The revised edition of the code has 
improved the disclosure of investors‟ use of proxy voting services11 and has sought 
to clarify the roles of asset managers and asset owners
12
. 
In summary, the rise of active ownership by institutional investors at the end of the 20
th
 
century; a number of corporate scandals involving reputable companies, as well as serious 
environmental disasters, have alerted shareholders to the potential liabilities they could 
accrue as a result of unethical corporate behaviour, at the same time that legislative changes 
in the US and the UK have aimed to facilitate engagement. All these developments taking 
place at the end of the 20
th
 and the beginning of the 21
st
 century have sparked an academic 
interest in the subject, manifested in the sharp increase of articles on shareholder activism 
since 2001 (see Figure 4).  The following section introduces the broader literature on ethical 
and socially responsible investment – an umbrella term that encompasses a variety of 
investor strategies, one of which (shareholder activism) is considered to be the most 
effective for securing change. 
2.2. From Socially Responsible Investment to Shareholder Activism 
The terms ethical and socially responsible investment (SRI, hereafter) are often used 
interchangeably since the various definitions advanced are broadly similar. Cowton (1994) 
defines ethical investment as „the exercise of ethical and social criteria in the selection and 
                                                 
11
 Investors now need to disclose the providers of proxy voting or other advisory services, the type of services 
provided and the extent to which they rely upon recommendations provided by those services. 
12
 The revisions specifically state that asset owners have a stewardship obligation to their beneficiaries. 
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management of investment portfolios‟. The origins of the SRI movement can be traced 
back to religious organisations – the earliest evidence of investment allocation based on 
non-financial principles dates back to the 17
th
 century and the Quaker movement‟s 
avoidance of investments in slavery. In recent years, ethical investment has become an 
increasingly popular investment approach among industrialised countries. The 2012 
European Sustainable Investment Forum‟s (Eurosif, hereafter) SRI survey distinguishes 
between a number of different SRI strategies (Eurosif, 2012) and the latest survey 
concludes that all of them have continued to grow since 2011 with growth rates ranging 
from 22.6 per cent to 91 per cent (Eurosif, 2014). Table 3 below summarises briefly the 
strategies described in the 2012 survey: 
Table 3: Different Approaches to SRI 
T Y P E D E S C R I P T I O N E X A M P L E 
Sustainability Themed 
Investment 
Investment in themes or 
assets linked to the 
advancement of 
sustainability. 
Thematic funds which focus 
on addressing social and/or 
environmental challenges 
such as climate change, eco-
efficiency and others. 
Best-in-Class 
Investment Selection 
Approach where leading 
investments in a class, 
universe or category are 
selected based on 
environmental, social and 
governance (ESG, 
hereafter) criteria. 
Investing in the best 
performing or best improved 
companies as identified by 
ESG analysis. 
Norms-based 
Screening 
Investment in companies 
which comply with 
international standards 
and norms. 
Investment in companies 
which do not violate, for 
example, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, or the 
International Labour 
Organisation‟s (ILO) 
conventions.  
Exclusion of Holdings 
from Investment 
Universe 
An approach of excluding 
shareholdings in 
companies that are 
thought to be unethical 
(also known as negative 
screening).  
Common criteria for 
unethical activities include 
weapons, pornography, 
tobacco and animal testing. 
Integration of ESG The explicit inclusion by The integration process 
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Factors in Financial 
Analysis 
asset managers of ESG 
risks and opportunities 
into traditional financial 
analysis and investment 
decisions. 
focuses on the potential 
impact of ESG issues on 
company financials, which in 
turn can have an impact on 
the investment decision. 
Impact Investment Investments made into 
companies, funds and 
organisations with the aim 
of generating social and 
environmental impact 
alongside a financial 
return. 
Impact investment includes 
microfinance, social 
business/entrepreneurship 
funds, community investing, 
and French fonds solidaires. 
Engagement and 
Voting on 
Sustainability Matters 
Active ownership 
approach which entails 
engagement with 
companies and voting of 
shares with the intent of 
influencing behavior. 
Dialogue with management, 
filing a proposal, letter 
writing and others. 
 
Source: Eurosif (2012) 
Traditionally, the notion of ethical investment has been most commonly associated with the 
first four strategies outlined above, which essentially entail a redistribution of capital – on 
the one hand away from unethical companies and, on the other, into responsible businesses 
that are norm-setters. Bowman (1973) suggests that many institutional shareholders tend to 
prefer investing in ethical companies because they view firms that are not socially 
responsible as riskier investments. The recent BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, after which 
city investors lost $30 billion, proves that, as suggested by Bowman, socially responsible 
investments can be safer in terms of long-term profitability, but the question remains as to 
what extent shareholders really prefer to invest their money in them.  
One central question that has generated much heated debates in the literature relates to the 
ability of such traditional SRI approaches to serve as an effective mechanism for the social 
control of business. According to the American social theorist Severyn T. Bruyn (1987), the 
phenomenon can be a major force for change as it advances the well-being of society with 
regard to employment policies, the urban community and Third World development; it 
generates higher returns for investors, improves corporate social reporting and questions the 
necessity of competitive markets and state regulation for maintaining free enterprise. Bruyn 
(1987) believes in the „cost of capital argument‟ – SRI fund managers increase the cost of 
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capital of unethical companies relative to ethical ones by abstaining from investing in the 
former. The intent is that such action discourages „bad‟ companies from pursuing further 
detrimental activities. 
However, many express scepticism when it comes to the potential of SRI to effectuate real 
changes in company behaviour. For example, Haigh and Hazelton (2004) are critical of the 
above mentioned cost of capital argument put forward by Bruyn (1987). They argue that, 
despite the recent growth of SRI funds, they still occupy only a fraction of the market and, 
as such, cannot have any real economic impact on companies. Furthermore, according to 
Boatright (1999), traditional SRI or passive investment, which involves avoiding certain 
companies and investing in others, is unlikely to have an impact on larger, heavily-traded 
companies as long as it is on a small scale.  
All these criticisms have led many to believe that a more active approach, whereby 
investors engage directly with companies and use their shareholder rights to put pressure on 
them, would have the potential to considerably intensify the intended impact. Such an 
active approach can also be described as shareholder activism and is expressed in the last 
strategy from the table above – „engagement and voting on ESG issues‟. Sparkes and 
Cowton (2004) talk about the „mainstreaming‟ of SRI or, in other words, its adoption by an 
increasing proportion of institutional investors as opposed to only charities and other value-
based organisations. The authors suggest that this trend has been accompanied by a process 
of maturation characterised by a growing incidence of shareholders using the power of 
activism. Such an upsurge in the occurrence of shareholder engagement has generated 
growing academic interest and analysis of the phenomenon. Having clarified the fact that 
shareholder activism is an SRI strategy that has recently grown in popularity and is 
considered by many to have greater potential of affecting companies‟ adoption of 
responsible practices, the following sections will discuss the literature on socio-ethical 
activism by grouping the main papers in four themes. 
2.3. Shareholder Proposals  
To begin with, the first theme identified in the literature groups together a number of 
studies which examine the topics, filers, voting results and targets of shareholder proposals 
filed at AGMs. All studies are set in the US. This shareholder tactic is comparatively rare in 
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the UK and especially common in the US, where proposals have been used as a way to 
advance corporate responsibility since the 1970s.   
In what can be argued to be the oldest paper on socio-ethical activism, Vogel (1983) 
examines trends in US shareholder proposals throughout a thirteen years period between 
1970 and 1982. He argues that, rather than being a passing fad of the first half of the 
seventies, shareholder activism will become a firm characteristic of corporate governance. 
Vogel (1983) relates much of the increasingly common use of the proposal mechanism to 
political and ideological processes, as well as to legal developments (i.e. rulings by the 
SEC). He comments on the degree of support for resolutions, stating that in the early years 
the majority of proposals did not receive the 3 per cent support necessary (according to US 
law) in order to be allowed to file again next year. However, since 1975, the average 
number of resolutions achieving this margin rose up to over 60 per cent. A study by Tkac 
(2006) conducted more than two decades later also discusses the average support for social 
resolutions in the US between 1992 and 2002 and asserts that this has risen to 8.2 per cent – 
a significant shift compared to proposal support throughout the 70s and 80s. However, 
when compared to proposals on corporate governance issues, SEE proposals receive much 
lower support – an average of 6.6 per cent of votes in favour compared to 23.6 per cent 
during the 1997 proxy season results analysed by Campbell et al. (1999) using data from 
the IRRC
13
.  
Since Vogel‟s publication in 1983, the literature has relied on a combination of longitudinal 
research of social shareholder proposals encompassing anything from three to thirty five 
years and on secondary data obtained from the IRRC. In what is the most comprehensive 
study of shareholder resolutions covering the lengthy period between 1969 and 2003, 
Proffitt and Spicer (2006) focus on resolutions regarding human rights and labour 
standards. The authors contend that, throughout this 35 years period, religious groups have 
been the most active filers of proposals, followed by public pension funds and individuals. 
Using a social movement perspective, the authors emphasise the crucial role that religious 
groups have played for the advancement of the global social issues agenda. When it comes 
to the identity of the filers of resolutions, there has been a stable, continuous trend 
throughout the entire period covered by the various papers. Similarly to Proffitt and 
                                                 
13
 The Investor Responsibility Research Centre – a not-for-profit organisation established by institutional 
investors in 1972. It provides a systematic database of all social policy shareholder proposals in the US. 
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Spicer‟s findings, Tkac (2006), Campbell et al. (1999) and Monks et al. (2004) also 
contend that the most active filers within their studies‟ timeframe were religious groups and 
individuals.   
Graves et al.‟s (2001) descriptive study which uses data collected from the IRRC analyses 
shareholder resolutions throughout an eleven year period between 1988 and 1998 and aims 
to identify the main topics addressed by shareholders. The authors group resolutions in 
twenty-seven categories related to specific issues raised and suggest that these issues can 
follow different patterns over time – some are just fads (come and go unexpectedly – for 
example, diversity), while others remain important and stable factors in shareholders‟ 
agenda for change (for example, human rights). Graves et al. (2001) name South Africa and 
the environment, followed by human rights and diversity, as the most popular issues 
addressed over the studied period. In a similar study which examines all social shareholder 
proposals recorded by the IRRC over the 1992-2002 period, Tkac (2006) also comes to the 
conclusion that environmental issues are among the three most common topics, alongside 
with international conduct and antidiscrimination. Considering the period 1997-2004, Rojas 
et al. (2009) examine the role of the type of issue and identity of the filer in the ability of 
activism to trigger corporate change. The paper reveals that the capacity to exert pressure 
can be higher for some types of filers (such as pension funds and mutual funds) and for 
some types of resolution topics such as energy and the environment, diversity, international 
labour and human rights. 
Telman (2011) discusses the topic of SEE shareholder proposals from a legal perspective. 
The author provides a comprehensive overview of the law on shareholder proposals, tracing 
back the rules and regulations that SEC has introduced throughout the years with respect to 
the submission of resolutions. The study portrays in detail the legal case of Lovenheim v. 
Iroquois Brands (1985) which is to date routinely cited by the SEC in response to 
corporations who seek to exclude proposals from the distribution of their proxy materials
14
 
on the grounds that they are not related to the corporations‟ business. The article‟s main 
argument is that the proposal mechanism stimulates shareholder involvement in corporate 
governance, facilitates open, clear and specific communication between firms‟ management 
and shareholders, and has the potential to influence corporate decision making. 
                                                 
14
 Documents regulated by the SEC and used by companies to inform shareholders and to solicit votes. 
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Furthermore, the implementation of activists‟ ideas via the shareholder proposal tool can 
ultimately be of benefit to the corporation. 
Research has also focused on identifying which corporations are targeted by shareholders‟ 
proposals. So far the most influential account that attempts to answer this question is 
presented by Rehbein et al. (2004) who argue that large companies, as well as companies 
who are more dependent on end-user consumers, are more likely to be targeted due to their 
visibility and exposure to social actions such as consumer boycotts and others. This 
assertion seems to continuously reappear in the findings of most authors (see Tkac, 2006; 
Clark et al., 2008; Rojas et al., 2009). According to Rojas et al. (2009) this trend can be 
explained by the possible spillover effects across the industry that big corporations can 
generate. 
In summary, the literature throughout the years expresses a uniform vision with respect to 
the following conclusions: the most active filers of SEE resolutions are consistently the 
same – namely, religious groups and, to a lesser extent, individuals and public pension 
funds; shareholder demands tend to concentrate on a few big issues such as the 
environment, labour and human rights; large and well-known corporations are the main 
targets of shareholder activists. However, despite these similarities, there is no consensus in 
the literature on the question of what constitutes a successful campaign when it comes to 
shareholder resolutions.  Tkac (2006), Proffitt and Spicer (2006) and Graves et al. (2001) 
argue that the withdrawal of a resolution should be regarded as a success for shareholders 
since this move usually comes as a result of some form of action on the part of the 
organisation – a dialogue, a promise for change, or a compromise as a result of 
negotiations. According to Tkac‟s (2006) results, in the majority of cases of withdrawn 
proposals, the shareholders‟ request was granted by the corporation. By contrast, Rojas et 
al. (2009) are highly critical of this view and argue that resolutions have a much more 
limited capacity to exert pressure. The authors suggest that the higher rate of withdrawal of 
social policy proposals in comparison to corporate governance ones (Chidambaran and 
Woidtke, 1999) can be attributed to the fact that, in anticipation of low support, filers often 
prefer to avoid failure rather than to persist with their demands.  
Academic opinion differs as well with respect to how a low level of support for a certain 
proposal is interpreted. While High and Hazelton (2004) purport that a proposal that 
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receives a minority vote is unsuccessful, Monks et al. (2004) and Graves et al. (2001) 
suggest that a low vote need not be necessarily a failure – if management feels a growing 
pressure from shareholders and consumers when a proposal has been kept on the proxy 
statement
15
 for several years, even a minority vote in favour is enough to initiate change. A 
good example are the numerous proposals filed at US companies in the 1980s which 
ensured the disinvestment of business from South Africa during the apartheid era. Tkac 
(2006) mentions an interesting point which the authors studying the use of proposals fail to 
consider. He points out that often, prior to filing a proposal, institutional shareholders 
attempt a dialogue with the targeted company. Only if such initial attempt at negotiation 
fails, do they employ other strategies. This suggests that the analysis of proposal data may 
present an overcritical picture which understates the success of shareholders‟ efforts. The 
difficulty of accurately assessing the impact of shareholder activism on corporate behaviour 
is evident when the next category of papers is considered.   
2.4. Is Shareholder Activism An Effective Mechanism for Change? 
The second major theme in the literature incorporates a number of papers evaluating the 
effectiveness of shareholder activism for influencing corporate policy and action. Although 
we have witnessed the dramatic surge of social, ethical and environmental shareholder 
engagement in recent years, our understanding of whether it produces the intended 
outcomes still remains limited. Despite the proliferation of research in this area, scholars 
have found support for arguments from both ends of the spectrum. This section starts with 
the earliest written article on the topic and then groups papers into two categories – studies 
that argue that shareholder activism can be a successful tool for change and studies that 
question its ability to influence corporate policy.   
In this review‟s earliest study on the effectiveness of active ownership, Hoffman (1996) 
highlights the complex and dynamic nature of shareholder-firm relationships. He draws on 
a case of a coalition of shareholders who campaigned for Amoco Corporation to adopt a 
number of environmental principles. The author presents a mixed account of the 
effectiveness of shareholder activism, giving credence to the importance of specific factors 
such as shareholders‟ influence and power, the corporate culture and the political 
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 A proxy statement is a document which companies are legally required to produce when they seek 
shareholder votes. It provides shareholders with all the necessary information so that they can make informed 
decisions regarding matters which will be discussed at an AGM. 
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environment in which the campaigning takes place. The findings reveal that the outcome of 
the campaign is a result of a negotiation process during which both parties make 
compromises as a way of reaching an agreement. 
Since Hoffman‟s article published in 1996, subsequent studies have expressed more polar 
views, being either optimistic or sceptical when it comes to shareholder activism. Sparkes 
and Cowton (2004) are among those who express their optimism about the potential for 
change of shareholder activism. The authors believe that, compared to the other passive SRI 
strategies outlined above (see Table 3), activism can prove to be a more powerful tool for 
influencing companies. However, these arguments are somewhat speculative as Sparkes 
and Cowton (2004) acknowledge the need for more empirical research on the topic and 
only provide an overview of recent developments in SRI without seeking to test their 
claims.   
In a more research-oriented, quantitative study which uses secondary data and a mail 
survey as sources of information, Neubaum and Zahra (2006) test various hypotheses to 
establish the investment horizons of institutional shareholders, as well as how the frequency 
and coordination with which they undertake activism affect corporate social performance. 
They conclude that long-term investment horizons of institutional owners are positively 
correlated with CSP and that this effect is exacerbated when the frequency of activism is 
higher. 
Using data from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
16
, and focusing geographically on the 
US states of Texas and Louisiana, Lee and Lounsbury (2011) examine the effect of 
environmental resolutions on chemical and petroleum firms‟ environmental performance. 
With a sample of thirty eight public corporations tracked for thirteen years, the authors 
conclude that the resolutions have a significant and positive effect on the targeted firms‟ 
environmental performance. The success of the resolutions is attributed to the ability of 
campaigners to: impose potential costs on firms through disruption of routines, reframe the 
issues using institutional logics, mobilise powerful third parties to support their cause. 
Furthermore, it is discovered that large firms and firms in industries that are closer to end 
user consumers respond more positively to shareholder pressures.  
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 One of the rare non-economic quantitative datasets which gives information on corporate pollution 
management practices. It has information on over 650 different toxic chemical releases. 
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On a more sceptical note, although acknowledging some of the merits of the phenomenon, 
O‟Rourke (2003) criticises shareholder activism on the grounds that it is costly, resource-
intense, only achieves small, corporate-specific and voluntary change, and is limited to 
those who already possess ownership rights. Her research is based on interviews, secondary 
data, detailed literature review and various case studies. O‟Rourke (2003) questions the 
ability of a model of shareholder democracy for advancing sustainability and replacing 
other democratic forms of controlling firms. 
Similarly, Haigh and Hazelton (2004) argue that activism „lacks the power to create 
significant corporate change‟ (p.59). However, as discussed above, the authors equate a low 
level of support for a proposal with an unsuccessful campaign – something which is not 
necessarily true according to other authors (see Graves et al., 2001). They contend that 
shareholder activism creates corporate-specific changes which are limited in their ability to 
trigger a more general and long-term industrial shift. Haigh and Hazelton (2004) believe 
that achieving change on a broader scale can be realised by large institutional investors if 
they undertake concerted action directed not only towards targeting companies, but also 
towards lobbying governments. 
Engle (2006) and David et al. (2007) are also among those who express scepticism when it 
comes to the potential of shareholder activism. Looking at the issue from a legal 
perspective, and with a focus on human rights, Engle (2006) is hesitant about the ability of 
shareholder proposals to shape corporate policy due to process constraints and the non-
binding nature of resolutions. The article emphasises the importance of social and 
environmental reporting by companies as this information is material to investment 
decisions and investors have a right to know the risks associated with any labour, human 
rights and environmental abuses.  
Using a quantitative methodology similar to the one developed by Neubaum and Zahra 
(2006), David et al. (2007) test the relationship between activism and CSP (using Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini‟s (KLD, hereafter)17 social and environmental ratings) and conclude 
that activism can be detrimental to CSP as it often entails a diversion of resources away 
from environmental issues into political activities aimed at resisting external pressures. By 
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 KLD is an independent rating service which assesses the corporate social performance of companies in the 
Standard and Poor‟s 500 index across a range of dimensions related to investor concerns.  
38 
drawing on the work of Mitchell et al. (1997), David et al. (2007) conclude that managers 
try to negotiate more with salient shareholders but their actions are „symbolic rather than 
substantive‟ (p.98).  
There is also disagreement in the literature when it comes to the link between socio-ethical 
shareholder activism and shareholder value and profits. In his review of the engagement 
practices of the American fund CalPERS, Barber (2007) observes that shareholder activism 
on social issues should be used with prudence since there is a lack of empirical and 
theoretical evidence suggesting that it leads to increased shareholder value. However, this 
assertion is not supported by Dimson et al. (2014) who examine different CSR 
engagements with US firms over 1999-2009 undertaken by one asset manager. The results 
reveal that the target firms‟ operating performance, profitability, efficiency and governance 
indices improve as a result of successful engagements. Reputational concerns and higher 
capacity to implement changes are the two factors which increase the likelihood of a firm 
responding to shareholder demands.  
In summary, disagreement appears to exist as to the ability of shareholder activism to serve 
as an effective „mechanism for the social control of business‟ (Smith, 1990), with the 
majority of papers adopting a sceptical stance. However, in spite of this general perception, 
there are some notable cases of success. For example, Home Depot decided to stop selling 
wood products from endangered forests after pressure from investors, while The Disney 
Corporation made a commitment to audit its subcontractors around the world so that they 
are not in breach of labour laws. In addition, the 2012 AGM season in the UK has been 
characterised by what has been labelled by the UK media as a „Shareholder Spring‟ – an 
unprecedented revolt against excessive executive pay backed up not only by small 
shareholders, but by large City institutions as well. Most recently, the „Aiming for A‟ 
investor coalition (backed by pension funds which together hold $245bn of assets) and 
NGOs ShareAction and ClientEarth tabled climate change shareholder resolutions at BP 
and Shell‟s 2015 AGMs, which received an unprecedented support with 98 per cent of all 
BP shareholders and 98.9 per cent of all Shell shareholders voting in favour (Farrell, 2015). 
The resolutions urged the companies to reduce their carbon emissions, invest in renewables 
and reform their executive remuneration systems so that directors are not rewarded for 
actions that harm the climate (Clark, 2015). However, one of this study‟s main arguments is 
that the effectiveness of a shareholder activist campaign should not be judged in terms of 
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immediate goals, but rather the concept of delayed gratification should be applied to 
explain the fact that more often than not campaigns find fruition in the future. This idea will 
be discussed in greater detail in Section 11.3. 
2.5. The Growing Role of Institutional Investors  
Historically, ownership and control of corporations rested in the same hands since firms 
were run by their founders-owners. The growth of the modern corporation in size led to a 
shift towards „managerial capitalism‟ – ownership and control were no longer in the hands 
of a few wealthy individuals. Control of the firm shifted from entrepreneurs to professional 
managers, while ownership became dispersed among a large number of unorganised 
shareholders who knew little of the day-to-day operations of their firms (Berle and Means, 
1932). This, according to Berle and Means (1932), would undermine the power and 
influence of shareholders vis-à-vis management and would encourage managers to act in 
their own interests.  
However, in recent years, ownership of the corporation has become concentrated in the 
hands of a relatively small group of institutional shareholders (Goergen, 2007), rather than 
individual stockholders, who, as Clark and Knight (2006) reveal, own seventy per cent of 
all listed equities in the UK. Taking into account these figures, it could be argued that large 
institutional investors‟ role for encouraging responsible corporate behaviour and for 
contributing to the success of shareholder activism is essential. Pension funds are among 
the most powerful of all institutional shareholders – their influence is being felt in every 
capital market in the world. According to estimates from TheCityUK (2014), the global 
conventional fund management industry had $97.2 trillion in assets under management at 
the end of 2013, with pension assets accounting for $38.1 trillion of the total (Ivanova, 
2014). UK pension funds and insurance companies hold about 11 per cent of the value of 
the UK stock market (see ONS, 2012 and Table 2).  
As early as the 1970s Peter Drucker (1976) acknowledged the importance of the growth of 
private pension provision and of pension funds who have become the controlling owners of 
America‟s largest companies. He envisaged the future development of an ever more 
influential pension fund movement which will serve as an alternative to free market 
economics and whose focus will be placed on „the formulation and achievement of social 
goals‟ (p.12). As British sociologist Blackburn (2002) suggests, much of the investment 
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that shapes the world we live in is undertaken by pension funds, and the growth of workers‟ 
capital through pension funds has occurred not only in America, but on a global scale as 
well. However, contrary to the utopian world envisioned by Drucker, such investment 
„fuels the glamorous world of high finance, property speculation, media and technology 
mergers, and stock exchange bubbles‟ (p.5) and dictates that, in Blackburn‟s words: 
…shopping malls and shiny offices will proliferate while parks, swimming 
pools, libraries and theatres open to all will not, (…) that the poorest will 
have to tighten their belts if economic adjustment is required, that natural 
resources accumulated over millennia will be consumed in a few short 
years… (Blackburn, 2002, p.5) 
Not only can pension funds yield a significant influence over companies due to their large 
shareholdings, but it is also often in their best interest to pressure companies for better 
governance. As Clark and Hebb (2004) argue, pension funds across the Anglo-American 
world are increasingly using passive indexes. This prevents them from selling their shares 
when they are dissatisfied, leaving the option of engagement with the company. 
Furthermore, as pension funds have long-term liabilities towards their clients (the pension 
savers), they have to adopt a long-term investment horizon and be sensitive to both short-
term and long-term performance.  
Hess (2007) expresses optimism about the ability of public pension funds to act as a 
powerful catalyst for change in the social and environmental practices of companies. 
Pension fund engagement is considered to be a good way of ensuring long-term shareholder 
value for future beneficiaries since environmental and social risks have consequences for 
long-term value creation and since traditional legal mechanisms have limits. Hess (2007) 
believes that public pension funds can serve as surrogate regulators should they begin to 
consider social and environmental issues. However, he argues that they are not such active 
owners as other sources suggest. 
Indeed, in recent years, despite institutional investors‟ potential derived from their increase 
in size and the concentration of their stakes (see Fig. 1 in Section 1.4.), Davis (2008) and 
Jackson (2008) observe an ownership paradox related to shareholders. Traditionally large 
institutions have adopted a passive approach and have refrained from challenging 
management‟s decisions. There is contradictory evidence when it comes to the effect that 
the regulatory changes in the UK (see Section 2.1.) have had on actual shareholder 
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practices. A study conducted by ShareAction (formerly FairPensions
18
), examining the 
practices at the twenty largest UK pension funds, reveals that only twelve of them disclose 
whether or not they consider environmental, social and governance issues. What is more, 
most pension funds express a general positive attitude towards SRI and activism without 
taking steps to actually start practicing such approaches (ShareAction, 2006). This trend of 
passive ownership has been attributed to legal rules and restrictions which have prevented 
action by shareholders: „institutional shareholders are hobbled by a complex web of legal 
rules that make it difficult, expensive, and legally risky to own large percentage stakes or 
undertake joint efforts‟ (Black, 1990, p.523).  
In view of this context of passivity, the role of non-governmental organisations for 
encouraging active engagement with companies by large and powerful institutional 
investors is crucial. According to Sjostrom (2007) their importance lies precisely in their 
ability to incentivise action by investors who have more power to push for change. 
Similarly, Perks et al. (1992, p.56) argue that large institutional shareholders could become 
the focal point of social movements and campaigners: „… environmentalists and political 
activists may wish to influence such institutions and encourage them to press for change in 
corporate reporting and in companies‟ activities‟.  
Inciting active ownership behaviour by institutional investors can be achieved through the 
use of what Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003) call „membership rights‟ – making use of the 
influence that an individual possesses as a client of a financial institution or of a pension 
fund to encourage the institution to initiate active engagement with a given company. In the 
UK context, this is usually achieved by setting up an online action tool through which 
supporters of an NGO send emails to their pension or Individual Savings Account (ISA, 
hereafter) providers. A case in point, among many others, are the 6,000 people who, during 
the Tar Sands campaign in 2010, emailed their pension provider and encouraged them to 
vote in favour of the resolutions put forward at BP and Shell‟s AGMs. As a result of such 
public mobilisation, pension providers asked their fund managers about the issue and tar 
sands were placed at the top of the AGM agenda. The following section looks at the 
literature on NGOs and their role in capital markets. 
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 The organisation changed its name from FairPensions to ShareAction in 2013 because the new name gave a 
more accurate representation of their campaigning activities. 
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2.6. Non-Governmental Organisations 
There are now more than fifty NGOs
19
 in the UK that have integrated the use of 
shareholder activism in some of their campaigns. Most of the papers written on the subject 
also contend that there is an upsurge in NGO shareholder activism and consider whether 
civil society organisations‟ capital market interventions have the potential of changing 
corporate policy (Waygood and Wehrmeyer, 2003; Sjostrom, 2007; Guay et al., 2004).  
By drawing on a case study of a campaign by FoE against the operations of Freeport – 
McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. in Irian Jaya (West Papua) – Emel (2002) explores the 
question of how far NGO shareholder activism goes in terms of ameliorating ecological 
destruction and human rights violations. Freeport – McMoRan is a large North American 
mining company which signed a concession agreement allowing it to operate in the lands of 
indigenous communities in Irian Jaya. The paper concludes that, although shareholder 
activism does elicit some corporate policy change, it is often small and incremental. 
Fundamental decisions about technology choice and the timing and location of investment 
are unlikely to change. It was discovered that the campaign did not affect negatively the 
profits of the corporation which were up by 7 per cent in 1999 compared to 1998. Although 
the publicity garnered by the shareholder resolution increased public scrutiny and led to a 
demand for more accountability, Emel (2002) questions the extent to which these 
improvements are enough to achieve truly sustainable development and to compensate for 
the damages done to livelihoods. She concludes: „While Freeport – McMoRan may be 
running an ecologically modernised operation in West Papua, the mountain is still coming 
down‟ (p.841-842). 
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 Including: The Burma Campaign, Friends of the Earth, Landmine Action, Campaign Against the Arms 
Trade, Carbon Disclosure Project, Corporate Responsibility Coalition, ChristianAid, Amnesty International, 
New Economics Foundation, People and Planet, EIRIS, War on Want, ECCR, ShareAction, Oxfam, CAFOD, 
ActionAid, UKSIF, Labour Behind the Label, WWF, Finance Innovation Lab, London Mining Network, 
Survival International, Platform London, PARTiZANS, Down to Earth, Indigenous Peoples Links, Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign, Rainforest Action Network, World Development Movement, Greenpeace, Ekklesia, 
Church Action on Poverty, UK Tar Sands Network, Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Client Earth, No Tar 
Sands, Indigenous Environmental Network, Citizens UK, Forum for the Future, The Carbon Tracker 
Initiative, Green Alliance, Global Witness, Biofuel Watch, Positive Money, Fuel Poverty Action, and others. 
See chronology in Appendix 3 and 4. 
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In another example of a study of NGO activism from a US perspective, Guay et al. (2004) 
draw on agency and stakeholder theory, in examining how civil society organisations 
pressure companies through SRI and shareholder activism. They identify four main roles 
used to affect CSR – NGOs can serve as: advocates pressing investors to engage in 
activism and SRI, company shareholders (may engage in NGO shareholder activism), 
advisors (provide advice and consultation for SRI funds), and SRI fund sponsors. Guay et 
al. (1994) apply Mitchell et al.‟s (1997, p.131) theory of stakeholder salience and 
legitimacy and conclude that NGOs can be considered „viable stakeholders in corporate 
decision-making‟ who can influence corporations to a degree disproportionate to their share 
ownership in the company due to the fact that they possess the attributes of power and 
urgency. The authors distinguish between indirect strategies whereby NGOs lobby and 
pressure institutional investors to act upon an issue and direct strategies whereby NGOs 
have a direct impact on corporate behaviour through their shareholder status. To 
accomplish their goals, they often employ several of these influencing strategies in the 
same campaign. 
Sjostrom (2007) focuses on NGO shareholder activism for human rights and outlines two 
case studies in which Amnesty Business Group (ABG, hereafter) in Sweden and FoE in the 
UK have used share ownership rights to try to influence corporate policy through raising 
questions at the AGM in the first case and tabling a shareholder resolution in the second. 
Both of these campaigns were successful with ABG influencing 12 companies to publish a 
human rights policy and FoE using the power of investors to convince Balfour Beatty to 
pull out of the Ilisu Dam project. According to one of the main conclusions of the paper, 
less powerful actors such as NGOs can achieve change because they effectively translate 
their ideologically based concerns into financial terms and this makes the issue relevant for 
actors (investors) who have more power to initiate change.  
Another study that focuses on the issue of campaign effectiveness and the ability of NGO 
shareholder activism to generate the desired results adopts a quantitative approach and 
analyses the extent to which the Carbon Disclosure Project
20
 (CDP, hereafter) has managed 
to encourage firms to disclose environmental information (Wegener et al., 2011). The 
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 The CDP is an NGO based in the UK, whose mission is to gather and disseminate climate change 
information. This is achieved through using an indirect micro strategy – each year CDP coordinates a request 
in the form of a letter written on behalf and signed by 655 institutional investors with $78 trillion in assets. 
This letter is sent to companies all around the world who are asked to disclose information on their emissions 
and to implement cost-effective emission reductions. 
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results of the study reveal that management‟s decision to disclose information on climate 
change indicators is influenced by domestic rather than foreign signatory investors. 
Moreover, the majority of firms that tend to disclose information are from lower polluting 
industries with less exposure to litigation risk. This puts into question the effectiveness of  
the shareholder activist strategy used (an investor letter sent to companies), as the success is 
most visible in firms that are less likely to be negatively impacted by stricter environmental 
regulations (Wegener et al., 2011).  
Waygood and Wehrmeyer‟s (2003) journal article and Waygood‟s (2006) book represent a 
more recent and possibly more interesting work on NGOs and their use of capital markets 
in the UK. Given the fact that insights from Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003) and 
Waygood (2006) are used extensively in the current study, their work will be discussed in 
more detail here. Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003) propose a taxonomy for NGO capital 
market intervention (also discussed in Waygood (2006)) based on two different strategies: a 
macro capital redistribution strategy and a micro investor influence strategy, both of which 
can be undertaken either directly or indirectly. The macro capital redistribution strategy is 
closer in principle to SRI and therefore will not be discussed here, whereas the micro 
investor influence strategy is essentially shareholder activism.  
The latter strategy occurs when the NGO uses the rights associated with share ownership to 
express its concerns. The authors classify a micro approach as indirect when the activists 
co-opt the support of investors and leverage their power in an attempt to influence specific 
companies via investors‟ shareholdings (for example, securing shareholder support for a 
resolution). By contrast, a direct strategy entails the civil society organisation lobbying the 
company without the help of large institutional shareholders. Instead, the NGO becomes a 
shareholder itself and uses its own influence to change corporate policy through its own 
shareholdings (for example, by acquiring shares in order to attend an AGM). Thus, under 
the micro strategy, NGOs can engage in shareholder activism either directly by becoming 
shareholders themselves, or indirectly by leveraging the power of institutional investors. A 
micro strategy also entails an attempt to influence the regulatory environment so as to make 
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it more conducive to shareholder activism or to encourage investors to become active 
owners
21
 (Waygood and Wehrmeyer, 2003).  
The current study makes a further distinction between indirectly targeting financial 
institutions and non-institutional actors (see Figure 5 below). In the figure, financial 
institutions are defined as companies that hold shares as investors or trustees, acting on 
behalf of other investors who are the ultimate beneficiaries and owners. Examples include 
unit trusts, insurance companies, pension funds (who act on behalf of individual savers and 
pensioners), investment companies and others.
 
 
By contrast, non-institutional actors are those who have no immediate or obvious link to the 
financial system, such as pension savers, individual citizens (people who do not save for a 
pension but can nevertheless be involved in shareholder activism), members of affected 
communities and the media. The following figure presents visually the different 
relationships and strategies used by campaigning NGOs – these will be discussed in greater 
detail in the findings chapters: 
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 For example, in 2002 Forum for the Future published a paper entitled „Government‟s Business‟, which 
urges the government to require that pension fund trustees report to members on how they implement SRI 
policies. Also, in 2002 the Corporate Responsibility Coalition (CORE, hereafter) sought the support of ethical 
investors to help it promote legislation that would oblige UK companies to report on their social, 
environmental and ethical performance, and on corporate governance issues such as executive pay. 
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Figure 5: NGO Shareholder Activist Engagement Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect 
Financial 
Institutions 
Non-
institutional 
Actors 
NGOs as 
Shareholders 
NGOs as  
Influencers 
ROUTE OF 
INFLUENCE 
ROLE OF 
NGOs 
TARGETS 
Companies 
STRATEGIES 
 Brining members of 
affected communities to 
AGMs and organising 
meetings with investors 
 Encouraging pension 
savers to engage with 
their pension providers 
 Encouraging citizens to 
attend AGMs and write 
to their ISA providers 
via an online action tool 
 
 Frame Blending 
 Speaking the 
language of investors 
 Investor engagement 
through briefing 
materials, seminars, 
meetings, phone 
calls, etc. 
Policy 
Makers 
Policy 
Makers 
 AGM attendance 
 Filing a resolution 
 Private 
engagement with 
companies 
 Change legislation so 
that it enhances the 
influence of 
shareholders, or 
encourages active 
ownership behaviour. 
 Engagement with 
policy makers. 
 Responding to 
consultations and 
government-
commissioned reports. 
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Waygood and Wehrmeyer (2003) identify three main challenges in the use of shareholder 
rights: legal (it can be difficult to comply with company law procedures, especially when 
submitting a resolution); financial (the amount of shares owned is related to the power that 
can be exercised; therefore, due to their limited financial reserves, NGOs may not be able to 
yield significant direct ownership influence) and professional (investors can be 
disinterested in NGOs‟ concerns). As a result of these challenges, the authors conclude that 
NGOs have tended to use an indirect rather than a direct approach.  
Waygood (2006) draws on empirical evidence to evaluate the success of each strategy 
through four case studies. He reviews critically the effectiveness and efficiency of UK 
NGO capital market intervention and concludes that capital market campaigning can be 
both highly efficient and highly effective mechanism for targeting companies and investors. 
Furthermore, Waygood (2006) asserts that the likelihood of success of a campaign 
increases with the adoption by an NGO of: a „micro investor influence strategy‟ 
(shareholder activism) rather than a macro „capital redistribution strategy‟ (ethical 
investment); an indirect route of influence in which the help of large institutional investors 
is sought rather than a direct one; and a balance of both business and moral arguments.  
2.7. Missing Perspectives in the Literature 
Empirical literature on shareholder engagement has been primarily preoccupied with 
analysing the results of shareholder proposals, whereas other activist strategies and tactics 
such as raising questions at an AGM or writing letters have rarely been accounted for 
(Monks et al., 2004; Tkac, 2006). What is more, the research area has been dominated by 
the use of quantitative methodology – the majority of studies exploring shareholder 
resolutions rely on statistical analysis of the ethical resolutions compiled by the IRRC 
within a specific time period and explore causal relationships between variables such as 
profitability, CSR, shareholder value and shareholder activism (see Southwood, 2003; 
Barber, 2007). Similarly, when it comes to the effectiveness of shareholder activism, both 
supporters and sceptics often measure changes in corporate behaviour with reference to 
scores by rating agencies (see David et al., 2007; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). Although 
such methodology is useful in identifying certain trends, a more in-depth analysis and 
multifaceted approach, which takes into account the nuances of the phenomenon, is 
necessary in order to account for the interactions between NGOs, investors and companies, 
and to answer how and why such trends arise. A qualitative approach based on multiple 
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case studies, semi-structured interviews and document analysis can be of benefit for 
achieving this (Mason, 2002). 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter the literature on socio-ethical activism has been discussed 
chronologically, synthesised in four major themes which cover: the issues and outcomes of 
shareholder proposals; the effectiveness of activism; the role of institutional investors, and 
the role of NGOs in the activist arena. Given the under-researched field of socio-ethical 
shareholder activism in general, especially in the UK context, and NGO intervention in 
particular, it has been concluded that the academic literature would benefit from more 
empirical research which examines the role of the not-for-profit sector in the shareholder 
activist arena. As suggested by Sjostrom (2007, p.158): „There is little academic research 
that explicitly addresses how civil society organisations are connecting themselves to the 
financial sector‟.  
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3. Methodology 
If we knew what we were doing, it wouldn’t be called 
research. 
(Albert Einstein) 
The main aim of this part of the study is to explore the methods and processes used to 
address the research questions which have been developed on the basis of the literature 
evaluation conducted in Chapter 2. Once the research questions are formulated at the 
beginning of the chapter, the scope, as well as the philosophical and theoretical context of 
the study are summarised. Furthermore, the research design is outlined, followed by an 
examination of the reliability, validity, and generalisability of findings, as well as a 
discussion of the research methods. Other elements of the research process, such as the 
mechanics of data collection and analysis, as well as the ethical considerations involved, are 
also explored. 
3.1. Research Questions 
1. What shareholder activist strategies do NGOs use to advance their goals? 
2. What impact do NGOs achieve among the investor community and the targeted 
companies? 
3. What are the main challenges faced by NGOs? 
3.2. Scope 
The thesis focuses on national and international NGOs operating in the UK. The primary 
reason for this decision stems from the scarcity of academic research on NGO shareholder 
activism in the UK, coupled with the growing expansion of the phenomenon in recent years 
and the regulatory environment which is more conducive to investor activism when 
compared to the US (see Black and Coffee, 1994). Given the context specific nature of 
activism, the findings of papers exploring the environment in different countries are not 
necessarily directly applicable to the UK. Second, limiting the geographical scope enables a 
more accurate comparison between the three campaign case studies as all NGOs studied 
here operate within the same political, legal and social environment and are subject to the 
same external pressures. Finally, the geographical coverage reflects the importance of the 
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City of London as a major international financial centre. To take an example with climate 
change, almost twenty per cent of all the fossil fuels in the world are owned and traded in 
London (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011). This suggests that the act of influencing the City 
can have a potential positive impact with far reaching consequences for global warming. 
In terms of the types of companies that are being targeted, as the main focus of this thesis is 
on NGOs‟ use of shareholder activism exercised via the financial markets, the form of 
corporate enterprises that are of interest are public limited companies (or (PLCs) listed on 
the stock exchange
22
. Public limited companies are „public‟ as they aim to acquire capital 
by issuing shares that can be bought by the general public. They are „limited‟ insofar as the 
maximum amount for which shareholders are liable is limited to the investment they made 
originally. The fact that listed PLCs tend to be significantly larger than other types of 
companies makes them the primary targets of NGO campaigns due to their potential to be 
trendsetters and because of their impact on society and the environment. 
While NGOs normally incorporate an array of different campaign tactics in their corporate 
engagement strategies, it is their shareholder activist actions (summarised below) that are in 
focus. The research discusses NGO activities that:  
- Target companies and/or their investors using the rights associated with share 
ownership to initiate change in company policy and behaviour.  
- Target either the government directly or via investors to change the public policy 
framework and structural conditions in which the capital market institutions operate 
with the aim of facilitating or encouraging responsible ownership. 
Unit of Analysis 
The campaigns, rather than the NGOs themselves, form the main unit of analysis. Although 
each NGO has a specific focus (i.e. the environment in the case of Greenpeace and Friends 
of the Earth; human rights – Amnesty International; poverty – ActionAid; indigenous rights 
– Survival International, etc.), unethical corporate practices can be interpreted from a 
variety of perspectives. This is why it is often the case that a number of different NGOs 
                                                 
22
 There are also PLCs which are not listed. Private companies can re-register as public companies, 
but keep the same restrictions on issues and transfers of shares, provided they comply with some 
additional company law rules. The focus of the thesis, however, is on listed PLCs as it is precisely 
in these organisations that shareholder influence can be leveraged more effectively.  
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campaign on the same issue. Focusing on the campaign enables a more in-depth, 
comprehensive exploration of the problem and of the efforts of all organisations working in 
the area. This approach widens the pool of available interviewees and facilitates a 
discussion of the whole repertoire of tactics that are employed.   
3.3. Philosophical Context and Theoretical Perspective 
Philosophical paradigms that explain the nature of reality and knowledge occupy a central 
part in a research process as they inform the formulation of research questions and the 
selection of research designs, encouraging researchers to adopt different methodologies 
(Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006). Therefore, a consideration of the epistemological and 
ontological foundations of the study is an essential „ingredient‟ of a „good‟ research project.  
The field of shareholder activism has been characterised by an abundance of papers that 
adopt a positivistic stance (for example, David et al., 2007; Vogel, 1983). In seeking to 
depart from this dominant approach, the current study is based on Derek Layder‟s (1993, 
1998) adaptive theory, which is predicated upon a realist model of social science. Realism 
can be regarded as an alternative to both traditional positivistic and interpretative 
philosophies. It shares resemblance to positivism because it acknowledges the existence of 
an objective reality, but it overcomes some of its weaknesses as it rejects the idea of a 
social world constituted of universal laws and one single truth (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 
2000). From an ontological perspective, realism also overcomes some of the weaknesses 
associated with interpretative and postmodernist approaches as, while not refuting the idea 
of the socially constructed nature of the world, it does not go so far as to allege that the 
world is merely socially constructed (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004). As Layder (1993, 
p.16) explains:  
Put very simple, a central feature of realism is its attempt to preserve a 
„scientific‟ attitude towards social analysis at the same time as recognizing 
the importance of actors‟ meanings and in some way incorporating them in 
research.  
Adaptive theory attempts to address the problem of the division between agency and 
structure in social research by offering a multifaceted model of society which incorporates 
both macro (structural, institutional) phenomena and micro phenomena (interaction, 
behaviour) (Layder, 1993). The realist perspective helps illuminate the dynamics of social 
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interaction and at the same time it outlines the structural conditions (economic and 
regulatory climate) that have an impact on the work of NGOs. The macro and micro levels 
of analysis form the basis of Layder‟s (1993) research map which attempts to convey the 
complex and interwoven nature of social reality. 
Figure 6: Research Map (Adapted from Layder (1993) to Reflect Areas of Interest to 
The Research) 
Research Element Research Focus 
CONTEXT 
Refers to macro phenomena 
which constitute the more 
remote environment 
influencing social activity. 
Macro social forms, e.g. political climate, 
legal framework, economic environment 
 
SETTING  
Refers to a research focus on 
the immediate environment 
which provides an arena for 
social activity. 
Immediate environment of social activity, 
e.g. organisation, AGM, conference/event 
SITUATED                      
ACTIVITY  
The research focus shifts away 
from the individual towards the 
characteristics and dynamics of 
social interaction. 
Dynamics of “face-to-face" interaction 
SELF  
The individual‟s relation to his 
or hers social environment. 
Biographical experience and social 
involvements 
 
Source: Layder (1993) 
These different elements overlap with each other and should be seen as operating in two 
dimensions simultaneously – as a series of layers (vertically) and as layers stretched over 
time (horizontally) (Layder, 1993). The multi-method approach to fieldwork adopted in this 
study has been viewed in terms of the elements outlined in the research map – the methods 
H 
I 
S 
T 
O 
R 
Y 
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described in the next section correspond to the four levels of analysis (context, setting, 
situated activity and self). Semi-structured interviews were used to obtain information on 
the dynamics of situated activity and self, participant observation provided an insight into 
setting and situated activity, whereas document analysis and secondary sources served to 
investigate the macro elements of the context. As Layder (1993) suggests: 
Investigation of self and situated behaviour is best conducted by the use of classical 
forms of qualitative research, such as participant and non-participant observation, 
semi-structured interviewing and so on…(p.114). 
(…) for the purposes of fieldwork the main sources of empirical data relevant to 
these phenomena will be gleaned from documentary and survey analyses (p.117). 
From a theoretical perspective, the research draws on insights from the social movement 
literature to explain, substantiate and position the findings within a broader academic field. 
Social movement scholars have traditionally focused on how movements interact with the 
state to influence policy (Giugni et al., 1999; Yaziji and Doh, 2013) and between the 1970s 
and the early 2000s academics studying corporations and non-profits rarely engaged with 
social movement theory (de Bakker et al., 2013). However, de Bakker et al. (2013) suggest 
that, as the boundaries between the social movement, civil society and corporate sector 
fields have become more open and fluid, movement scholars‟ focus shifted from an 
exclusive concern with „public politics‟ to an inclusion of „private politics‟.  The impact 
that movement activity has on shaping organisational behaviour has recently started 
receiving increasing attention (Lounsbury, 2001; King, 2008; King and Soule, 2007). 
According to de Bakker et al. (2013) this blurring of boundaries facilitates borrowing from 
and building upon insights stemming from different fields of study, leading in turn to new 
opportunities for advancing theoretical and practical understanding. An application of the 
knowledge on social movement dynamics will be of benefit to the study of socio-ethical 
shareholder activism because, as Zald and Berger (1978) have suggested more than three 
decades ago, little attention has been dedicated to those actors who steer away from radical 
tactics such as boycotts and protests and engage in activism inside corporations through 
leveraging the power of share ownership – a type of activism which, according to Lee and 
Lounsbury (2011) “facilitates the creation of legitimate agenda items in corporate decision-
making processes” (p.157). At the same time, exploring socio-ethical activism will provide 
valuable insights into how movements shape corporations and institutional investors.  
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3.4. Research Design: The Multiple Case Study Approach 
The purpose of the study forms part of the research design. Robson (1993) identifies three 
types of empirical enquiry underpinning social science research: exploratory, explanatory 
and descriptive. Very little academic attention has been dedicated to the exploration of the 
role of NGOs as change agents which encourage responsible ownership behaviour and 
which use the power of shares to advance their ideological objectives. Since exploratory 
research „relates to topics about which very little is known‟ (Richey and Klein, 2007, p. 
43), this paper adopts an exploratory purpose as it seeks to understand and explore the 
dynamics of engagement with investors and companies. 
The research design of the project is based on the multiple case study method – a method 
operationalised by Yin (2003) as a scientific enquiry focused on the investigation of a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context. This definition resonates quite well 
with the objectives of the current study. Rather than the more abstract and speculative 
theorising which is abundant in the literature on shareholder activism (Ghauri and 
Grønhaug, 2002; Corley and Gioia, 2011), the case study approach facilitates the 
formulation of novel, testable and empirically valid theoretical insights which closely 
mirror reality (Eisenhardt, 1989). In view of the deductive-inductive approach adopted, 
simple, well-constructed case studies can be very informative because, as suggested by 
Saunders et al. (2003), they can serve to challenge an existing theory and also provide a 
source of new theoretical insights. The methodological pluralism of case studies creates the 
potential for development of in-depth, narrative-like description (Marinetto, 2012) which is 
of particular importance for answering „why‟ and „how‟ questions (Yin, 2003). Moreover, 
within realism, case research is considered as being particularly effective in explaining 
complex social phenomena by establishing the underlying processes and structures that 
shape them (Easton, 1998).  
Choosing an experimental research design is discarded as an option given its artificial 
setting and inability to produce reliable data which corresponds with what is going on in the 
outside world (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). Given the often prolonged period through which 
campaigns can span, a longitudinal approach to data collection is beneficial for analysing 
the intervention in its entirety. To achieve such a longitudinal effect within the limited 
timespan of the research, strategies such as continual analysis of live and company 
documents, attendance at AGMs throughout the years, and re-interviewing of some of the 
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participants were adopted. These added a longitudinal and historical component to the 
research.  
However, the case study research design has often been criticised by proponents of the 
positivist tradition for being an inadequate method of inquiry. The main question being 
raised by critics centres on the issues of validity, reliability (producing rigorous data) 
(Thomas, 2004) and generalisation, or in other words, the inability to generalise results to a 
wider population (Marinetto, 2012).  
This thesis adopts the view that the aim of case studies and qualitative research is to 
enhance understanding (Stake, 1995) and to provide rich accounts of the social world 
which, on certain occasions, can lead to the development of theoretical propositions 
applicable to the wider society (Creswell, 1997). As Silverman (2005) asserts, extrapolation 
is a better suited word than generalisation as the primary reliance is on analytical, rather 
than statistical generalisation (Bryman, 1988). Since notions of validity and reliability, in 
terms of the way we understand them in quantitative research, cannot be used for assessing 
qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), alternative strategies for ascertaining the 
validity of qualitative studies have been developed. Table 4 below reveals the steps that this 
study takes to address the five categories of validity described by Maxwell (1992) in his 
model: 
 Table 4: Maxwell’s Five Types of Validity 
 
VALIDITY 
TYPE 
 
CENTRAL ISSUE 
 
STRATEGIES 
Descriptive Factual accuracy – refers to the valid 
description, credibility, and 
authenticity of the collected data and 
of the interpretations made from this 
data. 
 Extensive field notes 
written during the data 
collection process. 
 Thick description. 
 Interviews are tape 
recorded and a list of 
interviewees is included in 
Appendix 1. 
 On-going coding. 
Interpretive Meaning of events – relates to the 
meaning or the interpretation of the 
data. Has the researcher understood 
and portrayed accurately the 
participant‟s views? 
 Member checking – 
respondents commenting 
on the interview 
transcripts. 
 Triangulation – using 
secondary data and 
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document analysis to 
avoid memory bias 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and to 
obtain an accurate case 
narrative (Yin, 2003). 
 Use of direct quotes from 
the interviews. 
Theoretical Concepts and their relationships – 
Does the derived theoretical model 
correspond to the gathered data? How 
consistent is the researcher with the 
application of concepts and have all 
concepts been operationalised?  
 Clear operationalisation of 
key concepts at the 
beginning of the study. 
 Use of an external auditor 
to check consistency and 
validity. 
External Generalisability – the extent to which 
what has been studied can be 
extended to other persons, times or 
settings. 
 Measured conclusion. 
 Critical realism – the 
study offers partial 
insights into what might 
be encountered in another 
context. 
Evaluative Application of a framework – a 
consideration is given to the way the 
researcher has described, interpreted 
and constructed the theory. Has the 
development of a framework been 
done successfully and has the research 
accomplished what was intended 
initially? 
 Peer debriefing. 
 Use of an external auditor 
to provide an assessment 
of the data collection, 
interpretation and 
application of theory. 
Source: Maxwell (1992) 
The empirical findings are based on an analysis of a total of three case studies representing 
the following three campaigns: 
- The Vedanta Campaign – human rights and environmental concerns surrounding 
mining multinational Vedanta Resources‟ alumina refinery in Orissa, India and the 
company‟s proposal to open a bauxite mine on top of the Nyamgiri Hills – a sacred 
mountain for indigenous communities. 
- The Niger Delta Campaign – targets Royal Dutch Shell on two grounds – 
widespread environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and human 
rights abuses. 
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- The Tax Justice Campaign – targets FTSE 100 companies. Aims to address 
aggressive tax planning practices which stall the development of third world 
countries. 
These three interventions cover eight NGOs which have been campaigning on the issues 
and were chosen for the following reasons: 
1. The campaigns differ in a number of significant ways which will make for a fruitful 
discussion and comparison.  
- Different Strategies: First, the Niger Delta campaign has relied primarily, though 
not exclusively, on the indirect route of influence. This is in contrast to the Tax Justice 
campaign which is primarily based on NGOs buying shares and having a direct engagement 
with companies. The Vedanta case uses a mixture of both these strategies. 
- Level of Success: The prima facie level of success of different interventions varied – 
with some considered as successful (Vedanta) and others as less successful (Niger Delta). 
Such a contrast provides for an interesting assessment of the factors that influenced the 
outcome. 
- Focus of Campaign: Changing one small aspect of a company‟s behaviour (tax and 
Vedanta) versus targeting a company with a variety of controversial projects or a company 
whose whole business model is up for scrutiny (Shell). 
2. All campaigns are prominent cases which have generated significant media and 
NGO attention. Therefore, the amount of available data was sufficient to conduct the 
analysis. 
3. The selected campaigns provide a good contrast between historic, long-lasting 
interventions (Vedanta and Shell) and the comparatively recent but very topical issue of tax 
justice.  
4. Shareholder activism practiced by NGOs is not a widespread tactic yet and this 
poses limits on the choice of available campaigns to study. Some of the interventions that 
were considered for analysis but were discarded include: the Living Wage campaign, the 
Tar Sands campaign of 2010, the Climate Change campaign and the Arctic drilling 
campaign. The first two were discarded because they formed part of a previous study the 
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researcher conducted in 2012. The latter two interventions do not form part of the present 
analysis as they are considered to be very recent – their origins date back to the beginning 
of the research in 2013, whereas the Tax Justice campaign, although recent, had already 
been running for a year prior to the start of the data collection period. 
5. Two of the targeted companies (Vedanta and Shell) are from the mining and 
extractive sector. This selection is not made intentionally and is not designed to provide an 
insight into shareholder activist campaigns against companies from this sector. Rather, it 
can be explained by the fact that companies from the mining and extractive sector are 
known to commit in general a greater number of environmental and human rights abuses 
and, as a consequence, are a frequent target of NGO campaigns. According to the 
chronology in Appendix 3, 38 out of the 110 campaigns, or 34.5 per cent overall, targeted 
companies in the mining and extractive sector. 
3.5. Research Methods 
Having discussed the research questions, philosophical position, and research design, this 
section of the study examines and provides a justification for the choice of research 
methods. Such a choice is informed by the epistemological and ontological assumptions 
underpinning a particular study and depends on the main research objectives, as well as on 
the essence of the social processes under investigation. The ontological foundations of 
realism allow researchers to be selective in their choice of research tools (Fleetwood and 
Ackroyd, 2004).  
When collecting data on shareholder activism the temporal aspect should be considered 
carefully since campaign outcomes may not be evident in the short-term (Sjostrom, 2008). 
A major limitation in the literature stems from the fact that papers which use scores by a 
rating agency as a primary method for data collection do not adequately reflect changes in 
corporate behaviour as a result of campaigns. Sjostrom (2008, p.152) suggests that   
„Interview-based case studies can therefore play a vital role for such research‟. Given the 
exploratory nature of the present study, the need for a detailed understanding that takes 
account of temporal aspects, the scarcity of qualitative papers on the subject, and the 
methodological pluralism characteristic for critical realism,   the methodological position of 
the research is based on a multi-method qualitative research paradigm (see table below).  
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Table 5: Data Collection Techniques 
Semi-
Structured 
Interviews with 
Retrospective 
Component 
A total of 40 interviews with NGO representatives, 
investors and ESG professionals. See Appendix 1 
for a full list of interviewees. 
December 
2012 – 
December 
2014 
Analysis of 
Documents 
Newsletter archives, investor briefings, press 
releases, NGOs‟ research papers and publications. 
Live documents have been retrieved by searching 
for key terms (i.e. „Vedanta‟, „tax‟, „Niger Delta‟) in 
the major UK newspapers (The Guardian, Financial 
Times, The Independent, The Telegraph) and a 
content analysis of the results was conducted. The 
search command used was Site: Guardian.co.uk 
“Vedanta” to display all articles with the key word 
Vedanta published in the Guardian. 
September 
2012 – 
December 
2014 
Participant 
Observation 
Attendance at training events for shareholder 
activists organised by NGOs and conferences on 
investor engagement and ESG issues.  Participant 
observation at the AGMs of four FTSE 100 
companies. 
November 
2012 – 
November 
2014 
 
Methodology 
Qualitative methods provide the most appropriate way to address the research questions for 
various reasons which are explained in this section. This decision was influenced by the 
under-researched and contemporary nature of the phenomenon under study (NGO 
shareholder activism) which presupposes a more detailed approach focusing not solely on 
exploring the causal links between variables. As noted above, studies of shareholder 
activism have predominantly adopted a positivistic stance and quantitative methodology. 
However, the contradictory nature of the literature highlights the limitations of this 
approach as papers attempting to answer the same questions often produce very divergent 
results (ex. David et al. 2007; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Vandekerckhove et al., 2007). 
Although quantitative methods can be employed in measuring the success and impact of 
individual NGO campaigns, the depth and accuracy of findings may be open to question. 
This is explained by the fact that the outcomes of shareholder action are often intangible, 
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slow to be realised and cannot be assessed in isolation as each campaign is a complex 
interplay between various campaign tactics and external circumstances. In comparison, the 
merits of using a qualitative approach stems from its ability to provide a rich, holistic and 
nuanced account of social reality (Mason, 2002) and to explain the complex interaction 
between NGOs, investors and companies. It adds flexibility to the research process by 
facilitating the researcher‟s exploration of unforeseen issues as they arise (Lewis, 2003) and 
to tailor the methods to the circumstances of each interviewee (Bryman, 2008). This helps 
create what Mason (2002, p. 65) calls „situated knowledge‟. Moreover, the development of 
empirically supported new theoretical insights – a central aim of this paper – is facilitated 
by qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
Semi-structured interviews, analysis of documents and participant observation have been 
chosen as the most effective methods to be employed. These are discussed in turn in the 
following sections. 
Situated Activity and Self: Semi-Structured Interviews 
The semi-structured interview was chosen as a preferred method of data collection because, 
by being open to emergent themes and to the wants and needs of interviewees (Alvesson 
and Deetz, 2000), it offers much more flexibility when compared to „talking questionnaires‟ 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987). At the same time, the use of a guide makes data collection 
more systematic than in an unstructured interview and ensures that the conversation is 
being kept within the bounds of what is important for addressing the research questions 
(May, 2011).  
Due to the nature of the enquiry, which required gaining insight into conditions of great 
complexity, the researcher needed to be able to adapt the interview questions and follow up 
issues as they arise. The flexibility afforded by the semi-structured interview facilitated this 
process. As opposed to relying on a structured interview, the exploration of the case studies 
is more comprehensive when based on questions asked in a semi-structured format, because 
they document a richer account of participants‟ views and enable the exploration of much 
more complex and varied descriptions (Martin and Turner, 1986; Bryman et al., 1988). The 
data collected by means of semi-structured interviewing for this study thus represents 
respondents‟ views and feelings more accurately in the absence of the categorical 
imposition typical of questionnaire and survey research, as the method facilitated 
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interviewees‟ freedom of expression (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). Moreover, the 
opportunity to ask additional emerging questions, which elicit further explanation 
(Gubrium and Holstein, 2002), as well as the opportunity to negotiate meaning, make the 
subsequent analysis of data more valid (Mason, 2002). 
This said, it could be argued that the relatively novel and under-researched nature of the 
topic of shareholder activism makes the adoption of an unstructured approach to 
interviewing plausible. However, as the researcher had previously undertaken some 
research into the area, she had identified the information that needed to be collected.  There 
is also the issue that unstructured interviewing poses challenges when it comes to the 
comparability of responses and data analysis since it generates less systemic and 
comprehensive accounts (Walsh and Wigens, 2003). This risks making the comparison of 
collected data between different case studies difficult. The unstructured interview format 
was therefore discarded as an option for the current study. The combination of clearly 
defined questions with a semi-structured interview style ensured a clear focus and structure 
for the enquiry, which allowed room for additional insights to emerge from more fluid 
interaction with respondents.  
However, semi-structured interviewing is not without its limitations. For instance, issues of 
comparability exist in semi-structured interviews as well, because respondents may not 
have been asked exactly the same questions and different probes may have been explored. 
Although less pertinent than in an open-ended, unstructured interview, it was recognised 
that the problem of variation is a feature of the semi-structured format. In addressing this 
potential weakness in the research design, the interview schedule was designed prior to the 
start of the data collection process and all interviews were therefore based around a 
predefined set of  key questions which need to be covered as an absolute minimum and 
which were asked in all interviews. On occasions where an interviewee spent a long time 
answering a specific question, it was sometimes difficult to formulate probes and follow up 
questions immediately, due to the sheer quantity of ideas that presented themselves and 
could be pursued. To mitigate this problem, brief notes were written by the researcher 
throughout the interview which served as the basis for questions once the participants had 
finished expressing their views. All interviews were conducted in the participants‟ natural 
work setting in order to elicit further information about their daily activities, to 
contextualise the research findings, and to enhance ecological validity (Creswell, 2003). 
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Context: Analysis of Documents 
The use of organisational documents serves two important functions – it allows for 
triangulation of the data gathered through interviewing and helps contextualise the research. 
Scott (1990) emphasises the historical element that documents can add to research by 
giving examples of sociological studies which have used documentary sources for historical 
investigation. In this respect, the analysis of organisational documents forms a central part 
of the research process as it has allowed the researcher to recreate 'a history' of 
organisational processes with regard to shareholder activist campaigns. According to 
Layder (1993), although historical research tends to often be neglected in methods books, it 
is essential to incorporate a historical component as part of the data collection procedure 
since it traces institutional and social behavioural changes over time and adds depth to a 
study. 
The use of documents is advantageous because they provide rich and contextually relevant 
information (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). They also eliminate the problem of observer bias as 
they are almost always easily available, free to obtain and naturally occurring (Lindlof and 
Taylor, 2011). The analysis of documents, coupled with retrospective interviewing, adds an 
additional longitudinal element in case study research (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Rather 
than considering a single fixed moment in time, organisational documentation allows for an 
understanding of how processes have unfolded over a longer timescale. This is of particular 
importance to the current study since all of the campaigns have been running for more than 
three years. The use of documents was essential in the present study for purposes of fact 
checking, for developing the chronology and for collecting valuable information in advance 
of each interview with the view of minimising the time spent on general questions. 
Nevertheless, document analysis also has limitations. For example, it may often be time-
consuming and laborious to sort through documents, relevant data can be difficult to obtain 
due to extraneous information, and some documents may be costly to access (Grady, 1998). 
When it comes to the current study, it was not difficult to obtain information but, due to the 
sheer quantity of newspaper articles, NGO reports and company documents available, 
going through everything and synthesising the data involved considerable time and effort. 
Live documents were retrieved by searching for key terms (i.e. „Vedanta‟, „tax‟, „Niger 
Delta‟) in the major UK newspapers (see Table 5) and a periodic search through the 
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webpages of the campaigning NGOs and the targeted companies ensured that the researcher 
had access to the latest investor briefings, press releases, and NGO research papers. 
Setting and Situated Activity: Participant Observation 
The study also relies on a unique method of data collection in research on shareholder 
activism – namely – participant observation in the form of attendance at company AGMs 
and training events organised by the researched NGOs. Haug (2013) characterises meetings 
as „the nodes of the social movement infrastructure‟ (p.728) and advocates for an increased 
use of meetings as units of analysis because such an approach leads to a better 
understanding of social movement dynamics, implying new perspectives on leadership, 
hierarchy, control, democracy, change, and inter-organisational collaboration. Participant 
observation adds depth to the study, enhances credibility, and provides a close, insider view 
into the complex interactions between the campaigning organisation and shareholders, 
companies, individual supporters, and other NGOs (Becker and Geer, 1957). It allows for 
the context of people‟s behaviour to be mapped out fully (Punch, 2005) and facilitates a 
central aim of the study – namely – the forging of links between micro and macro 
phenomenon, between behaviour and context. The ethnographic method is considered to be 
a particularly useful way of collecting data, given the exploratory nature of the study and 
the under-researched field. It should also be taken into account that this methodological 
technique has been rarely utilised before in shareholder activist research. 
Similarly to interviewing, participant observation can also be time-consuming and can 
generate a great amount of data (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010). Some question the method‟s 
ability to accurately reconstruct a participant‟s social reality (Blaikie, 2000) and suggest 
that the presence of a researcher may alter the normal rhythm of events, making participants 
feel the need to perform (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
When conducting ethnographic work, the researcher must decide which role to adopt on the 
participant-observer continuum. For the purposes of this study, the classification developed 
by Gans (1968) has been applied. It consists of three roles (the total participant, the 
researcher-participant and the total researcher) that coexist and are used at different times 
during the ethnographic process. Gans‟ (1968) classification has an advantage as, unlike 
Gold‟s (1958), it deals only with overt observation and acknowledges the fact that 
researcher‟s roles are often subject to negotiation and renegotiation. 
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Field notes constituted a crucial part of the ethnographic work – they were taken throughout 
the observation process and immediately after noticing something important. Full field 
notes were written up in detail at the earliest opportunity. In terms of content, the field 
notes represented a thorough summary of events and behaviour, as well as the researcher‟s 
analytical ideas and reflections on them. Although the writing of notes was oriented 
towards the research objectives, interesting and unexpected insights were also recorded in 
line with the flexible nature of qualitative research (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
3.6. Ethical Considerations 
The study is guided by the ESRC Research Ethics Framework (REF). Prior to embarking 
upon the data collection process, ethical approval was sought and was granted by the 
university‟s ethics committee. Consent forms were given to participants at the beginning of 
each interview (Appendix 2). These outlined the main aims of the research, as well as the 
methods of data collection. They assured interviewees that their participation would be 
entirely voluntary, highlighted their anonymity, and stressed their right to withdraw at any 
time or to refuse to answer certain questions. Participants were given mine and my 
supervisor‟s contact details should they have any questions related to the study. To 
distinguish between interviewees and at the same time safeguard their anonymity, all 
interview extracts from one participant are represented through a certain letter which is 
specific for each interviewee. 
3.7. Mechanics of The Research Process 
Altogether 40 interviews were collected – 36 of them were face-to-face and 4 were a 
telephone conversation.  Lasting between thirty and ninety minutes, all interviews were 
digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed. Once the campaign case studies were 
chosen, the documentary material was reviewed with the aim of identifying key personnel 
in a position to provide the necessary insight. The data collection process was governed by 
purposive sampling – individuals were carefully selected based on their time spent in the 
organisation (and to what extent this coincided with the timespan of the campaign), their 
role (whether they were involved in investor engagement, AGM attendance and strategy 
formulation), or their broader knowledge on responsible investment and market reform. As 
the fieldwork progressed, there was also an element of a „snowball‟ effect in getting access 
to interviewees. Appendix 1 provides a list of respondents.  
65 
In terms of the interview schedule, there were both campaign-specific questions and 
standard benchmark questions applied across all participants. Broadly speaking, the 
standard questions were concerned with the objectives and timeframe of a campaign, the 
role of the interviewee, the strategies used, the challenges faced, and the investor and 
company response. Case study specific questions were devised prior to each conversation 
and were based on two factors: a careful analysis of relevant campaign documents and the 
circumstances of each participant. Interviews were conducted until reaching data saturation 
point where no further distinct themes were emerging. One potential problem was that 
interviewing NGO representatives, who are so closely involved with the campaigns, could 
result in a bias towards exaggerated claims of success and downplay of failures. To mitigate 
this risk, extensive use was made of relevant documentary sources and cross-referencing of 
statements with the opinions of other interviewees. 
Table 6 below provides a list of participant observation events throughout the research. 
These were chosen on the basis of their relevance to the study.  
Table 6: Participant Observation Events 
Date Time Event Type Organisation 
17 November 
2012 
10 am – 4.30 
pm 
Become A 
Workplace 
Responsible 
Investment 
Champion (1)
23
 
Training event ShareAction 
28 January 2013 8 pm – 9 pm Long-term Vs. 
Short-term 
Investing (2) 
Webinar Network for 
Sustainable 
Financial Markets 
16 February 
2013 
10 am – 4.30 
pm 
Become A 
Shareholder 
Activist (3) 
Training event ShareAction 
18 March 2013 6.30 pm – 7.30 
pm 
Fighting for 
Human Rights for 
People in the 
Developing 
World: Standing 
Up for the Local 
Davids Against 
British Goliaths 
(4) 
Lecture Martin Day 
(senior partner at 
Leigh Day & Co 
and former 
chairman of 
Greenpeace UK) 
11 April 2013 11.30 am – 3 
pm 
BP AGM (5) AGM BP 
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 Similarly to the interview extracts, each participant observation event has its own number from 1 to 28. 
This is to ensure that the fieldwork notes discussed in the findings are linked back to the specific event during 
which they were recorded. 
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02 May 2013 3 pm – 4.20 pm Labour and 
Finance in the 
USA (6) 
Lecture Sanford Jacoby 
(Professor at 
UCLA) 
9 May 2013 4 pm – 5 pm Pushing the Reset 
Button for Pension 
Fund Investment 
(7) 
Webinar Network for 
Sustainable 
Financial Markets 
21 May 2013 9 am – 1.30 pm Shell AGM (8) AGM Shell 
24 May 2013 11 am – 1.30 
pm 
HSBC AGM (9) AGM HSBC 
11 – 12 June 
2013 
8.30 am – 5.30 
pm 
Responsible 
Investment Europe 
2013: The Investor 
– Corporate ESG 
Summit (10) 
Conference Responsible 
Investor 
01 July 2013 1.30 pm – 4.30 
pm 
Mobilising Ethical 
Investment to 
Close the Gap (11) 
An event on fair 
pay and fair 
taxation for 
church-based 
investors 
Church Action on 
Poverty, the 
Ecumenical 
Council for 
Corporate 
Responsibility 
(ECCR, hereafter) 
01 August 2013 3 pm – 5.30 pm Vedanta AGM 
(12) 
AGM Vedanta 
15 August 2013 4 pm – 4.45 pm CEO of 
ShareAction on 
Pension Funds and 
Climate Risk (13) 
Webinar Network for 
Sustainable 
Financial Markets 
19 September 
2013 
2 pm – 3 pm Multinational 
Corporations and 
Tax Transparency: 
Issues for 
Responsible 
Investors (14) 
Webinar Sustainalytics 
(speakers from 
ChristianAid, and 
Arisaig Partners) 
16 October 2013 6 pm -  Principles and 
Profits: Investing 
to Protect People, 
the Planet and 
your Savings (15) 
Panel 
Discussion 
National Ethical 
Investment Week 
(NEIW), the 
Ethical 
Investment 
Research Service 
(EIRIS, 
hereafter), 
ShareAction 
17 October 2013 4.30 pm – 6.30 
pm 
Church Investment 
– Witness or 
Whitewash? (16) 
Open Debate NEIW, ECCR 
26 October 2013 9.30 am – 2 pm Finance: What‟s 
Faith Got to do 
with it? (17) 
Seminar ECCR, Shared 
Interest, Fair 
Trade Wales, 
Church in Wales 
30 October 2013 6 pm – 8.30 pm Green Light 
Campaign Launch 
(18) 
Launch Event ShareAction 
19 November 5 pm – 6.30 pm Our Money, Our Report launch ShareAction 
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2013 Business: Building 
A More 
Accountable 
Investment System 
(19) 
with a 
presentation 
from Christine 
Berry (author) 
followed by a 
panel discussion 
25 January 2014 10.30 am – 4 
pm 
Become A 
Shareholder 
Activist! (20) 
Training Event ChristianAid and 
ShareAction 
09 March 2014 6 pm – 7.30 pm The UK Gold (21) Film on Tax ActionAid 
20 May 2014 9 am – 12.30 
pm 
Shell AGM (22) AGM Shell 
23 May 2014 11 am – 1 pm HSBC AGM (23) AGM HSBC 
04 June 2014 6 pm – 7 pm Paying Up – Is 
Tax A Question of 
Ethics? (24) 
A panel 
discussion 
convened by 
ChristianAid 
and JustShare 
ChristianAid and 
JustShare 
01 August 2014 3 pm – 5.30 pm Vedanta AGM 
(25) 
AGM Vedanta 
14 October 2014 4.30 pm – 6.30 
pm 
Shareholder 
Voting Rights (26) 
Seminar Shareholders 
Society 
22 October 2014 4 pm – 6 pm „Investing in 
Equality‟ (27) 
Panel Debate Organised by 
ECCR with 
participants from 
ShareAction and 
ChristianAid 
17 November 
2014 
6.30 pm – 8 pm „How Finance is 
Tackling 
Sustainability: A 
Roadmap to the 
Future‟ (28) 
Public Lecture London School of 
Economics 
 
Apart from various subject-related conferences, NGO talks, seminars and training days, the 
researcher purchased shares and observed the AGMs of Vedanta Resources and Shell for 
two consecutive years (2013 and 2014), as well as the 2013 AGM of BP
24
, at which the 
researcher asked a question. The first two were chosen because two of the case studies are 
based on campaigns launched against Vedanta Resources and Shell. BP‟s AGM was 
attended because a question on tax was asked by a representative of ChristianAid during the 
event. Thus, those five AGMs are directly relevant to all three case studies. I observed 
Shell‟s AGMs via an audio visual link established online – the AGMs took place in The 
Hague and UK shareholders not travelling to the Netherlands to attend personally were not 
permitted to ask questions. I attended BP‟s AGM in 2013, as well as Vedanta‟s AGMs, in 
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 HSBC‟s AGMs in 2013 and 2014 were also observed but they are not mentioned here as they do not form 
part of the subsequent analysis in Chapter 8.  
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person. I was assigned as a proxy by ShareAction for the BP AGM during which I also 
asked a question on high executive pay.  
In order to gain access to Vedanta‟s AGMs, I became a shareholder in the company by 
buying a share through Equiniti‟s Shareview online certificated dealing service. Equiniti 
acts as the registrar for sixty per cent of the FTSE 100 companies. Once registered online, I 
chose the certificated share I wanted to buy and paid with a debit card. The price of the 
share was £11.48, while the dealing fee was £40, making a total of £51.55. A few days 
later, all the documents were received through the post, including the unique shareholder 
reference number which can be used to create an online account for managing your shares 
and the share certificate which confirms the possession of one share in Vedanta Resources. 
Being a shareholder means that I receive an AGM attendance card every year which grants 
access to the AGM. The attendance at AGMs was invaluable for gaining an in-depth insight 
of how NGOs operate in the context of direct shareholder activism. It also served to 
reaffirm and experience in person some of the claims made by interviewees with regards to 
the AGM forum.  
3.8. Data Analysis and Theory Development 
To analyse the data, the interviews were firstly transcribed and, together with the field 
notes, were transformed into a coherent „text‟ (Silverman, 1993; Latimer, 1998). Following 
adaptive theory (Layder, 1998), pre-existing secondary research sources were used to 
support and develop the empirical findings.  
Thematic analysis helped to categorise and organise the data in analytically relevant 
subsets. This entailed assigning codes to parts of varying size text such as words, phrases, 
sentences and paragraphs (Miles and Huberman, 1994) for the purposes of condensing the 
data set into analysable units by creating categories or themes from the data (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996). The data analysis process relied on a mixture of both a predefined and 
data-driven approach to coding. First, a number of predefined broad codes which related 
directly to the research questions were devised. The researcher was interested in examining: 
strategies, impact, campaign-specific challenges and finally, broader external challenges. 
Second, the data was content analysed to identify representative inductive themes within 
these categories obtained directly from the raw data. Reoccurring trends emerged after a 
careful reading and re-reading of the interviews and the participant observation notes. 
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Coding was an on-going process that became more refined over time – each interview was 
coded shortly after it was conducted and before any further data was collected. Such an 
approach was adopted because, as Miles and Huberman (1994, p.65) suggest: „Coding is a 
form of early (and continuing analysis)… on-going coding discovers real or potential 
sources of bias, and surfaces incomplete or equivocal data that can be clarified next time 
out‟.  
The choice of research approach is considered by some to be closely linked to a particular 
research philosophy such that inductive reasoning is seen to owe more to interpretivism, 
whereas deductive reasoning to positivism. However, as Saunders et al. (2003) suggest, 
such strict categorisation is rather misleading and of no practical value. Therefore, the 
theory development approach of the current study is informed by Layder‟s (1998) adaptive 
theory. The thesis occupies a middle ground between the deductive or theory-testing and 
the inductive or theory generating approach. This approach „attempts to combine an 
emphasis on prior theoretical ideas and models which feed into and guide research, while at 
the same time attending to the generation of theory from the on-going analysis of data‟ 
(Layder, 1998, p.19). Chapter 4, which uses Waygood‟s model to expand and develop a 
new chronology, leading to the refinement of the model towards the end of the chapter, is 
an example of the deductive approach. Another example is the use of secondary sources as 
a way of supplementing and informing the case study analysis. The inductive approach 
relates to the identification of representative themes obtained from the raw data, to the 
provision of in-depth, contextualised understanding and to the development of new 
theoretical models such as the one in Section 8.4. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research questions and has explored the philosophical and 
theoretical underpinnings of the study; positioning itself within the realist paradigm and 
adaptive theory. Having discussed the research design and methods, it was determined that 
the thesis is to adopt a multiple case study, qualitative methodology based on semi-
structured interviews, document analysis and participant observation. The data collected is 
used in two ways: 
1. To provide the empirical record necessary to compile the chronology of NGO 
shareholder activist intervention between 2003 and 2013. 
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2. To provide the necessary information for building and presenting the campaign case 
studies. 
In addition, the chapter has examined the reliability, validity, and generalisability of 
research findings, the ethical considerations of the study, as well as the data collection and 
analysis process. The following chapters mark the beginning of the findings section of the 
thesis. Chapters 4 and 5 form the context and history levels of analysis represented in 
Layder‟s (1993) research map (Section 3.3., Figure 6). Drawing on interview data, live 
document searches and document analysis, Chapter 4 presents a chronology of NGO 
shareholder activist intervention in the UK throughout the period 1990 – 2013 and analyses 
trends in NGO strategies.  
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CONTEXT OF NGO-LED SHARE ACTIVISM
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4. Trends in UK NGOs’ Use of 
Shareholder Activism (1990 – 2013) 
If you want to understand today, you have to search yesterday. 
(Pearl S. Buck) 
The aim of this chapter is to trace the development of NGO shareholder activism 
throughout a 24-year period between 1990 and 2013 and to conduct a unique longitudinal 
analysis of activist strategies adopted by campaigning organisations. To achieve this, a 
chronology of NGO shareholder activist interventions, spanning 11 years (2003 – 2013) 
and encompassing 110 campaigns, is created based on empirical data (see Appendix 3). The 
interventions are classified according to Waygood‟s model (2006) explained later in the 
chapter. Second, the study compares the current chronology with the findings from 
Waygood‟s (2006) chronology encompassing the years 1990 – 2002 (13 years and 46 
cases) and discusses the development of NGO shareholder activist strategies over time. 
The purpose and reasons for the creation of the most recent chronology can be summarised 
in six main points. To begin with, it constitutes the first ever record that focuses specifically 
on the actions of UK NGOs in the shareholder activist arena (a central contribution of the 
thesis as discussed in the Conclusion chapter). Second, it systematically compiles and 
categorises the data using Waygood‟s model with the aim of analysing the nature of NGO 
shareholder activist intervention. Third, it adds a longitudinal element to the research by 
tracing the scale and nature of NGO interventions between 1990 and 2013, facilitating a 
more holistic understanding of the phenomenon. Fourth, it positions the campaign case 
studies discussed throughout the chapters that follow in the broader context of NGO 
shareholder activism. Moreover, as Layder (1993) argues, historical analysis traces 
institutional and social behavioural changes over time and adds depth to a study. Finally, 
the chronology serves to refine Waygood‟s model, tailoring it specifically to the 
circumstances of shareholder activist interventions. 
4.1. Chronology Development and Analysis 
Apart from drawing on empirical data to answer the research questions, the study also aims 
to understand how NGO shareholder activism has evolved between 2003 and 2013. This is 
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achieved by developing a chronology detailing all instances of the phenomenon throughout 
the period. The chronology builds upon the work of Waygood (2006) who records instances 
of UK NGO capital market intervention since the time this approach first began to develop 
into a relatively widespread NGO strategy, namely, between 1990 and 2002. Mapping the 
interventions between 2003 – 2013 enables the analysis of trends that emerge over time and 
facilitates the making of comparisons with what has already been discovered by Waygood 
(2006). This results in the provision of a continuous and up-to-date record of the activities 
of third sector organisations in the area of responsible investment since the very inclusion 
of the tactic in their repertoires. However, it should be noted that this thesis, alongside the 
chronology, has a narrower focus on shareholder activism, in comparison to Waygood‟s 
discussion of capital market (CM) intervention in general, which also includes the macro 
capital redistribution strategy, or ethical investment. 
The data for the development of the chronology was sourced from live documents analysis 
(based on a NEXUS database search), semi-structured interviews with campaigners who 
have worked in the campaigning organisations during the researched period, secondary 
literature, web searches, company documents (press releases, briefings, newsletters), and a 
search through the back issues of two periodicals featuring news on responsible investment 
and NGO campaigns – EIRIS‟s The Ethical Investor and ECCR‟s e-newsletter. Based on 
Waygood‟s (2006) analysis, cataloguing the data involved organising it into the categories 
outlined below for each intervention: 
 Number – the chronological position of the intervention compared to the rest of the 
cases in the table. Used for subsequent reference in the text. 
 Date – the year (and month, if known) during which the intervention was launched 
and when it was discontinued.  
 NGO(s) – the name of the NGO(s) involved in the intervention. 
 Campaign Issue – a summary of the main topic of the campaign. 
 Aim – the aim of the intervention. When no articulation of the aim is provided by 
the NGO, a prima facie aim is developed based on the information available. 
 Nature of intervention – a brief description of the action that was initiated by the 
NGO(s). 
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 Classification – the strategy adopted by the NGO(s), classified using an adapted 
version of Waygood‟s model (see below). 
The components of Waygood‟s (2006) model discussed in Section 2.6. provide the means 
of classification. The model is used to classify each intervention rather than the NGO‟s 
overall approach to shareholder activism according to the following: 
1. Route of Influence  
 Direct – as an owner of shares, the NGO uses the influence it has in listed 
companies. 
 Indirect – the NGO co-opts the influence of other CM actors who own, buy and sell 
shares in listed companies. 
 Both 
2. Primary Audience  
 „Capital Markets (CM) institutions‟ – companies and their investors. 
 „Public policy‟ – government „policy makers‟ are the audience. NGOs target the 
public policy framework within which CM institutions operate with the aim of 
facilitating or encouraging shareholder engagement. 
 Both 
3. Nature of Argument 
 Moral case – NGOs use ethical principles such as concerns for the environment and 
human rights to advocate their cause. 
 Business case – NGOs use quantitative or qualitative financial analysis in support of 
a particular course of action. 
 Both 
The following three scenarios outlined in Table 7 demonstrate how the model is applied in 
practice. 
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Table 7: Waygood’s Model in Practice 
Example Scenario 
 
Classification According to 
Waygood’s Model 
1. An NGO attempts to change company behaviour 
by lobbying institutional investors to engage with 
that company – perhaps because its human rights 
track record poses significant threats to reputation 
and share price – and the NGO gathers investor 
support via targeted correspondence and briefing 
of main shareowners. 
 Indirect – „via targeted 
correspondence and 
briefing of main investors‟. 
 CM institutions – 
„institutional investors‟. 
 Business case – 
„significant threats to 
reputation and share price‟. 
2. An NGO attempts to influence a specific 
company via buying shares with the objective of 
attending the AGM and asking a question which 
highlights the environmental consequences of the 
company‟s operations. 
 Direct – „buying shares 
with the objective of 
attending its AGM‟. 
 CM institutions – 
„attending the AGM‟. 
 Moral case – „highlights 
the environmental 
consequences of the 
company‟s operations‟. 
3. An NGO writes a report on the barriers to long-
term thinking or on the narrow interpretation of 
fiduciary duties (two of the main issues that 
impede responsible ownership) and presents the 
findings to policy makers, citing advantages such 
as improved financial performance and reduced 
risk over the long-term. 
 Direct – „presents the 
findings to policy makers‟. 
 Public policy – „policy 
makers‟. 
 Business case – „citing 
advantages such as 
improved financial 
performance and reduced 
risk over the long-term‟. 
 
The mechanism of company influence (i.e. investor advocacy versus economic) present in 
Waygood‟s chronology is not mentioned here as every intervention is based on investor 
advocacy influence (i.e. shareholder activism) rather than economic influence (SRI) 
because the focus is only on shareholder activism. Another component present in the 
original categorisation and excluded in this analysis is an initial indication of the success of 
the NGO intervention based on a prima facie analysis of outcomes. The reason for this 
omission is that the conclusion derived from an initial superficial examination of the facts is 
not considered as sufficient evidence for reaching a conclusive decision about the 
effectiveness of a campaign. Given the complex nature of activism, the sometimes long 
time frame necessary for the outcomes of a campaign to become evident, the difficulty of 
establishing a causal link between NGO efforts and intervention results, it is concluded that 
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any categorisation of success on the basis of prima facie analysis hinders the development 
of reliable findings based on this categorisation. 
The findings from the chronology (Appendix 3) are presented throughout the following 
sections of this chapter and are based on content analysis of the chronology. Once the 
current trends are analysed, they are compared to the results exhibited between 1990 and 
2002 and described in Waygood‟s (2006) work. A detailed content analysis of Waygood‟s 
chronology was performed with the aim of differentiating between the cases of shareholder 
activism (investor advocacy influence) and ethical investment (economic influence). 
Having compiled all the instances of NGO shareholder activist campaigns (presented in 
Appendix 4), the NGO strategies used throughout 1990-2002 are compared with those 
employed in the last decade with the aim of producing a more detailed analysis. This way 
the research presents a longitudinal picture of the nature of NGO shareholder activist 
intervention in the UK, encompassing a period of 24 years. The findings also represent the 
first ever attempt to collect comprehensive data that focuses specifically on the third 
sector‟s efforts in the arena of shareholder activism.  
It should be taken into account that NGO campaigns can sometimes be confidential and 
lacking in media publicity. Therefore, while every effort has been made to ensure that the 
chronology is as comprehensive as possible, some campaigns might still be omitted from 
the collected data, and this is particularly true when it comes to direct action. See Section 
4.4. for a detailed explanation of why this might be the case. However, in view of the 
exhaustive analysis of live documents, organisational documents and secondary literature, 
coupled with the insights of interviewees who have worked for the NGOs throughout the 
timeframe of the chronology, it can be assumed with sufficient confidence that all NGO 
interventions that are of relevance and significance have been included. The encompassing 
approach to data collection has at least minimised the possibility for omission of important 
cases. 
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4.2. NGO Shareholder Activist Interventions Over the Years – Is There 
A Change in Scale? 
Based on the empirical data in the chronology, Figure 7 below plots the number of UK 
NGO shareholder activist interventions taking place between 2003 and 2013.  
Figure 7: Frequency of NGO Shareholder Activist Interventions (2003 to 2013) 
 
The figure reveals a significant increase in NGO activity in the sphere of shareholder 
activism from average levels of 4.8 interventions per annum during the first five years to 
15.6 interventions per annum in the last five years. To gain a more holistic understanding of 
NGO interventions, it would be beneficial to trace the changes in scale since the time when 
shareholder activism became a relatively widespread NGO strategy – namely, since the 
early 1990s. Based on a content analysis of Waygood‟s (2006) chronology and the findings 
of this paper, Figure 8 below plots the overall number of UK NGO shareholder activist 
interventions that took place between 1990 and 2013. 
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Figure 8: Frequency of NGO Shareholder Activist Interventions (1990 to 2013) 
 
The scale of NGO activity between 2003 and 2013 is far greater than that between 1990 
and 2002. On average, the number of NGO campaigns per year during the first period was 
3.5, compared to an average of 10 per year during 2003-2013. Such findings suggests that, 
rather than being just a passing phenomenon, more and more NGOs have begun to 
incorporate the practice of shareholder activism into their campaigning tactics and have 
regarded the world of financial markets as a legitimate way of pursuing their objectives to 
the point where the use of shareholder activism by the third sector is more popular than 
ever before. 
However, as can be seen from the figure, there is no discernible strong positive linear trend 
throughout the time period. The first half of the 90s can be characterised by a low level of 
NGO intervention, followed by a sharp increase from 1996 onwards with a particular peak 
in the year 2002. Waygood (2006) puts forward a suggestion as to what might have 
triggered such a sharp increase in NGO activity from 1996-1997 onwards. He singles out 
two interventions as a turning point – first, the coalition of NGOs including Friends of the 
Earth, The Ecologist, Global Witness and others (intervention 9 in Appendix 4) who 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Frequency
79 
campaigned against the construction of the Bakun hydroelectric dam in Malaysia in 1995-
1997 and second, the intervention by Pensions and Investment Research Consultants 
(PIRC, hereafter) Greenpeace, Amnesty and WWF-UK (in 1997) surrounding Shell‟s 
human rights record in Nigeria (intervention 10, Appendix 4). These cases of NGO 
shareholder activism were significant in scale and highly successful in achieving their 
objectives. There was a strong perception that the use of the CM had been an important 
contributing factor to this success. Waygood (2006) argues that these two campaigns have 
incentivised other NGOs to adopt a shareholder activist strategy.  
One possible explanation for the peak in interventions during 2002 can stem from the 
reform of the UK Pensions Act which came into effect in 2000. As mentioned earlier, the 
Act requires from occupational pension funds to disclose in their SIPs the extent to which 
SEE issues are considered in the investment process. A closer inspection of the chronology 
in Appendix 4 reveals just how influential the reform was for driving NGO activity during 
2002. To begin with, two of the campaigns were directly related to the reform 
(interventions 39 and 45, see Appendix 4) – they were aimed at ascertaining the effect the 
reform has had on individual pension funds‟ way of conducting their affairs and at 
strengthening the SRI SIP policy requirement by calling for an annual report in support of 
the SIP.  
Second, NGOs may have seen this legislative change as a facilitating factor that leaves 
room for discussion and lobbying of the pension fund sector which is now expected to take 
into account SEE issues at least to some extent. Another campaign by Forum for the Future 
(intervention 42, Appendix 4) was aimed at promoting engagement and raising awareness 
of the importance of SEE issues within the pensions and investment industry.  Third, it is 
highly probable that the reform was seen as a signal for NGOs that change can also be 
accomplished via long-term legislative campaigns which target public policy actors. 
Indeed, three of the campaigns during 2002 (interventions 41, 45 and 46) are all aimed at 
changing the legislative environment underlying capital markets. This is also the year with 
the highest concentration of public policy campaigns (or campaigns aimed at changing 
legislation) during the period 1990 – 2002 (see Table 4.3.: „Chronological Analysis of 
Primary Audience‟ in Waygood (2004, p.148)). 
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If we look at Figure 8 above, the scale of NGO interventions between 2002 and 2004 
appears to be declining but in fact it should be taken into account that the year 2002 is an 
outlier with a disproportionate number of campaigns compared to previous years – a 
phenomenon driven by the reform of the Pensions Act two years earlier. Taking this into 
account, the incidence of interventions throughout the period 2003-2007 (encompassing 5 
years) is not dissimilar to the one between 1996 and 2001 (encompassing 6 years) – 
altogether 24 interventions have occurred in the first instance and 26 in the second. What is 
noticeable is the great increase in NGO shareholder activist action from 2007 onwards. 
What could have triggered such a sudden change – far greater than the rise observable from 
the mid-1990s onwards? 
It could be argued that the uptake and emphasis on shareholder activism has been triggered 
by one specific and very noteworthy event – the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Nowadays, it is widely accepted that large institutional shareholders who failed to 
scrutinise the activities of the companies in which they held shares were one of the causes 
of the downturn. Risky business models went unchallenged in the pursuit of short-term 
gains to the detriment of the economy: 
With hindsight it seems clear that the board and director shortcomings discussed in 
the previous chapter would have been tackled more effectively had there been more 
vigorous scrutiny and engagement by major investors acting as owners (Walker 
2009, p.72). 
During the aftermath of the financial crisis, and following recent controversies around 
executive pay and climate change, the idea of active ownership began to enter the 
mainstream. Also numerous government reviews (for example, Myners, 2001; Kay, 2012) 
emphasised the role of institutional investors as „stewards‟ of their investee companies who 
are to promote sustainability and long-term value creation through engagement. All this 
emphasis on investors and their role in promoting good corporate governance has directed 
the attention of NGOs to shareholder activism and capital market campaigning, and their 
uptake of this practice has more than doubled compared to twenty years ago. As Waygood 
suggest in an interview conducted as part of this study: 
At least up until the financial crisis, shareholder activism wasn‟t a very popular 
issue to work on – that has changed [Fieldwork Interview, Waygood, 2013]. 
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4.3. Have NGOs Explored A Variety of Different Strategies? 
The tables that follow explore the frequency with which NGOs have employed each of the 
components of the model, namely, „route of influence‟, „primary audience‟ and „nature of 
argument‟. The findings for each component are compared to data on shareholder activist 
campaigns gathered from Waygood‟s chronology in order to determine how NGO 
strategies have developed over a longer period of time – between 1990 and 2013. 
 
 
Table 8.1. above demonstrates that the direct route of influence was the most commonly 
used by NGOs – in 49.1% of the cases in comparison to the use of both routes (direct and 
indirect) which was the least common of all three alternatives – used in only 19.1% of the 
cases. When these results are compared to what the nature of NGO interventions was a 
decade earlier (Table 8.2.) two things become evident. First, probably the most important 
trend is the significant increase in the use of a direct route of influence – from only 8 cases 
between 1990-2002 (17.4% of the total) to 54 cases between 2003-2013 (49.1% of the total 
between 2003-2013). Second, Waygood‟s analysis shows that while NGOs used direct CM 
intervention during the first few years of observation, there was a significant shift towards 
the indirect method in subsequent years. The current chronology suggests that this upward 
trend has not continued – instead, the number of Indirect campaigns overall has decreased 
slightly (35 compared to 38).  The way in which NGOs use the direct route of influence 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 which draws on the participant observation 
experience of the author‟s attendance at a number of AGMs. 
 
2003 - 2013 Frequency Per cent  1990 - 2002 Frequency Per cent 
Direct 54 49.1  Direct 8 17.4 
Indirect 35 31.8  Indirect 38 82.6 
Both 21 19.1  -   
Total 110 100  Total 46 100 
Table 8.1.: Frequency of Route   
of Influence (2003 – 2013) 
Table 8.2.: Frequency of Route  
of Influence (1990 – 2002) 
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Table 9.1. above reveals that CM institutions were the main audience of NGOs‟ shareholder 
activist interventions (70% of all cases). This result substantiates and continues the trend 
from a decade earlier when CM institutions, such as pension funds, asset management firms 
and banks, were also the most common audience (see Table 9.2.). However, it is interesting 
to observe that, while between 1990 and 2002 NGOs have made a very limited effort to 
influence the public policy arena underlying the capital market, their efforts in the sphere 
have been more substantial in recent years – those interventions targeting a public policy 
audience are more than three times higher – from only six between 1990 – 2002 to twenty 
one between 2003 – 2013. The mixed strategy targeting both public policy and CM 
institutions has also been employed with much higher frequency than before – one case 
compared to twelve between 2003 and 2013. Waygood (2006) argues that public policy 
interventions have increased over time, with a higher concentration towards the end of the 
studied period but concludes that it is too early to say whether this is a broader trend 
towards NGO public policy intervention. The findings from Table 9.1. firmly support the 
idea that NGOs‟ activity in this sphere has been growing slowly but steadily over the years 
and will most likely continue to grow in the future.  These results will be further discussed 
in Section 4.5. below. The following tables consider the frequency with which NGOs have 
relied upon different types of arguments over the years. 
 
2003 - 2013 Frequency Per cent  1990 - 2002 Frequency Per cent 
CM 
Institutions 
 
77 70  
CM 
Institutions 39 84.8 
Public 
Policy 
21 19  
Public 
Policy 
6 13 
Both 12 11  Both 1 2.2 
Total 110 100  Total 46 100 
Table 9.1: Primary Audience 
(2003 – 2013) 
Table 9.2.: Primary Audience 
(1990 – 2002) 
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Table 10.1. shows that NGOs in the UK have tended to use mostly business case arguments 
as a way of gaining support for their campaigns. Although Waygood (2006) argues that 
interventions that use both business case and moral case arguments have the potential of 
being more successful, there is no move towards using this approach as the number of cases 
classified as „both‟ is only slightly higher than it was between 1990 and 2002 – 28 
compared to 22 and has in fact decreased as a percentage of the total interventions – 47.8 
per cent during the first decade of the chronology in comparison to 25.5 per cent more 
recently. What is noticeable is the considerable increase in the use of business case 
arguments – from 13 instances representing 28.3 per cent of the total, to 49 instances 
representing 44.5 per cent of the total in recent years.  
Overall, the tables above demonstrate that the variability of NGOs‟ use of strategies has 
remained a constant. In common with the period studied by Waygood (2006), NGOs have 
relied on the full range of alternative strategies within each component of the model. 
However, the frequency tables also reveal some discernible trends in NGOs‟ inclination 
towards choosing certain strategies over others. In particular, there has been a higher 
proportion of: 
 Direct over indirect as a route of influence. 
 CM institutions as the primary audience. 
 Business case arguments over moral and a mixture of both. 
2003 - 2013 Frequency Per cent  1990 - 2002 Frequency Per cent 
Business 49 44.5  Business 13 28.3 
Moral 33 30  Moral 11 23.9 
Both 28 25.5  Both 22 47.8 
Total 110 100.0  Total 46 100.0 
Table 10.1.: Nature of Argument 
(2003 – 2013) 
Table 10.2.: Nature of Argument 
(1990 – 2002) 
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The comparative analysis of the two chronologies suggests some important changes have 
taken place throughout the years. The three main differences that deserve mentioning are: 
 The direct route of influence has become much more common, to the extent that it is 
nowadays more prevalent than the Indirect one. The increasing popularity of the 
indirect route observed previously has not continued throughout the last decade.  
 Although CM institutions are still the primary audience, there has been further 
significant growth in the interventions that fall in the category „public policy‟ and 
„both‟. Therefore, we can talk about a steady increasing focus on policy issues over 
the last 24 years. 
 The marginal preference for the use of „both business and moral case arguments‟ 
has shifted towards a preference for business case arguments, followed by moral 
case arguments. 
4.4. Has There Been A Change in the Nature of NGO Interventions? 
To examine whether there has been a change in the nature of NGO interventions towards 
direct engagement with investors and companies throughout the studied period, the 
following graph plots the number of cases per year in which NGOs have relied on media-
focused AGM disruption attempts (these include asking questions at an AGM and 
submitting a shareholder resolution).  
Figure 9: The Changing Nature of NGO Interventions (2003 – 2013) 
 
Source: Appendix 3. 
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This approach to the representation of data was chosen because it gives a more accurate 
idea of the changes taking place. It analyses the chronology as a whole rather than a set 
number of interventions – for example, the first ten campaigns compared to the last thirty. 
As AGMs are annual events, any accurate comparison should be based on the number of 
years rather than the number of interventions. The graph indicates that AGM activity 
throughout the first six years of the chronology is fairly constant with the exception of 2006 
when a slight dip is noticeable. AGM interventions during the first years are fewer in 
number, but there is continuous and sharp rise during the period 2009-2013 – from an 
average of 2.75 interventions per year during the first four years (2003-2006), to an average 
of 7 per year during the last four (2010-2013). How can these findings be compared to the 
scale and distribution over time of NGO AGM interventions throughout the 90s and early 
2000s?  
Waygood (2006) conducts a qualitative analysis of the nature of the first 10 NGO 
interventions in his chronology and concludes that four of them (or 40 per cent) involve 
some type of AGM disruption attempt. The same analysis of the last 30 interventions in his 
chronology reveals that only 3 of them (or 10 per cent) represent an attempt to realise 
campaign goals via the AGM. A prima facie analysis of such a trend indicates that NGO 
strategy has evolved from more confrontational media focused campaigns to more 
substantive attempts to engage with the investor community (Waygood, 2006). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that two important changes with regard to the nature and 
scale of NGO interventions have taken place since the early 2000s. First, AGM 
interventions between 2003 and 2005 have more than doubled compared to the period 
between 1990 and 1992 as the average has gone up from 1.3 to 3 interventions per year and 
they have continued to grow in numbers post 2006. It can be concluded that the scale of 
direct action at AGMs has increased significantly over the past few years. This considerable 
increase has also been documented in the accounts of some of the interviewees: „There are 
quite a few NGOs that go to AGMs‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b] and „I 
think going to AGMs is quite common nowadays‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013b]. 
Second, the pattern of NGO actions at AGMs has not followed a uniform trajectory over 
the 24 years under study (1990 – 2013). The early 1990s saw a good number of AGM 
disruption attempts, followed by a focus on seeking allies among the investor community 
throughout the subsequent years. However, this decline in direct activity has proven to be a 
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transitory phenomenon since the scale of AGM interventions over the past decade has far 
superseded the initial number of AGM campaigns during the early 90s.  
It should be noted that this increase is even greater than documented for a number of 
reasons: 
1.) Many Companies – One Issue (over a number of years). As part of some campaigns, 
NGOs attend the AGMs of a variety of different companies for two, three, or even more 
consecutive years. For example, at the time of writing, the Living Wage campaign has been 
running for three years and members of NGOs have attended the AGMs of numerous FTSE 
100 companies over the course of the campaign. However, for the purposes of the 
chronology, attendance at these AGMs is documented only for the year the campaign was 
launched and was counted as a single case because all interventions formed part of a single 
far-reaching campaign. Other examples of such campaigns include interventions 3, 81, and 
101. 
2.) Single Company – Single Issue (over a number of years). A targeted company‟s 
AGM constitutes a date of high importance in an NGO‟s calendar of events and some 
NGOs campaigning against a particular company have attended its AGMs annually over a 
long period of time. Examples include the Niger Delta campaign (intervention 41), the 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign (intervention 45), and the UK Tar Sands Network 
(intervention 55) who has gone to BP‟s AGMs between 2010 and 2013 to raise concerns 
over their tar sands business in Canada. Although the UK Tar Sands Network has attended 
BP‟s AGMs for a number of consecutive years, because the questions concern the same 
campaign, the intervention was counted only once at the start of the campaign.  
3.) Single Company – Multiple Issues (over a number of years). NGOs with different 
agendas attend one company‟s AGM and ask various questions during a given year. For 
example, see intervention 88 where five NGOs have gone to BHP Billiton‟s AGM to raise 
their concerns on a variety of topics – this has been counted as one case in the chronology 
because the target company is the same. The London Mining Network also attend the 
AGMs of a number of mining companies each year to talk about a diverse range of issues. 
In summary, the scale of direct NGO-led share activism at AGMs is inevitably larger than it 
appears at first glance of the chronology because interventions have been counted only once 
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in the chronology in cases when: NGOs attend many AGMs under the umbrella of one 
campaign, NGOs campaign on a single issue and attend the AGMs of targeted companies 
over a number of years, and different NGOs attend one company‟s AGM to ask different 
questions related to the same campaign. 
4.5. Short-Term Instrumental Use of the Capital Market versus Change 
in the Structure of the Capital Market over the Long-Term?  
It is the responsibility of the government to set the legislation that underpins the structure of 
the capital market. This legislation depends on the decisions made by public policy makers. 
Therefore, an intervention is considered to be long-term in nature when the primary 
audience is the public policy maker rather than the CM institution. In that sense, the extent 
to which the public policy audience has been the primary audience can be regarded as an 
indication of whether the intervention is an attempt to change the structure of the CM with 
a view of facilitating or encouraging shareholder activism. 
Based on an analysis of his chronology, Waygood (2004)
25
 contends that over the time 
period studied (1990 – 2002), 84.8 per cent of all interventions targeted primarily CM 
institutions rather than public policy. Moreover, the few interventions that targeted public 
policy (altogether 6) were scattered towards the end of the period – the last four years of the 
chronology. There were as many as three such interventions in 2002 due to the reform of 
the Pensions Act in 2000 as discussed in Section 4.2. Therefore, the results suggest that 
NGOs have focused more on short-term instrumental use of the CM for corporate 
campaigning, rather than on seeking to enact structural changes over the long-term. This 
can be explained, Waygood (2006) claims, not only by the fact that NGO CM intervention 
appears immature, but also because the structure of the CM, as well as the legislation that 
underpins that structure, remain unfamiliar to the third sector. Has this changed and how 
has it changed over the last decade? 
A closer inspection of the 2003 – 2013 chronology reveals that NGOs have actively sought 
to become much more involved in shaping public policy through submitting evidence to 
key UK government-commissioned reviews such as the Walker Review and the Kay 
                                                 
25
 The discussion of whether NGOs have attempted to change the structure of the CM over the long-term is 
present in Waygood (2004), but not in Waygood (2006). The latter is a book based on Waygood‟s thesis from 
2004. The information in both sources is absolutely identical, but some small sections such as this one have 
been omitted from the book.  
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Review, as well as through providing written responses to consultations on both the original 
and the revised Stewardship code, narrative reporting, effective corporate stewardship, and 
others. While there are NGOs whose primary focus has been on raising awareness of 
broader structural issues that need to be addressed (such as Forum for the Future and their 
„Barriers to Long-term Thinking‟ report), there are also NGOs who have set their intentions 
on campaigning for the introduction of a specific reform. Examples of the latter include the 
Green Alliance and their aim to incentivise long-term thinking through tax reform, 
ShareAction and their efforts in the area of fiduciary duty, mandatory voting disclosure and 
pension reform, and also CORE‟s focus on corporate reporting. There are also NGOs such 
as the Finance Innovation Lab and New Economics Foundation who fall under the umbrella 
of the growing alternative finance movement that seeks broader long-term system change. 
Overall, as discussed in Section 4.3. and Table 9.1., NGO interventions that target policy 
makers have increased substantially over the past decade. If we consider the cases 
categorised as „public policy‟ and „both public policy and CM institutions‟ in terms of their 
audience, 33 of the 110 interventions involve actions by NGOs in the policy arena. This is 
compared to 7 of 46 for the previous decade. These figures suggest that NGOs increasingly 
understand the need for public policy changes and are becoming more familiar with the 
structure of the CM, as well as with the legislation that governs it.  
4.6. Analysing Campaign Topics 
NGO interventions for the period 2003 – 2013 were grouped in 18 categories related to 
specific issues such as the environment, labour, corruption and bribery, among others (see 
Figure 10 below). All the 110 interventions from the chronology are included in the present 
analysis. However, there are single interventions which tackle a broad range of different 
issues and these have been classified under all relevant campaign topics addressed by the 
interventions. Therefore, one intervention can be classified under more than one of the 18 
categories. For example, at the BHP Billiton AGM on 25 October 2012, NGOs asked a 
variety of different questions about the environment, health, community compensation, and 
poverty.  
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Environment 
24% 
Human Rights 
13% 
CM & Public 
Policy Reform 
13% 
Pension Fund & 
Investor 
Engagement 
10% Health 
6% 
Labour Issues 
6% 
Compensation and 
Consultation  
6% 
Corporate 
Reporting (ESG 
Issues) 
4% 
Corruption 
& Bribery 
4% 
Poverty 
3% 
Corporate Power 
2% 
Political Lobbying 
3% 
Banking/Financial 
Industry 
2% 
Remuneration 
2% 
Military  
1% Tax 
1% 
Animal 
Rights 
1% 
Land 
Acquisition 
1% 
Other 
13% 
Figure 10: Campaign Issues (2003 – 2013) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix 3. 
Figure 10 reveals that topics addressed by NGOs vary widely. By far the most popular 
category is the environment (24 per cent), followed closely by human rights (13 per cent), 
capital markets and public policy reform (13 per cent), and campaigns aimed at facilitating 
and encouraging pension fund/investor engagement (10 per cent). Historical interest in the 
environment and human rights can be traced back to the 70s and 80s when a lot of NGOs 
emerged around these areas. Clustered together in terms of popularity are issues related to 
health (6 per cent), labour issues (6 per cent), as well as compensation and consultation of 
affected communities (6 per cent), followed by slightly lower interest in corporate reporting 
(4 per cent), corruption and bribery (4 per cent), and poverty (3 per cent). There are some 
issues such as land acquisition (1 per cent), tax (1 per cent) and animal rights (1 per cent) 
that are comparatively new and are only just beginning to gain popularity. A closer 
examination of the chronology shows that a significant proportion of the environmental 
campaigns seek to address climate change. Similarly, decent pay or, in other words, living 
wages, is the concern most commonly expressed by NGOs under the „labour issues‟ 
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category. Furthermore, there seems to be a great focus on developing countries in relation 
to areas such as access to medicines, mining practices of companies, poverty alleviation, 
land acquisition, and tax.  
This analysis substantiates the findings from previous research which also cite the 
environment and human rights as being among the most popular issues addressed over the 
studied period (Tkac, 2006; Graves et al., 2001). When analysing shareholder resolutions 
between 1988 and 1998, Graves et al. (2001, p.305) argue that there are „old stand-by‟ 
issues which maintain a steady amount of interest over time and identify human rights as a 
prime example. The current analysis supports this conclusion, placing the „human rights‟ 
category as the second most popular topic more than a decade later than Graves et al.‟s 
(2001) original research. Using Graves et al.‟s (2001) classification, issues such as tax, 
banking/financial industry, and land grabbing can be considered as „fad and fashion: 
emerging issues‟ (p.305) as their rise can be attributed to recent macro-environmental 
events  such as the financial crisis (tax) and the increased focus on biofuels as a way of 
reaching governments‟ renewable energy targets (land acquisition). 
4.7. Refining Waygood’s Model 
Primary Audience 
This section of the chapter looks at ways in which Waygood‟s model can be refined. The 
first category that will be addressed is primary audience. According to Waygood (2006), 
the audience element involves deciding whether to target CM institutions and/or the public 
policy framework (public policy). Although the category CM institutions comprises 
companies and investors, the author does not distinguish between the two and they are 
treated as one entity. 
CM institutions can be divided into company and investors in order to emphasise that there 
is a difference between campaigns that rely on investor engagement (i.e. the indirect route) 
and those which involve direct communication between an NGO and a company (the direct 
route). This separation will facilitate a more in-depth analysis of the strategies available to 
NGOs and of the different routes of influence. It will prompt a new and more sophisticated 
question – „what would an indirect and a direct route look like for a company and an 
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investor, considered separately?‟ The following table provides possible answers to this 
question: 
Table 11: Refining Waygood’s Model: Breaking Down of The Category ‘CM 
Institutions’ Into ‘Company’ And ‘Investors’ 
Company Investors 
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
 A member of 
an NGO 
asking a 
question at an 
AGM. 
 Filing a 
shareholder 
resolution. 
 Holding shares 
in the company 
and engaging 
in dialogue 
with it. 
 
 Using the 
influence of 
investors 
holding shares 
in the company 
to alter its 
practices. 
 Encouraging 
supporters and 
volunteers to 
attend AGMs 
and ask 
questions. 
 Lobbying 
investors to take 
action on a 
particular issue 
(essentially the 
same as the 
Indirect route on 
the left). Gather 
investor support 
for the tabling of 
a resolution, or 
encourage 
shareholders to 
speak to the 
targeted 
company. 
 Mobilising pension 
savers to write to 
their pension fund. 
 Galvanising the 
support of people 
from within the 
industry who can 
convey the message 
to investors. 
 Mobilising ordinary 
citizens to write to 
their ISA provider 
who buys stocks and 
shares in companies 
(stocks and shares 
ISAs only). 
 
Therefore, according to the new classification, the primary audience category will consist 
of three components – company, investors and/or public policy, and any combination of the 
three would be a viable option. 
Route of Influence 
Waygood‟s original chronology does not account for the possibility of NGOs using a 
mixture of both a direct and an indirect strategy, i.e. asking questions or tabling a resolution 
at an AGM and engaging with investors. This is the reason why the current study has 
expanded the classification model by adding another category – „both direct and indirect 
route of influence‟. This category has been applied to the current chronology and the 
subsequent analysis has revealed that in 19.1 per cent of all the cases (Table 8.1.), NGOs 
have chosen to employ a mixture of both direct and indirect route of influence. In fact, the 
importance of incorporating this strategy in the chronology is evident when looking at the 
positive views expressed by a number of interviewees with regard to its potential for 
delivering satisfactory results: 
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If you pursue both routes you are increasing the overall pressure. You are improving 
the chances of your success if you are approaching something from different angles 
[Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2014]. 
Waygood also acknowledges the importance and viability of employing a mixture of both 
direct and indirect strategy:  
I believe a balance of these is appropriate. If NGOs ignore the indirect approach, 
ultimately they will be less effective. Equally, if they only do indirect and don‟t go 
to the company, then the investors will say to them: „Well, why haven‟t you spoken 
to the company? [Fieldwork Interview, Waygood, 2013]. 
Therefore, according to the new classification proposed in the present study, the route of 
influence category will comprise three elements – direct, indirect, and both. These 
strategies will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters through case study 
analysis.  
Nature of Argument 
Rather than proposing a change in Waygood‟s model in this respect, this section seeks to 
challenge and present a fresh way of looking at one of the main findings of Waygood 
(2006). Waygood hypothesises that the likelihood of success is increased when an NGO 
adopts a balance of both business and moral case arguments. Based on a prima facie 
evaluation of the level of success of the campaigns in his chronology and on a chi-square 
test, Waygood (2006) concludes that interventions that adopt both business and moral case 
arguments have a higher likelihood of being effective. However, this assertion has to be 
considered carefully because, as has already been explained in Section 4.1., there are 
dangers in basing the outcome of shareholder activist campaigns, which are by nature long-
term, complex and influenced by a number of different variables, on a prima facie 
examination of evidence. That being said, Waygood‟s (2006) subsequent case study 
analysis seems to substantiate his initial findings. In contrast, the data gathered based on 
analysis of the Vedanta, Niger Delta and Tax Justice campaigns contradicts Waygood‟s 
hypothesis. Almost all interviewees shared a predominant view that the adoption of 
business case arguments is the only way for achieving campaign goals: 
I do not think it‟s helpful to be preaching to people in the financial institutions about 
why the ethical case is so important. It is the business case that really is the driver 
for the conversation [Fieldwork Interview, Forum for the Future, 2013]. 
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CDP was able to leverage and mobilise much more mainstream investors by 
pushing the business case for disclosure rather than the moral case [Fieldwork 
Interview, CDP, 2013]. 
We don‟t talk about the moral case at all. Obviously we believe the moral case is 
important, but it doesn‟t shift behaviour, so we just don‟t go there [Fieldwork 
Interview, Greenpeace, 2013]. 
Therefore, while it is common for NGOs to use moral arguments when targeting the 
general public (Chapter 5 explores the injustice frames advanced to gather public support 
for the three case studies), there seems to be a wide acceptance among both present 
campaigners and institutional shareholders that relying on business case arguments 
provides the most effective way of securing the attention of investors and companies. 
Although moral arguments are still used by some NGOs in combination with business case 
arguments (for example, see Section 6.4.), there is an overall realisation that a greater 
reliance in emphasising financial risks and opportunities would be more productive in terms 
of gaining allies among the corporate and investor sectors. 
4.8. Criticising Waygood’s Assertions 
After presenting his chronology, Waygood reviews a number of hypotheses using chi-
square tests with the aim of determining whether the success of a campaign is influenced by 
the categories in his model – i.e. by the route of influence adopted by an NGO and the 
primary audience. In particular, Waygood (2006) asks two questions – does the likelihood 
of success increase when an NGO adopts an indirect route of influence and do interventions 
that involve CM institutions as the primary audience have a higher likelihood of success 
than those who focus on the public policy audience? The results from the chi-square tests 
are not statistically significant, meaning that they suggest there is no relationship between 
success and the route of influence and between success and the primary audience. However, 
Waygood (2006) also determines to what extent both the direct and indirect route of 
influence have been used as a percentage of all interventions – 17.4 per cent and 82.6 per 
cent, respectively. Then, based on the prima facie classification of an intervention as 
successful or not, applied previously by the author, a conclusion is made that 25 per cent of 
direct interventions were „apparently unsuccessful‟ and only 8.7 per cent „apparently 
successful‟26. In comparison, 87 per cent of apparently successful interventions adopted an 
                                                 
26
 It should be noted that Waygood groups the interventions into five categories: „apparently successful‟, 
„possibly successful‟, „unsure one way or the other‟, „possibly unsuccessful‟, and „apparently unsuccessful‟.  
94 
indirect route of influence. Based on these assumptions, the author concludes that an 
indirect strategy is more closely linked to success. The same logic is applied to the primary 
audience category, with the conclusion being that campaigns are more likely to succeed 
when they target CM institutions.  
These conclusions are problematic on two grounds. To begin with, the results of the 
statistical tests can be contested given that they are based on a superficial prima facie 
categorisation of each campaign as successful or unsuccessful, without reference to any 
evidence that leads to these conclusions. Second, even if the categorisation is considered as 
valid, the statistical tests show no significant relationship between success and route of 
influence and success and primary audience. Even in this case, however, the author 
proceeds to validate his hypotheses by means of comparing the percentage of successful 
interventions that have adopted one of the two – a direct or an indirect approach and have 
had either CM institutions or a public policy audience as their target. The problem with this 
approach is that the figures cannot be directly compared in this way given the fact that 
direct interventions in the chronology have been far fewer (17.4 per cent) than indirect ones 
(82.6. per cent) and CM institutions have been the target of activism far more often than 
public policy ones (more specifically, in 84.8 per cent of the cases). Given the fact that the 
scope of the current thesis does not include a case study targeting public policy actors, it 
would not be possible to verify or disprove Waygood‟s claim regarding the primary 
audience based on the empirical findings. However, the assumption that an indirect 
approach is more effective than a direct one can and will be tested in subsequent chapters 
by making reference to the findings.  
Conclusion 
The chapter has built upon Waygood‟s (2006) chronology and has analysed the changing 
nature of NGO shareholder activist intervention between 1990 and 2013. In general, the 
analysis revealed that NGO activity in the sphere of shareholder activism has more than 
doubled between 2003 and 2013 compared to 1990 – 2002 and that NGOs have used a 
broad range of strategies. The comparative analysis of the two chronologies discovers three 
important trends: a move from indirect towards direct strategies; a continued growth in 
long-term public policy campaigns; a move towards business case arguments. The chapter 
has also explored the main campaign topics, placing the environment, human rights, and 
CM and public policy reform at the top of the list of NGO preferences. Finally, Waygood‟s 
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model has been re-examined in two important ways – the category CM institutions has been 
subdivided into company and investors and under route of influence a consideration of 
interventions which employ a mixture of both a direct and indirect strategy is proposed.  
The three case studies discussed throughout the following chapters will provide a detailed 
exploration of how the various NGO strategies are used in practice. The table below lists 
the campaigns chosen for review in chronological order: 
Table 12: The Three Campaign Case Studies 
 NGOs Intervention Classification 
1. Amnesty International, 
ShareAction, 
Platform London, 
ECCR 
Shell‟s operations in    
the Niger Delta 
 Both Direct and   
Indirect 
 CM Institutions 
 Business Case 
2. ActionAid, Amnesty 
International UK, 
EIRIS 
Mining company 
Vedanta Resources‟ 
operations in India 
 Both Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM Institutions 
 Business and Moral 
Case 
3. ShareAction, 
ChristianAid, 
ActionAid  
Corporate Tax Practices  Direct 
 CM Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
To date, no systematic attempt has been made to analyse, categorise and present the 
repertoire of shareholder activist strategies used by NGOs. Various papers have discussed 
shareholder activism alongside other strategies influencing the financial sector and have 
focused mainly on studying the effects of the proposal mechanism (Emel, 2002) or have 
adopted a theoretical angle in an attempt to explore the roles NGOs adopt when they want 
to affect CSR (Guay et al., 2004). Based on the empirical data collected, Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 
and 9 explore the main shareholder activist tactics used by NGOs with reference to the case 
studies. They are grouped in three broad categories: information provision strategies, 
indirect strategies, and direct strategies.  The next chapter discusses the information 
provision strategies which are usually the first and most quintessential step in every NGO‟s 
campaign. Three sections explore in turn the „stories‟ recounted by NGOs with regard to 
the Shell, Vedanta and tax interventions.  
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5. NGOs As Framers and Narrators of Injustice  
I walked behind the house, where I could see the small outdoor 
kitchen area, where a few pots were sitting on top of a plank of 
wood, and piles of bowls and cups and pans and spoons were in 
the ground-dirt. They were covered in thick dust. A large oil 
barrel was full of water. It had a picture of a shell printed on the 
side. A cup floated at the top. I hoped that the oil barrel water 
was not used for washing the dusty bowls, or worse still, 
cooking with. 
(„Tiny Sunbirds Far Away‟, Christie Watson, 2011, p.25) 
The current chapter examines the information provision strategies of campaigning 
organisations – going back to Chapter 4, these strategies refer to the „nature of argument‟ 
category in Waygood‟s model (2006) and explore the way in which NGOs frame their 
concerns. First, Chapter 5 briefly outlines the history of each of the three campaigns. Some 
campaigns represent long-standing concerns and have been running for more than a decade. 
Therefore, what is necessary is an examination of the historical context in which these 
interventions developed and an exploration of the motivation behind NGOs‟ actions. The 
background information is presented in a chronological order, starting with the earliest 
campaign. Altogether eight NGOs are involved in the case studies discussed
27
. Appendix 5 
provides a summary table which introduces each NGO and informs the reader of its origins, 
mission, geographical focus, income, staff/supporters, corporate campaigning approach, 
and frequency of shareholder activist intervention. 
Second, the chapter applies Becker‟s (1963, p.149) idea of „moral entrepreneurs‟ to the 
study of NGOs and explores the way in which collective moral entrepreneurs (NGOs) 
generate concern and anger on particular topics. To achieve this, the study draws on the 
work of Gamson (1992a and 1992b) and his „injustice frames‟ concept and analyses how 
different collective action frames are used with the aim of bringing certain campaign issues 
to the attention of the investor community and the general public. Thus, the second part of 
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 The fact that Royal Dutch Shell is an Anglo-Dutch company headquartered in The Hague explains the 
involvement of Friends of the Earth Netherlands (or Milieudefensie) in the campaign.  Their work has centred 
on providing support to four Nigerian farmers to bring a court action against Shell in the Netherlands, seeking 
damages for the destruction of their fishponds and livelihoods. Milieudefensie has also been attending 
regularly Shell‟s AGMs and asking questions and it has engaged with Dutch investors. However, as this study 
focuses on the actions of NGOs who operate in the UK, a detailed examination of the work of Milieudefensie 
does not form part of the research. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that all relevant sources of information 
have been consulted, the researcher has conducted an interview with a representative of FoE Netherlands 
involved in the campaign, and excerpts from the interview are discussed in the findings chapters. 
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the chapter is structured thematically and explores a total number of three different injustice 
frames put forward by all the NGOs involved in the three campaigns. The empirical 
findings are based on organisational reports and documents, as well as on interviews. The 
three injustice frame categories were derived from content analysis of NGO reports and 
interview extracts, discussing the arguments that campaigning organisations used to gain 
supporters among the public. An interesting observation which occupies a central place in 
the chapter is that different NGOs are involved in the same campaigns, but there is often a 
lack of collaboration between them. Such behaviour is exhibited because they each have a 
different agenda and it can be explained by making reference to Becker‟s idea of moral 
entrepreneurs. These findings will be further elaborated on at the end of the chapter.   
.5.1. The Historical Context of the Three Campaigns  
Shell and the Niger Delta – A History of Liability  
The first case study discusses the campaign against Royal Dutch Shell‟s operations in the 
Niger Delta region
28
. Civil society interest in the topic can be traced back to the 1990s and, 
since then, a variety of different NGOs have been campaigning at various intervals 
throughout this period. However, there has been a significant revival in NGO activity 
around the issue post-2011 following the publication of the United Nations‟ Environmental 
Programme (UNEP, hereafter) report dated 4 August 2011, which outlines the findings of 
an independent study of oil pollution in Ogoniland, Nigeria. It is precisely this more current 
phase of the campaign (post-2006) that is of interest and that would be examined in the 
study. However, reference will also be made to a shareholder resolution tabled in 1997 
because this is an important shareholder activist strategy and because the event was 
significant in that it constituted the first ever SEE resolution to be tabled in the UK. The 
NGOs who have been active in the area are Amnesty International, ShareAction, ECCR, 
Platform London and Friends of the Earth Netherlands (or Milieudefensie).  
                                                 
28
 The oil industry comprises of joint ventures between the government of Nigeria and multinational 
companies, as well as some Nigerian companies. The majority stakeholder in all joint ventures is the state-
owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC, hereafter). The non-state companies are those 
responsible for activity on the ground. Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC, hereafter), a 
subsidiary of Shell, is the main operator on land and therefore the main focus of NGOs‟ actions. NNPC has a 
55 per cent stake in SPDC; Shell has 30 per cent, Elf Petroleum Nigeria Ltd. 10 per cent and Agip 5 per cent 
(Amnesty International, 2009). Throughout this thesis „Shell‟ is a general term used to refer to the corporate 
group, including its joint ventures and subsidiary companies with operations in Nigeria under the control of 
Royal Dutch Shell plc.   
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With a population of some 31 million people, the Niger Delta is one of the most important 
coastal marine eco systems in the world and is also a place of huge oil deposits extracted 
for decades by the Nigerian government and by multinational companies. Shell‟s subsidiary 
SPDC is the region‟s largest oil and gas company which currently operates over 31,000 
square kilometres. The oil and gas sector represents 97 per cent of the country‟s foreign 
exchange revenues (Amnesty International, 2009). Nowhere in the world is there such a 
stark example of the „resource curse‟29 as in the Delta – waste dumping, oil spills and gas 
flaring
30
 are wide-spread and have led to pollution of the soil, water and air, threatening the 
survival of hundreds of thousands of people who rely on traditional livelihoods like 
agriculture and fishing.  
Moreover, more than half a century of oil exploration, which has benefited mainly 
politicians, government officials, and the companies involved, has been marked by protests 
by local communities who have complained about the negative environmental impact of the 
industry, corruption, and the failure of oil wealth to be translated into good living 
conditions (Amnesty International, 2009). As a result, armed groups have started engaging 
in oil theft and acts of violence in an attempt to capture at least some of the benefits of oil 
production. Since the end of 2005, armed groups have also engaged in kidnapping of oil 
workers and their relatives. Although serious, the problems have received little attention 
from the Nigerian government and the oil companies in recent years. The following table 
outlines key events throughout the Niger Delta‟s long history of oil exploration: 
Table 13: Shell in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective 
1938 Shell D‟Arcy obtains license to explore for oil throughout Nigeria. 
1958 Oil exploration begins, two years after Royal Dutch Shell first discovered 
crude oil at Oloibiri. 
1988 The federal Environmental Protection Agency (which later became the 
Federal Ministry of Environment) is established.  
1990 Crisis in Umuechem – results in massacre of innocent citizens. 
1993 SPDC withdraws from Ogoniland due to local protests. To date, the 
company has not resumed operations in the area. 
1993 Sixth participation agreement adjusts SPDC equity to NNCP 55 per cent, 
Shell 30 per cent, Elf 10 per cent, Agip 5 per cent. 
1993-4 Peaceful Ogoni protests against Shell and lack of economic development. 
Nigerian government occupies Ogoni region. 
                                                 
29
 The paradox associated with the tendency of countries rich in natural resources to have lower economic 
growth and worse development outcomes in comparison to countries with fewer natural resources. 
30
 The act of burning the gas that is separated from oil. 
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1995 More than 3,000 Ogoni reportedly die under military occupation. Ken Saro-
Wiwa – a founder and president of the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP, hereafter) and eight others were executed by the 
Nigerian government on the basis of false charges. International protests. 
1995 SPDC admits that its infrastructure needs work and that corrosion is the 
cause for 50 per cent of oil spills. 
1996 Shell sued in a US court by Ken Wiwa and other members of MOSOP. 
1997 ECCR, PIRC and others, supported by WWF and Amnesty International UK 
file a resolution at Shell‟s AGM. 
2001 Ogbodo oil spill – loss of over 16,000 barrels of oil. This impacts over 40 
communities.  
2006 The United Nations Development Program publishes a report stating that 
more than 6,800 spills were recorded between 1976 and 2001, with a loss of 
3 million barrels of oil.  
2006 ECCR and others submit a shareholder resolution to Shell‟s AGM regarding 
social and environmental performance in the Niger Delta. 
2007 Legislation, which significantly restricts the ability of the Ministry of 
Environment to enforce compliance in the oil and gas sector, is introduced. 
2007 SPDC announces further delay to 2011 for an end to gas flaring due to 
$1.3bn owed by the state. 
28 
August 
2008 
A fault in the Trans-Niger pipeline results in a significant oil spill in Bodo 
Creek, Ogoniland. The burst pipe is the responsibility of SPDC. The leak 
was not stopped until 7 November. 31 
2008 Four Nigerian citizens and friends of the Earth Netherlands file a lawsuit 
against Shell in The Hague. 
February 
2009 
A second oil spill reported to have occurred in the Bodo Creek area. 
04 
August 
2011 
The UNEP publishes a report which reveals the findings of an independent 
study of oil pollution in Ogoniland, Nigeria. The report exposes the failure of 
Shell‟s subsidiary SPDC to clean up oil spills promptly and questions the 
adequacy of Shell‟s remediation process. It recommends that $1bn is set 
aside for the first year of a clean-up project that would take 30 years in 
Ogoniland alone. 
Source: ECCR (2010a), Amnesty International (2009) 
This campaign differs from the other case studies described in the thesis as, although the 
NGOs involved have used both indirect and direct shareholder activist tactics to achieve 
their goals, they have relied primarily on the indirect route which has been the most 
effective. Second, by contrast to the campaign run against Vedanta, here there is no prima 
facie indication of a successful outcome – something which enables the researcher to reflect 
upon the factors which are inhibiting success. 
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 Nigerian law stipulates that oil spills have to be cleaned up quickly and effectively. 
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Vedanta Resources – Environmental and Human Rights Concerns In India  
The second case study reviews the campaign against the UK-based mining company 
Vedanta Resources plc.
32
 focused on the environmental, social and human rights 
implications of its operations in the state of Orissa, Eastern India. The NGOs that have been 
involved in the campaign are numerous, but those who have incorporated shareholder 
activist tactics in their broader strategy are ActionAid and Amnesty International. Although 
not a campaigning organisation, EIRIS, the NGO which provides ESG research for 
responsible investors, has played a crucial role in the campaign and has engaged with 
investors regarding Vedanta. Therefore, its involvement will also be discussed in the study.  
Vedanta has come under increasing international scrutiny for its plans to carry out a six-
fold expansion of its existing alumina refinery in Lanjigarh and to open a bauxite mine 
which was to cover 700 hectares of land on top of the Niyamgiri hills – a sacred and 
traditional land of the local indigenous people – the Dongria Kondh. The mining project 
was to be carried by the South-west Orissa Bauxite Mining Corporation – a joint venture 
between a subsidiary of Vedanta (Sterlite Industries) and the state-owned Orissa Mining 
Corporation (OMC, hereafter). The construction of the mine threatens the culture, tradition, 
religion, physical, and economic survival of the Dongria Kondh as they rely on the Hills for 
food, water, firewood, medicinal plants, and forest produce. The Niyamgiri Hills are also a 
sacred place for the indigenous population which worships Niyam Raja Penu – a male deity 
believed to be living on top of the Hills. The refinery expansion is opposed on the grounds 
of environmental devastation, pollution, health problems, and human rights violations 
associated with the operation of the existing plant. 
The campaign against the company began as early as 2004 when ActionAid raised concerns 
following the official agreement signed on the 5
th
 October 2004 between the OMC and 
Sterlite Industries for the purpose of mining for bauxite reserves in Lanjigarh. The 
following table summarises some of the key dates related to Vedanta‟s two projects and 
reveals how the events have unfolded over the years: 
 
                                                 
32
 Throughout this thesis „Vedanta‟ is a general term used to refer to the corporate group, including its joint 
ventures and subsidiary companies with operations in Orissa, India under the control of Vedanta Resources 
plc. 
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Table 14: Vedanta Resources in India: A Historical Perspective 
2005-2006 Vedanta Aluminium begins first stages of construction of the mining project 
(clearing of ground and erecting of pillars) but has to suspend the work 
following complaints of forest law violations. 
Mid 2006-
early 2008 
The construction of a 1 million tonnes per annum alumina refinery at 
Lanjigarh, Orissa state, Eastern India by Vedanta Aluminium is completed 
and the refinery begins production. 
October 
2007 
Vedanta Aluminium seeks environmental clearance from the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF, hereafter) for a six-fold capacity expansion 
of the refinery. 
November 
2007 
Supreme Court halts mining project. 
August 
2008 
The bauxite mining project is approved by the Supreme Court of India with 
conditions on local communities‟ development and protection of wildlife. 
December 
2008 
London-based NGO Survival International files a complaint about Vedanta 
Resources‟ mining operations in Orissa to the UK National Contact Point 
(NCP). 
Late 2008 
 
The company begins expansion of the refinery without the necessary 
permission being granted. 
December 
2008-April 
2009 
The MoEF grants in principle environmental clearance for the mine. 
12 January 
2009 
The Orissa State Pollution Control Board (OSPCB, hereafter) tells the 
company to cease expansion related construction activities. 
31 March 
2009 
In a report, the OSPCB states that expansion activities are continuing despite 
its order. 
May 2009 Members of indigenous communities submit an appeal to challenge the 
environment clearance granted by the MoEF for the mining project. 
August 
2010 
MoEF rejects the application for the final stage forest clearance for the 
Niyamgiri mining project and suspends the clearing process for the alumina 
refinery expansion. 
September 
2010 
Vedanta‟s bank lenders commission an independent review of the company‟s 
sustainable development practices. 
April 2011 The OMC files a petition in the Supreme Court of India challenging MoEF‟s 
decision to reject the forest clearance for the mining project. 
November 
2011 
11 Adivasi leaders also file a petition asking the Supreme Court to hear their 
arguments against the mine. 
5 
December 
2012 
Production in the refinery is suspended due to inadequate supply of bauxite. 
18 April 
2013 
The Supreme Court orders that the gram sabhas (assemblies consisting of all 
adult voters) of two villages in close proximity to the proposed mine site are 
to decide whether the mine will affect their religious and cultural rights and to 
inform India‟s Ministry of Environment and Forests within three months of 
their views. 
11 July 
2013 
The Lanjigarh refinery resumes operation after a gap of seven months at 60 
per cent capacity. Bauxite supplies are delivered from other states. 
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August 
2013 
All twelve gram sabhas unanimously oppose mining in the hills. 
January 
2014 
As a result of the decision of the gram sabhas, the MoEF rejected Vedanta‟s 
proposal for bauxite mining in Orissa. 
30 July 
2014 
A public hearing is held in the Biswanathpur village of Odisha to seek the 
consent of locals for the six-fold expansion of the Lanjigarh refinery. Amid 
many controversies and criticisms regarding the way the hearing was 
conducted, it was announced by a local official that the majority of attendees 
had given their consent for the expansion (FoilVedanta, 2014). 
 
Source: Amnesty International (2010), EIRIS (2010, 2013) 
This case differs from the other case studies in that the NGOs involved have relied more or 
less to an equal extent on both direct and indirect engagement strategies, and both have 
played an important role for the overall outcome of the campaign. Second, a prima facie 
examination suggests a successful outcome, providing for an analysis of the factors that 
have contributed to this. Third, the campaign does not target one single aspect of a 
company‟s operations that could easily be changed – instead, it challenges its core business 
model questioning its ability to build a bauxite mine and expand a refinery, asking for 
considerable improvements in company practice. This is similar in principle to, for 
example, campaigning for Shell to stop exploiting tar sands in Canada – a suggestion that, 
although environmentally wise, would not make financial sense for the company. 
The Tax Justice Campaign  
The third case study traces the efforts of UK NGOs to bring about just tax practices across 
FTSE 100 companies operating globally. Civil society organisations have started 
campaigning on the issue since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 when the 
drastic austerity measures introduced across Europe in the context of constantly raising 
corporate profits put the topic on the radar of the general public and spurred movements 
such as the UK Uncut campaign. Although the number of third sector organisations 
involved in tax justice advocacy work is large, this thesis focuses only on those who have 
utilised shareholder activism as part of their broader campaigning tactics. Those NGOs are 
ChristianAid, ActionAid and ShareAction.  
The focus of the campaigns ran by the three NGOs has been on tax as a development issue, 
the argument being that the money necessary to eradicate poverty and hunger exists, if only 
multinationals paid their fair share of taxes. Tax is a complex issue with ripe opportunities 
103 
for companies to exploit legal loopholes. There are two main ways for a multinational 
company (MNC, hereafter) to manage taxes – through tax evasion (which is illegal) and tax 
avoidance (legal)
33
. Both often entail the use of tax havens
34
 which provide a very low tax 
rate for monies held there and which enable corporations to deprive poorer countries of vast 
amount of taxes they are entitled to collect. However, as the payment of tax is now seen as 
vital for contribution to society, rather than as something that companies should avoid 
whenever possible, the difference between tax evasion and tax avoidance has merged in the 
eyes of civil society, governments and the general public.  
The opportunities to exploit tax loopholes are even more evident in developing countries 
where the capacity of governments to legislate and effectively collect taxes is weaker. 
Poorer countries obtain thirteen per cent of their GDP from taxes, whereas the world‟s 
richest countries raise on average between thirty five and thirty seven per cent 
(ChristianAid, 2013, ActionAid, 2009).  According to recent estimates by ChristianAid, 
developing countries lose £80bn a year in uncollected corporate tax – an amount which can 
fund the UN‟s Millennium Development Goals35 several times over (ChristianAid, 2009) 
and limit poor countries‟ dependency on overseas aid. Taxes are essential for governments‟ 
ability to provide systems of health, social security, education, as well as to invest in 
infrastructure.  
The tax justice campaign is complex and multifaceted with various different strands. On the 
one hand, NGOs are attending the AGMs of FTSE 100 companies and are holding private 
meetings with them. This action is substantiated by lobbying investors to take a stance on 
the problem and to encourage the integration of tax as a corporate responsibility issue 
within companies. The main aim of this aspect of the campaign is: „To change corporate 
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 Tax evasion occurs when the taxpayer takes steps to avoid paying a tax liability that has already arisen by, 
for example, not declaring all income. By contrast, tax avoidance entails exploiting the law in such a way as 
to minimise the amount of tax paid by avoiding a tax liability before it has arisen. Tax avoidance can be 
further classified as acceptable and unacceptable (or aggressive) tax avoidance. The former relates to tax 
planning which is within the spirit of the law (for example, claiming allowances for R&D expenditure) and 
the latter is planning which is against the spirit of the law. 
34
 Tax havens enable non-residents to register companies and pay little or no tax on the profits earned. They 
also protect tax information by making it unavailable, or very difficult to obtain by other states. In tax havens, 
the identities of the real owners of bank accounts can be kept secret. One third of MNCs‟ investments and 
more than fifty per cent of all banking assets pass through tax havens (Palan et al., 2010). Tax havens in 
Europe include Luxembourg, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Ireland. The Channel Islands – one of 
Britain‟s Crown Dependencies is also considered as a tax haven, as are the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, 
Dubai, and the Bahamas, alongside with some US states like Delaware and Florida. 
35
 A set of targets for halving extreme poverty, as well as the spread of HIV and AIDS, and for providing 
universal primary education by 2015. 
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behaviour on tax and change the ability for companies to any longer dodge tax, to create a 
change among investors, our supporters, and to get CEOs and chairmen to understand that 
tax is no longer something to be scurried away, but it should be part of your long-term risk 
management‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2013]. On the other hand, NGOs have 
broader campaign aims which are focused towards influencing policy makers in the UK and 
at an international level
36
. However, as the focus of this thesis is on shareholder activism, 
only shareholder activist strategies are of interest to the current study. The broader public 
policy work undertaken by NGOs on tax justice does not constitute part of the analysis. 
This case study differs from the others as the third sector organisations involved have relied 
to a greater extent on leveraging their direct influence as shareholders in FTSE 100 
companies via attending their AGMs and organising private meetings with them. Second, 
this is the only campaign discussed in the thesis where a variety of different companies are 
all asked to make improvements with respect to one aspect of their operations – namely 
their tax practices. Third, in comparison to the other two campaigns, due to the more recent 
nature of this case study, there was no prima facie indication of success or failure. Having 
discussed the context in which each of the campaigns unfolds, the second part of this 
chapter explores in greater detail Becker‟s idea of moral entrepreneurs and analyses the 
different action frames advanced by campaigning NGOs.  
5.2. An Exploration of the Injustice Frames Advanced by NGOs 
Becker (1963, p.149) uses the term ‟moral entrepreneurs‟ to describe the organisers, do-
gooders and advocates who operate with an absolute ethic and push for a particular cause. 
Driven by their moral and humanitarian concerns, they strive to create new rules which 
would prevent the exploitation of one person by another and would advance their moral 
beliefs. In his writings, Becker (1963) focuses on individuals as moral crusaders, but this 
study suggests that his idea can also be applied to collective actors such as NGOs, who are 
driven by their moral values. Just as much as individuals, NGOs can be seen as moral 
                                                 
36
 For example, they have called for the G20 and the United Nations to request that the International 
Accounting Standards Board adopts a global country-by-country financial reporting standard. At the moment 
MNCs are required to report on a consolidated basis, i.e. one set of accounts revealing the overall financial 
activities and results of all subsidiaries, without a break-down of these activities for each country in which 
they operate. Country-by-country reporting has the potential of uncovering cases of tax evasion and avoidance 
as company transparency and access to information improve. They have also called for the creation of a 
global multilateral tax information exchange agreement, for closer alignment between the place where an 
activity occurs and where tax on that activity is collected, and for a move towards a unitary taxation of 
multinationals. 
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entrepreneurs who define certain issues as problems and campaign for the introduction of 
new company policies and practices. However, Becker does not detail exactly how moral 
entrepreneurs carry out their public crusades and how they make the broader public aware 
of their moral concerns. The idea of frame narratives provides a useful way of answering 
this question. Therefore, Section 5.2. of the study focuses on the way in which moral 
entrepreneurs (NGOs) frame certain issues which are of concern to them. 
In recent years the proliferation of academic research on framing processes and collective 
action frames in relation to social movements (for example, Snow and Benford, 1988; 
McAdam et al. 1996, Hart, 1996) has meant that they have become a central element for 
understanding the nature of social movements. Collective action frames are defined by 
Benford and Snow (2000, p.614) as „action-oriented set of beliefs and meanings that inspire 
and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organisation‟. In essence, 
frames are signifying devices that help individuals better understand complex issues and are 
designed by activists to mobilise supporters, influence public opinion and incite change 
(Soule, 2009). Frames are a crucial element of each campaign as they provide valuable 
information to investors and the public in cases when they may not be necessarily well 
informed on certain problems arising from companies‟ practices. As Gray (1992, p.404) 
suggests: „…power can be exercised in some degree by all…external parties. For that 
power to be exercised there is a basic need for information (as an essential element of the 
participatory democratic process…) and this information will be an extension of that 
currently available‟.  
The NGOs in this study have sought to disseminate collective action frames through the use 
of information provision strategies such as report and briefing writing. All of the documents 
analysed in the sub-sections that follow have something in common – their reliance on what 
Gamson (1992a, p.68) labels „injustice frames‟. According to Gamson (1992b, p.32), 
injustice „focuses on the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul‟. 
Thus, using „injustice frames‟, or in other words, defining a situation as unjust, is a 
common strategy adopted by social movements which is a necessary precondition for 
collective action. The following sections consider three key injustice frames created by the 
campaigning NGOs with the aim of distributing and gathering support for their campaign 
ethos among the public.   
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Injustice Frame One: Human Rights and International Conventions 
To begin with, NGOs have tried to gather support for their cause by creating an injustice 
frame which emphasises that, with their actions, the targeted companies are failing to 
respect human rights. For example, as part of both its campaigns against Shell and Vedanta, 
Amnesty International has continually stressed the failures of the two companies in the area 
of human rights. The organisation started campaigning on the Niger Delta from the mid-
1990s when it supported a shareholder resolution tabled by ECCR at Shell's 1997 AGM. It 
has interacted with investors on an ad hoc basis since that time, but has only sought 
concerted engagement with investors as a group regarding Shell since Autumn 2009, 
following the publication of Amnesty International's detailed report „Petroleum, Pollution 
and Poverty in the Niger Delta‟ in June 2009.  
The report emphasises the severity of the situation in the Delta, the main argument being 
that, given the fact that more than 60 per cent of the people in the region depend on the 
natural environment for their survival, widespread pollution and environmental damage 
constitute significant risks to human rights (Amnesty International, 2009). As a result of 
pollution, the majority of the Delta‟s population has no access to potable water and 
experiences health problems from waterborne diseases. Pollution also causes damage to 
fisheries, diminishing the overall fish stocks and destroying a key source of food and 
income for many. Furthermore, the proximity of oil infrastructure to densely populated 
rural areas means that oil spills occurring on agricultural land have been devastating. Citing 
various international conventions, the report argues that there is a failure to respect a 
number of different human rights – the right to food, to work, to an adequate standard of 
living, to health, and a healthy environment
37
. The report utilises diagnostic framing, one of 
the core framing tasks described by Benford and Snow (2000), as it not only identifies the 
„victims‟ of a given injustice, but also the sources of causality, or the culpable agents.  In 
terms of attribution of blame, it places as much attention to the role of the government in 
the current situation as it does to the role of Shell (Amnesty International, 2009). 
Amnesty International‟s most recent report „Bad Information‟ (2013a) highlights the 
injustices surrounding the oil spill investigation process in Nigeria which the NGO claims 
is seriously flawed, with inaccuracies when it comes to establishing the cause of a spill and 
                                                 
37
 Gas flaring is said to lead to noise pollution, discomfort generated by the constant light from flaring, black 
dust settling in people‟s homes, as well as on clothes and food. 
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the volume of oil spilt. The human rights implications are huge since both the cause of a 
spill and the volume spilt affect the compensation a community receives. Communities 
often have to negotiate compensation directly with companies who have greater technical 
knowledge and considerable influence over setting the terms of compensation. According 
to the report, the impact on human rights is exacerbated by the continuous failures in 
relation to the proper and swift remediation of contaminated sites (Amnesty International, 
2013a). 
Apart from Amnesty International, Platform London is another NGO which has aimed to 
highlight the human rights abuses taking place in Nigeria. However, Platform‟s approach is 
quite different in the sense that the NGO does not cite environmental pollution as the 
source of the problem, but focuses on the fuelling of armed conflict undertaken by Shell 
and on the inadequacy of contractor oversight. Although the NGO runs a campaign against 
Shell, engagement with investors does not form part of its campaigning tactics. 
Nevertheless, the work of the organisation is still relevant to the study since members of 
Platform have regularly attended and asked questions at Shell‟s AGMs.  The NGO 
published a report in October 2011 („Counting The Costs: Corporations and Human Rights 
Abuses in Nigeria‟) which discusses the role of Shell in human rights abuses committed by 
the Nigerian government forces and other armed groups in the period between 2001 and 
2009.  
To begin with, the report argues that Shell has paid and provided logistical support to the 
Nigerian military who, in their desire to pacify protesters against the oil industry and 
attackers of oil installations, have been implicated in human rights abuses such as extra-
judicial killings, torture, harassment, and intimidation of local residents. In 2009 the 
company‟s financial support for government forces reached an estimated $65 million 
(Platform, 2012).  Second, the report suggests that, by giving routine payments to armed 
criminal gangs (disguised as security contracts), the company re-enforces a culture of 
violence in the region. Third, the report mentions the poor oversight of contractors who, 
instead of being held accountable for their human rights abuses and poor performance, are 
being rewarded with lucrative contracts by Shell (Platform, 2011). The injustice lies in the 
fact that, according to Platform, these routine payments to armed groups and military 
personnel only exacerbate human rights violations in the region.  
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Similarly to its Niger Delta campaign, Amnesty International has also sought to emphasise 
the injustice associated with disrespecting human rights when campaigning against 
Vedanta. The NGO started campaigning on the issue in 2009 when it first attended 
Vedanta‟s AGM. However, the publication of its report „Don‟t Mine Us Out of Existence‟ 
in 2010 marked the beginning of its dialogue with investors on the issue. The report is a 
result of an extensive field study conducted between 2008 – 2009 by Amnesty International 
researchers who visited the Lanjigarh area and the Niyamgiri Hills and spoke with members 
of the Dongria Kondh community. An Amnesty International official summarises the main 
concerns of the NGO in relation to Vedanta: „The key concerns revolve around two aspects 
of Vedanta‟s work in Orissa – one is in relation to an existing aluminium refining plant and 
historic concerns with regard to that in terms of damage to the environment, pollution, 
impact on people‟s health, access to water and so on. Related to that, Vedanta wanted to 
develop a bauxite mine, with bauxite being the raw material for its aluminium refinery in 
the same area. And that was on a mountain that was sacred and extensively used by a local 
indigenous group‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2013a].  
The 2010 report states that none of the actors involved – the Indian government, the state 
government of Orissa and the companies
38
, have consulted with the Dongria Kondh and 
their consent for the mining project has not been sought
39
. The OSPCB organised two 
public consultations in 2003 in relation to the refinery and the mine but notices of these 
were published in newspapers in Orissa‟s capital, 440 km from the Hills. Due to this 
ineffective process of informing the Dongria Kondh, there were no representatives of the 
tribe attending the hearings. Second, the report discusses the effects of the alumina refinery 
opened in 2006 on the people living in close proximity to it. Key findings of the OSPCB 
during the period 2006-2009 suggest that there are „numerous instances where the 
company
40
 has failed to put in place adequate pollution control measures‟ (Amnesty 
International, 2010, p.47). This has resulted in recurrent leakages of highly alkaline water 
into the nearby river Vamsadhara which is used by local people for drinking, personal use 
and irrigation. As a result, local communities‟ health has been impacted with people 
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 Vedanta Aluminium, Sterlite Industries, the Orissa Mining Corporation and the South-west Orissa Bauxite 
Mining Corporation. 
39
 The right to be consulted about projects that may affect communities is enshrined in international human 
rights instruments such as the UN Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) where Free, Prior, 
Informed Consent (FPIC) is a core right. 
40
 The company in this case is Vedanta Aluminium. Vedanta Resources owns 70.5 per cent of the share 
capital of Vedanta Aluminium with Sterlite Industries owning the remaining 29.5 per cent. 
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developing skin problems after being exposed to the contaminated water. The refinery is 
also a source of air pollution caused by dust emissions which, as Amnesty International‟s 
researchers document, lead to respiratory problems, headaches, irritation to eyes, nose and 
throat, and other symptoms (Amnesty International, 2010). 
ActionAid‟s report „Vedanta Cares‟, published in July 2007, also considers the human 
rights implications of Vedanta‟s operations, paying particular attention on the construction 
of the mine. ActionAid has a long standing programme in India, with ActionAid India 
being its first country programme, established in 1972. The UK branch of the NGO first 
became aware of the problem when staff on the ground in India reported that Vedanta was 
planning to build a mine and that the community was strongly opposed to it. As a result, 
ActionAid UK first started campaigning on the issue in 2004. However, it was not until 
2007, when it attended Vedanta‟s AGM for the first time, that shareholder activism was 
introduced as a tactic. According to one interviewee involved in the running of the 
campaign, the main aim was to: „stop Vedanta from building a mine in Niyamgiri and also 
to stop them from expanding the refinery there‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013a]. 
The 2007 „Vedanta Cares‟ publication cites evidence from official reports, journalists, 
ActionAid‟s own field visits, and relies heavily on first-hand accounts of local residents. 
The report findings suggest that the construction of the mine is: posing a serious threat to 
the Dongria Kondhs‟ culture, customs and traditional way of life, resulting in involuntary 
resettlement and the taking over of common land used for growing, consuming and selling 
vegetables, and could lead to a change in the ecological characteristics of the area 
(Chowdhary and Pandav, 2006), as well as ground water contamination (ActionAid, 2007). 
Relating to human rights  are those frames of injustice that highlight infringments of 
international law, especially with regard of communities or individuals. For example, 
Amnesty International‟s second report on Vedanta entitled „Generalisations, Omissions, 
Assumptions‟ (2011) considers five Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs41, hereafter) 
from 2002 until 2008 and analyses the extent to which they comply with the specifications 
stipulated in Indian regulations. The main conclusions of the report reveal a startling 
difference between rules and regulations and the practices of Vedanta and highlight the 
unjust nature of the EIAs (see Appendix 6 for a summary of the report findings). 
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 The EIAs are documents produced for Vedanta‟s joint ventures and subsidiaries in Orissa and aimed at 
gaining clearance for the expansion of the refinery, as well as for the construction of the mine. 
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In its reports distributed to investors, EIRIS has also mentioned Vedanta Resources‟ norm 
breaking practices. The NGO wrote a series of Convention Watch
42
 papers on the 
company‟s operations – the Orissa project was discussed in two of these reports. The first 
examined the impact of the bauxite mine on indigenous rights and biological diversity, 
while the second mentioned the Lanjigarh smelter and the pollution it created.  The investor 
who led the most public and long-lasting engagement with Vedanta was Aviva (for more 
detailed information on Aviva see Chapter 10, Table 23). EIRIS had an instrumental role in 
the decision of Aviva to engage with the company. Via its Convention Watch service, 
EIRIS analysed Aviva‟s holdings and, based on information from other NGOs, highlighted 
where the worst controversies were. As a result, Aviva and EIRIS worked together to 
produce seven recommendations for improvement and Aviva commissioned an 
independent report from the NGO (see EIRIS, 2010) which details these recommendations 
and the main allegations against Vedanta. This first report was followed by three other 
yearly reports assessing the extent to which Vedanta has dealt with the initial seven 
recommendations (see EIRIS 2011a, 2012, 2013).  The recommendations are presented in 
the table below: 
Table 15: EIRIS’ Seven Recommendations 
1. Widen the remit of the Health and Safety Committee (should include human rights 
and indigenous rights policies). 
2. Train and allocate responsibility at board level on ESG risks. 
3. Create a link between both board directors‟ and senior executives‟ remuneration and 
ESG performance. 
4. Set up complaints/grievance mechanisms at all operations. 
5. Improve risk management systems available to the Board including a) setting up a 
panel of external experts to assess the Orissa operations against international norms 
and commissioning independent environmental and human rights impact 
assessments and b) publishing these and committing to issuing a public response to 
any recommendations. 
6. Support voluntary self-regulation standards, such as the OECD Guidelines for 
MNEs, UN Global Compact, The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), The International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), and the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights. 
7. Strengthen systems for monitoring compliance with ESG policies and publicly 
report on any non-compliances and remedial actions taken. 
Source: EIRIS (2010). 
                                                 
42
 Convention Watch is a service established in 2005 and provided by EIRIS to investors. It identifies serious 
allegations against companies in press articles and via NGO campaigns. It assesses allegations of company 
breaches of major international conventions on labour standards, the environment, human rights, anti-
personnel landmines, corruption, and cluster munitions. A core part of the process is engaging with the 
company in order to determine its response to the allegations.  
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EIRIS‟ initial report from 2010 discusses a vast array of international norms and 
conventions, portraying a picture of discrepancy between them and Vedanta‟s behaviour: 
It may not be sufficient in certain situations for companies to simply state they are 
in compliance with local laws. This has been given added impetus by the UN 
„protect, respect and remedy‟ framework (…) (EIRIS, 2010a, p.5). 
Broader international conventions are also used by the relevant UN committees to 
protect indigenous rights. For example Article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights states: „minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy 
their own culture (EIRIS, 2010a, p.5). 
In singling out the behaviour of Vedanta as particularly lagging in terms of compliance 
with international codes of conduct, EIRIS aims to validate the trustworthiness of its 
arguments and to convince the company and investors of the necessity for Vedanta to 
urgently change its course of action. 
Injustice Frame Two: Making Comparisons  
The second way in which NGOs have shaped their arguments involves making some kind 
of comparison between, for example, good and bad practice, or between fairness and 
unfairness, with the purpose of revealing a sharp contrast which prompts action. Both 
ChristianAid and ActionAid have employed this type of injustice frame as part of their tax 
campaigns. Although the two organisations initiated their campaigns in 2008, it was not 
until 2011 when they began targeting investors and talking about the business case for tax 
transparency. It was then when both ChristianAid and ActionAid published two separate 
reports („Tax Responsibility‟ and „Tax and Sustainability‟) which emphasised the 
importance of seeing tax justice as an element of companies‟ broader CSR practices. 
ShareAction also began campaigning on the issue in 2011 when it co-authored the „Tax 
Responsibility‟ report with ActionAid. The organisation was commissioned to work with 
ChristianAid in 2012 and, as an NGO that specialises in responsible investment, to help 
with ChristianAid‟s shareholder activist strategy mainly in terms of attendance and asking 
of questions at the AGMs of FTSE 100 companies, but also for the purposes of engaging 
with investors and mobilising public support.  
ChristianAid‟s (2008) report „Death and Taxes‟ provides an example of the second type of 
injustice frame. It explores the differences in tax rates and tax revenues obtained by 
developing countries and discusses what the implications of these divergences are. The 
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report tells the story of two countries – Tanzania and Malawi. In Tanzania, one of the 
fastest emerging gold producers in Africa, more than half of the population live on less than 
$1 a day, life expectancy is 51 years and 44 per cent of people are under-nourished.  The 
country has lost millions of pounds due to low royalty rates levied on extracted gold and 
companies who have minimised their tax liability by overstating their losses (ChristianAid, 
2008). Tanzania‟s story is contrasted with the situation in Malawi where the country‟s 
uranium reserves are expected to generate an annual income of $250m. The government of 
Malawi which took a more robust negotiating stance has negotiated a royalty rate of 1.5 per 
cent for the first three years, raising up to 3 per cent afterwards, a 15 per cent stake in the 
mine, and has set the corporate tax at 27.5 per cent.  
Similarly to ChristianAid‟s (2008) report mentioned above, ActionAid has written two 
detailed exposés which endeavour to make a stark contrast between the taxes paid by two 
multinational companies and the taxes paid by local residents in Ghana and Zambia. The 
two reports are focused on unmasking the tax avoidance practices of London-based 
SABMiller (see ActionAid, 2010) and Associated British Foods (ABF, hereafter) (see 
ActionAid, 2013a). Both companies form part of the FTSE 100 index and are operating in 
the developing world. The report findings are based on published financial information, 
interviews with government officials and undercover research. 
ActionAid‟s most recent exposé published in 2013 targets UK food giant Associated British 
Foods – one of the largest food multinationals in the world, which owns well-known brands 
such as Silver Spoon sugar, Kingsmill bread and clothing chain Primark. The paper focuses 
on the activities of one of ABF‟s Zambian subsidiaries – Zambia Sugar Plc., arguing that 
poverty and hunger can be eradicated if developing countries raise revenues to meet the 
needs of their citizens. Much like ActionAid‟s report from 2010, this exposé enhances the 
appeal and strength of the message it wants to deliver through recounting the personal 
stories of two ordinary working people – Caroline Muchanga (a market stall holder who 
works from 5.45am to 9pm, seven days a week but still cannot afford to send her two 
children in a government school) and Isaac Banda (a cane-cutter for Zambia Sugar Plc. who 
starts work at 5.30am, but despite his hard work, he sometimes struggles to feed his family 
of six). Their monthly income tax payments are compared to the amount of income tax paid 
by Zambia Sugar Plc. between 2008 and 2010 to reveal a stark contrast: 
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Table 16: Paying A Fair Share? Income Tax Payments of Different Taxpayers  
Within the Zambia Sugar Supply Chain 
Taxpayer’s 
Name 
Occupation Average 
monthly net 
income 
(Zambian 
Kwacha) 
Average 
monthly 
income tax 
paid (Zambian 
Kwacha) 
% of net 
income paid 
in income tax 
Caroline 
Muchanga 
Stallholder 
selling sugar in 
Nakambala 
market, near the 
Zambia Sugar 
estate. 
650,000 30,000 4.6 
Isaac 
Banda 
Cane-cutter 
employed by 
Zambia Sugar 
2,213,000 25,500 1.2 
Zambia 
Sugar Plc. 
International 
sugar company. 
56,270,667,000 0 (2008-2010) 0 
Source: ActionAid (2013a). 
The table shows that Zambia Sugar paid no corporation income tax between 2008 and 2010 
and the lost tax revenues since 2007 amount to some $17.7mn. The tax avoidance practices 
used by the company have involved a number of transactions made to pay out of Zambia 
over a third of the company‟s pre-tax profits (over $13.8mn) each year into tax havens in 
the Netherlands, Mauritius and Ireland.  The specifics of these activities are detailed in Appendix 
7. Appendix 8, in turn, describes SABMiller‟s tax managing practices. 
Leaving the tax campaign aside for a moment, another NGO which has relied on the use of 
the comparative injustice frame is EIRIS. EIRIS‟ 2010 report makes frequent comparisons 
between Vedanta and other companies from the mining sector. It ranks Vedanta last in 
terms of board practice
43
 and systems for identifying and assessing company-wide ESG 
risks. For each of the allegations made against the firm, there are best practice examples 
revealing the actions of other large and well-known mining companies: 
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 Separation of Chair and CEO, independence of the board, etc. 
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Rio Tinto publishes a policy stating that it respects the rights of indigenous people 
in accordance with international instruments such as ILO 169 and the UN 
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples (EIRIS, 2010a, p.8). 
BHP Billiton has a sustainability committee, which focuses on health, safety, 
environment and community (HSEC) risks and the group‟s performance in relation 
to these (EIRIS, 2010a, p.11). 
Judging by the account of an EIRIS official, this peer comparison strategy appears to have 
had some effect on Vedanta: „What we said to them originally was: „How do you compare 
with your peers in the mining sector? Do you want to appear to be a company which is 
considerably behind?‟ And they didn‟t really answer the question, but obviously that is a 
sign, you know‟ [Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013]. 
Injustice Frame Three: Emphasising the Scale of the Injustice 
Another strategy used in frame narratives created by NGOs has been to emphasise the large 
scale of any given injustice. For example, some of the reports written by ActionAid and 
ChristianAid are based on robust research and concrete figures and aim to quantify the 
impact that tax avoidance is having on developing countries, putting a particular emphasis 
on its large scale. In a study published in March 2009, ChristianAid considers the damage 
done to individual countries by trade mispricing
44
. International trade pricing expert Simon 
Pak analyses US and EU trade data, estimating the amount of capital shifted between 2005 
and 2007 to the UK, US, EU and Ireland through bilateral trade mispricing. The report 
estimates that the total amount of capital flow into the EU and the US from this tax 
avoidance scheme exceeds £581.4bn. In terms of tax revenues, this means that non-EU 
countries could have raised £190.8bn between 2005-2007 and the forty nine poorest 
countries could have raised an additional £1.8bn in tax. The total tax loss by both emerging 
                                                 
44
 A transfer price is the price paid for an exchange of goods and services between different affiliates of the 
same MNC. By the rules of tax authorities any such transaction should follow an „arm‟s-length principle‟ 
which means paying the open-market price. However, transactions are often mispriced to allow the parent 
company to shift money around and minimise tax. For example, goods from the industrialised world can be 
sold to the developing world at inflated prices to reduce the „buyer‟s‟ profit margin and tax liability. 
Similarly, unrelated companies can make secret deals between themselves with the aim to export goods at 
lower prices from the country of origin to depress profits artificially.  
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and developing countries is more than the annual global development budget and the 
annual sum required to meet the millennium development goals (ChristianAid, 2009)
45
.  
In another report whose main subject is once again tax havens, ActionAid explores the 
extent to which they are used by FTSE 100 companies. The report reveals that, of the 100 
biggest companies on the London stock exchange, 98 use tax havens, with the total number 
of subsidiary companies, joint ventures and associates amounting to 34,216. The banking 
sector makes heaviest use of tax havens followed by oil and gas companies. A comparison 
with a similar analysis of the 100 largest companies in the US shows that the problem in the 
UK is more serious (ActionAid, 2011). 
Securing the Support of Investors: Frame Blending 
Frame blending occurs when an NGO does not articulate one specific concern, but rather 
enumerates a number of different problems associated with the practices of a specific 
company. ECCR‟s 2010 report „Shell in the Niger Delta: A Framework for Change‟ 
(ECCR, 2010a) is an example of this type of frame. ECCR became aware of the impacts of 
oil extraction on communities in Nigeria as far back as the 1990s when a number of 
members of the organisation who also held shares in Shell expressed a desire to „make sure 
that as shareholders they were able to understand more about what was happening and to 
express their views about it‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013]. The organisation has 
engaged with Shell throughout the years and has tabled two shareholder resolutions – one 
in 1997 and one in 2006, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. It has also 
encouraged faith-based and responsible investors to put pressure on Shell and urge changes.  
The 2010 report provides an overview of the company‟s environmental and social impacts. 
It comprises of five case studies from five civil society organisations who work with 
communities in the Niger Delta and who each identify a variety of divergent problems 
associated with Shell‟s operations in Nigeria: frequent oil spills, inadequate remediation, 
unfair compensation, militarisation, inaccurate scope and content of the EIAs conducted for 
the Gbarain-Ubie integrated oil and gas project, gas flaring and security focused 
surveillance contracts, among others (Appendix 9 summarises the main findings of the 
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 Results of another report published by ChristianAid in March 2013 suggest that MNCs with connections to 
tax havens engage in profit shifting more intensively as they face higher incentives and opportunities to dodge 
taxes – they report 1.5 per cent less profits, pay 17.4 per cent less in taxes per unit of asset and 30.3 per cent 
less per unit of profit (ChristianAid, 2013). 
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report, applying Benford and Snow‟s (2000) ideas on diagnostic and prognostic framing). 
These concerns have all been previously discussed with variable intensity by one or another 
of the campaigning NGOs, but what this injustice framework does is to group, or „blend‟, 
everything together. 
Raeburn (2004) also discusses the idea of „frame blending‟ but in a different context. 
According to him, frame blending is the use of two or more frames, at least one of which 
appeals to the target and at least one of which appeals to activists. In Raeburn‟s case study, 
activists successfully „blended‟ the ethics of domestic partnership benefits with the 
potential financial benefits that could be accrued by the targeted companies, making the 
arguments more easily understood by corporate leaders who are ultimately concerned about 
the bottom line. This frame blending strategy is adopted by many NGOs whose actions are 
motivated by moral considerations. Although they highlight various injustice frames in 
order to gather the support of the public, when engaging with companies and investors, 
NGOs outline the financial and reputational benefits that could be accrued by taking action 
(see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.). When it comes to the Niger Delta campaign, ShareAction has 
produced a series of briefing documents specifically designed to distil large and complex 
information for investors and to keep them updated on any recent campaign developments. 
These documents aim to gather investor support and, as such, are drafted in a very different 
language than the one used in normal NGO reports (for more on this see Chapter Six).  
ShareAction became involved in the campaign in February 2012 and wrote the first 
investor briefing on Shell in Nigeria in April the same year. The organisation was 
commissioned by AI to provide advice and support with the investor engagement work 
already under way. ShareAction resumed its work on the project in July 2013
46
. The 
motivation behind the writing of its first briefing is explained in these lines: „The UNEP 
report had zero impact and Amnesty were quite curious as to why that was the case and I 
said „well, it‟s because it‟s a hundred and forty something pages‟. No one has time to read 
it, so our first task in our first briefing was effectively a summary of that report but only 
pulling out what was relevant to Shell…‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. „A 
Legacy of Liability‟ (the briefing) aims to provide a concise and accessible guide for 
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 ShareAction discontinued its work on the campaign as its initial arrangement with Amnesty International 
expired in July 2013 and it was not extended beyond this point. When asked about the reason behind this 
decision, an Amnesty International official said that ShareAction were too busy with other projects. Given 
that this justification seems implausible, the exact reason behind the discontinued collaboration between 
ShareAction and Amnesty International remains unclear. 
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investors which summarises the UNEP report‟s findings and recommendations in relation 
to Shell‟s Nigerian subsidiary SPDC. The document emphasises two main findings from 
the UNEP (2011) report – the inadequacy of Shell‟s clean-up of oil spills47 and the 
inadequate control, maintenance and decommissioning of oilfield infrastructure. It also 
reminds shareholders about the recommended establishment of an environmental 
remediation fund with an initial sum of $1bn to be paid by the operating companies and the 
Nigerian government (ShareAction, 2012a).  
The second briefing published in August 2012 is aimed at keeping pressure on the company 
and presents an assessment of Shell‟s published update on its implementation of the 
recommendations from the UNEP report (ShareAction, 2012b). The third briefing briefly 
outlines the findings of a report produced by an independent scientific panel of the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) which was to provide 
recommendations to Shell for restoring biodiversity and habitats at spill sites (ShareAction, 
2013a)
48
.  
Similarly to the campaign against Shell, the process of frame blending is also present in the 
Vedanta case study and is undertaken by EIRIS. Most of the seven recommendations in 
EIRIS‟ 2010 report are shaped in governance terms and relate to how appropriate systems 
of governance should look like for a company operating on a global scale.  The 
environmental and social consequences of Vedanta‟s operations are not overemphasised 
and complying with environmental and human rights norms is portrayed as a matter of 
good business sense. Shaped in these terms, the message is less likely to be neglected by 
the company: 
The key to it is, because we did these seven demands which also related to how a 
company should govern itself, it was harder for Vedanta to come back and say 
nothing. If you say „We don‟t think you are governed very well. When we compare 
you to other mining companies, we can see you are doing very poorly‟, then it is 
speaking their language and that is important [Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013]. 
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 With spill sites being inaccurately recorded as having completed remediation and with the remediation by 
enhanced natural attenuation (RENA) process being deemed as ineffective. 
48
 Although at the time of writing the briefing paper, only the executive summary of the IUCN report was 
available, its findings once again point to problems with remediation practices and oil spill response, 
inadequate contractor oversight during and after remediation, and non-application of international standards 
when it comes to target limits for chemicals of special concern (IUCN, 2013). 
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Frame blending is also present as an element in the tax justice campaign. Two reports 
published in the same year (2011) by, on the one hand, ActionAid and ShareAction („Tax 
Responsibility‟) and, on the other hand, by ChristianAid (Tax and Sustainability‟) talk 
about the importance of companies and investors to recognise that tax planning is a 
corporate social responsibility issue that should form part of an organisation‟s commitment 
to CSR. To increase the appeal of their arguments, the NGOs discuss the business case for 
responsible tax practices. They mention the growing compliance, reputational, regime, cash 
flow, and financial risks to business, associated with tax planning. The main arguments are 
that aggressive tax planning can affect the predictability of future returns to investors, 
increase the risk of litigation, impact negatively on shareholder returns by damaging a 
company‟s brand, and lead to loss of favourable tax status or other forms of financial 
assistance provided by the government. ActionAid and ShareAction‟s (2011) paper also 
compares tax to the sweatshop crisis of the 80s, giving examples with how, initially 
discarded by businesses, the latter came to be recognised as a legitimate and important CSR 
issue to consider. The report makes the case for companies to embrace transparency in 
relation to their tax planning in the same way that they have supposedly become more 
transparent about their labour rights issues.  
As has been demonstrated so far, the information provided by NGOs regarding the 
Vedanta, Shell and tax case studies is evidence-based, detailed and comprehensive. Surveys 
of the ethical investment scene conducted by researchers identify information as the key to 
effective action (see Ward, 1986; Domini and Kinder, 1984). In an effort to identify the 
major information sources used by ethical unit trusts in the UK when making responsible 
investment decisions, Harte et al. (1991) employs a questionnaire approach which reveals 
that nine out of the eleven trusts surveyed rely heavily on the data provided in annual 
company reports. The research also assesses the usefulness of the annual report for 
providing information on investment decisions and concludes that respondents share a 
strong degree of consensus about the insufficiency of information provided for appraising a 
company‟s performance in the area of CSR.   
Despite the high degree of investor dependence on annual reports, Perks et al. (1992) also 
argue that „most contain little to indicate companies‟ environmental activities‟ (p.62) and 
reports „appeared to be more concerned with public relations and image‟ (p.55) rather than 
a genuine interest in facilitating accountability and transparency. The need for more 
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adequate information disclosure in annual reports is reflected in the words of one 
interviewee working in the sustainability department of a major fund management firm:  
We could do with better disclosure sometimes. It is sometimes not easy to 
understand to what extent a company is exposed to an issue, so better disclosure 
from companies might be useful [Fieldwork Interview, Scottish Widows Investment 
Partnership (SWIP, hereafter), 2013]. 
Given the shortfalls of corporate reporting discussed in the secondary literature and 
revealed in the empirical data, it could be argued that NGOs play a crucial role as 
information providers to both the general public and the investor community. They help 
alleviate the limitations of annual reporting, raise awareness of hidden problems, and incite 
action by shareholders.  
Conclusion  
At the time of writing, apart from the problems in the Niger Delta, Shell is being targeted 
by a variety of different NGOs concerned with issues such as tar sands, fracking, tax, and 
Arctic drilling. This is just one example of a situation where, as one interviewee puts it, 
„different NGOs are trying to get different issues on the agenda of investors with different 
companies‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2013]. The empirical data 
collected portrays a reality where investors‟ time dedicated to addressing SEE issues is 
limited, just like their resources for engagement are, and where an NGO‟s main concern is 
„how do you get your own issue to the top of the agenda to make sure that that's the issue 
that's paid attention to‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013].  
A closer examination of the various injustice frames embedded in each of the reports 
discussed above reveals that, even when campaigning on one issue, NGOs often look at the 
problem from different perspectives and emphasise divergent concerns. For example, with 
regard to the Niger Delta campaign, NGOs have focused on human rights impacts 
(Amnesty International); armed conflict (Platform); gas flaring, oil pollution and EIAs 
(ECCR), and the destruction of livelihoods (the court case against Shell) (Milieudefensie). 
Similarly, while ActionAid has mentioned the environmental and human rights impacts of 
the refinery in India, its main focus (as well as the focus of others such as Survival 
International) has been on protecting the rights of indigenous people who oppose the 
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construction of the mine. By contrast, Amnesty International has extensively covered the 
environmental and social implications of the refinery operations in its reports.  
Upon reading all the documentary evidence available, a picture of disconnected NGO 
action emerged, whereby each organisation looks at an issue from a different angle and 
strives to deliver its own message to investors. This idea was tested empirically by asking 
participants to account how their organisation collaborates with other NGOs campaigning 
on the topic under investigation, a question to which they provided vague and generalised 
answers. Some interviewees acknowledged the lack of sufficient collaboration as one of the 
problems hindering effective engagement with investors: 
It is certainly true that sometimes NGOs are not always as joined up as they could 
be and the joint campaigning, whilst it does happen, when they are trying to 
influence investors to make change, they arguably don‟t do enough of the 
collaboration which might give them a greater leverage over the investor and 
therefore a greater result in terms of what they are trying to achieve. If NGOs make 
a united, well-thought out case to investors as to why they should be concerned 
about a particular issue, then investors can consider taking notice [Fieldwork 
Interview, EIRIS, 2013]. 
WWF can approach an investor about environmental degradation and then Oxfam 
can approach the same investor about a social issue and this goes on and on. If it is 
possible to identify an issue which cross cuts a lot of the realms of the large NGOs, 
and we come to an investor together, highlighting one specific issue, it might be 
harder for them to ignore that. While not always possible, when you can try this 
approach, then you may have a greater chance of getting investors‟ attention 
[Fieldwork Interview, WWF, 2013]. 
Such an approach to campaigning can be explained by considering the above mentioned 
idea of moral entrepreneurs advanced by Becker (1963). The current study has suggested 
that NGOs too can be regarded as moral crusaders advancing a particular cause. By nature, 
entrepreneurs are known to be very single-minded, focused and determined to achieve the 
best results for their particular issue. As moral entrepreneurs, NGOs exhibit the same 
characteristics which can explain the lack of collaboration between campaigners and the 
advancement of divergent collective action frames. Thus, the problem of getting an issue to 
the attention of investors can be ameliorated if there was more collaboration between NGOs 
who come together and deliver a unified, strong message that is more difficult to ignore due 
to the fact that it is coming from so many different interested parties. Such a step would 
also serve to reduce the constant struggle to attract the limited attention of shareholders 
who are bombarded by a myriad of divergent SEE issues with which to deal. 
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Chapter 5, which explored how NGOs frame campaign issues, marks the end of Part One of 
the findings chapters. Part Two and Three are a natural progression from what has been 
discussed so far as they examine what NGO shareholder activist strategies emerge from the 
framing processes described (see Fig. 5). The literature on pressure groups distinguishes 
between direct and indirect action. The former involves groups who target decision makers 
directly, while the latter constitutes an attempt to influence policy in more indirect ways 
through mobilising other, more powerful actors (Gerber, 1999; Maloney et al., 1994; Soule, 
2009). This conceptual framework can be applied to the field of financial activism and is 
used to distinguish between the campaign strategies employed by NGOs, with Part Two of 
the findings chapters focusing on indirect strategies and Part Three on direct ones. What 
follows next is an analysis of the indirect shareholder activist strategies employed 
throughout the case studies. 
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PART THREE: INDIRECT STRATEGIES 
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6. Leveraging The Shareholder Power  
Of Financial Institutions 
If CSR is to be encouraged, the role of the institutional 
investment community is essential. 
 (Solomon et al., 2002, p.1) 
Enlisting the support of third parties such as consumers, labour unions and states, who can 
impose sanctions and put significant pressure on targeted companies, is a common method 
used by social movements in order to gain salience (Luders, 2006). For example, the Infant 
Formula Action Coalition began a campaign to build public support for a boycott of Nestle 
– the world‟s largest seller of infant formula products (Post, 1985). Thus, mobilisation of 
powerful third party constituents can facilitate social movement organisations in creating a 
credible threat against a targeted firm.  
The indirect strategies discussed in the study are subdivided into tactics that seek to 
leverage the shareholder power of financial institutions
49
 such as pension funds, fund 
managers and SRI investors (Chapter 6), and tactics which aim to mobilise the support of 
non-institutional actors, namely, pension savers, the general public and the media (Chapter 
7). The current chapter discusses the interaction between NGOs and investors, analysing 
the avenues through which NGOs gain the support of powerful institutions. Both Chapter 6 
and 7 are an example of the „situated activity‟ level of analysis as described in Layder‟s 
(1993) research map (see Table 6).  
The leveraging of financial institutions should be considered in the context of the fiduciary 
duty
50
 of investors. Fiduciary duty is often interpreted by the investor community as having 
a legal responsibility to act in a way which maximises financial returns. This interpretation 
ignores social and environmental considerations as they are not seen as having a material 
impact to the bottom line. Based on empirical evidence from the three case studies, Chapter 
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 Financial institutions are defined as companies that hold shares as investors or trustees, acting on behalf of 
other investors who are the ultimate beneficiaries and owners. Examples include unit trusts, insurance 
companies, pension funds (who act on behalf of individual savers and pensioners), investment companies and 
others. 
50
 The term „fiduciary duty‟ can be more broadly applied to corporations and board of directors who have 
duties towards the shareholders – private investors or the general public. However, I am interested here in the 
duties owed by pension funds toward their beneficiaries, namely, future and present pension savers.  Trustees 
have a „fiduciary duty‟, or a legal obligation to act in the best interest of the people whose money they are 
managing (beneficiaries). 
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6 explores the indirect strategies used by NGOs to gain the support of financial institutions 
in the context of this common interpretation of fiduciary duty. The chapter considers what 
type of investors are targeted, how do NGOs communicate with investors, how does the 
campaign message get delivered, what is the role of emotion and of a relational approach to 
campaigning, and in what ways do NGOs facilitate the engagement activities of investors. 
6.1. Segmenting the Investor Community  
According to a former ActionAid employee who was part of the development of the 
Vedanta campaign strategy, in its approach to engaging with shareholders, the NGO sought 
to „educate the shareholders who had a sensitivity to those issues and then make it clear to 
them that what the company was doing was well outside of what their ethical comfort zone 
was‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013b]. The investors were not seen as one 
homogenous constituency, but rather they were differentiated on the basis of a number of 
criteria – 1.) whether they had an ethical policy in writing (i.e. if they are an ethical fund); 
2.) who their clients were („if they were representing people who worked in a religious 
organisation, they would have principles that they wouldn‟t want to see their money being 
used in ways which harmed communities‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013b]; 3.) 
whether the shareholder had a recognisable public presence („they represent people who 
make a constituency in the public that would care about these things – for example, church 
going people, students, professors, or public sector workers‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
ActionAid, 2013b]). When targeting SRI investors and those expected to behave ethically 
by society, the first and main consideration is to again look for the large institutional ones 
which can yield the greatest power.  
That is why local authority councils investing in Vedanta through their pension funds were 
seen as a good target by ActionAid which approached them in 2009, asking that they put 
pressure on Vedanta to withdraw its plans for opening the bauxite mine in Niyamgiri 
(Stewart, 2009). Investment and Pensions Europe reports that a spokesman of Wandsworth 
Borough Council, one of the targeted local authorities, said in response to ActionAid‟s 
request: „The council has a paramount fiduciary duty to obtain the best possible financial 
return on its pension fund investments. As the law stands any shortfall in the fund‟s 
performance would have to be met by taxpayers‟ (Stewart, 2009, p.2). This statement 
reveals that in practice the legal obligations that trustees have to the people whose money 
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they are managing (fiduciary duty) are routinely equated with a single, over-riding duty to 
maximise returns.  
Clark and Knight (2006) cite precisely the narrow interpretation of fiduciary duty, which 
excludes reference to anything other than maximising returns, as a possible reason for 
institutional investors being slow to respond to environmental and social responsibility 
issues. The Vedanta campaign is not the first instance where NGOs have called upon 
investors to become more engaged with the companies they invest in. Evidence from earlier 
research suggests that pension funds, when encouraged to vote in favour of a resolution 
concerning Shell and BP‟s tar sands operations in Canada, have also cited their fiduciary 
duty as a reason for not taking action (see Ivanova, 2015). Chapter 11, Section 11.2. looks 
at what role are NGOs playing in dissolving the myth behind fiduciary duty and how their 
policy work helps address this barrier to investor engagement. 
The strategy of segmenting the investor community was also adopted by Amnesty 
International and ShareAction as part of the Niger Delta campaign. As one employee 
explains:  
We also felt that it would be important to mobilise a small number of interested 
investors rather than trying to mobilise a huge number of investors. We focused on 
investors whose mission we felt would mean they would be particularly interested in 
issues in the Niger Delta… We focused on faith based investors in the UK and in 
the US and also SRI investors who have a particular reason to be interested in this 
issue [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
Similarly, when asked whether the organisation targeted mainstream investors apart from 
SRI oriented ones, a former member of ECCR commented that the organisation‟s attention 
was dedicated mainly on the ethical and SRI community. However, at the same time, there 
was a discrepancy between NGOs‟ actions and the expressed strong belief in the influence 
that mainstream investors can yield: 
The SRI market is still quite small (though growing), so if we can get the 
mainstream investors to shift capital and to take ESG issues into account, then we 
are going to get a lot more action [Fieldwork Interview, WWF, 2013]. 
The role that large institutional investors can play in ensuring that the companies in which 
they hold shares are responsibly governed has been well documented in the literature and 
there seems to be no disagreement about it (see Owen et al., 2006). Perks et al. (1992), 
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Sparkes and Cowton (2004, p.54) and others believe that institutional investors can bring 
about the desired change in corporations: „… it is institutional investors (…) that are most 
likely to provide leverage on companies to improve their performance with respect to 
CSR‟. Therefore, although some NGOs are attempting to engage with the mainstream 
financial institutions, it seems that they should dedicate more efforts towards achieving this 
goal. The next section considers the language NGOs use when addressing investors and 
when harnessing their support. 
6.2. Speaking the Language of Investors 
The findings from the 2003 – 2013 chronology suggest that NGOs have started to employ 
predominantly business case arguments for advancing their concerns. This trend has been 
reinforced by the empirical data collected, with an overwhelming number of participants 
emphasising the importance of „speaking the language‟ of investors for achieving a 
successful campaign. Greenpeace‟s investor engagement strategy is an example of the 
changing way in which NGOs approach shareholders: 
We don‟t talk about the moral case at all. Obviously we believe the moral case is 
important but it doesn‟t shift behaviour so we just don‟t go there. I think the only 
way you can get shareholders to address these issues at all is to show that there is a 
significant exposure to cash risk, dividend risk, or shareholder value [Fieldwork 
Interview, Greenpeace, 2013]. 
The reason behind this strategic choice stems from the nature of the investor community 
which is primarily interested in shareholder value and financial returns: 
For the majority or at least a significant part of shareholders to act it‟s essential to 
point to the financial risk for a company [Fieldwork Interview, FoE Netherlands, 
2013]. 
With investors, no matter how ethical they are, you need to be able to present them, 
at the end of the day, with evidence that is going to show that their investment is not 
well invested [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013b]. 
The literature on investor activism substantiates these findings. In their article, Mackenzie 
and Sullivan (2008) consider whether investors are prepared to intervene in situations 
where there is no evident business case for companies to improve their environmental and 
social practices, hence, no financial reason for shareholders to engage. They conclude that 
the new European investor activism continues to pursue only goals that are aligned with 
investors‟ financial interests. Even the seemingly altruistic investor activism on an issue 
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such as climate change, which can safely be termed the biggest market failure of all (and 
exploiting market failures maximises profits)
51
, is driven by self-interest – there are long-
term benefits to be accrued and investor engagement has been limited to goals that are 
pursued without damage to investors‟ short-term interests (Mackenzie and Sullivan, 2008).  
Evidence of the fact that NGOs have begun to incorporate business case arguments in their 
advocacy efforts is also found when we consider the case studies. To begin with, when it 
comes to the Vedanta campaign, the reports produced by EIRIS and commissioned by 
Aviva Investors are gauged in corporate governance terms and highlight the business case 
for improved governance practices and policies across the group (see Chapter 5, p.117). In 
contrast, the reports written by Amnesty International and ActionAid emphasise the human 
rights abuses and environmental destruction caused by Vedanta‟s operations in Orissa. 
However, during their private engagement with investors, both NGOs have adopted a 
different communication strategy with the aim of persuading shareholders to take action. 
As a former staff member of ActionAid explains: „We did try to present the case that the 
company was a financial risk to investors. The picture that was being painted was of a 
company that wasn‟t to be trusted with investors‟ money‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 
2013b]. The key argument was centred on the legality of Vedanta‟s operations – the 
company was portrayed as a financial risk because it was operating against the laws of 
India – trying to build a mine that has no real basis in legal permit52, violating 
environmental laws
53
, and building the refinery without the right permits
54
. Similarly, 
Amnesty International had a dedicated staff member in charge of the NGO‟s investor 
engagement work, whose role was to „translate to investors why what is happening partly 
should be addressed by them, there is a moral concern but also they should understand that 
these issues often translate into a financial impact sooner or later‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
Amnesty International, 2013]. This process of translation of ideologically-based concerns, 
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 Market failures occur under conditions when the interests of companies and investors are not aligned with 
those of society. Mackenzie and Sullivan (2008) argue that, according to economic theory, exploiting market 
failures maximises profits for investors and that is why they are unlikely to engage in shareholder activism to 
address CSR issues.  
52
 Under the recent Forest Rights Act (2006) which came into effect in 2008, the Dongria Kondh and other 
marginalised communities can make community claims for the forest lands which they have been directly 
using. In 2009 they began filing claims to forest land in Niyamgiri which went unregistered by the local 
authorities. The Dongria Kondh‟s claims under the FRA were legitimised in 2010 after two MoEF-appointed 
panels visited the area and recommended that the MoEF reject forest clearance for the mine. 
53
 The EIAs described in Amnesty International‟s report from 2011 which fail to meet India‟s regulatory 
requirements. 
54
 Vedanta began work on the six-fold expansion of the refinery before receiving clearance. 
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as Sjostrom (2007) puts it, is evident in both campaigns ran by Amnesty International 
against Vedanta and Shell. 
Second, the business case for taking action is also clearly articulated in the Niger Delta 
campaign. For example, the first briefing paper written by ShareAction and targeting the 
company‟s investors, examines the risks that shareholders face in view of the UNEP (2011) 
findings. It talks about „the significance of the potential financial liabilities‟ (2012a, p.1) 
that Shell could incur as a result of its consistent failure to clean-up oil spills
55
 which only 
exacerbates clean-up costs and creates „a legacy of undisclosed liability‟ (p.1). Apart from 
the financial risks involved, there are also reputational risks to do with the sustained 
criticism coming from NGOs and community groups regarding Shell‟s operations in 
Nigeria – such public pressure, according to the briefing, is only going to continue unless 
the company identifies clear steps for the reduction of oil spills and the carrying out of 
prompt and appropriate clean-up. 
Third, NGOs have also endeavoured to explain in detail to both companies and investors 
why it makes good business sense to adopt responsible tax practices. In their investor guide 
entitled „Tax Responsibility‟ and published in 2013, ActionAid portrays aggressive tax 
practices as causing three types of risks – financial, reputational and regulatory (ActionAid, 
2013b). The first type can be further subdivided into stock price crash risk, compliance risk 
and cash flow risk. The secrecy involved in aggressive tax planning can cause an 
accumulation of bad news until a tipping point is reached, whereby all the bad news come 
out at once leading to a stock price crash. Second, an aggressive tax position can lead to 
greater scrutiny by governments and tax authorities, creating substantial compliance costs 
and adjustments to current tax settlements that increase the tax liability. Third, it can result 
in significant contingent tax liabilities on a company‟s balance sheet which, if to become 
due in the future, can have a damaging impact on the organisation‟s cash flow at that date 
(ActionAid, 2013b). ChristianAid‟s „Tax and Sustainabiliy‟ report also talks about cash 
flow risk as a business case argument for the adoption of sustainable tax practices, 
suggesting that uncertainty and volatility of earnings could have a material impact on 
investor confidence (ChristianAid, 2011). 
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 Under Nigerian law, operating companies are legally responsible for clean-up of oil spills, irrespective of 
the cause of the spill. If the accident is due to sabotage, companies are still required to remediate the site but 
are not liable for paying compensation to the affected communities.  
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Apart from financial risks, the investor guide suggests that aggressive tax planning can 
result in reputational risk and brand damage. The recent high-profile cases of companies 
such as Starbucks, Amazon, Google, and Apple, which were exposed as having been using 
aggressive tax avoidance strategies, reveal that public awareness in the US, EU and 
developing countries is growing and that tax is no longer seen as something to be avoided 
by companies, but rather as a valuable contribution to society (ChristianAid, 2011; 
ActionAid, 2013a). This growing public concern has also alerted governments to the need 
to focus their efforts on companies that adopt an aggressive tax position meaning that such 
a position can create unnecessary regulatory risk. As one interviewee argues: 
You can create more stability and better planning if you don‟t take very aggressive 
position as a company on trying to reduce and very actively trying to minimise tax 
payment around the world – that can be quite risky because the authorities may take 
a close interest and you might end up having to pay a bit more than you planned 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013a]. 
For example, following pilot tax audits of four mining companies in Zambia commissioned 
by the Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA, hereafter), the ZRA revised the Mopani Copper 
Mine‟s (operated by Glencore) tax bill increasing it significantly (ActionAid, 2013a). 
Another aspect of the importance of adopting responsible tax practices is explained in 
ActionAid and ShareAction‟s (2011) „Tax Responsibility‟ report and portrayed in the 
words of one interviewee:  
If companies don‟t contribute to taxation in countries, whether it‟s in the West or in 
the developing world, then the state can‟t pay for the public goods which underpin a 
healthy strong economy (…) Investors have an interest in general growth in the 
economy – that is what will underpin their long-term returns, particularly big 
investors like large pension schemes [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013a]. 
Despite the growing public and government concern in relation to tax practices, 
campaigning NGOs face a significant challenge in their attempts to emphasise the business 
case for adopting a responsible tax approach. As Dowling (2014) argues, corporations and 
managers perceive tax as an expense to be minimised – the argument being that effective 
tax management is a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. There is a general resistance 
in the business community toward framing tax as a moral issue and the problem has been 
exacerbated by the fact that scholarly literature has seldom made reference to tax as 
forming part of the CSR debate (Dowling, 2014; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). In a study 
which examines tax disclosures by managers of companies subject to public criticism over 
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their tax practices in the period 2005-2011, Holland et al. (2015) reveal that, although 
managers recognise the threat of tax avoidance, they are unwilling to engage in a debate on 
the subject due to fear of legitimising the concerns of NGOs and the public. However, as 
Section 10.2. (pp. 221-224) reveals this position is evolving partly due to the fact that tax 
questions have been put forward by NGOs in a very public forum such as the AGM, which 
has forced company executives to consider the issue and respond to allegations.  
In summary, when articulating the business case for an issue in an attempt to speak the 
language of investors, NGOs have a role to play in helping shareholders to understand the 
risks and in highlighting the opportunities that arise from compliance with NGO demands. 
Opportunities are often linked to enhanced reputation as a result of embracing a 
sustainability issue or adopting a policy ahead of other competitors.  In its communication 
with investors, WWF-UK uses these two lenses of risk and opportunity to advance its 
ideals:  
I have found that investors pay attention when you speak their language: risk and 
opportunity. These terms can affect their reputation or their bottom line and it 
resonates with the way they think. For me, coming from the finance sector, these 
two lenses are very useful. On the opportunity side, proper ESG integration into 
investment strategy can lead to potentially greater financial performance over the 
long-run [Fieldwork Interview, WWF-UK, 2013]. 
6.3. Delivering the Message 
The phrase „delivering the message‟ can be defined as the process of translating NGOs‟ 
arguments and campaign objectives to the investor community. The methods used to 
achieve this goal are explored in detail in the following paragraphs. As mentioned above, 
Amnesty International began to systematically focus its attention on Vedanta‟s investors at 
the end of 2009. The aim of the organisation, when it comes to both this campaign and their 
Niger Delta campaign, was to: „focus on the public shareholders through engagement, 
relationship and provision of information to in turn try and get them to put pressure on the 
companies that they are investing in to alter the way they behave and therefore to stop or 
prevent human rights abuse occurring‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2013]. 
These lines summarise the main position of Amnesty which was somewhat different from 
that of ActionAid in that, while the former sought to encourage continuous shareholder 
engagement with the company with the aim to „effect change‟, the latter advocated for 
divestment as the only solution to the problem because, as an ActionAid‟s employee puts it: 
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„This is a very black and white decision – either they build the mine or they do not. The 
community did not want the mine, (…) Vedanta was digging in its heals in refusing, you‟d 
already seen divestment as you‟d seen the Norwegian Pension Fund divest (…) so we felt 
that at this point in the campaign calling for divestment was the right choice‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, ActionAid, 2013a]. ActionAid targeted specific shareholders such as the Church 
of England seeking divestment.  
In a study that looks at the interactions between local, national and international NGOs 
campaigning against Vedanta‟s mining plans in Orissa, India, Kraemer et al. (2013) reveal 
that such interactions are often characterised by conflict between different actors as they 
have divergent goals and interests. The authors argue that international NGOs and local 
stakeholders did not form a stable front in opposing Vedanta‟s plans. The current article‟s 
findings substantiate this argument as similar divergent goals and insufficient collaboration 
is found to exist between international NGOs such as ActionAid and Amnesty 
International. 
Amnesty International‟s reports described in the previous chapter contain very detailed 
research (each one is more than a hundred pages long) and this information, together with 
investor briefings (short versions of the reports), was made available to a group of investors 
via either direct meetings, telephone calls, sending of briefing materials, letters, or emails. 
ActionAid also sought to engage with and disseminate information to the investor 
community via written and face-to-face conversations with key shareholders. ECCR 
distributed hard copies of its report on the Niger Delta to Shell, corporate members of 
ECCR (75 copies), the board, patrons, donors, partners, readers, and key contacts 
(altogether 22 copies) and sent 110 executive summaries to individual members.  
Another method of reaching investors is by distributing a printed copy of the reports to 
shareholders inside the venue where an AGM takes place prior to the commencement of the 
meeting. For example, I was pleasantly surprised when an Amnesty International employee 
closely involved with the campaign approached me at Vedanta‟s AGM in 2013, giving me 
a copy of Amnesty International‟s latest briefing „Vedanta‟s Perspective Uncovered: 
Policies Cannot Mask Practices in Orissa‟ published in 2012. Investors accepted the paper 
with interest and the small pile of reports was distributed in no time, despite Vedanta‟s 
attempt to prevent it. The company must have anticipated this action by Amnesty 
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International based on experience from previous years since shareholders were allowed to 
take their seats only five minutes before the start of the meeting – something I found 
unusual when compared to other AGMs I observed.  
Furthermore, NGOs often organise launch events such as seminars and roundtables for 
investors where they present the findings of their most recent reports. For example, on 17 
July 2013 ActionAid organised a seminar hosted by Legal and General Investment 
Management during which the organisation presented its latest report „Tax Responsibility: 
An Investor Guide‟. Similarly, EIRIS has participated for three consecutive years in an 
yearly roundtable organised by Aviva during which it presented its latest report on Vedanta 
and answered questions from other investors who were present. Members of NGOs also 
often act as guest speakers and share the work they have been doing with participants in 
seminars or webinars organised by other third sector organisations (see participant 
observation events in Chapter 3).  
6.4. The Role of Emotion – Telling the Personal Story  
Bringing members of the affected communities to Vedanta‟s AGMs was always one of the 
main strategies pursued by ActionAid. They would attend each year and ask questions to 
the board of directors. This, according to one interviewee, adds credibility to the demands 
and unequivocally reveals the sheer magnitude and seriousness of the problems on the 
ground: 
Bringing members of affected communities has a much stronger moral authority. If 
I am standing there and I say „You are doing this in India‟ they can very easily turn 
around. They don‟t actually say this but they imply: „You are a white American 
who lives in London, what do you know about it, dear?‟, whereas if you have 
someone saying „In my community the rivers are running red, I cannot drink the 
water‟, that‟s a lot harder to argue with, both because they know the situation on the 
ground and because the moral authority of it – being someone who is actually 
impacted – is much stronger [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013a]. 
Furthermore, during the later stages of the campaign (post-2008), when coming over for the 
AGM, people from the Kondh communities would also meet with those larger investors 
who, according to ActionAid, were more likely to reduce their stake, sell their shares, or 
take other actions. 
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Similarly, the role of emotion and the act of triggering an emotional response from 
investors played a great role in FoE Netherland‟s investor engagement strategy: 
The investment managers and shareholders who decide to take steps either by 
sending a letter to Shell, by asking for a meeting, or by selling their shares, have to 
take a difficult decision. It is a financial calculation, but it‟s also an emotional 
calculation – to get to the point where a person in an institution is willing to take 
such a decision we also need to trigger him emotionally [Fieldwork Interview, FoE 
Netherlands, 2013]. 
Therefore, much like ActionAid in the case of Vedanta, the organisation also arranged for 
members of the affected communities from the Niger Delta to meet and talk with investors.  
On the 1
st
 July 2013 ECCR and Church Action on Poverty held a one day event aimed at 
encouraging ethical investors to „close the gap‟ between rich and poor by becoming active 
owners when it comes to issues such as high executive pay and taxation. At this event, one 
of the investors present commented that what would enable the investor community to be 
more engaged on the issue is to show what tax avoidance means for people in developing 
countries by giving concrete real life examples [Fieldwork Notes(11), 2013]. This is 
precisely what ActionAid‟s 2013 exposé on ABF attempts to achieve by telling the 
personal stories of ordinary people living in the affected developing countries.  
The report introduces the reader to Caroline Muchanga who works seven days a week from 
5.45am to 9pm in a market in the Zambian town of Mazambuka and sells bags of „White 
Spoon‟ sugar produced by Zambia Sugar. Despite her long workday she cannot afford to 
send her two children to a government school and instead they go to a volunteer-run 
community school. When her children get sick the nearby government-funded hospital 
often does not have the necessary drugs and has to give a prescription for Caroline to buy 
the medicine herself. She pays her business taxes every day, irrespective of whether she has 
made a profit or not, in the form of a market levy (20 US cents). The report argues that, 
despite record annual revenues of over $200m, between 2008-2010, Zambia Sugar has 
made no payments of corporate income tax at all. In 2010/11 and 2011/12 the company has 
paid 90 times less tax than Caroline relative to her income (ActionAid, 2013a).  
Apart from the three campaigns discussed here, there are numerous other instances whereby 
the campaign strategy of telling the personal story of affected communities has been used 
by NGOs to secure the attention of companies and investors alike. For example, the first 
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time someone asked a question about the living wage at an AGM was in 2003, when 
Citizens UK helped a cleaner at HSBC to buy shares and attend the meeting [Fieldwork 
Interview, Citizens UK, 2013].  As part of the Living Wage campaign, other workers who 
were paid below the living wage have stood up from the floor to ask questions and at some 
occasions this has resulted in great successes – the PCS56 managed to secure a meeting with 
Capita as a result of one such question at an AGM [Fieldwork Notes(3), 2013]. 
6.5. Adopting A Relational Approach 
NGOs can be subdivided in two types when it comes to the nature of the relationships they 
build with investors. On the one hand there are those who believe that, when using the 
indirect mode of influencing, one of the most crucial strategies to adopt is to create long-
term, stable relationships with key investors based on trust: 
(…) constantly trying to build quite good long-term relationships with people in the 
investment world so that, if something comes up, we can pick up the phone, they 
know who we are. We really just try to have quite a relational model of influencing 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2012]. 
What we want to do is to build strong relationships, build good connections with 
asset managers in the asset management companies that advise, for example, the 
pension funds, build good links with them so they can trust us and believe in what 
we are saying [Fieldwork Interview, Platform, 2013]. 
Relationships are important. It‟s very difficult to do shareholder activism through 
investors if you don‟t have any relationships with investors. It would be very time 
consuming to build up the relationships to be able to at least try to have an effective 
shareholder campaign through the investor route [Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty 
International, 2013].  
However, the empirical data suggests that relatively few NGOs adopt this relational model 
of influencing:  
There is not a huge number of organisations who do this focused campaigning and 
even within that there is an even smaller group who do it in a really investor-
focused way as opposed to just bringing your issue to the attention of investors, and 
there is a difference [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b].   
When it comes to their campaigns, the majority of NGOs are often „sporadic, not very 
methodical and without really thinking it through at all‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Platform, 
2013]. This has created an atmosphere of distrust among the investment community and has 
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led to a situation where „the contacts that have been built up and that sense of trust and 
engagement with the companies gets lost – which is a real mistake, real mistake‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, Platform, 2013]. When asked whether they cultivate links with fund 
managers and their investment firms, a majority of the participants responded negatively.  
This view is reinforced by the opinion of an investor who admits that „sometimes NGOs 
can be a bit sort of fly by night, a campaign is turned on and is turned off and I think 
longer-term engagement with the issues and with investors is more productive‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, 2013]. Such a tendency to focus on shareholders in the short-term, by simply 
making them aware of the issues of concern, instead of engaging in a productive dialogue, 
was encountered in the NGO-investor interaction during the Vedanta campaign, leading to 
a decision on the part of an investor to discriminate between the two different types of 
NGOs in future interactions: 
There were also lessons in terms of how to handle relationships with NGOs. Some 
of the NGOs were up for a productive dialogue with investors, some of them 
weren‟t. [Fieldwork Interview, 2013]. 
At the same time, the importance of having contacts within the investor community, and of 
building lasting relationships based on trust, is also recognised by staff members of the 
NGOs themselves, as well as by the fund management community:  
If you just walk into an investment house and speak to their ethical investment 
team, they‟ll give you some kind of long spiel. Even if you present them with lots of 
evidence, they‟ll say „Yeah, well, you know, we are engaging with the company and 
we‟ll keep you posted‟ and then you won‟t hear anything for six months. Having a 
contact within the fund management firm itself is very useful, because they will set 
up meetings with the right people, the people who actually matter and make the 
decisions [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013b]. 
We need to improve our standing with that community and we need to do that by 
better performance in what we have done in the past and consistent engagement 
[Fieldwork Interview, Greenpeace, 2013]. 
It‟s about trust and building relationships. We are much more likely to work with 
ShareAction on the Living Wage because we‟ve got a great deal of trust, I 
completely believe in what Catherine
57
 is trying to achieve. It‟s that trust and 
understanding and it is easier for us because these NGOs are our clients [Fieldwork 
Interview, CCLA, 2013a]. 
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There are various explanations as to the inconsistent approach towards investor engagement 
adopted by NGOs. To begin with, smaller NGOs such as Platform and ECCR have reported 
suffering from lack of finance and capacity. Second, the process of shareholder activism is 
time consuming – often engaging with investors and building those relationships tends to 
require a lot of time and it can take three or  more years before campaigning organisations 
start seeing any changes in company behaviour. Therefore, it is important that „if people 
think they can achieve something in three months, unless it‟s a crisis situation where 
someone rushes to put out a fire, you are not going to achieve anything and NGOs need to 
get that‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b].   
However, even for big NGOs with considerable capacity, the scale of resource (people, 
money, time) they invest in this area is limited – „they tend not to invest very much time or 
money in this area [Fieldwork Interview, Aviva, 2013]. For example, at the time of 
interviewing a WWF member, the organisation had only one and a half people working in 
the area of sustainable finance and interviews were taking place for an additional member 
who would join the team. By the words of the interviewee, „it is quite a small team in WWF 
even though WWF-UK itself is around three hundred people‟ [Fieldwork Interview, WWF, 
2013]. Similarly, when asked what are the factors that inhibit the investor engagement work 
of Greenpeace, a member leading the work of the organisation on capital markets named 
resources as a key constraint: „It‟s still a boutique, it‟s a niche thing for us here at 
Greenpeace. It‟s not the main thing that we do so, realistically, it‟s always going to be a 
relatively small part of our output and it‟s going to be constrained by resources‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, Greenpeace, 2013].  
Another explanation for this short-term approach to investor engagement might stem from 
deeper cultural issues that have to do with the way people in NGOs perceive themselves, 
their role and the corporate world: 
A lot of people in the NGO sector see themselves as inherently more critical of 
capitalism or finance capitalism. This makes people not want to work in that sector, 
whereas you might feel happier about the idea of working in parliamentary politics 
[Fieldwork Interview, Platform, 2013]. 
I suppose it is a general bias towards „people in suits‟ – these are just conversations 
I‟ve had. They haven‟t really been meetings or anything, just people talking about 
how they feel about corporate engagement in quite an informal setting [Fieldwork 
Interview, Fairfood International, 2013]. 
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Furthermore, capital markets campaigning through shareholder activism is also seen as 
ineffectual, as this member of Fairfood International explains:  
Some NGOs just think it‟s a bit watered down to start entering in discussions on 
these corporate levels. I think they consider it ineffectual. A lot of them just view 
engagement with corporations as a waste of time (…). There is a feeling that 
engagement will result in limited success [Fieldwork Interview, Fairfood 
International, 2013]. 
6.6. Facilitating Investors in their Engagement with Companies 
Here „facilitating investors‟ in their engagement processes means helping investors engage 
more effectively with companies. There are various ways through which some of the NGOs 
under study have tried to facilitate the process of engaging with companies. To begin with, 
all briefing papers produced by ShareAction as part of the Niger Delta campaign contain 
sample questions related to the findings of the UNEP and IUCN reports which investors 
can raise when engaging with Shell. These questions are tailored in a pragmatic and 
business-focused way, emphasising the financial liabilities associated with the clean-up. 
Some of the questions include: 
1. Will the company disclose the costs of clean-up and remediation of spills in 
addition to the volume of oil spills? 
2. What has been the cost of oil spill clean-up and remediation in the Niger Delta to 
date? 
3. What are the anticipated costs in decommissioning facilities? 
 
In a similar vein, ActionAid‟s (2013b, p.2) investor guide aims to „equip investors with 
tools to engage with companies on acceptable levels of risk associated with tax policy and 
planning‟. It details three main elements to a responsible approach to tax, namely, a 
responsible tax policy, measures to ensure that the tax policy is implemented throughout the 
group (tax management) and reporting on tax responsibility. The guide provides seven 
indicators of a responsible approach to tax with questions which investors can raise before 
management to determine the company‟s performance against these criteria (see Table 17 
below). 
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Table 17: Seven Criteria for Tax Responsibility 
 
Tax Policy Questions 
 
Indicators 
1. Who provides input and 
who sets the policy? 
- Active board-level participation in the creation, 
approval and review of tax policy. 
- Corporate responsibility and other relevant non-
financial staff involvement in setting tax policy. 
2. Who has responsibility and 
how is the policy reviewed? 
- Board-level oversight of policy. 
- Regular reviews. 
- „Extraordinary‟ review conducted in the face of 
new risks. 
- Reviews include feedback on the impact of tax 
practices in all countries where the company is tax 
resident. 
3. How does the content of the 
policy address risk? 
- Policy discards aggressive tax practices. 
- Policy defines the level of risk acceptable. 
- Policy encompasses qualitative and quantitative 
benchmarks. 
- Policy outlines criteria for tax negotiations. 
 
Tax Management Questions 
 
Indicators 
4. What systems are in place 
to implement the policy and 
ensure compliance? 
- Policy is communicated to employees. 
- Outlining the criteria for performance management 
of staff in charge of implementing the tax policy. 
- Relevant staff are trained on how they are 
expected to implement the policy. 
- The need to address tax as a corporate 
sustainability issue is clearly articulated. 
- Procedures to remedy non-compliance are set up. 
 
Tax Reporting Questions 
 
Indicators 
5. Is the tax policy available? - The tax policy and any relevant codes of conduct 
are published. 
- Staff, external tax advisers and auditors are aware 
of the contents of the policy. 
6. How much tax is paid, and 
where? 
- Depth: a breakdown of tax payments at the 
country level, as well as other relevant financial 
information is available. 
- Breadth: information exists for all the jurisdictions 
in which the company is tax resident, including a 
full list of subsidiaries by jurisdiction. 
7. Is detailed information 
given on subsidiaries in tax 
havens? 
- The company structure is publicly available. 
- Financial information is published for each 
subsidiary based in a tax haven. 
- Accounts are available on the company‟s website 
for every subsidiary company. 
Source: ActionAid (2013b) 
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ECCR is another organisation which has sought to facilitate investors in their engagement 
work by producing an investor action guide in conjunction with its 2010 report on the Niger 
Delta. This guide has been distributed to interested parties and ethical investors together 
with the report. It urges investors to encourage Shell to implement the recommendations of 
the report by either writing to the company, or by asking a question at its AGM (see ECCR 
2010b). The guide provides a model letter addressed to Shell‟s CEO and refers investors to 
read „Investment and Engaging with Companies: A Guide for Faith Communities‟ – a free 
publication written by ECCR in 2008 and explaining the practicalities of taking action.  
NGOs have also played an instrumental role in keeping investors informed about any 
relevant campaign news and updates. ECCR produces regular updates on recent 
developments in the Niger Delta in its monthly magazine, as well as in its electronic 
newsletter which is distributed to all its members and subscribers. One of the strategies 
employed by ShareAction has also been to „make sure that investors have a flow of 
succinct, relevant briefing material on the situation on the ground in Nigeria, making sure 
they have really relevant updates, both in terms of what the UN is doing, in terms of what 
the company is doing, and any other developments of interest on the ground‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, ShareAction, 2013a]. 
Moreover, NGOs, especially big ones, can add credibility to a campaign and serve as an 
additional point of leverage that other shareholders engaging with the company can refer to: 
“If there is a campaign going on outside, which those institutional investors can refer to and 
say „Look what‟s happening here, we‟ve got ECCR, shareholders in your company saying 
„this is not good‟, then we need to be listening more” [Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013a]. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 6 has examined six indirect shareholder activist strategies used by the campaigning 
NGOs to incite action by financial institutions. These strategies are: segmentation of the 
investor community, speaking the language of investors, communication of the campaign 
ethos to investors, telling the personal story of affected communities, adopting a relational 
approach when it comes to the interaction with investors, and facilitating shareholders in 
their engagement with companies. The main conclusions from the chapter are summarised 
below. 
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To begin with, the findings suggest that, to maximise impact, NGOs need to focus on 
working with mainstream shareholders who have a bigger stake in companies through their 
shareholdings and who also invest in some types of companies which are often excluded 
from the portfolios of SRI investors on ethical grounds. Second, as discussed in Section 4.7 
„Nature of Argument‟, making an instrumental case for taking action is seen as essential for 
the overall success of a campaign and this has been driven by shareholder interest in 
financial returns and risks to their portfolios. When asked how does Standard Life decide 
with which companies to engage on sustainability issues, a responsible investment analyst 
cites the level of influence (or the number of shares they hold in a company) and the level 
of exposure, or „how much money can we potentially lose‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 2014, 
Standard Life] as the two main deciding factors. The quote emphasises the idea that, 
although NGOs‟ actions are driven by their moral considerations, campaigning 
organisations have a better chance of being successful if they rely on financial arguments 
when targeting investors and companies. 
Third, the empirical data suggests that the strategy of telling the personal story of affected 
communities and appealing to the emotions of shareholders can be effective in gaining 
credibility and leverage over companies. Fourth, although some NGOs have adopted a 
relational approach to their engagement with investors, for the most part, shareholder 
activism is still predominantly regarded by third sector organisations as a short-term 
practice: „NGOs don‟t engage as much with investors. Undertaking engagement for 
engagement‟s sake just wastes people‟s time, especially if they have wrongly identified 
something as an issue in their reports‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Standard Life, 2014]. In order 
to regain credibility within the investor community, there is a need to build contacts with 
investors and fund managers and create long-lasting relationships based on trust and 
respect.  
Finally, NGOs have aimed to facilitate the interaction between asset owners and companies 
by providing sample questions and action guides, and keeping investors informed about 
campaign updates. They have also served as an additional point of leverage which 
shareholders can use when talking with companies. The chapter that follows continues the 
discussion on indirect strategies, albeit with a different focus – namely – indirect strategies 
that aim to mobilise non-institutional actors such as pension savers, individuals, the media, 
and the general public.  
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7. Mobilising Non-Institutional Actors Behind 
Shareholder Activist Campaigns  
If you think you are too small to make an impact, try sleeping 
in a room with a few mosquitoes. 
(West African proverb) 
Back in the 1950s, John Kenneth Galbraith (1952) argued that there are four major forces 
that can countervail corporate power – free competition between corporations, 
governmental regulation, organised labour, and citizen activism and organisation. Given 
that the first three have somewhat failed to live up to expectations in recent times, the 
potential for change rests with the fourth force which is only beginning to grow and gain 
momentum, with scholars positive about its development (Soule, 2009). The social 
movement literature discusses at large this concept of citizen mobilisation (Tarrow, 1994; 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996; McAdam, 1986; Snow et al., 1980). As will be 
revealed in the current chapter, NGOs play a crucial role in raising awareness and 
mobilising share activism.  
What follows is a discussion of the indirect shareholder activist tactics of third sector 
organisations which target the general public. To facilitate the analysis, a distinction is 
made between two different types of stakeholders – the immediate stakeholders and the 
detached stakeholders. The first group consists of pension fund holders who have a direct 
stake in companies‟ affairs through their savings which are invested in equities. This is the 
more traditional public that has jobs and saves for a pension. The second group of 
stakeholders consists of the general public, especially younger people, who do not 
necessarily have a pension fund, but who are nevertheless valuable members of society. 
They have other avenues for participating in corporate campaigning such as by buying a 
share and attending an AGM. Section 7.1. considers the avenues for participation in 
corporate governance open to immediate stakeholders and the strategies adopted by NGOs 
to mobilise this group. Second, the chapter explores modes of participation open to 
detached stakeholders
58
, as well as the tactics used by NGOs to gather support from this 
group. Finally, the chapter analyses what media strategies have been employed as part of 
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without a pension cannot lobby their pension fund to engage with a targeted company. 
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the three campaigns in order to mobilise both immediate and detached stakeholders and 
what impact have these tactics had on the overall outcome of the interventions. 
7.1. Mobilising Immediate Stakeholders (Pension Savers) 
In their attempts to influence corporate behaviour, NGOs have traditionally targeted 
consumers. However, new avenues for participation in corporate governance by ordinary 
citizens
59
 are emerging, as we move into a world where share ownership, despite being 
more concentrated in the hands of institutions, is becoming more democratised. 
Shareholder activism can be regarded as a sleeping giant, being awakened by the efforts of 
NGOs.  
One way in which individuals can participate in corporate governance is through their 
pension savings. Drucker (1976) emphasises the influence that individual workers who are 
members of pension schemes can exercise over the actions of corporations due to the high 
ownership stake they hold in US pension funds: 
In terms of socialist theory, the employees of America are the only true „owners‟ of 
the means of production. Through their pension funds, they are the only true 
„capitalists‟ around, owning, controlling, and directing the country‟s „capital fund‟. 
The „means of production‟, that is, the American economy…is being run for the 
benefit of the country‟s employees (Drucker, 1976, pp.2-3). 
Urged to engage by savers and having a large stake in companies compared to other actors, 
pension funds can be a powerful tool for change. There have been a number of pension 
funds such as CalPERS (see Nesbitt, 1994; Smith, 1996 and Anson et al., 2004 for 
evidence of the „CalPERS effect‟) and the Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUFF, hereafter)60 
(see Becht et al., 2010) which have been proactive in shaping company policies and 
participating in corporate governance. Over the period 1998-2004 the HUFF engaged with 
thirty of the forty-one companies in which it invests, calling for the implementation of a 
range of actions such as restructuring of the operations of diversified firms, increasing the 
cash payout to shareholders, replacement of the CEO or the chairman, and appointment of 
independent directors. Although instrumental by nature, these interventions were found to 
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substantially affect corporate activities, resulting in economically large returns from 
activism (Becht et al., 2010). 
Similarly to Drucker, British sociologist Robin Blackburn‟s (2002) main argument is that 
employees (pension savers) should exercise democratic control over corporations and 
should ensure that their practices benefit them, their families and the communities they live 
in rather than the financial services industry. The UK is the second largest market after the 
US with about 10 per cent of the world‟s total pension assets – and pension funds in the UK 
are among the largest asset-owning types of investors (Maslakovic, 2011). Clark and Hebb 
(2004) criticise Drucker‟s argument on the basis that he fails to outline the mechanisms by 
which such dispersed ownership can be unified to undertake concerted action. Building 
upon Robert Clark‟s (1981) model which examines how capitalism has evolved over time, 
passing through four different stages, the authors posit a fifth stage of capitalism – one 
defined not by pension fund socialism, but rather by pension fund capitalism. This stage is 
dominated by pension funds which, although representing a broad share ownership, act as 
single industry players who take decisions on behalf of beneficiaries but are not controlled 
by them. According to Clark and Hebb (2004), the transition to a fifth stage is driven by the 
fact that, although the role of pension savers is widely discussed, they are unable to sustain 
their position as central actors. 
NGOs can serve as the mechanism that unifies pension savers to undertake concerted action 
and to regain centre stage. In its action guide „Shell in the Niger Delta: A Framework for 
Change‟, ECCR (2010b) encourages individuals to write to their pension fund, bank or 
insurance company (big organisations which almost certainly hold shares in Shell), asking 
them to lobby the company to adopt the recommendations from ECCR‟s 2010 report. This 
is not an isolated case of an NGO harnessing the influence of pension savers. As part of 
some of its previous, as well as its current campaigns, ShareAction (the charity which 
promotes responsible investment) has mobilised and continues to mobilise pension savers 
via an online action tool which enables them to send a message to their pension fund asking 
it to engage with a targeted company on their behalf (see Ivanova, 2014  and Ivanova, 
2015).  
Furthermore, ShareAction has recently started organising training events designed to 
convert pension savers into workplace responsible investment champions (WRICs), whose 
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primary aim is to transform their pension fund into an actively responsible investor. The 
first event held in November 2012 was general in nature – it gathered people with diverse 
interests and gave them tips on how to use the power of their pension savings to effect 
change with regard to any issue they choose, but the second and third events (in September 
and October 2013) were more focused on two specific issues – climate change and living 
wages. The topics discussed during the first training included: an explanation of the 
investment chain in the UK and the key players within it, the duties of pension funds to 
their beneficiaries, rights to information, examples of campaigns where the power of 
WRICs has been used, and who are the key decision makers in your fund and how to 
engage with them [Fieldwork Notes(1), 2012]. A booklet containing all the relevant 
information for WRICs was also provided at the day of the event.  
Apart from its training days, ShareAction has also aimed to disseminate its vision of 
pension savers who serve as a catalyst to pension fund activism at other events hosted by 
third sector organisations. For example, speaking at a panel discussion entitled „Principles 
and Profits: Investing to Protect People, the Planet and your Savings‟, a ShareAction employee 
argues: 
It is very important for people to understand that we are pension savers, consumers, 
citizens, but we are also capitalists and that‟s the big secret, that‟s what they won‟t 
tell us. We have power and we can influence big corporations. We were told 
politicians and CEOs and people above will set the rules and that has been the 
perception until the crisis. The system is us, all we do as an organisation is to pull 
the plank out of people‟s eyes. The money that flows around the City of London is 
yours through occupational pension funds, but we don‟t occupy this money. We 
only have to recognise that we have power and we have to get over the complexity 
and jargon the City throws at us to tell us we can‟t do anything [Fieldwork 
Notes(15), ShareAction, 2013b]. 
Evidence from interviews conducted with mainstream fund managers suggests that pension 
savers‟ intervention can really have a transformational effect on pension funds‟ propensity 
to engage with companies and become active owners:  
I think one of the reasons why many pension funds today take account of ESG 
issues is because their pension scheme members have asked for it. I think it is very 
important – a number of pension funds have moved because of demands from their 
pension savers [Fieldwork Interview, Scottish Widows Investment Partnership, 
2013]. 
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These lines go some way to contradict the argument by Simon (1993) that pension fund 
„socialism‟ is limited in its ability to democratise corporations and is hindered by many 
obstacles. Simon suggests that the diversification of investments typical for many pension 
funds decreases risk but, at the same time, dilutes the control that savers can exert indirectly 
over any given corporation. Second, he argues that workers need to have a significant 
degree of shared interests if they are to exercise their voice effectively through their 
pension fund. There is, for example, potential for conflict stemming from the divergent 
interests of employees in different positions within the organisation or at different stages of 
employment. Simon (1993) gives the example of a typical retiree, interested in the 
investment return of the pension portfolio and welcoming of wage cuts and layoffs that 
increase the profitability of a firm their fund has invested in, while an existing employee of 
that firm will be concerned with the organisational policies which affect employment. 
However, Richardson (2007) suggests that the consensus problem is exaggerated: „While 
disagreements will most likely permeate traditional ethical or religious issues such as 
alcohol or gambling, substantial agreement in other areas may readily arise. For instance, 
members of a pension fund probably rarely favour deliberate environmental degradation or 
human rights‟ violation‟ (p.166). 
These limitations notwithstanding, the current study, as well as previous studies (see 
Ivanova, 2015; Richardson, 2007), show evidence that pension savers can be mobilised 
around a particular issue
61
. The problem is that, important as savers might be, the 
movement that empowers people to know where their pension savings are invested and to 
push for change is still in its nascent state and, as argued by a sustainability research expert 
at the Scottish Widows Investment Partnership: 
At the moment, relatively tiny proportion of pension savers ask any questions at all 
about these issues and I think some pension funds use that as an excuse to do 
nothing. So the more pension savers ask, the better [Fieldwork Interview, Scottish 
Widows Investment Partnership, 2013].  
Apart from ShareAction, the NGO community has not dedicated its efforts to working in 
this area, despite the fact that some NGOs with a broad membership and supporter base 
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of a broader group of institutional investors and due to its overreliance on governors and legislators willing to 
tolerate a campaign against private corporations. 
146 
such as Friends of the Earth have the influence and ability to educate their members in the 
benefits of becoming a more active pension saver. 
An interviewee from ShareAction talks about another significant challenge that NGOs face 
when attempting to use the pension saver activism strategy: 
It can be quite difficult to get people engaged with what is happening with their 
pensions, partly because there is a demographic issue – a lot of the people who are 
more activist and take e-mail actions are not the same demographic that identify 
themselves strongly with their pension savings, or maybe even have pension 
savings. So in terms of trying to build a movement and build an activist network – 
that is a challenge that we have to think about [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 
2013c]. 
The demographic problem the interviewee refers to concerns the fact that young people 
often do not have pension savings or find the world of pension investments complex and 
distant, as indicated by a respondent who is a young employee with ShareAction: 
When I start talking about my work and about pension savings to friends from my 
circle who are the same age as me (24 years), they are just not engaged and 
automatically assume that what I do is not interesting [Fieldwork Interview, 
ShareAction, 2012]. 
These insights into attitudes towards pensions, as reflected in the quote mentioned above, 
are supported by secondary academic research. General studies examining attitudes toward 
direct action and protest reveal that young people are more likely to get involved. This 
assertion is confirmed by Barnes and Kaase (1979) who examine the willingness of youths 
and their parents to participate in varieties of direct action across five industrialised 
societies. Similarly, Parry et al. (1992), who researched participation in social movements, 
conclude that: „young adults in Britain…have an abiding attachment to direct action‟. 
Byrne (1997) claims that younger people‟s attraction to social movements can be explained 
by the fact that they tend not to have established careers and extensive family commitments 
– this in turn means they possess more disposable time and are more open to 
unconventional tactics. 
There are therefore many considerations in respect of pension activism and it may well be 
the case that there is a demographic dimension whereby younger members of society do not 
identify with the campaigning method being proposed. The section that follows reveals 
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how this younger part of the population, which is perhaps more detached from the financial 
system, can take part in shareholder activism. 
7.2. Mobilising Detached Stakeholders  
Apart from encouraging pension holders to have their say in the way their savings are 
invested, NGOs are also attempting to mobilise ordinary citizens who may not necessarily 
have a pension. Detached stakeholders can participate in corporate governance through 
buying a single share and attending a company‟s AGM with the aim of asking a question62 
(see Chapter 8 for more on the dynamics of AGM participation). This makes ordinary 
citizens corporate „insiders‟, or shareholders (King and Soule, 2007), who are able to use 
their position as owners of the corporation to bring about change.  
ShareAction raises awareness among its supporters and other NGOs via its annual 
corporate AGM training event. The event is free of charge but there is one prerequisite – 
that each participant attends at least one company AGM during the year. In this way, 
ShareAction creates what it labels its own „shareholder army‟. I attended two such events in 
February 2013 at the Unison centre in Euston and in January 2014 at ChristianAid‟s 
London office. The audience was mixed – 15 to 20 people with a variety of different 
interests including animal rights, climate change, fair wages and tax, goods sold from 
occupied Palestinian land, women on executive boards, among others. The events were 
very informative and provided useful advice for any aspiring novice shareholder activist. 
Topics covered included what an AGM is from a company and an NGO perspective, what 
are the advantages of this campaigning tactic, practical advice on how to buy shares, what 
to expect on the day, how to maximise your impact, and how to frame your questions 
(paying attention to tone, clarity, brevity, the business case, and even your attire). An 
abundance of real life examples of AGM questions from ShareAction‟s campaigns were 
provided and the day finished with a role-play exercise where participants pretended to be 
shareholders asking questions at FTSE 100 AGMs and board members providing responses 
[Fieldwork Notes(3), 2013; Fieldwork Notes(20), 2014]. The organisation also asks its 
supporters if they hold shares in any companies and if yes, would they like to appoint 
ShareAction as a proxy. This gives the NGO access to the AGM without incurring costs 
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associated with buying a share – the share is owned by a supporter but s/he appoints a 
member of ShareAction‟s team to go the AGM instead and to ask a question. 
Many NGOs nowadays have started to train their supporters and provide them with the 
advice needed to attend an AGM and ask a question. A good example from the tax case 
study is ChristianAid‟s strategy to engage „with our key supporters and campaigners to see 
if they would be willing to ask the question‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2013]. 
The organisation has understood the hidden potential of shareholder activism and aims to 
empower individuals to take action and realise their influence:  
One of the challenges is to get the supporters to understand that they can make 
changes through their very small investments rather than bigger institutional 
investors, and we try and galvanise, but also encourage and enthuse them to do that. 
One of the challenges around that is giving people the confidence and getting the 
right people to ask the right questions [Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2013]. 
Waygood (2006) argues that, as the system is „one share one vote‟, meaning that a greater 
number of shares provides an investor with a greater influence, the ability of NGOs to 
pressure corporations is limited as they do not hold sufficient financial reserves to buy 
substantial numbers of shares. However, what training events like those described above 
reveal is that only one share is required to tackle the lack of democracy in companies and to 
occupy the boardroom – one share that can be bought by NGOs and any individual member 
of the public alike. This powerful mechanism is therefore seen as a measure that can give 
voice to a greater variety of stakeholder interests.   
A powerful way of capturing the attention of both immediate and detached stakeholders is 
through the use of old media (traditional news programmes, print journalism, national daily 
newspapers) and new media (internet based campaigning using social media). Making 
reference to each of the three case studies, the following section looks at how the media is 
used to mobilise the general public. It also explores the divergent effects the media has had 
on the outcome of the interventions.  
7.3. Mobilisation through the Media – Evidence from the                   
Case Studies  
The media plays an important role as an indirect channel of diffusion of movement tactics 
and collective action frames. It has an amplifying effect, by echoing the goals of social 
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movement organisations towards a broader audience (Dubuisson-Quellier (2013) and 
serves as a method for mobilisation of the public. Spilerman (1976) suggests that the urban 
riots of the late 1960s, which spread throughout urban, black areas, were inspired by 
television coverage of civil rights activism. He argues that the media created a cultural 
linkage among African Americans across different cities. In a more recent take on the 
subject, Myers (2000) considers the diffusion of racial rioting in the US from 1964-71 and 
finds evidence that the level of media attention received is positively correlated with the 
propensity for riots. He concludes that those riots which received national media attention 
led to an increase in the subsequent national level of riots. 
The agenda-setting hypothesis suggests that while the news media may not be successful in 
telling people what to think, it is quite successful in telling the public what to think about 
(Cohen, 1963). This hypothesis has been a cornerstone of political and mass 
communication research for more than 40 years and the goal has been to understand the 
news media‟s role in shaping public opinion (Carroll, 2011). According to McCombs and 
Shaw (1972, p.176): „In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and 
broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about 
a given issue, but how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of 
information in a news story and its position…The mass media may well determine the 
important issues – that is, the media may set the „agenda‟ of the campaign‟. McCombs and 
Shaw‟s (1972) study of the 1968 American presidential election argues that there is a 
significant relationship between media reports and people‟s perception of public issues. 
Given the important place the media occupies in movement dynamics, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the ability of NGOs to generate media and public interest in a topic played a 
paramount role in all of the campaigns described in this study. As will be discussed later in 
the chapter, media campaigns often create a broader environment of public awareness 
which can play an important role for influencing shareholders. The existence of, or lack of, 
media and public interest in a topic can have significant implications for the final outcome 
of campaigns, as exemplified by the divergent impacts media attention had on each of the 
three case studies under investigation.  In some instances, the lack of stories happening on 
the ground and the lack of media interest in a topic made it more difficult for NGOs to 
influence investors (the Niger Delta campaign); on other occasions NGOs developed a 
sophisticated media strategy which reinforced their campaigning message and efforts (the 
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Vedanta case), and in the case of corporate tax issues, tax justice became a trendy topic 
which occupied headlines across the world and gave impetus to a new campaign.  
An Unsuccessful Media Strategy – The Niger Delta Campaign 
To begin with, it could be argued that the Niger Delta campaign (see Section 5.1 for an 
overview of the issue) has not been particularly effective in capturing the attention of the 
media and the public. Other interventions targeting Shell have been more successful. For 
example, the campaign against Arctic drilling managed to persuade the company to suspend 
drilling operations in 2013. According to a staff member of Platform
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, this achievement 
can be attributed to the interest the public has expressed in the issue, which in turn has been 
driven by the media:  
Part of that success has come because there has been a very wide public interest in 
the question of the Arctic because of public perception that the Arctic is a very 
special place and that interest has been driven by the media both in Europe and the 
US. That public interest in itself has an impact on the US government local 
authorities – both the Department of the Interior who‟ve looked closely at Shell‟s 
activities, but also the US Coast Guard who‟ve inspected Shell‟s rigs and support 
vessels to a degree which they would never normally do [Fieldwork Interview, 
Platform, 2013]. 
These lines provide evidence of another campaign where, similarly to Vedanta‟s case (see 
next section below), the media and public interest have encouraged increased government 
scrutiny of company‟s activities. Amnesty International‟s 2009 report cites a study 
conducted by a group of independent environmental and oil experts who visited the Niger 
Delta region in 2006 and estimated that the figure for oil spilt, both onshore and offshore, 
amounts to between 9 and 13 million barrels of oil over the last 50 years (Nigerian 
Conservation Foundation, WWF UK and IUCN, 2006). This is a staggering amount 
compared to the 4.9 million barrels of oil spilt in the Gulf of Mexico and the 257,000 
barrels spilt during the Exxon Valdez disaster. Yet the latter two incidents, and the 
possibility for future oil spills in the Arctic, are considered as greater disasters than the 
situation in Nigeria because „there is a lot of public concern. There are oil spills of a major 
scale in the Niger Delta every single week and nobody gives a damn, not in the West‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, Platform, 2013].  
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Low public interest in the West can be explained by the fact that the problems in the Niger 
Delta are seen as something distant, something which is very hard to solve and does not 
have a direct impact on the everyday lives of people in the industrialised world. While 
Arctic drilling can have catastrophic repercussions for climate change, the situation in 
Nigeria is only directly relevant to the affected communities living in the Niger Delta. As 
one interviewee explains succinctly: 
These countries are far away so it‟s difficult to get a lot of public involvement in the 
Netherlands because people see this as something that‟s far away and not relevant 
for them, and they do not see why they should be concerned about these issues 
[Fieldwork Interview, FoE Netherlands, 2013].  
Another reason behind the relative public disinterest may stem from the fact that the 
environmental and social problems in the Niger Delta have existed for a long time and the 
campaign against Shell has been a very long-standing one (initiated in the 1990s). In 
comparison, when news of Vedanta‟s plans to expand its alumina refinery and to mine for 
bauxite in Niyamgiri first came to prominence in 2004, as the topic was new and 
fascinating, it was able to capture the attention of the public and the NGOs involved 
managed to sustain this attention until the issue was resolved – a period which was much 
shorter (around ten years) than in the Niger Delta case. 
The lack of engagement by the traditional media with the Niger Delta issue and the 
apparent „media fatigue‟, which may also have emerged as a result of the long-standing 
nature of the problem, contribute further to the scarce public interest in the topic. Moreover, 
a respondent employed by Platform said that in his opinion the threat of violence in the 
region has meant that it has been much more risky, expensive and less desirable for media 
corporations to send their staff to Nigeria [Fieldwork Interview, Platform, 2013]. In a 
vicious circle, low media attention has been reinforced by the scarcity of new, interesting 
information coming out. This contrasts starkly with the Vedanta campaign where pressure 
on the company was constantly maintained via media stories depicting health and safety 
breaches at a range of its operations such as the famous incident whereby a chimney 
collapsed and killed forty workers in 2009 at Vedanta‟s Bharat Aluminium Company 
power plant in Korba, central India (Hopkins, 2009; The Economic Times, India, 2010). 
Respondents said that the company‟s decision to deny all allegations at first and to adopt a 
non-transparent approach to dealing with stakeholders has only served to reinforce media 
attention:  
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In terms of media, which was another big aspect of it, Vedanta didn‟t do themselves 
any favours. They were aggressive, they were secretive, they were doing some 
really horrible things which made for good news content. Unfortunately it‟s often 
the worse stories that make the best news and Vedanta were quite unrepentant about 
any of it. So they were their own worst enemies [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 
2013b]. 
By contrast, the situation in the Niger Delta has been very different, with no major stories 
or eye catching newsworthy content: 
There hasn‟t been enough to react to. In Nigeria it can go months without something 
emerging for all sorts of reasons, compared to other issues. And, if you want to try 
and get a lot of investors interested, you need there to be a sense of „this is not going 
away, this is a problem‟. Shell and the Niger Delta is a little more like a 
malingering, constant problem. Looking it coldly as a campaigner who is trying to 
find leverage to bring this to the table, nothing new happens. It‟s relentless in a non-
headline making way. The oil is always there, but there is never a newsworthy spill, 
if you know what I mean [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
However, the literature provides another explanation for the low media interest in Nigeria – 
an explanation that leaves aside the specifics of the campaign and instead focuses on wider 
issues. Many studies have revealed that the attention of the Western/Northern news media 
is heavily skewed towards a few countries and that most countries in the developing world 
get almost no coverage at all, even in newspapers that provide extensive coverage of 
foreign affairs such as the New York Times (Wu, 2000). An analysis of the data set of 
Ramos et al. (2007), carried out by Thrall et al. (2014), reveals that 78 per cent of the two 
hundred nations studied received no human rights coverage in either the Economist or 
Newsweek between 1986 and 2000 – a statistic which poses a serious challenge for NGOs‟ 
efforts to reach both immediate and detached stakeholders through the media.  A recent 
study estimated that the quantity of foreign news stories published in newspapers in the UK 
fell by 80 per cent from 1979 to 2009 (Moore, 2010).  
Low media and public interest in the Niger Delta campaign, as well as other campaigns ran 
by NGOs, might also be explained by the existence of „compassion fatigue‟ among the 
general public – a phrase often used by journalism analysts to describe a condition 
whereby, as a result of being exposed to too many appeals, the public becomes resistant to 
responding to these appeals and to helping campaigners in their fight against big 
corporations. A specific case of the presence of compassion fatigue among NGOs‟ 
supporters became evident during one of the participant observation events. When running 
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a stall for ShareAction as part of the „Finance – What‟s Faith Got to Do with It?‟ seminar, 
the researcher was given the task to expand the supporter base of the NGO and persuade 
people to join its mailing list. However, although some individuals were interested in the 
work of the organisation, they were hesitant about providing their email address, because 
they said that they were already supporters of many of the other big NGOs and, as a 
consequence, they were constantly bombarded with emails, petitions and online appeals 
[Fieldwork Notes(17), 2013]. 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that media interest and public engagement 
can catapult an issue to the top of a company‟s and investors‟ agenda. The presence of these 
two factors serves as an additional leverage which drives increased investor engagement on 
a topic of concern to NGOs:  
Nigeria is much more significant in terms of impact on peoples‟ lives than the Gulf 
of Mexico is but, because of the lack of the regulatory pressure (there are laws in 
America), because of the lack of television cameras – Nigeria just isn‟t as big a 
priority, you don‟t need to be fighting that fire to maintain a solid presence in Shell 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
The Vedanta campaign case study also stresses the importance of regulatory pressure for 
achieving a shift in company behaviour (see next section). Such regulatory pressure in the 
case of Vedanta has also been driven by heightened public and media engagement. 
Therefore, it could be argued that these three factors – regulatory pressure, media interest 
and public engagement, play a paramount role in the effectiveness of a shareholder activist 
campaign. 
Successfully Capturing the Media and Public Attention – The Vedanta Case 
In contrast to the Niger Delta case study, the media and public interest regarding Vedanta‟s 
operations in India is very high. Overall, the campaign against Vedanta (see Section 5.1 for 
an overview of the intervention) can be considered as an example of a successful 
intervention. This success is partly attributed to the elaborate media strategy developed by 
ActionAid as part of its broader campaign efforts. The NGO has endeavoured to „make sure 
that the controversy around the Niyamgiri mine was picked up in the press at the time of 
the AGM‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013a].  For example, in 2009 ActionAid 
hired a JCB digger and placed it outside the AGM to attract attention and provide a good 
photo backdrop. ActionAid also did a Photoshop stunt in 2008 – an image of St Paul‟s 
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Cathedral with a wrecking ball. The objective was to demonstrate how destroying a sacred 
site would feel to a community and an actual planning application to demolish the cathedral 
accompanied the stunt. In 2009, this was followed by a spoof photo of Stonehenge being 
demolished to keep the issue alive and in the public‟s imagination.  All three images are 
shown below:  
 
 
 
 
 
Bianca Jagger with Indian activists outside Vedanta‟s 2009 AGM. The JCB digger provides a good    
photo backdrop. 
 
         
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These powerful images were widely circulated both through old media channels 
(newspapers, news programmes) and new media channels (the internet, social media 
websites, email alerts), ensuring that the message reaches immediate, as well as detached 
stakeholders. 
 
 
 Left: 2008 Photoshop stunt by ActionAid depicting the demolition of St Paul‟s Cathedral.  
 Right: 2009 spoof photo of Stonehenge being demolished. 
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A review of live documents conducted by the researcher demonstrates that the campaigning 
efforts of ActionAid and Amnesty International have been closely followed by the media. 
The Guardian newspaper has covered the events at Vedanta‟s AGM for five consecutive 
years since 2009 and the BBC has published regular updates of developments throughout 
the years. The upheaval in the UK was well documented across all of India‟s major 
newspapers – a significant factor for the success of the campaign, according to the 
interviewees: 
The more that we built media pressure in the UK, the more that would be reflected 
back in the Indian context and slowly but surely that actually changed how feasible 
it was to get political action and in the end what worked wasn‟t getting shareholders 
to convince the company not to invest, it was getting shareholder activity to 
generate a lot of press to make the Indian government feel uncomfortable about it, 
and then that ended with one of the clearances for the mine being cancelled 
[Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013a]. 
The lines above suggest that shareholder activism can achieve the desired outcome in terms 
of changing corporate policy not only through influencing immediate and detached 
stakeholders, but also through getting the attention of a third type of stakeholder – namely – 
governments and politicians. Governments can in turn change the regulatory environment 
so that companies are forced to comply with the newly introduced legislation. This is 
precisely what happened in the case of Vedanta when on 18 April 2013 the Supreme Court 
of India delegated the responsibility for making a decision as to whether the mine should be 
built to the gram sabhas (assemblies consisting of all male voters, see Chapter 5, Table 14). 
The media has played a central role for the success of this campaign – the fact that all the 
shareholder activist tactics employed generated a lot of media attention both in the UK and 
in India, helped create the right political environment for the Indian government to 
intervene. One of the interviewees gives an interesting explanation of what might have been 
the reason behind the Supreme Court‟s judgement: 
You have to remember that in India the Supreme Court was also very aware of 
every investor that was pulling out, of every press release, and every article that was 
being published about Vedanta and how it was affecting not just the community, but 
I would say the image of India as a place to do business. I think there was a political 
dynamic to it as well – it became a lightning rod for how development was 
trampling over human rights in India and that sits uncomfortably with a country‟s 
image of a modern democracy, so that was quite an important aspect of it as well 
[Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013b]. 
156 
The NGOs involved in the campaign were instrumental in generating, maximising and 
keeping alive the media attention. According to one interviewee from the Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust, the campaigning NGOs were very helpful in maximising the publicity 
around the organisation‟s decision to divest by giving advice on the press release and its 
timing [Fieldwork Interview, 2013, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust].  
The NGOs also managed to organise and spark an interest among supporters as they held 
numerous demonstrations against the company – each year outside Vedanta‟s AGMs, on 
the Niyamgiri mountain and at the Supreme Court of India. In addition, utilising a new 
media strategy aimed at attracting detached stakeholders from the demographic group 
described previously, Amnesty International urged its members to sign an online petition 
and, as a result, more than 30,000 people wrote to the Indian authorities while the NGO 
engaged in talks with Vedanta (Amnesty International, no date).  
In accordance with the findings discussed in this chapter, scholars have discovered many 
examples whereby NGO networks were able to encourage governments to take action 
through sharing new information, framing existing problems and informing public opinion 
by running a high profile media campaign (Bogert, 2011; Burgerman, 2001; Froehling, 
1997; Khagram and Sikkink, 2002; Price, 1998; Shipper, 2012). According to Khagram and 
Sikkink (2002), NGOs employ the „mobilisation of shame‟ (p.16) strategy in that they use 
the international arena as a stage to hold governments and multinational companies 
accountable to a global judgement about appropriateness. The main aim is to initiate change 
through publicising norm-breaking behaviour and through embarrassing public authorities 
or firms. In the pursuit of publicising norm-breaking, the media is seen as a crucial outlet 
and a powerful ally of campaigners, resulting in much effort being dedicated to gaining 
media attention (Khagram and Sikkink, 2002). 
The Tax Campaign – Media and Public Interest as Triggers of                     
Investor  Engagement 
The level of public awareness and media interest has also played a significant role for the 
advancement of the tax campaign. Once considered as an obscure and complex subject 
matter which is of interest only to companies and their auditors and accountants, in recent 
years the discussion around tax has undergone a revolutionary transformation and has come 
to occupy the minds of ordinary citizens. The traditional media interest in the subject has 
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also been abundant, with major UK newspapers covering stories about the tax scandals 
associated with companies such as Google, Amazon, Starbucks, and Barclays, which were 
alleged to have failed to pay their fair share of taxes in the UK (Syal and Wintour, 2012; 
Kay, 2012b; Pratley, 2013; Rushton, 2013; Griffiths and Bowers, 2013).  
What is interesting to note is that NGOs campaigning against Vedanta and Shell had to 
generate media and public attention from scratch, whereas in terms of the tax campaign, the 
public and media outcry regarding tax avoidance in the UK had already begun to gather 
impetus when campaigners from ChristianAid, ActionAid and ShareAction decided to 
make use of it and redirect it towards the tax injustices occurring in developing countries. 
Such media and public attention can be partly explained by the broader economic and 
political environment, characterised by public spending cuts and numerous corporate 
scandals spurred by aggressive tax avoidance practices. However, another factor which 
needs to be taken into account is the role of the Tax Justice Network (TJN, hereafter) – an 
independent international network launched in 2003, which conducts research, analysis and 
advocacy on international tax. TJN co-founder and chartered accountant Richard Murphy is 
amongst the few people to realise the importance of aggressive tax avoidance before it 
became a salient public issue. The TJN and Richard Murphy could be credited with 
pioneering many new concepts in relation to the tax justice debate. 
For example, Murphy (2010) developed the entirely new country-by-country accounting 
standard
64
 (see footnote 36) which forms a central role in NGOs‟ calls for company action 
and which helped place tax haven discourse on the international agenda. In addition, 
Murphy (2008) also spearheaded the „tax gap‟ concept upon writing the Trade Union 
Confederation commissioned report „The Missing Billions‟. The report calculates the „tax 
gap‟ in the UK, or in other words, the difference between the tax that might be expected to 
be paid to governments and the tax that is actually collected. The report estimates that the 
UK Government loses £25 billion annually from tax avoidance and tax planning. As a 
result of this research, closing the tax gap is currently a major priority of HM Revenues & 
Customs‟ business plan. A number of other influential books and reports have been 
published by the TJN, including Nicholas Shaxson‟s (2011) „Treasure Islands‟ (a 
comprehensive account of tax havens and the tax justice consensus), „Tax Us If You Can‟ 
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(Murphy et al., 2005) and „Tax Us If You Can 2nd Edition‟ (Murphy and Christensen, 
2013). „Tax Us If You Can‟, TJN‟s first ever publication, provides a comprehensive 
overview of the concept of tax and tax justice. It analyses the causes of tax injustice, 
outlines the key players who benefit from tax injustice, mentions the agencies which 
address global tax issues and explores the key solutions TJN campaigns for. The report 
boasts a 22 page long glossary explaining key terms. It was written well before the NGOs 
discussed here started campaigning for tax justice and certainly at a time when international 
tax was not widely accepted as an issue that could be a focus of campaigning efforts. As an 
example of this, in December 2003, the TJN was the only civil society organisation to 
attend and address the UN Committee of Tax Experts who met in Geneva. As such the TJN 
has been instrumental in raising awareness among civil society organisations, the media 
and the general public of aggressive tax avoidance and the role of tax in corporate social 
responsibility.  
While TJN‟s core focus is on creating systemic change on a wide range of issues related to 
tax, through writing and publishing the findings of their reports, the primary objective of 
the campaigning NGOs discussed here was to make sure that the development story in 
relation to tax is picked up by the media and finds its place in the minds of stakeholders. 
Major UK newspapers have covered the release of both ActionAid‟s exposés of SABMiller 
and ABF (see Boffey, 2013; Lawrence, 2010), as well as other reports published by the 
NGO and by ChristianAid (Anderson, 2013; The Telegraph, 2011). The main aim was to 
inspire a sense of unfairness and moral wrongdoing when immediate and detached 
stakeholders consider the tax practices of corporations and to emphasise „the fact that tax 
was not being paid in the places where the economic activity took place‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, ChristianAid, 2013].  
Social media too played a role in advancing the campaign and in mobilising those 
stakeholders who do not follow traditional news content. For example, via its website and 
Twitter page, ShareAction provided details about the specific questions raised and the 
answers received at all AGMs which it attended in order to ask a tax question. A 
respondent explained that the main objective of this tactic was to „get into the media to get 
your wider message across to a wider group of people than those attending the AGM‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. Another interviewee from ShareAction 
commented that reliance on social media has proven useful as it secured the organisation 
press coverage in The Telegraph.  
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Many have acknowledged the potential of the online environment for gathering public 
support and media interest. Yet, studies have shown that blog traffic, Facebook likes, 
YouTube video views, and Twitter followership are heavily skewed toward a small number 
of popular people and organisations (Cheng et al., 2008; Farrell and Drezner, 2008; Kwak 
et al., 2010). This assertion appears true if we compare the Twitter followership of a small 
organisation such as ShareAction (5,011 as of 2015) with that of, for example, Amnesty 
International (1.41m.), Greenpeace (1.32m.), and even ChristianAid (71,000), or ActionAid 
(18,500).  
An analysis of the Twitter feeds of Amnesty International, Greenpeace and ChristianAid, 
undertaken by the researcher during the 2014 AGM season (May – November), suggests 
that these organisations, which have considerably higher followership, do not use Twitter to 
talk about their AGM activities or the other shareholder activist tactics that they employ in 
their campaigns. The topic of shareholder activism is very much beyond the radar when it 
comes to their online presence. If this trend was to change, it could lead to a greater 
awareness among the public, as well as greater mobilisation of detached stakeholders 
willing to engage in shareholder activism. The empirical findings suggest that the poor use 
of Twitter to advertise shareholder activist actions can be explained by the fact that 
shareholder activism is not a fundamental part of what big NGOs such as ChristianAid and 
ActionAid do. In addition, their Twitter accounts are centralised and not all staff have 
access to them. Everything that is published is agreed months in advance and, although 
individual staff used their own Twitter accounts to popularise the shareholder activist 
activities they have been involved in, no mention of them was present on the official 
Twitter page of the organisations [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2014]. 
One strategy often used by social movements is to draw the attention of the mass media 
with the expectation to win the sympathies of more powerful actors able to exert influence 
on decision-makers (Gitlin, 1980; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). Such an approach can be 
a potentially powerful indirect way of attracting the attention of investors, especially when 
it comes to large consumer facing companies with strong brand reputation for which, as 
suggested by Rehbein et al. (2004), the negative impact of bad publicity is far greater. The 
empirical evidence supports this assertion – when asked about what motivated the 
organisation‟s decision to engage on tax, one of the employees working for a mainstream 
fund management firm said that „there has been news flow on tax so we tend to respond to 
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issues when there are controversies in the media, or from our clients, and on tax there has 
been a lot of controversy‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Scottish Widows Investment Partnership, 
2013]. Similarly, a member of the EIAG (Ethical Investment Advisory Group, hereafter) 
for the Church of England argues that the focus of NGOs has been on raising the issue „in 
the public consciousness and that has brought it to investors‟ consciousness. I think that‟s a 
different way of reaching investors‟ [Fieldwork Interview, EIAG, 2013]. 
However, a discussion of the huge media and public interest surrounding the subject of tax 
would be incomplete without positioning it in the broader economic context. The state of 
the economy can play a significant role in determining the success of a campaign and this is 
especially true for the tax campaign: 
I think there are wider factors behind why the issue has been taken up and some 
NGOs jumped on the bandwagon of that as well, kind of have a piece of it 
[Fieldwork Interview, EIAG, 2013]. 
The economic context can be perceived as a facilitating influence to the tax campaign. 
Austerity measures introduced with the election of the new government after May 2010 
saw a drastic reduction in public spending. At the same time the public started to hear 
reports about companies refusing to pay their fair share of taxes in both the developed and 
the developing world. Naturally, insisting for corporations to adopt responsible tax 
practices was seen as a way of easing the burden on governments struggling to collect 
money for education, the aid budget, health expenditure, and others.  
Based on the observations from the tax campaign, two other factors important for securing 
the success of an intervention can be added to the three conditions (regulatory pressure, 
media interest, public engagement) already discussed previously. These are the extent to 
which a company is public facing and susceptible to reputational damage and the broader 
economic environment in which a campaign unfolds. A large and well-known corporation 
with strong brand image can more easily become the target of shareholder activism and 
concede to NGO demands: „Generally what you see is that those companies who rely on 
reputation and have had adverse publicity have gotten very engaged on tax. Companies that 
have had adverse publicity, but don‟t really rely on reputation have not really engaged‟ 
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[Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2014b].  However, the economic climate also has to be 
right for a campaign to flourish, as has been demonstrated by the tax case study
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.  
Conclusion 
Chapter 7 has examined the avenues through which NGOs mobilise the public – both 
immediate and detached stakeholders. The indirect strategies discussed were: educating 
pension savers on how to use the influence of their savings; raising awareness and training 
individuals on how to buy shares, attend an AGM, ask questions to the board and maximise 
impact; using the media and public interest in a topic as a proxy for getting the attention of 
investors and increasing the chances for success of a campaign. The main conclusions from 
the chapter are summarised below. 
To begin with, the chapter has explored the unifying role of NGOs who have the potential 
to mobilise pension savers and ensure that they occupy a central role in the pensions 
industry. The empirical evidence suggests that pressure from pension savers can be 
instrumental for a shift in pension fund behaviour. Despite that, such pressure is still 
lacking on a bigger scale and NGOs, with the exception of ShareAction, have not started 
campaigning in this area.  There is potential for some big membership-based organisations 
such as Friends of the Earth to take the idea forward.  
Second, a small number of NGOs (such as ShareAction and ChristianAid) have started 
transforming individuals into corporate „insiders‟ who can change company practices. This 
transformation process is achieved through training events that equip citizens with in-depth 
knowledge on how to buy shares and attend an AGM. Although still in its early stages, the 
momentum for this type of action is growing, not only among individuals, but among 
NGOs as well, as has been shown by the chronology (see Chapter 4). The notion of the 
„shareholder army‟ composed of ordinary individuals refutes Waygood‟s (2006) argument 
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 Having discussed a number of shareholder activist strategies, it should be noted that an NGO campaign is 
rarely based purely on shareholder activism as a point of leverage. Often the focus on the financial market 
runs in parallel with other tactics such as celebrity endorsement (for example, Bianca Jagger and Michael 
Palin in the campaign against Vedanta); building relationships with key political figures (for example, Boris 
Johnson, Ed Miliband and Simon Hughes are all supporters of the Living Wage campaign); initiating reforms 
at regulatory level (for example, the tax campaign also aims to change tax policies and frameworks at the UK, 
EU and global levels), and others. All these factors have an impact on the outcome of a campaign. However, 
as they are not directly related to capital markets campaigning, they will not from part of the analysis in the 
thesis. 
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concerning the inability of NGOs to exert influence over corporations due to their lack of 
financial power. 
Finally, the chapter has discussed media strategies employed by the NGOs and the 
divergent impact that the level of public and media interest has had on the success of each 
campaign. It has been discovered that the existence of, or lack of, media and public interest 
in an issue can have significant implications for the final outcomes of a campaign. Apart 
from the level of media interest and public engagement, other factors which contribute to 
the effectiveness of a campaign have been identified. These are the existence of regulatory 
pressure, the state of the economy and the extent to which a company is public facing. A 
public facing company, which is subject to regulatory pressure and attracts a lot of media 
content and public interest, is more likely to concede to activists‟ demands.  What follows 
is an examination of the direct shareholder activist strategies that NGOs have used as part 
of their campaigns against Vedanta, Shell and tax injustice. 
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8. The AGM  
Going to AGMs had been really useful in putting issues on 
the agenda of companies, in bringing issues to the 
attention of directors and other shareholders. 
(Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b) 
Part Three discusses two direct shareholder activist strategies used by NGOs who strive to 
influence corporate behaviour – namely – attendance at an annual general meeting (Chapter 
8) and filing of a shareholder resolution (Chapter 9). These strategies are explored with 
reference to the three case studies and they constitute the „setting‟ level of analysis in 
Layder‟s (1993) research map (Table 6). First, a detailed examination of how NGOs 
operate in an AGM setting is provided, paying particular attention to the nature of questions 
asked and the company responses received. The effectiveness with which NGOs implement 
this tactic is also discussed. Second, Chapter 9 focuses on shareholder resolutions as a 
mechanism for initiating change, by making reference to the two resolutions filed as part of 
the campaigns discussed – the 1997 and the 2006 resolutions presented at Shell‟s AGMs.  
According to Luders (2006), engaging in the disruption of routines is a key method used by 
social movements to compel change. By carrying out activities such as boycotts, protests, 
strikes, and litigations, social movements create negative publicity for the targeted 
corporation and can increase its cost of doing business. Filing a resolution and attendance at 
an AGM with the aim to ask a question or stage a demonstration (either inside or outside 
the venue) are prime examples of the disruption of routines described by Luders (2006).  
The chronology of NGO CM interventions (Chapter 4) reveals that, in the last decade, 
NGOs‟ use of direct strategies has escalated enormously compared to figures for the period 
between 1990 and 2002. The empirical evidence presented in this thesis supports the trend, 
because attending the targeted company‟s annual general meeting formed part of the 
NGO‟s strategy in all three case studies described here, albeit the level of importance 
placed on the tactic varied across each campaign. As mentioned in the methodology 
chapter, the researcher attended and observed the AGMs of four different companies (three 
of which are discussed in this chapter), in order to experience and record at first-hand how 
NGOs assume their role as shareholders and how they interact with the targeted companies. 
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Table 18 below outlines the AGMs attended, as well as the campaign to which they 
correspond and the NGOs which have asked questions to executive directors: 
Table 18: Attended AGMs (Company, Year, Campaign and NGOs involved) 
Company Year Campaign NGOs/supporters 
Shell  2013 and 2014 Niger Delta 
Campaign  
ShareAction (2013), Amnesty 
International (2013), FoE 
Netherlands (2013), Platform 
(2013, 2014) 
Vedanta 
Resources 
2013 and 2014 Vedanta 
Campaign 
Amnesty International (2013, 
2014), A Dongria Kondh 
representative (2013), Bianca 
Jagger (2013) 
BP 2013
66
 Tax Campaign The UK Tar Sands Network, 
ShareAction, ChristianAid 
 
The following paragraphs give details about each of these companies‟ AGMs in the order in 
which they appear in the table. The information is based on the participant observation 
notes compiled by the researcher and on the verbal accounts of interviewees who have 
attended past AGMs.  
8.1. Shell 
Members of Amnesty International UK have bought a token share and have attended 
Shell‟s AGMs since 2011, and members of ShareAction have been present at the events 
since 2012. Similarly, ECCR staff and supporters have attended the company‟s AGMs 
since the late 1990s. As Shell is an Anglo-Dutch company, its AGMs have traditionally 
been held jointly at London and The Hague with a live satellite link-up being set up, 
enabling UK shareholders to ask questions to directors at the meeting in The Hague. 
However, this arrangement was changed for the first time in 2013 when the event was 
streamed live online because, as suggested by Shell, the interactive satellite link did not 
meet shareholders‟ needs (Neate, 2013). 
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 BP‟s 2014 AGM does not form part of the participant observation discussion because the issue of tax 
avoidance was not raised during the meeting. 
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Nature of Questions Asked 
When it comes to the Niger Delta, various NGOs have attended Shell‟s AGMs at different 
points in time (ECCR between the mid-1990s and 2011, Platform since the early 2000s, 
FoE Netherlands from the late 1990s onwards and Amnesty International most recently – 
post-2009). Campaigning NGOs have asked a variety of questions over the years and some 
of these have focused on highlighting failures to adequately clean up or compensate 
communities for pollution, seeking disclosure of information, demanding commitments for 
the reduction of gas flaring, and so on. To demonstrate the dynamics of NGOs‟ 
campaigning in practice, Shell‟s 2013 AGM was observed and will be discussed in this 
section. Overall, with a total of eleven questions related to Nigeria being asked, 
campaigners, investors and citizens catapulted the Niger Delta issue to the top of the AGM 
agenda. Representatives of ShareAction, Amnesty International, FoE Netherlands and 
Platform
67
 were all present at the meeting and asked questions. The following table 
provides a sample of some of the concerns raised: 
Table 19: Questions Asked at Shell’s AGM 2013 
 
 
Organisation  
 
 
Question 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ShareAction 
 
 
My name is … and I am a shareholder. My question relates to 
contractor oversight within the Shell group (...). It is quite concerning 
to see issues about contractor oversight being raised repeatedly in 
relation to the Shell group. The US Department of the Interior, in its 
review of your Alaskan operations in 2012, said that the most 
significant shortcomings in Shell‟s management systems were in the 
area of contractor management and oversight. The executive summary 
from the IUCN scientific panel which was established by Shell said 
that stricter monitoring of contractors carrying out remediation in the 
Niger Delta is required. Peter Voser himself at last year‟s AGM when 
asked about remediation in the Niger Delta referred to contractors 
being at fault. So my question is: „What specific steps are Shell 
currently taking to address the shortcomings that Peter Voser himself 
referred to, that the US Department of the Interior report refers to, and 
that the IUCN scientific panel‟s executive summary of their report 
refers to?‟ 
  
 
Amnesty 
International 
 
My name is… I am a shareholder and also a member of Amnesty 
International in the UK. I am concerned to understand exactly where 
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 Platform is a London-based charity focusing on the social, environmental and economic impacts of global 
oil companies. For more information see Appendix 5. 
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Amnesty 
International 
 
accountability for group-wide environmental standards and their 
performance lies
68
 (…). When I look at group literature – most recently 
the 2012 sustainability report where on page 5 in terms of 
accountability it states „overall accountability for sustainable 
development rests with our chief executive and the executive 
committee and there are group-wide standards that are set and are 
expected to be adhered to across our group‟. Now this is directly 
contradicted by legal statements that our company has made in court 
most recently in Holland where it states categorically that Royal Dutch 
Shell and its directors are in no way accountable for the actions of 
subsidiaries (…). So I am sure that this certainly leaves me and also 
other shareholders confused on this vital issue and I‟d appreciate 
clarification regarding where accountability for group-wide standards 
actually lies (…). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FoE 
Netherlands 
 
 
Good afternoon! My name is… I work for FoE Netherlands. I am 
happy to see that gas flaring is going down, but still gas flaring is 
contributing highly to the climate emissions by the Shell group and 
therefore I have some questions about gas flaring in Nigeria and Iraq. 
For Nigeria we are fairly curious which project would be built over the 
coming years and what the results would be, and if zero flaring is still 
the objective? (…) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Platform 
 
 
I am not only speaking here for myself but on behalf of a colleague - 
Peter
69
. He lives in Port Harcourt and he was eager, desperately keen to 
come to this shareholder meeting to be able to present to the board. 
Unfortunately, he couldn‟t get the visa to get into the Netherlands 
despite a great deal of trying. It interests me that Chad Holliday
70
 has 
been twice to Peter‟s homeland over the last 24 months or so and Peter 
can‟t come here. It makes it very difficult to have a level playing field  
(…). („A question please!‟, the chairman interrupts at one point). He 
works with the villagers in Ogoniland, it‟s now two years since the 
UNEP plan for the cleaning of the environment in the Ogoniland was 
agreed and it‟s awaiting the go ahead of Shell (…). The finances are 
there (…) why is Shell not going ahead with this? I think this is an 
important question in relation to this changing security situation. Over 
the last two years there has been a better security situation in Nigeria 
and the opportunity wasn‟t taken up to push forward with the UNEP 
plan. Why not and when is it going to go forward? 
 
Source: Fieldwork Notes(8) (2013) 
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 The person asking the question also cites the IUCN report which states, contrary to Shell‟s assurances, that 
clean -up and remediation is not satisfactory in the Niger delta (see full version of the question in Appendix 
10). 
69
 A fictional name made up to conceal the true identity of the person. 
70
 Non-executive director of Shell since 2010.  
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What is noticeable is that the first two questions, and to some extent the third, discuss broad 
issues such as contractor oversight, accountability for group-wide environmental standards 
and gas flaring.  Rather than being focused on one specific aspect of Shell‟s operations such 
as tar sands, the Arctic, or Nigeria, these issues are relevant to Shell‟s activities worldwide. 
The first question talks about contractor oversight in relation to both the Arctic and Nigeria 
and the third question mentions gas flaring in Nigeria and Iraq. According to an interviewee 
from ShareAction, the decision to formulate the questions in such a way comes in response 
to the increasing tendency for companies such as Shell (and also BP, see the section on tax 
below which provides an account of BP‟s AGM) to group all questions from a specific 
topic together and, instead of answering them one at a time, to provide a broad, general 
answer to all five or ten questions on, for example, Nigeria: 
I think the Shell AGM is very predictable. They are waiting for ten questions on 
Nigeria, they are waiting for ten questions on the Arctic. They are all sitting there 
and they will just bat them off and they won‟t really pay any attention [Fieldwork 
Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
When the theme of a question is overarching, such as contractor oversight, or community 
relations, or legal strategies – that, first of all, creates a more unpredictable meeting for 
Shell and hinders their elaborate strategy for dealing with uncomfortable NGO questions 
and, secondly, speaks the language of investors, creating the impression that the question is 
coming not from an NGO representative, but rather from a well-informed and concerned 
shareholder: 
It‟s not Nigeria, the shareholders aren‟t hearing Nigeria, they are hearing legal 
strategy, they are hearing contractor risk, they are hearing things that work for them 
and also the Shell board is just out of its comfort zone a little bit… [Fieldwork 
Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
Question four, whose shortened version is presented here, begins with a rather long 
preamble expressing moral indignation at the unfairness of the fact that it is so difficult for 
members of the affected communities in Nigeria to visit the Netherlands and attend the 
AGM.  This rather unrelated to the topic comment visibly seemed to have annoyed the 
board as the Chairman interrupted at one point, demanding that a question be asked. Being 
present at ShareAction‟s AGM training event in February 2013, one of the main messages 
with regard to the nature of AGM questions had to do with the importance of formulating 
shorter, sharper questions which express one specific ask [Fieldwork Notes(3), 2013]. This 
ensures that the message NGOs attempt to convey is not lost or misunderstood, that the 
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board and shareholders are not bored or annoyed, and that the board has no opportunity to 
give a general comment without addressing the question.  
Apart from the questions asked by NGOs, there were also a number of Dutch investors who 
stood up from the floor to challenge the board (see questions five to seven in Appendix 10). 
A representative of a number of Dutch pension funds, as well as a member of the Dutch 
Association of Investors for Sustainable Development, were among those who asked 
questions. Investors were mainly concerned about the clean-up of oil pollution and about 
gas flaring. Question six, asked by a Dutch shareholder, is an interesting one – it suggests 
Shell has not been transparent with regard to its operations in Nigeria and has misinformed 
the public when it comes to its role „in the tragedy in the Niger Delta‟. To understand better 
what this assertion might allude to, the company‟s response to the allegations and the 
questions at the AGM should be examined. The next paragraph does precisely that. 
Company Response – The Victim 
Shell‟s official position and main response to the human rights and environmental 
allegations was expressed by the group‟s CEO Peter Voser during his opening speech in 
which he addressed shareholders. The company was portrayed by Mr. Voser as a victim of 
the circumstances – a victim who is trying to do the right thing, but the people and the 
Nigerian government (which is not contributing to its share of the clean-up costs) stall its 
efforts: 
Let me start off by saying that we have not always got things right in Nigeria, but 
we learn from mistakes and look to improve our operations. We again made 
progress in 2012. But please remember that SPDC is operating in an environment 
with substantial social and security problems. There is widespread vandalism, oil 
theft, violence against our staff and their families [Fieldwork Notes(8), Peter Voser, 
CEO of Shell, 2013]. 
This position has been reiterated numerous times in Shell‟s annual reports, sustainability 
reports and other official documents (for further information on the complex operating 
environment in Nigeria, characterised by a corrupt government, oil theft, conflict within 
communities, and between communities and oil companies, see Chapter 5 which provides a 
brief overview of the situation).  
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Second, another argument frequently put forward by the company and also expressed 
during its 2013 AGM is that, rather than being caused by poor infrastructure and 
operational problems, the majority of oil spills are due to illegal activities and vandalism. 
As Peter Voser argues:  
Today there are fewer than 65 sites affected by spills before 2012 that still need 
addressing and these are predominantly as a result of criminal activities. We are 
moving in the right direction, but I want to stress that the security situation, 
especially the theft of crude oil, is a major problem which seems to have got worse 
in 2012 and 2013 (...). Theft also causes environmental damage [Fieldwork 
Notes(8), Peter Voser, CEO of Shell, 2013]. 
If you just take 2012, 95 per cent of the spills were sabotage [Fieldwork Notes(8), 
Peter Voser, CEO of Shell, 2013]. 
Strong disagreement exists between NGOs and oil companies over the number of spills that 
are attributed to sabotage, with third sector organisations and local communities believing 
that companies such as Shell purposefully designate operational spills as sabotage in order 
to avoid paying compensation. Sabotage, vandalism and oil theft are all serious problems 
existing in the Delta, but no claim can be made with certainty as to what extent of the spills 
has been caused by such activities because, as Amnesty International (2009) points out, 
data on the causes of oil spills in Nigeria has never been subjected to independent 
monitoring and verification. The report proceeds to argue that the majority of spills prior to 
the 1990s were due to infrastructure problems and human error. By the own admission of 
SPDC, most of the oil they spilt between 1989 and 1994 was due to corrosion or 
operational problems (Amnesty International, 2009).  
In response to a question by a Dutch shareholder, Shell‟s CEO revealed that the company 
had 329 spill sites verified in 2012, as opposed to 351 in 2011 and 400 in 2010. He 
acknowledged that the security situation in the region had improved in 2011 and 2012 and 
that Shell could do more. However, when asked by a member of Platform why this window 
of opportunity had been missed and the company had not pushed forward with the 
recommendations of the UNEP report, Mr. Voser acknowledged the question without 
answering it directly, and instead stressed that the security situation has again deteriorated 
during the last five to six months, claiming that had stalled progress.  
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One year on, the 2014 AGM, which was also observed by the researcher, suggested that 
Shell‟s approach to dealing with allegations has not changed much. During this AGM, the 
new CEO Ben van Beurden, who stepped in in January 2014, emphasised yet again that the 
situation in 2013 has been very challenging due to a substantial increase in oil theft and 
security problems (including 16 staff being kidnapped). He admitted that there were 
operational spills and environmental damage resulting from oil theft and said that the 
company was trying to reduce spills caused by sabotage. At no point during his speech on 
Nigeria did he mention the other common reasons for the occurrence of spills highlighted 
by NGOs – namely – poor maintenance of infrastructure, corrosion and equipment failure. 
Similarly to the statements from the previous AGM made by his predecessor Mr. Voser, 
van Beurden claimed that gas flaring was down in 2013, but some gas flaring projects have 
been facing delay as a result of lack of funding from the Nigerian government. The point 
about the shortfall in government funding in relation to gas flaring was reiterated twice. The 
CEO confirmed that Shell is reducing its footprint by divesting from more onshore blocks 
in Nigeria
71
 and is focusing instead on the gas value chain and deep water. However, van 
Beurden clarified that this is not an exit from Nigeria as Shell is still making large growth 
investments onshore [Fieldwork Notes(22), van Beurden, CEO of Shell, 2014]. 
What is interesting to note is that, during the questions and answers session at the AGM, of 
all the different NGOs campaigning against Shell in Nigeria, only one member of Platform 
stood up to ask a question on the issue (see Appendix 10 for a transcript of the question) 
[Fieldwork Notes(22), 2014]. This is in stark contrast with the 2013 AGM when there were 
altogether seven questions on Nigeria – four from NGOs (Amnesty International, 
ShareAction, Platform and FoE Netherlands) and three from investors. ShareAction did not 
ask a question at the 2014 AGM because by that time the organisation was not working on 
this particular campaign (its initial contract with Amnesty International had come to an 
end). When asked about why representatives of Amnesty International did not attend the 
AGM, the NGO said it was due to a lack of funding.  
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 Since 2010 Shell sold a series of blocks exceeding $2bn, but it announced in 2013/14 that it will sell 
licences for another four oil production areas in the eastern Niger Delta region and this sale represents the 
largest so far in terms of production (Makan, 2013). 
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8.2. Vedanta  
ActionAid members have bought token shares and have attended the AGMs of Vedanta 
since 2007. Amnesty International has done the same since 2009. EIRIS has not attended 
the meetings but its reports have been used by investors such as Aviva and others who have 
stood up from the floor and asked questions based on the information in the papers. 
Alongside the questions asked in the boardroom there were protests outside organised by 
the NGOs involved so as to „make sure that investors were aware of the scale of the 
controversy‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013a]. According to the former head of 
trades and corporates at ActionAid, the NGO adopted a direct strategy in order to: „confront 
the company in their home territory, so to speak, in terms of where they are registered and 
where their financial base is, to get them to address those questions‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
ActionAid, 2013b] and an Amnesty International employee, closely involved in the 
investor engagement strand of the campaign, argues the NGOs‟ aim was to „add weight to 
whatever issues Amnesty International was seeking to change, to challenge the board of 
directors and to publicly highlight the issue where there are concerns‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
Amnesty International, 2013a]. 
Nature of Questions Asked 
Over the years numerous questions have been asked at Vedanta‟s AGMs revolving around 
issues such as the legality of mining and refinery operations in terms of the permits the 
company had, environmental pollution, human rights abuses, the procedures used for land 
acquisition and building permissions, and others. The company‟s AGM in 2013 was 
attended by representatives of Aviva, Amnesty International, the Dongria Kondh and by 
Bianca Jagger, who all stood up to ask questions. The following table provides a short 
version of some of the questions (see Appendix 11 for the full version of the questions): 
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Table 20: Questions Asked at Vedanta’s AGM 2013 
Organisation/Individual Question 
 
 
 
 
Bianca Jagger 
 
(…) What are the lessons learnt by Vedanta from the 
Niyamgiri experience which will be applied to all other 
projects with regard to issues of consultation and impact 
assessment? My second question is, does Vedanta now 
accept the need to gain the free, prior and informed consent 
of Adivasi
72
 people before embarking on any future 
projects? Thirdly, has Vedanta conducted an internal 
investigation into the charges by the Indian National Human 
Rights Commission (INHRC, hereafter) (…)? If no internal 
investigation has been conducted, may I continue by 
suggesting that this is a disgrace given the serious nature of 
the offenses that the INHRC, an independent watchdog, has 
drawn attention to.  
 
 
 
 
Stephanie Meier, Aviva 
 
Since the beginning of 2010, Vedanta‟s share price has 
underperformed in relation to its mining peers by 25 per 
cent. We consider that a proportion of this can be attributed 
to mismanagement of sustainability issues. (…) We are still 
to see the evidence that policies and practices are being 
comprehensively embedded in the culture of the company 
and translated into action on the ground. This cultural 
change should be driven by the board and appropriately 
trained and experienced board is therefore crucial. (…) We 
do not consider that there is sufficiently robust and 
independent challenge and oversight at board level. (…) A 
focus on sustainability will help the board deliver value to 
Vedanta and its shareholders. 
 
 
 
Amnesty International 
 
(…) My question to you is, are you prepared to make a 
commitment that, in any future projects, you will undertake 
human rights impact assessments at the outset, and that the 
decision whether to go ahead with the project will depend on 
these impact assessments that will address the full socio-
economic and human rights impacts and that these 
assessments will be shared with affected communities so 
that they can take a view on whether they want the project to 
go ahead or not. Are you willing to make that commitment? 
A Dongria Kondh 
representative 
 
 
 
Last year you said you will delete that part of your report 
where you say the Dongria Kondh are backward. In the 
„Vedanta‟s Perspective‟ report you have made racist 
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 The term Adivasi is used to describe India‟s indigenous communities. 
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A Dongria Kondh 
representative 
comments about the Dongria Kondh… [Here the person 
asking the question is interrupted by the Chairman, Anil 
Agarwal who speaks in Indian and they briefly exchange 
words that are not translated to the rest of the attendees in 
the room. Then, the tribal representative stands up and says 
he wants to sing a song on behalf of the Dongria Kondh, the 
main message of which is that Vedanta is not welcome in 
Niyamgiri. The song is in Indian but the man slips in a few 
sentences in English while singing: „We won‟t leave 
Niyamgiri. We won‟t leave, we won‟t give‟]. 
 
Source: Fieldwork Notes(12) (2013) 
As can be seen from the table above, the questions at Vedanta‟s 2013 AGM revolve around 
the lessons that the company has learnt throughout the engagement process and test its 
willingness to: follow international human rights standards, respect the right to free, prior 
and informed consent of indigenous groups, conduct comprehensive human rights impact 
assessments as part of its future projects, embrace sustainability, and embed its new 
policies and practices in its culture, translating them into actions on the ground.  It is 
interesting to observe the stark contrast in language and tone between the question 
delivered by the institutional investor Aviva and the questions asked by campaigners and 
NGOs. The former mentions sustainability issues but speaks the language of investors, 
making reference to share price performance and emphasising that the ultimate goal is to 
„deliver value to Vedanta and its shareholders‟. In contrast, one of the campaigners asked 
her question with a voice full of emotion and the sound of her last reprimanding words  
echoed in the room: „may I continue by suggesting that this is a disgrace given the serious 
nature of the offenses…‟. The song of the Dongria Kondh member served to once again 
reinforce the position of the Adivasi people and to remind the company that its 
development story is lacking in real substance. His performance was listened to in complete 
silence and welcomed with a moderate applause.  
Company Response – The Saviour 
Both written documents and the verbal accounts of interviewees suggest that, when the 
campaign first started, the company was very reluctant to engage with anyone and to 
respond to the allegations it faced. Amnesty International sought to follow-up on its 
research while drafting its first report on Vedanta by requesting an interview with the 
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company in London. It also gave Vedanta an opportunity to comment on two drafts of the 
report. However, no response was received (Amnesty International, 2010). Similarly, an 
EIRIS official also argues that, initially, the company was reluctant to comment on the 
allegations: „to begin with they were very unresponsive and wouldn‟t really communicate 
much at all‟ [Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013a]. 
However, the attendance by Aviva at the AGM in 2010 marked a turning point in the way 
in which the company treated its investors and responded to concerned stakeholders. A 
representative of Aviva attended the AGM to present EIRIS‟ report alongside the seven 
recommendations and urged the company to address these recommendations. The chair – 
Mr. Agarwal made a commitment to respond to the report in due course. By pursuing an 
escalation strategy, Aviva had achieved what other investors who sold their shares had not 
– a response and public commitment by the company which led to an increased dialogue 
over the years. This highlights the merits of adopting a shareholder engagement over a 
divestment strategy. It also reveals, along with other examples discussed in the study, that a 
direct tactic such as attending an AGM to ask a question could be a powerful tool for 
change. One of Waygood‟s (2006) main arguments is that an indirect shareholder activist 
strategy increases the chances for a successful campaign. However, the current study has 
revealed the powerful effect that a direct approach can have, therefore rendering 
Waygood‟s assertion as somewhat simplistic and over-generalised. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that Aviva‟s decision to engage has most probably been motivated by the fact that 
it has a tracker holding in Vedanta. As such, it is a passive investor who does not choose 
the companies in its portfolio and cannot divest from Vedanta if dissatisfied with 
management. In the literature, shareholder activism is considered to be particularly 
important and often practised among passive, index-tracking investors who cannot divest 
and need to engage directly with companies (Monks, 2001; Solomon, 2007). 
The reason behind Vedanta‟s change in attitude can be explained by two factors. First, the 
public nature of the message (asking a question at the AGM) forced Vedanta to respond. 
Second, it was an institutional investor (Aviva) who expressed concerns in a public way: 
To be seen to ignore an investor, even a small investor in a company is irresponsible 
and therefore you can‟t do it for very long, particularly if it‟s in the public realm. I 
think that paper was very important in bringing to the company‟s attention and to 
other investors‟ attention in a more public fashion the challenges of Vedanta and, 
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had that been done all behind the scenes, I don‟t think it would have had the same 
impact [Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013b]. 
The importance of the message coming from inside the investment industry has been 
emphasised on various occasions in the interviews: 
Much more important is to try to get the message from people who have credibility 
within the system [Fieldwork Interview, Forum For The Future, 2013]. 
If investors feel like it is coming out of their field, it may actually be a risk, but they 
may not be ready to acknowledge that [Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013b]. 
These empirical findings are substantiated by Solomon‟s (2007) claim that for socially 
responsible investment to have a sound future and to progress substantially, it has to be 
driven by players within the industry such as fund managers and trustees. Therefore, there 
is certainly an argument to be made that NGOs should focus their attention on gaining 
allies within the investor community. Having said that, let us turn our attention to 
Vedanta‟s responses to the questions raised during its 2013 AGM at which the researcher 
was present. Such an analysis highlights the successful nature of the Vedanta campaign. 
To begin with, one of the main discourses put forward by the company during the meeting 
had to do with the role the company plays for the growth of the Indian economy and the 
well-being of the impoverished people in Orissa who have no access to jobs. Vedanta was 
portrayed by its Chairman and majority shareholder Mr. Anil Agarwal as the saviour who 
brings hope, prosperity and development to a place forgotten by everyone: 
In Niyamgiri it has been a test for us for the past 8 years. When I first came there it 
was poor to poor, we took courage to go there. There was no road, everything was 
isolated. We created all the infrastructure, we employed 14,000 people and we built 
this plant for seven years. We opened a school, hospital, we have created jobs, 
whatever we could do in the most transparent manner, we have done (…). Orissa is 
the poorest state of our country and it requires jobs, it requires industry. The only 
way to come out of the poverty is the manufacturing. No industry is coming, we are 
the only industry who can come and invest $10bn in that state and provide some 
kind of hope. We have no other intention except to do the right thing [Fieldwork 
Notes(12), Anil Agarwal, Chairman of Vedanta, 2013]. 
Here, the view that solely the mining industry can bring access to education, health care and 
other essential services is reinforced verbally just like it was previously expressed in 
written form in the document „Vedanta‟s Perspective‟ (Vedanta, 2012b).  
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The second main strategy adopted by the company at its AGM was to emphasise the 
legality of its operations and to delegate responsibility for its actions to the state and local 
governments, the MoEF, the Supreme Court and its joint venture partner – the Orissa 
Mining Corporation: 
I believe what we have done is right. There is no lesson to be learnt because we 
have done everything within the law. It is very unfortunate that the people have no 
jobs. India needs aluminium and we should produce aluminium. The process of 
consultation is not in the company‟s power. Consultation is done by the local 
government, by the MoEF. Whatever lessons have to be learnt, have to be learnt by 
the district authorities, the state government and the MoEF [Fieldwork Notes(12), 
2013, Mr. Mehta, CEO of Vedanta]. 
We are not pursuing the plant, this is between the OMC, the gram sabhas, the 
environmental ministry and the Supreme Court. These so called lessons are to be 
drawn by the actors. Vedanta is not an actor in the process, this point has to get 
understood [Fieldwork Notes(12), 2013, CEO of Vedanta]. 
Similarly, in response to AI‟s call for a commitment towards comprehensive and timely 
human impact assessments for future projects, the Chairman said: 
The report [the impact assessment] is not finalised by us. It has to go to the 
environmental clearance authorities, to the ministry. It is for them to say whether it 
is adequate or not adequate. What you are saying is that you want from us to 
conduct the best impact assessment study – the answer is yes, the commitment was 
always there. The important thing here is that there is a difference between what the 
company has to do and what the authorities need to do. When it comes to 
consultation and following the law as prescribed by the various acts, it is the public 
authorities. If they have been deficient, then we need to address it to them. All we 
can do is to supply information. We also have to lead toward development, towards 
manufacturing… [Fieldwork Notes(12), Anil Agarwal, Chairman of Vedanta, 
2013]. 
The above lines suggest that, although the company has become more responsive to its 
critics, it still lacks experience in its communication with stakeholders and lags behind what 
is considered to be best practice in public relations terms. What is more important though is 
the lack of insight Vedanta exhibits in terms of its actions, its roles and responsibilities – 
and its impact in the broader sense. I was quite surprised by the almost frantic passion with 
which the Chairman spoke about „his‟ company and my impression was that even the 
changes at company level that have been achieved so far should be considered as quite 
remarkable given the board‟s apparently firm belief in the impeccability of their actions.  
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I was also present at Vedanta‟s 2014 AGM to track progress and provide up-to-date 
information on the development of the campaign. At the onset of the meeting, accidentally 
forgetting to talk about housekeeping items, it was noticeable that the Chairman Mr. 
Agarwal could not wait to mention the company‟s 10 year anniversary at the FTSE 100 
stock exchange. There were giggles in the room every time a board member said something 
that could be considered as „green wash‟. Moreover, unlike BP‟s AGMs where each word 
of the board members is followed by an approving applause from the audience, the voices 
of Vedanta‟s Chairman and newly appointed CEO Mr. Albanese faded in complete and 
awkward silence. One point came across strongly during the meeting – a reaffirmation of 
the company‟s commitment not to mine in the Niyamgiri without the consent of the 
indigenous communities. However, the new CEO announced that obtaining bauxite from 
other parts of Orissa for ramp-up of the Lanjigarh refinery remains a key priority. In 
response to concerns about the environmental effects of the refinery, Mr. Albanese said that 
Vedanta hopes to achieve the world‟s first zero waste refinery at Lanjigarh by engaging in a 
range of programmes such as Green Concrete and the red mud disposal system.  He also 
mentioned the closure of the Scott Wilson recommendations (see Section 10.1, p.209) 
stating that these have now become part of Vedanta‟s framework [Fieldwork Notes(25), 
2014].  
Questions from the floor were on subjects such as the chimney disaster at Balco in 2009, 
illegal mining in Goa and compensation for communities, the fatality rates across 
Vedanta‟s operations, the veracity of the company‟s commitment to environmental 
sustainability and safety, changes in India‟s democratic system since the elections, and the 
profitability of Sesa Sterlite‟s operations in Goa. A member of Amnesty International UK 
talked about the need for cultural change in the company and questioned the results from 
the public hearing held on 30
th
 July regarding the expansion of the Lanjigarh refinery 
(Table 20) (see Appendix 11 for a transcript of the question).  Overall, the tone of Vedanta 
has changed favourably compared to the previous year (2013) and the new CEO seemed 
willing to work with stakeholders to address their concerns [Fieldwork Notes(25), 2014]. 
Having discussed the dynamics of NGO-company interaction at Vedanta‟s AGMs, the next 
section draws on participant observation data from the 2013 BP AGM. 
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8.3. Tax – BP  
Although campaigning on tax since 2008, it was not until 2012 when ChristianAid began 
targeting FTSE 100 companies by attending their AGMs and asking a tax related question. 
The organisation enlisted the support of ShareAction, the NGO with specific expertise in 
capital markets campaigning, and members of both ChristianAid and ShareAction joined 
forces to put tax on the agenda of company boards during the 2012, 2013 and 2014 AGM 
seasons (for a list of all the company meetings attended by the NGOs see Appendix 12). Of 
all the NGOs campaigning on tax and discussed here, the only one which has not focused 
on incorporating the tactic of AGM attendance into its broader strategy is ActionAid.  For 
those involved in AGM activity, however, the decision to adopt such an approach was 
motivated by the realisation that: „Going to AGMs can be really useful in putting issues on 
the agenda of companies, in bringing issues to the attention of directors and other 
shareholders, and also asking similar questions at a number of AGMs could create a ripple 
effect across companies. Therefore, we thought tax was ideally suited to AGM activity‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b].  
Nature of Questions Asked 
ShareAction and ChristianAid attended the AGMs of a total number of fourteen companies 
during 2012. The questions asked during this AGM season can be broadly grouped in two 
main categories – questions that sought reassurance that the board has good oversight of the 
company‟s tax practices and questions that had to do with calling for more transparency 
and more detailed information on taxes borne and collected in different countries of 
operation. The latter type of questions, examples of which are provided in Table 21 below, 
predominated.   
Table 21: Tax Questions Asked During the 2012 AGM Season 
 
AGM 
 
Question 
 
 
Schroder 
Transparency in revenues, profits and taxes is fast becoming a hot issue 
for companies regarding sustainability and reputation. And, I can see that 
revenues are reported by country on page 93 of the annual 
report. However, we can only see tax split by UK and non-UK in the 
taxation section. Given the company's good work reporting revenue by 
country, can you explain why we do not also report tax in the same way, 
by country? 
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BT 
Transparency in revenues earned and taxes paid is fast becoming an 
important corporate social responsibility and reputational issue for 
companies (...) It seems from the annual report that no breakdown is 
provided with respect to overseas taxes – either in terms of the countries 
in which tax is paid, or the type of taxes paid. Could you let us know in 
what countries other than the UK we pay corporation tax and can you 
confirm whether the company would be open to providing more detailed 
information on the type of taxes borne and collected in countries other 
than the UK? 
 
 
 
BP 
I know that BP was a founding member of EITI and submits relevant 
information to EITI compliant countries. Nonetheless, we still lag behind 
some of our peers when it comes to tax information included in one 
centralised place such as our Sustainability Review. The most readily 
comparable peer given the composition of our board of directors is Anglo 
American who on page 45 of its sustainability report provides much more 
detailed information on taxes borne and collected in many of the 
countries in which it operates. Will the Board raise with BP's reporting 
team the possibility of including more detailed information on taxes 
borne and collected in various countries in our Sustainability Review 
2012? I'm sure Ms Carroll as CEO of Anglo American could share useful 
insights on the business benefits of doing so. 
 
Source: ShareAction (2012c) 
As can be seen from the questions above, the focus is very much on embedding an idea 
within the culture of corporations – the idea of tax as a central reputational risk that should 
form part of the corporate social responsibility agenda of each company.  
During the 2013 AGM season the researcher was present at BP‟s AGM held on the 11th of 
April at the ExCel centre in London and had the opportunity to witness first-hand how a tax 
campaigner from ChristianAid raises the issue of tax on the agenda of the board, as well as 
how other campaigning organisations operate in an AGM setting. Speaking confidently, 
calmly and with complete control over her voice which emanated strength, ChristianAid‟s 
member asked about BP‟s response to a specific legislative change in the EU: 
In response to a question at the AGM last year on the issue of increasing our level 
of transparency on our tax reporting it was said that we would continue to report 
„right up against the law‟. Earlier on this week in the EU, agreement was reached on 
a new set of tax payment reporting style. Do you see these new standards as a limit 
to our reporting or merely the bar to which we will then look to move further on?  
Also, in light of legal challenges in the US on similar new legislation, can you 
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confirm if BP is contemplating a legal challenge here in the UK? [Fieldwork 
Notes(5), 2013]. 
The above mentioned quote exemplifies one type of questions asked during the 2013 AGM 
season – namely, questions regarding the risk of policy framework change. Other questions 
sought information about companies‟ views and practices with respect to country-by-
country reporting (RBS, Aviva), increased transparency and visibility of tax information 
(Tesco, Tate & Lyle) and tax havens (Lloyds, HSBC). 
Putting the tax campaign aside for a moment, there was an interesting situation that took 
place at the BP AGM which deserves mentioning as it is an example of vehement NGO 
campaigning combined with indoor demonstration. Halfway through the meeting one by 
one different members of the Tar Sands Network
73
 took the microphone and asked 
questions about BP‟s tar sands operations. Prior to asking their question, some of them 
spoke for a really long time, providing a lot of detailed information to the meeting about the 
issues they campaigned on, resembling a speech. The growing impatience of the board and 
other shareholders in the room could be felt easily. Finally, one of the women talking at the 
moment was told to shorten her monologue and deliver the question. Not distracted by this 
request, she argued that shareholders have a right to know about the problems she was 
talking about and continued with her speech. The public did not seem to agree with this 
statement as, shortly after, a „boo‟ followed from some people in the room. The Chairman 
repeated his request to hear a question, but the woman seemed not to notice. He then gave 
the word to another shareholder who introduced himself, but his words were accompanied 
by the now quieter voice of the woman who continued to stand in front of the microphone 
at the other end of the room. Following another ignored request of the Chairman asking the 
woman to show respect and let the shareholder deliver his question, security stepped in and 
escorted her out of the meeting. Clapping all around in the room followed as the two 
security guards stood next to the woman and led her towards the exit. A few questions later, 
around six people from the UK Tar Sands Network „died‟ symbolically by lying down in 
protest about the company‟s contribution to climate change and human rights abuses and 
had to be carried out of the room by security. The implications of such NGO behaviour are 
discussed in Section 8.4. which summarises general observations from the AGMs. 
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 The Tar Sands Network campaigns in partnership with indigenous communities affected by the Tar Sands 
oil developments in Canada and targets companies, governments, banks, and investors operating in the 
Alberta Tar Sands. 
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Company Response 
The specific response of BP to the question asked by a member of ChristianAid was short, 
vague, and rather defensive. The Chairman argued that: 
We are supporting the level of transparency in how we report taxes around the 
world. We have no problem about how we pay taxes over the world [Fieldwork 
Notes(5), BP‟s Chairman, 2013]. 
The Chief Financial Officer added that BP will completely comply with the new legislation 
introduced by the EU and that they will continue to work with various jurisdictions around 
the world regarding transparency of tax information. However, he noted that the law in 
some jurisdictions is an impeding factor which halts BP‟s desire for tax transparency and 
accountability.  
The AGM activity can be considered as the main shareholder activist tactic used in the tax 
campaign. Therefore, an assessment of companies‟ responses to campaigners‟ questions at 
AGMs forms an essential part of ascertaining the impact of the intervention. This section 
focuses only on the specific response of BP at its 2013 AGM, but Chapter 10, Section 
10.2., which discusses the changes to corporate policy and behaviour introduced as a 
consequence of NGOs‟ activities, provides a more detailed examination of FTSE 100 
companies‟ position on tax.  
8.4. NGOs at AGMs – General Observations 
Based on field notes compiled during the three AGMs described above and on empirical 
data from the interviews, this section considers to what extent NGOs have managed to use 
the AGM as a forum for channelling their ideas, what are the common mistakes in their 
approach, and which practices could be carried forward due to the impact they have 
achieved.   
To begin with, NGOs differ in the way they perceive the role of the AGM. Based on the 
participant observation carried out at a number of company meetings, a model, which 
distinguishes between NGOs on the basis of their behaviour at AGMs, is created. The 
model posits that the voluntary sector can broadly be categorised in three groups – the 
morality advocates, the media-focused campaigners, and the pragmatics (see Figure 11 
below).   
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According to their 
Approach to the 
AGM 
The 
Morality 
Advocates 
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Focused 
Campaigners 
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Pragmatics 
Figure 11: A Model of NGO Types at Company AGMs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To begin with, the morality advocates see the AGM as their one opportunity to make their 
moral case heard by the people who run the company – they stand up from the floor to ask 
a question with a voice full of emotion and speak passionately about the injustices caused 
by the targeted firm. Question four from Shell‟s AGM (Table 19), question one from 
Vedanta‟s AGM (Table 20), and the questions delivered by the UK Tar Sands Network at 
BP‟s AGM are all examples of this situation. Second, the media-focused campaigners 
engage in high-profile demonstrations inside and outside the AGM designed to attract 
media and shareholder attention. An example is the demonstration staged by the UK Tar 
Sands Network inside BP‟s AGM. One interviewee has an interesting way of describing 
this approach to AGMs: „Some NGOs go at it quite, not aggressively, but using more 
radical methods. Some NGOs come to AGMs and then begin shouting off about stuff‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, FairFood International, 2013]. Third, the pragmatics comprise this 
group of NGOs who, when speaking at an AGM, direct their efforts towards gaining the 
sympathy of those who can be their greatest allies, namely, investors. These campaigners 
engage in frame blending (see Chapter 5) and speak in business case terms when 
approaching investors, adopt the role of real shareholders in the company, and deliver clear, 
short and financially-oriented questions. Questions one and two from Shell‟s AGM (Table 
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19), as well as question three asked at BP‟s AGM (Table 21) provide an example of this 
group of NGOs
74
.  
The first two NGO types tend to predominate but, as third sector organisations‟ experience 
and involvement in shareholder activism are growing at an increased pace, there is a 
tendency towards a shift in behaviour as more and more organisations begin to adopt the 
pragmatic approach. When it comes to the effectiveness of each of these three tactics, the 
participant observation undertaken revealed deficiencies in the first two – the board, 
investors present at the meeting and other members of the audience were much less likely 
to be sympathetic to the cause of the person asking a question when s/he was either looking 
to highlight the moral case or to generate media attention. As one interviewee suggests: 
If you are doing it to speak truth to power, there is a value in that, but if everybody 
is just there to do that, then you are not really achieving much. Or even just 
speaking quite passionately about something that matters to you, the board would 
just sit and listen to you and you will go on and they will ask you what your 
question is and you would have some questions tucked at the end of it and the board 
is bored, everyone else in the room is bored [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 
2013b]. 
Similarly, the empirical evidence reveals that demonstrations inside the boardroom were 
seen negatively by investors and served to build a bad image for the NGO community in 
the eyes of shareholders:  
Shell shareholders have felt the AGMs have been hijacked by NGOs and there is no 
real discussion of serious issues [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
NGOs tended to be slightly more confrontational and arguably some of the investors 
were rather annoyed because they were trying to make too much of a circus out of it 
and not enough of constructive conversation. While investors do sometimes 
appreciate that NGOs do have to be more assertive, more aggressive, there is 
sometimes a danger that, if they do it that way, they‟ll end up alienating the 
investors whom, if they have on their side, they can achieve greater things 
[Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013b]. 
Evidence from the participant observation also suggests that, as discussed previously, the 
demonstration organised by the UK Tar Sands Network at BP‟s AGM and the way 
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 The case of the Tar Sands Network explored above reveals that the NGO has acted simultaneously as a 
moral advocate and as a media-focused campaigner. Therefore, it should be noted that the campaigning 
organisations can adopt more than one role at a given AGM. In addition, as NGO tactics are being changed in 
the light of success and failure, an NGO which was traditionally characterised as a morality advocate, can 
later begin to adopt a pragmatic approach.  
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members of the organisation acted served only to alienate shareholders present in the room 
and to evoke pro-tar sands sentiments in them. These findings only emphasise the 
importance of moving towards a pragmatic approach to AGMs which is characterised by 
shorter questions delivered in a natural tone, lacking in reprimanding comments: „The 
questions that are generally asked, they are not questions for starters, they are speeches and 
they are „everything is wrong and it‟s awful and you are bad‟ and the company kind of goes 
„well, we don‟t agree with you‟ and we are nowhere‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 
2013b].  
The Vedanta campaign has proven that there is a way through which the emotional message 
can be delivered to the board but, rather than via NGOs, this happens via members of the 
affected communities who attend the AGM to ask a question and deliver valuable 
information about the conditions on the ground. Their story is more credible, more 
influential and more moving than any passionate long speech an NGO member can ever 
deliver. And the role of the third sector is to make sure that these community 
representatives are always present at the AGM so that they keep the pressure on the 
company in question. 
In summary, based on the information that has been discussed so far, six recommendations 
detailing how NGOs can maximise their impact at an AGM can be outlined. To begin with, 
as BP‟s and Vedanta‟s AGMs have demonstrated, it is important to keep demonstrations 
outside the remits of the annual meeting, using the AGM forum for fostering productive 
dialogue with the company and for gaining alliances among the investor community. 
Second, speaking to investors in terms of legal, financial and reputational risks, as well as 
shareholder value ensures that campaigners have their attention. Third, the way in which 
the question is asked during the meeting is of importance – contrary to what Bianca Jagger 
did at Vedanta‟s AGM, the presenter should speak with a natural, calm voice which does 
not reveal any emotions. Fourth, the questions would have the greatest impact if they are 
short and clear. The situation in which a member of the UK Tar Sands Network delivered a 
speech at BP‟s AGM showcased the inadequacy of adopting a strategy of listing everything 
the company has done wrong – this just wastes precious time and annoys the audience. 
Fifth, as seen in the case of Vedanta, bringing representatives of affected communities can 
be helpful as they are in a good position to deliver the emotional message more 
successfully than a representative of an NGO. Last but not least, as observed in the case 
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studies, it might be a productive idea for civil society organisations to adopt proactive 
strategies designed to make the AGM unpredictable and to limit companies‟ attempts to 
evade or downplay NGOs‟ questions (for example, ShareAction‟s tactic for asking 
questions adopted at Shell‟s 2013 AGM). All the recommendations discussed here 
contribute to the literature on shareholder activism and NGOs as previous research on the 
topic has not relied on participant observation to explore in such detail the interaction 
between NGOs and companies in the context of the AGM. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the use of one specific direct tactic – the AGM, by drawing on 
participant observation notes from a number of company meetings which correspond to the 
three case studies – the AGMs of Vedanta (2013, 2014), the AGMs of Shell (2013, 2014) 
and that of BP (2013, the tax campaign). For each of these events, the nature of questions 
and the company response to those questions have been analysed. In terms of company 
response, it is interesting to note that Shell and Vedanta have adopted two contrasting roles 
in their attempts to address criticisms – in the former case, the role of the „victim‟ of 
circumstances and actors which impede its every effort to do good and, in the latter case, 
the role of the „saviour‟ who brings prosperity and opportunity to a region stricken by 
poverty and underdevelopment. In terms of the nature of questions asked and the way 
NGOs behave at AGMs, a model has been devised which groups NGOs into three 
categories: the „morality advocates‟, the „media-focused campaigners‟ and the „pragmatics‟. 
The evidence suggests that the first two categories still predominate, but a shift towards the 
third is beginning to emerge as NGOs become more experienced in the AGM arena. The 
urgency with which this shift needs to take place is exacerbated by the fact that the first two 
types of NGOs are not perceived as legitimate actors with whom relationships can be built. 
The chapter also summarises six recommendations that will maximise NGOs‟ impact at an 
AGM. The next chapter analyses another direct strategy from the repertoire of NGOs – the 
filing of a shareholder resolutions. 
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9. The Shareholder Resolution  
Proxy resolutions open the door to corporate 
management – private-sector opinion makers whom 
social activists could not otherwise reach.  
(Kinder et al., 1993, p.8-9) 
The shareholder resolution is the main legal tool available to investors – a tool used much 
more extensively in the US than in the UK (Becht et al., 2010; Buchanan et al., 2012). In 
the UK, resolutions, or motions, are binding on companies if passed and are governed by 
the Companies Act 2006 (Part Thirteen, Chapters 1 – 3). The successful tabling of a 
resolution requires at least one hundred shareholders, with shares having an aggregate value 
of minimum £10,000 in nominal value, who are prepared to file (Sparkes, 2002). Investors 
can also propose a motion if they hold at least five per cent of the total voting power of all 
the outstanding shares of a company (will involve large sums of money). By contrast, in the 
US, shareholders are eligible if they hold one per cent of the total voting power of the 
corporation or $2,000 in shares which they have had for at least one year
75
, but resolutions 
are non-binding (Logsdon and Van Buren, 2009; Santella et al., 2009). As Buchanan et al. 
(2012) conclude, although UK proposal rules are more onerous on proposal sponsors, UK 
resolutions are more powerful for initiating real change as they are binding, if they achieve 
a 75 per cent of shareholders‟ votes in favour. In the UK shareholders also have the right to 
call special meetings and elect directors. Two resolutions are the focus of this chapter – 
both tabled at Shell‟s AGMs during 1997 and 2006 and both concerning the company‟s 
operations in the Niger Delta. These proposals represent the only instances out of the three 
case studies where this tactic has been used by NGOs. The chapter provides information on 
the wording, results and effectiveness of the proposals, as well as the main challenges 
encountered when relying on this strategy. 
9.1. The 1997 and 2006 Resolutions Presented at Shell’s AGMs 
Once a tool used only by investors dissatisfied with the way their corporation has been 
governed, increasingly more and more third sector organisations have started to put 
pressure on companies by filing shareholder resolutions on social, environmental and 
ethical issues (see chronology in Appendix 1 and Sjostrom, 2007). Although NGOs in the 
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 For further information, see the SEC Shareholder Regulations Rule 14a-8 (17 Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) Ch. II, Sec. 240.14a-8), which governs shareholder resolutions rules. 
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US have used this shareholder activist tactic much more frequently than their counterparts 
in the UK, the phenomenon exists here as well
76
. The two shareholder resolutions discussed 
in this section are based on Shell‟s operations in the Niger Delta and are both initiated by 
ECCR with almost a decade separating one from the other. The exact wording of the two 
resolutions is outlined in Table 22 below:  
Table 22: Wording of the 1997 and 2006 Resolutions Tabled at Shell’s AGMs 
 
1997 Resolution 
 
„In recognition of the importance of environmental and corporate responsibility policies, 
(including those policies relating to human right), to the company‟s operations, corporate 
profile and performance, the directors are requested to: 
 Designate responsibility for the implementation of environmental and corporate 
responsibility policies to a named member of the Committee of Managing Directors. 
 Establish effective internal procedures for the implementation and monitoring of 
such policies. 
 Establish an independent external review and audit procedure for such policies. 
 Report to shareholders regularly on the implementation of such policies. 
 Publish a report to shareholders on the implementation of such policies in relation to 
the company‟s operations in Nigeria by the end of 1997‟ (PIRC, 1998, p.8). 
 
2006 Resolution 
 
„The shareholders request that, in the interests of the good reputation of the Company, and 
the avoidance of costly delay to, or interruption of, production, and for the present and future 
peace, safety, environment and prosperity of local communities directly affected by the 
Company‟s operations: 
1. the Directors undertake, in all the Company‟s international exploration and development 
operations, to collaborate with local stakeholder communities in order to reach, before 
project works begin, a mutually acceptable Memorandum of Understanding based on an 
independently conducted and transparent Social and Environmental Impact Assessment;  
2. the Directors undertake on the acquisition of companies (or assets and operations of other 
companies) to exercise due diligence in respect of risk, by subjecting social and 
environmental reports relating to business operations and activities to qualified 
independent assessment, and to revise the Company‟s plans or adopt alternative methods 
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 Examples include the 2001 resolution filed at Balfour Beatty‟s AGM by the Ilisu Dam Campaign, the 2007 
resolution filed by War on Want at Tesco‟s AGM (intervention 22 from the chronology in Appendix 3), the 
2010 resolutions filed by Greenpeace, ShareAction and WWF at Shell and BP‟s AGMs (intervention 48, 
Appendix 3) and others.  
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of extraction and refinement in the light of such assessments;  
3. the Directors institute rigorous policies in risk assessment and community consultation 
particularly when proposing to use unproven techniques such as untested gas production 
and processing on peat and in proximity to occupied dwellings, or when operating in ice-
congested waters; 
4. the Directors ensure, through proper oversight by the Board‟s Social Responsibility 
Committee, that all policies, procedures and standards on environmental and social issues 
are rigorously enforced at all stages of project planning and operation; 
5. the Directors report to the shareholders by the 2007 AGM how the Company has 
implemented these measures‟ (ECCR, 2006, p.1). 
 
Source: PIRC (1998) and ECCR (2006) 
Voting Results of the Two Resolutions 
This section discusses how Shell‟s shareholders have voted when presented with the two 
Niger Delta-related shareholder resolutions filed in 1997 and 2006. These voting results are 
then compared with the level of support achieved for other socio-ethical resolutions as 
discussed in US-based academic papers and with some recent examples of socio-ethical 
proposals tabled in the UK. The resolution in 1997 was coordinated by PIRC and supported 
by ECCR, Amnesty International and WWF-UK. Some 10.46 per cent of Shell 
shareholders voted in favour of the proposal (altogether 39.9 million shares), while 6.52 per 
cent of shareholders (representing 24.9 million shares) withheld their vote. In total, 16.98 
per cent of votes cast did not support the company‟s management and either voted for the 
resolution, or abstained from voting.  
The result is comparable, although slightly higher in 2006, when altogether one in six of 
voted or withheld shares, or 17.16 per cent, refused to back management‟s recommendation 
to oppose the resolution. In 2006, 19.9 million shares (or 6.07 per cent) were voted in 
favour of the resolution and 36.4 million shares (or 11.09 per cent) represented abstentions 
(ECCR, 2006b). Aberdeen, F&C, the Environment Agency Pension Fund, the Church of 
England‟s (CoE, hereafter) central funds, and Henderson were among the major UK funds 
that either backed up the proposal or abstained from voting (ECCR, 2006b). 
Upon analysing these figures, it seems that both resolutions have achieved comparable 
results – at both AGMs around 17 per cent of shareholders did not support management. 
What is interesting is that, although the overall figure is similar, for the 2006 resolution the 
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withheld votes have increased at the expense of the votes in favour which have diminished 
in comparison to the 1997 resolution. Therefore, it could be argued that investors have 
become more cautious about expressing openly their disapproval of management‟s 
practices. However, the level of support achieved in 1997 is high compared to what is 
reported as average in the literature. In a paper that analyses the results of resolutions on 
SEE issues throughout an eleven-year period (1992-2002), Tkac (2006) reveals that the 
average level of support was 8.2 per cent. Looking at the results of the 1997 proxy season 
in the US, Campbell et al. (1999) contends that, on average, 6.6 per cent of votes were cast 
in favour of social policy proposals.  In a similar US-based study encompassing the period 
2000 – 2003, Monks et al. (2004) calculate that the average support for all CSR resolutions 
is 7.7 per cent.  
Although there is no study discussing the support for SEE shareholder proposals from a UK 
perspective, a few examples from other resolutions filed at the AGMs of UK companies can 
serve to put the results from the discussed resolutions into perspective. As an example, the 
recent tar sands shareholder proposals tabled at Shell and BP‟s AGMs in 2010 resulted in, 
respectively, 11 and 15 per cent of shareholders either voting for, or abstaining from voting 
(Williams, 2010). This result, although significant, is lower than the two resolutions 
discussed here. Another more recent UK shareholder proposal on socio-environmental 
issues which made history was the resolution tabled on April 16 2015 at BP‟s AGM. It 
called for increased annual reporting on climate change risks and an overwhelming 
majority (98 per cent) of investors voted in favour. 
Assessing The Effectiveness of The Two Resolutions 
However, what do these voting percentages mean in real terms? The empirical findings, 
secondary literature and documentary evidence all suggest that the first resolution tabled in 
1997 was very successful. According to PIRC (1998, p.32) „Shell has, in a relatively short 
period of time, moved as requested by the resolution „to the head of the movement for 
corporate responsibility‟. Similarly, when discussing the effectiveness of the resolution, 
Waygood (2004, p.139) suggests that in the eighteen months that followed its tabling, 
„Shell was to take action that substantively met the five requests contained in the 
resolution‟.  
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By contrast, when asked about the tangible results of the 2006 resolution, interviewees 
found it difficult to give a concrete answer and expressed an overall scepticism with regard 
to the outcomes:   
The objective was to get the company to change its culture and the way it dealt with 
human rights and environmental problems. Was that achieved? Not really, no. 
Maybe some incremental cultural change and maybe some improvements in the 
way it tackled the problems – that would be a fair judgement, but incremental 
change is the best that we achieved [Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013b]. 
The one in 2006 got virtually no publicity at all, largely because it happened in The 
Hague. I would have to say the 1997 one was taken much more seriously by the 
company than the 2006 one which, I think, disappeared without a trace [Fieldwork 
Interview, individual supporter, 2013]. 
Arguably the most significant change taking place as a result of the 2006 resolution was the 
appointment of a new managing director of Shell in Nigeria who was reported to show 
„more humility and more willingness to listen to civil society and admit mistakes‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013b]. A senior Shell director, shortly before retirement, 
also showed a genuine willingness to hear civil society voices. However, no specific report 
detailing how the five requests contained in the most recent resolution have been 
implemented was produced by Shell because the votes cast in favour of the resolution were 
not sufficient for it to be passed.  
The reason behind the greater effectiveness of the 1997 resolution lies in the fact that it was 
the first shareholder resolution in the UK that a large company had ever faced on an ethical 
and environmental issue. As a result, it generated a lot of media and academic attention. 
Sparkes (2002, p.34) singles out the resolution as a turning point for shareholder activism 
on social and environmental issues: „The real beginnings of UK shareholder activism on 
SRI issues can be precisely dated to 14 May 1997. This was the date of the 1997 annual 
general meeting of the Shell Transport and Trading Company. Shell had already received 
negative publicity in 1995-96 over its planned disposal of the Brent Spar oil platform, and 
concern over human rights abuses in Nigeria culminating in the execution of Ken Saro-
Wiwa. In 1997 an NGO led-coalition was able to assemble enough support from local 
authority pension funds (coordinated by PIRC) and church investors led by ECCR to file a 
shareholder resolution‟. Marinetto (1998a, p.125) also emphasises the unique nature and 
importance of the resolution: „The intervention made at Shell‟s AGM was quite different 
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(…) This was a rare event when investors actively took up these grievances, questioning 
the company‟s commitment to its wider social responsibilities‟.  
9.2.  General Observations 
The empirical data collected has provided some valuable insights when it comes to the 
nature of the resolution as a shareholder activist tool and the challenges faced by filers. 
Filing a shareholder proposal entails placing the issue on the formal agenda of the company 
and on the engagement agenda of the investment community. Given the vast amount of 
issues competing for investor attention, filing a resolution can be an effective way of 
pushing a topic to the forefront (ShareAction, 2011a). However, the process has a number 
of challenges that should not be overlooked.  
To begin with, campaigners involved in gathering the support of shareholders for the two 
resolutions have highlighted the difficulty of finding who the actual owners of the company 
are as a barrier to effective advocacy work: 
Generally, it is very difficult to know who investors are. In 1996 I went to the 
Registrar‟s Office in Worthing and I wasn‟t allowed to see the shareholders‟ 
register
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 [Fieldwork Interview, individual supporter ECCR, 2013]. 
Therefore, to gather support for the resolutions, ECCR relied on „word of mouth‟ and 
publicity – the interest of Shell‟s shareholders was sparked via talks and events organised 
by ECCR, whereby the future plans of the organisation for filing the resolutions were 
discussed.  
Similar problems with getting access to information about the shareholders in Vedanta were 
encountered by ActionAid when the organisation endeavoured to compile a short list of 
investors who were concerned, or could be persuaded to take action on ethical issues, and 
who had sufficient shareholdings to make an impact: 
Getting information about who the investors are can be quite difficult. You would 
think that you just go to the Companies House
78
 and it is all there, but that is 
sometimes harder than it sounds [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013b].          
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 Companies use registrars to keep a register of who owns their shares. The shareholder register provides a 
list of active owners, detailing their name, address, and number of shares held. 
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 The Companies House is an executive agency of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS, 
hereafter), whose main function is, among other things, to examine and store company information delivered 
under the Companies Act.   
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According to a former employee of ActionAid involved in the early stages of the Vedanta 
campaign, two pieces of information are crucial when aiming to engage with investors – to 
know who the shareholders of the targeted company are and how much they have invested 
in order to maximise impact. The BIS Committee launched an open consultation in 
September 2013 (see intervention 105, Appendix 3) aimed at discussing a range of 
proposals for making company ownership more transparent. A number of NGOs such as 
ChristianAid and ECCR took part in the consultation and submitted their responses. 
Following the consultation, in October the same year, the UK government announced that it 
will compile a public register of company ownership in the UK (ECCR, 2013a) – a measure 
that would facilitate the future efforts of NGOs to gather support for resolutions and to 
engage with investors. 
A second hurdle when it comes to resolution filing relates to the difficulty of gathering 
enough individuals (who each own at least £100 worth of shares) to reach the one hundred 
threshold. The problem is exacerbated by the limited time that NGOs have for coordinating 
the support of those one hundred individuals who would co-file the resolution:  
The major challenge for shareholders who want to table a resolution is that you need 
over a hundred individual co-filers with a considerable number of shares and you 
need to have got those all signed by the end of February for a meeting in May. 
There was a situation where, for instance, my wife and I shared our holding so that 
we can have two people to sign. In another case, a sympathetic stock broker who 
had a large number of shares held as nominees persuaded 20 of their shareholders to 
put some of their shares in their own name so that they could co-file [Fieldwork 
Interview, individual supporter, 2013]. 
Apart from the high legal threshold in terms of the amount of shares needed to table a 
resolution, it can be very difficult to generate sufficient support for a resolution: 
The whole process of getting sufficient support to go through the requirements of 
tabling a resolution is very, very difficult [Fieldwork Interview, individual 
supporter, 2013]. 
Trying to get support for a shareholder resolution is very, very difficult [Fieldwork 
Interview, Amnesty International, 2013]. 
Part of the decision of Aviva Investors to engage with Vedanta in a public way by asking a 
question at the AGM, as opposed to filing a resolution, was motivated by the realisation 
that it would be much more difficult to get the resolution on to the ballot paper. In 
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comparison, proposal filing rules in the US, as mentioned earlier, are much more relaxed 
when it comes to the signatories required and the percentage of company shares they own.  
Third, as has been mentioned above, the 2006 resolution differed from the 1997 one in that, 
although the overall percentage of shareholders who did not back management was almost 
the same, a greater number of investors decided to abstain, rather than to vote for the 
resolution tabled in 2006 – „that appears to have been the furthest that they would go if they 
didn‟t support the company‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013b]. This finding alludes to 
another challenge when it comes to resolutions – the reluctance of British investors to adopt 
a more public approach to shareholder activism. The literature postulates that, compared to 
US activism, UK activism hardly ever has to resort to the more radical options of filing or 
voting on a resolution and that it is largely limited to dialogue with companies „behind 
closed doors‟ (Becht et al., 2010, p.5; Owen et al., 2006). Such a difference in the approach 
of British and American investors can be explained by cultural factors. Traditionally, UK 
investors have been „reluctant to be seen to be reacting aggressively against companies that 
they own‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013a] and „unwilling to rock the boat‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2013]. By contrast, American shareholders 
have been „more assertive and aggressive and more activist traders in the market‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2012]. 
Despite the above mentioned challenges to the shareholder proposal as an activist tactic, it 
is important to discuss a theme that emerged from the empirical findings. On a number of 
occasions, interviewees talked about the existence of people within the targeted companies 
who sympathise with the ideals of campaigners: 
When we initially had the resolution in 1997 people within the company thanked us 
because within the company there are debates on these issues and it helped them to 
raise the sorts of issues that we wanted to raise [Fieldwork Interview, individual 
supporter, 2013]. 
Another interviewee, talking about his first visit to the Shell Centre
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 in London, says: 
I arrived on my bicycle which is an earlier version of this one [points to his bike]. 
That was 8-9 years ago and, to my astonishment, there was another bike like this. 
They were quite rare then, and it was one of the non-executive directors of Shell 
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 Shell‟s headquarters in London. 
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who was on it, whose bike it was. So, it‟s quite interesting, there are good people, 
there are good people [Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013a]. 
The role of people in big institutions has also been discussed by interviewees and has been 
pinpointed as an essential factor that contributes to raising awareness for a specific issue 
among the investor community: 
There are quite good people within organisations who are gently agitating, or not so 
gently, depending on their personality, agitating from within to change the system. 
While it wouldn‟t be seen as a campaign, they have an NGO at their heart and they 
are trying to change things from within. Those are such powerful voices and you 
should recognise the need for those kind of people in position within the system, as 
well as the need for campaigning from outside, because the influence they can have 
is much much greater I would say [Fieldwork Interview, Forum for the Future, 
2013]. 
These people who can either be working for companies targeted by NGOs such as Shell 
and Vedanta, or for institutional shareholders such as pension funds and fund managers, are 
the crucial link between the world of investors and that of NGOs – they help make the 
conversation between the two happen. As Soule (2009) argues, open political systems 
where there are sympathetic elites are more responsive to movement demands than closed 
systems in which elites are hostile to the movement (see also evidence from Weber et al., 
2009). Similarly, Raeburn (2004) believes that alliances between the elite and others 
outside the corporation can lead to favourable outcomes for a given movement‟s goals. 
King (2008), like Raeburn, suggests that certain characteristics of a corporation such as new 
officers, changes in corporate leadership and supportive allies in governance positions can 
shape the effects of mobilisation. As the quotes below from members of ShareAction and 
Platform reveal, such elite allies can translate NGOs‟ concerns in a way that resonates well 
with the institutions in which they are working, raise the legitimacy of a particular issue and 
can be regarded as powerful actors whose good will should be gained: 
Many of the people who we get best connections with are people who themselves 
are driven by the moral case, maybe people who work in finance but think they 
want to do something good with it. There‟s no doubt that that‟s what makes it 
possible for us to have a conversation with them. If they were people who weren‟t 
concerned about that on a personal level, then they probably wouldn‟t bother to 
meet with us [Fieldwork Interview, Platform employee involved in the Niger Delta 
campaign, regularly asking questions at Shell‟s AGM, 2013]. 
They are not all the same there and part of what we want to do is fuel a debate 
inside the company – you will always have people who support a progressive 
position and they need animation [Fieldwork Notes(3), ShareAction, 2013]. 
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The number of evil people I have met in the City is very small. The majority of 
people are good people. They may be trapped in the system, but we should see them 
as potential new recruits. We should draw the boundary as far as we can – people in 
the City, individuals, etc. as they are important for moving things internally 
[Fieldwork Notes(15), ShareAction, 2013].  
These findings are substantiated by arguments made by social movement scholars. 
According to the political mediation model, successful mobilisation by social movement 
actors is dependent on the existence of sympathetic elites as their presence is critical in 
determining policy outcomes (Cress and Snow, 2000). The argument can be extended to 
cases of private politics where, as revealed by this study, the involvement of elite allies 
occupying important positions within organisations is also critical in realising movement 
objectives and in pushing for change in corporate behaviour. Such individuals can be a 
great ally to the third sector community. 
9.3. NGOs As Investors – A New Direct Approach? 
Although on the rise, the current chapter has suggested that shareholder resolutions are not 
widely used and investors often choose to adopt a passive stance as revealed by the results 
of the 2006 proposal at Shell‟s AGM. However, there might be an alternative, more 
informal way of engaging with companies which also uses the power of direct share 
ownership – this new method forms the subject of this section. 
Sometimes NGOs engage in communication with targeted companies outside the remit of a 
formal AGM meeting. They strive to secure a private meeting that will facilitate a more in-
depth discussion of the issue. Throughout their interaction with companies, NGOs can 
leverage the power of their own investments by speaking from the point of view of a 
shareholder who owns shares in a particular corporation through its pension savings or 
equity investments. There could be a great potential in the adoption of such a strategy, as an 
interviewee working for a large fund management firm argues: 
NGOs collectively do own quite a lot of companies – tens of billions worth of. I 
think last time I looked it was about 80 billion in the UK in joint investments by 
charity world institutions and, if they were to collectively mobilise themselves, they 
could be a very powerful entity but they don‟t really do that [Fieldwork Interview, 
2013, Aviva]. 
In reality, despite this potential, NGOs have indeed largely refrained from using their 
influence as shareholders in corporations. ChristianAid, for example, held a number of 
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bilateral meetings with companies at the beginning of its tax campaign but, during those 
conversations, the NGO was speaking from the point of view of a third sector organisation 
as opposed to an investor. The reason behind this decision is explained by a former 
employee who worked on writing the advocacy strategy for the organisation: 
Our finance director is very nervous about starting to use ChristianAid‟s pension 
fund as a leverage tool, partly because there were problems with the pension, there 
was a major pension deficit. He just wanted to manage the risk that there was with 
the pension fund financially and not diversify into those other issues, aside from the 
risk screening and ensuring that we weren‟t investing in companies that were 
involved in tobacco or armed manufacturers [Fieldwork Interview, 2014b, 
ChristianAid]. 
However, one NGO – ShareAction – started addressing this missed opportunity for 
changing the dynamics of interaction between civil society and companies by creating the 
Charities Responsible Investment Network in the Spring of 2013. The aim of the project is 
to compile a membership base
80
 of organisations that fulfil their charitable purposes 
through shareholder engagement with the companies they are invested in. The engagement 
takes the form of letters and meetings and network members meet twice a year to discuss 
progress, receive training from ShareAction and agree on next steps. The current 
engagement themes that network members are working on are: living wage standards, tax 
transparency, lobbying and political donations, and tackling executive pay. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined another shareholder activist tool – the shareholder resolution. 
The 1997 and 2006 proposals filed at Shell‟s AGMs, regarding the company‟s involvement 
in the Niger Delta, have been taken as an example of how this tool works in practice – their 
wording, results and effectiveness have been discussed at length. It is worth noting that, 
although receiving a similar level of support, the more recent resolution saw more investors 
abstaining rather than voting in favour. This could be a sign that investors are becoming 
more cautious about expressing their concerns on the topic, or a sign symptomatic of a 
general lack of interest of UK shareholders to express disapproval of management publicly 
– something which can be attributed to cultural factors.  
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 At the time of writing seven organisations were participating – namely – Barrow Cadbury Trust, Friends 
Provident Foundation, Lankelly Chase Foundation, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Joseph Rowntree Charitable 
Trust, Holly Hill Charitable Trust, and Polden-Puckham Charitable Foundation. 
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The section has also discussed the main challenges experienced by NGOs who file 
resolutions. These include: difficulty of identifying the owners of a corporation, high 
support threshold necessary to submit a resolution; high threshold of share ownership; and 
challenges associated with gathering investor support for the proposal. The chapter has also 
revealed the crucial role that individuals with progressive views working within targeted 
companies and investors can have for advancing the campaign goals of NGOs.  
A new tactic for direct engagement which makes use of the position of charities as 
shareholders in investee companies has been outlined, with the argument being that the 
tactic is currently underused, but the future offers potential for change. This chapter marks 
the end of the discussion of all the indirect and direct campaigning tactics used by NGOs 
and analysed in Part One and Part Two respectively. The next section of the thesis 
evaluates the impact the three case studies have had on the targeted companies and on the 
investor community. 
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10.  Assessing the Impact of Campaigns on the Investor 
Community and the Targeted Companies  
There are certainly a number of companies I have spoken 
to in the last year or two which I probably wouldn’t have 
spoken to was it not for NGOs challenging us.  
(Fieldwork interview with a mainstream fund manager) 
Having outlined the main shareholder activist strategies employed by NGOs as part of the 
three case studies, this section of the thesis focuses on ascertaining the impact of the 
campaigns and the challenges faced by voluntary organisations. Measuring the 
effectiveness of a shareholder activist campaign can be difficult from a social movement 
perspective as it may take years or decades for the results of collective mobilisation to 
become discernible. Furthermore, as Edwards and Hulme (1995, p.11) suggest, assessing 
NGOs‟ performance poses challenges in itself: „a great part of the dilemma…lies in the 
nature of the work that [NGOs] do and the messy and complex world in which they do it – 
measuring performance (…) is an extraordinarily difficult task… NGO evaluation (even 
more than evaluation in other organisations) is inevitably a matter of judgement and 
interpretation‟. In this study, impact is measured by the extent to which the campaign: a.) 
motivates investors to engage with the targeted companies and b.) leads to changes in 
corporate policy and behaviour.  
10.1. Investor Impact 
The chapter first analyses the impact on the investor community through providing a 
detailed account of the actions taken by investors as part of each of the three campaigns 
(starting from Shell, then Vedanta, and lastly the tax justice intervention). Interview data 
based on accounts of staff members of financial institutions and SRI experts provides 
information on the role that NGOs have played for inciting responsible ownership and 
engagement with the targeted companies.  
Shell and the Niger Delta  
Ultimately, the aim of all NGOs engaging with the investor community was to persuade 
shareholders to engage with the company regarding the issues of concern in the Delta. 
Given the fact that the problems in the area are historic and long standing, prior to this most 
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recent stage of the campaign, „the investment community had gone a bit tired, they weren‟t 
keeping an eye on it anymore, they were not really putting any pressure, they were quite 
happy with the fact that Shell makes lots of money out there‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
ShareAction, 2013a]. The following paragraphs examine the extent to which NGOs have 
managed to incite action by the investor community. 
The empirical data suggests that investors have indeed started to put pressure on the 
company and have started asking questions related to Shell‟s operations in Nigeria: 
With Shell we know that investors have taken up issue with regards to various 
things in the Niger Delta and went back to the company and asked questions, sought 
answers, had further follow-up meetings so that sort of pressure has increased on 
Shell in terms of having to deal with better informed shareholders [Fieldwork 
Interview, Amnesty International, 2013]. 
We know that shareholders are interested and have asked Shell how they are going 
to deal with the issue of clean-up [Fieldwork Interview, FoE Netherlands, 2013]. 
We have helped ensure that the Niger Delta has become a topic of conversation for 
the Shell board whenever they are in a group of investors. I know from anecdotal 
evidence that a member of the board did come to a shareholder and asked why there 
was a sudden uplift in questions on the Niger Delta and we can take some credit for 
that [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b].  
We‟ve just played a role in nudging the investment community back into a slightly 
more challenging perspective, sort of engagement with the company [Fieldwork 
Interview, ShareAction, 2013a]. 
Given the culture in the UK, which tends to favour behind the scenes dialogue (Becht et al., 
2010; Goranova and Ryan, 2014, see p.192), it is difficult to say with certainty how many 
and which investors are engaging with Shell. However, the documentary evidence available 
substantiates the claims made by NGO members. For four consecutive years (2010-2014) 
Shell has organised a special event for its SRI investors in which it discussed the most 
pressing of issues related to sustainability, and the Niger Delta has occupied a central stage 
in all these investor briefing events. The 2011 SRI investor briefing transcript reads: „One 
issue that has received much attention throughout the last year is Nigeria‟ (Shell, 2011a, 
p.11), while the 2012 briefing says that „for 2012 the CSRC (corporate and social 
responsibility committee) will sustain a focus on the ongoing challenges in Nigeria‟ (Shell, 
2012a, p.5). Nigeria has also featured as a prominent topic in all of Shell‟s annual 
sustainability reports which have discussed issues such as gas flaring, oil spills and 
remediation of affected sites, the recommendations of the UNEP report, oil theft and illegal 
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refining, the security situation in the Delta, community development initiatives, and Shell‟s 
economic contribution. A number of the latest sustainability reports (Shell, 2010, 2011b 
and 2012b) have also featured open letters from Mutiu Sunmonu – Chairman of Shell 
companies in Nigeria and managing director of SPDC. 
Despite the increase in dialogue between shareholders and the company that has taken place 
as a result of the campaign, some investors are sceptical about the extent to which NGOs 
have managed to maximise their effect and question the way they have approached the 
investor community: 
I don‟t think that campaign has been high quality at all. I don‟t think it recognises the 
complexities of the situation in Nigeria, the ownership structure of Shell‟s operations there 
in terms of it being a joint venture with the Nigerian government, the problems of 
criminality in the Niger Delta. Many NGOs have pursued a very simplistic strategy of 
trying to portray Shell as irresponsible and that really doesn‟t have much credibility with 
the investor community [Fieldwork Interview, investor, 2013].  
The problem may stem, in part, from the investor community itself which, as has been 
previously discussed when talking about the filing of a resolution as a shareholder activist 
tactic, tends to be quite conservative and inclined towards agreeing with the company. This 
is a widely held view among members of different campaigning groups such as Amnesty 
International, ShareAcion and FoE Netherlands: 
UK investors want to believe that the companies they invest in are fundamentally 
sound and straightforward, doing the best they can [Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty 
International, 2013]. 
Many shareholders say to NGOs 'we have to trust what a company tells us 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
Shareholders tend to be quite conservative so it‟s difficult to get them to the point 
where they really take a position that is opposite of the position of the company. 
They tend to trust the management of the company… [Fieldwork Interview, FoE 
Netherlands, 2013]. 
That being said, it is clear that, apart from the general perceived reluctance of investors to 
contradict management, there have been some deficiencies in the way the campaign has 
been ran that have to do with the inability of NGOs to be sufficiently flexible and 
sophisticated in their response to the defensive strategies adopted by Shell: 
If a company is open about the problems it faces, that engenders trust. Conversely, 
if NGOs are not open about the complexity of the situation, that doesn‟t engender 
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trust, because it feels like they are hiding something or ignoring something and just 
trying to paint a particular picture [Fieldwork Interview, 2013]. 
An example that illustrates this point can be found when the trip to the Niger Delta that 
Shell organised for investors towards the end of 2012 is considered. The overall feeling 
within the NGO community was that, during the week investors spent in the Delta, the 
company had managed to convince them that Shell was the victim in the situation. In 
contrast, NGOs have not yet managed to come up with a way to sway shareholders‟ opinion 
in favour of their cause, without alienating investors. Reflecting on the reaction of some 
NGOs following the trip, a member of ShareAction argues that:  
When the investors went on that trip, they came back with particular viewpoints, 
things they thought Shell had been unfairly criticised and it‟s very important to 
acknowledge those, to learn from those and to incorporate those within your 
strategy, rather than say „we have a position that we are just going to keep‟. I think 
that‟s sometimes an NGO feeling which is „We have a position. You can keep 
saying what you want but we are just going to keep reiterating our position.‟ In the 
field that we operate in that just won‟t get you anywhere – you have to incorporate 
new information and move forward with that [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 
2013b]. 
Vedanta  
In the case of the campaign against Vedanta, at first a number of high profile investors 
started engaging with the company – among these, the study will examine more closely the 
key figures in the UK, namely, Aviva Investors, The Church of England (CoE) and the 
Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (JRCT, hereafter). The table below provides summarised 
information for each of the shareholders in question: 
Table 23: Profile of Active Investors in Vedanta 
Overview 
Aviva CoE JRCT 
Owned by Aviva plc, the 
UK‟s largest insurer, 
Aviva Investors is a global 
asset management firm, 
whose assets under 
management amount to 
almost £274 billion across 
a range of funds. With £21 
billion of assets in UK 
equities, its London-based 
team manages almost 2 per 
The CoE is both the largest 
church, and the largest 
church investor in the UK. 
Created in 1994, the Ethical 
Investment Advisory Group 
(EIAG) is an advisory body 
which supports the CoE‟s 
national investing bodies 
(the Church 
Commissioners, the Church 
of England Pensions Board 
The JRCT is an independent 
foundation established by 
successful businessman and 
philanthropist Joseph 
Rowntree in 1904. A Quaker 
trust, JRCT aims to 
„transform the world by 
supporting people who 
address the root causes of 
conflict and injustice‟ (JRCT, 
no date). Governed by 11 
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cent of all listed equities, 
making Aviva Investors 
one of the largest investors 
in the UK market. The 
company employs over 
1,250 staff based in 20 
offices across 15 countries 
(Aviva Investors, no date). 
and the CBF Church of 
England funds) on ethical 
investment and works with 
assets under management of 
around £8 billion. It gives 
advice on ethical 
investment policies, 
engages with companies on 
behalf of the Church and 
oversees proxy voting at 
AGMs. 
trustees and comprising of 7 
full-time and four part-time 
staff, the trust has net assets 
of £177 million as of 2013 
and invests in UK and 
European listed companies 
(JRCT, 2013). 
Investment Approach 
Aviva CoE JRCT 
The asset management 
firm has its own 
stewardship statement 
which describes how its 
policies and procedures are 
in compliance with the UK 
Stewardship Code and its 
seven principles. The 
document states that 
„engagement with 
companies is an integral 
part of our investment 
management process‟ 
(Aviva Investors, 2013, 
p.6). 
With a total membership 
that does not exceed 18 
people, the EIAG has 
developed an ethical 
investment policy which 
embraces both screening 
and stewardship. During 
2012-2013 the advisory 
body engaged with a total 
number of 50 companies in 
either face-to-face 
meetings, or video and tele-
conference on a wide range 
of issues (EIAG, 2013). 
The trust‟s investment policy 
is governed by the need to: 
- Fund the grant making 
programmes over the 
long-term. 
- Invest in enterprises 
which reflect the 
organisation‟s aim. 
- Avoid investing in firms 
whose activities 
contradict the 
organisation‟s aims. 
- Encourage business to be 
ethical and 
environmentally and 
socially responsible. 
Each year the JRCT 
undertakes both direct and 
collaborative engagement 
with companies. Recent 
issues of interest include: 
banks and cluster bombs, 
hotel groups and sexual 
exploitation, and supply 
chain problems (JRCT, 2011). 
Timespan of Engagement with Vedanta 
Aviva CoE JRCT 
January 2010 – present July 2009 – February 2010 August 2009 – February 
2010 
Holdings in Vedanta 
Aviva CoE JRCT 
Tracker holding – around 
0.3 per cent 
Shares worth approximately 
£3.8 million 
77,600 shares worth £1.9 
million 
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When it comes to the impact of the campaign on the investor community, there are certain 
outcomes which are a direct result of shareholder activism and the campaigning efforts of 
the NGOs. To begin with, all interviewees seem to agree on one thing – it was initially very 
difficult to engage with the company, as it refused to discuss the allegations with both 
NGOs and investors. By pursuing an escalation strategy, when Aviva attended Vedanta‟s 
AGM in 2010 to ask a question, it managed to secure a response from the company and a 
public commitment which led to an increased dialogue over the years. Such an outcome 
was, in the words of an EIRIS official, one of the most significant changes that occurred 
because „the communication with the company improved significantly in quantity, quality 
and frequency‟ [Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013c]. 
Second, the empirical data suggests that in all three of the cases of investor engagement, the 
campaigning NGOs played an instrumental role in investors‟ decision to initiate a dialogue 
with the company:  
We used EIRIS‟ Convention Watch service to go through all our holdings and tell 
us what were the worst controversies, highlighted by different types of NGOs, in 
our holdings. And then we looked at those and took action accordingly [Fieldwork 
Interview, Aviva, 2013].  
I would say that the focus by NGOs (ActionAid and then later on AI) on the 
company was instrumental in devoting our attention to the company. NGOs did 
bring to our attention the issues with Vedanta and that was when we started 
engaging with them [Fieldwork Interview, investor, 2013]. 
We were first alerted to the problems with the company by a campaigning NGO 
[Fieldwork Interview, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2013]. 
The first quote gives an explanation of the criteria used by investors to select the companies 
with which they engage and alludes to one of the barriers to active ownership.  
Shareholders generally have diversified portfolios and hold shares in a variety of different 
companies, leading to what Scott (1985, p.51) terms a „constellation of interests‟. Owning 
an overall small stake in the company means that cooperation between shareholders is key 
to influencing corporate strategy (Marinetto, 1998b). But the empirical data suggests that 
this is not always easily achieved due to the divergent interests of investors:  
If you organise yourself in a big group of shareholders, it‟s difficult to have a strong 
viewpoint because the position is the average of the position of all the members of 
the coalition. Therefore, to put it negatively, the company can have a divide and rule 
approach towards its shareholders [Fieldwork Interview, FoE Netherlands, 2013]. 
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Collaboration by multiple investors is more persuasive to companies, since each 
investor has tiny portion (sometimes less than 1%) of shares issued by the targeted 
companies. However, this is not always that easy to achieve because in engagement 
activities each participant is different and has its own agenda and views [Fieldwork 
Interview, EIRIS, 2013b]. 
The other problem identified by interviewees and stemming from dispersed ownership is 
that investors have limited time and resources to spend on SEE issues and to ascertain 
exactly what the problems are on the ground. As a result, much like it is the case with 
Aviva and their engagement with Vedanta, both SRI and mainstream investors tend to 
devote their scarce time and resources to the most urgent of concerns: 
They have hundreds of problem companies. There is a limit to what they can engage 
on, so they go after the big fires [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
Even the SRI shareholders or the SRI fund managers, they tend to respond only to 
more shocking, or urgent, or pressing issues of negative impacts of the companies 
they invest in because their time is limited [Fieldwork Interview, ECCR, 2013b]. 
Given the strain on resources that socio-ethical engagement can bring to investors, NGOs 
play another crucial role which has been exemplified in this case study. The campaigning 
groups were recognised by investors as a useful source of information once the engagement 
process had begun: 
With ActionAid, they kept us updated on what Vedanta was doing. Because they 
were able to give us information about the company, background information that 
we would have found it very hard to find out for ourselves – it was very valuable, 
the information they could give us [Fieldwork Interview, Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust, 2013]. 
The role of NGOs, particularly Amnesty, it has been outstanding entity in raising 
specific issues with direct evidence of on the ground issues which we don‟t have 
access to, we don‟t routinely go to these areas and decide for ourselves what is 
going on so….we have to rely on experts such as Amnesty International [Fieldwork 
Interview, Aviva, 2013]. 
As the extracts above reveal, NGOs are much better placed than investors to document the 
misdoings of a company. In the specific Vedanta case analysed as part of this study, both 
Amnesty International and ActionAid had regional offices in India which could collect 
valuable on-the-ground information and feed it back to the NGOs‟ UK branches. 
Additionally, both NGOs have collaborated with India-based local civil society 
organisations to produce their detailed reports. In a similar way, ECCR‟s 2010 report on the 
situation in the Niger Delta put together five case studies written by third sector 
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organisations that had worked and communicated extensively with local communities to 
collect the necessary information. These findings support Sjostrom‟s (2007) claim that 
shareholder activism can serve as a powerful educational device, the argument being that 
through activism NGOs alert investors to problems with their companies that they might 
not have previously been aware of. By becoming more informed, shareholders have the 
potential to serve as allies to civil society organisations. However, as suggested in Chapter 
5, informing investors is only the first step of the campaigning process and, while moral 
arguments are part of the portfolio of tactics used by a decreasing number of NGOs, 
ultimately only the business case has the potential to actually deliver change. As the next 
paragraph suggests the fact that Vedanta had problems in corporate governance terms, 
meant that investors were more willing to engage.   
In general, it could be argued that, in the case of Vedanta, the level of shareholder 
engagement with the company was significant, especially when compared to other 
campaigns. However, it should be noted that this heightened investor interest had as much 
to do with the poor governance practices of Vedanta with respect to how it treated minority 
shareholders (i.e. it was unresponsive to their concerns and exhibited a lack of appetite for 
dialogue), as with the Orissa mine and refinery concerns that the NGOs were focusing on. 
Investors were worried that Vedanta was „well behind best practice in governance terms‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013a], something which was reflected in its poor 
environmental and social records. The company‟s culture was not as transparent and as 
accountable as it should be, and Vedanta did not have the necessary policies and procedures 
in place on environmental and social issues. Therefore, some NGO respondents asserted 
that the fact that there were corporate governance, as well as environmental and social 
concerns, had made investors more open to engaging with Vedanta and facilitated NGOs‟ 
work.  An example of this sort of viewpoint is detailed below:  
Our campaign with investors was helped by the fact that Vedanta wasn‟t really a 
well-loved company by the investors in the UK themselves. Although they invested 
in it, they were not necessarily pleased with the way that Vedanta conducted itself 
in terms of governance, which made them relatively sympathetic to hearing what 
Amnesty and other NGOs had to say. I think that was quite important in terms of 
the relative success of the NGOs‟ shareholder activism in regard to Vedanta 
[Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2013]. 
Listed on the London stock exchange as recently as 2003, a respondent from Amnesty 
International said that, in their view, Vedanta was seen by UK investors as essentially an 
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Indian company and as „somewhat outside the establishment‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
Amnesty International, 2013] – a company which is a laggard compared to its peers from 
the sector and which is not used to engaging in productive dialogue with interested 
investors. 
What differentiated the Vedanta campaign drastically from other campaigns was that the 
shareholder activism attracted a lot of media attention and was very high-profile due to the 
fact that it involved public expression of investor discontent via the AGM forum. As Becht 
et al. (2010) suggest, in the UK context, a lot of the activity takes place „behind closed 
doors‟ or „behind the scenes‟ as one of the interviewees from this study describes it. In 
other words, most UK asset owners tend to engage privately with companies via letters and 
dialogue. And that is certainly what the Church of England and the JRCT did between 2009 
and 2010 before they decided to divest completely from Vedanta. However, there were 
other large and well-known shareholders such as Standard Life, Legal and General, Black 
Rock, Newton Asset Management, and Aviva who raised questions from the floor at the 
AGMs (Popham, 2012). Following a report produced by investor consultancy PIRC in 
2010, which recommends that investors oppose certain key resolutions at Vedanta‟s AGM, 
shareholders voted against the election of some of Vedanta‟s non-executive directors, 
against the acceptance of the annual report and against the approval of the remuneration 
report (PIRC, 2010, Dawber, 2010a, Reuters, 2011). Although the data suggests that the 
culture in the UK is not conducive to public engagement, it is also believed that such public 
engagement is sending a strong message to companies and is very effective: 
Activism tends to be behind the scenes, but public engagement by investors (i.e. at 
an AGM or a resolution) can be very effective [Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013a]. 
Apart from the AGM activities described above, interested investors also engaged with 
Vedanta privately via letters, emails and face-to-face meetings with company officials. An 
interesting approach was the collaborative engagement undertaken by shareholders via the 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI, hereafter) engagement Clearinghouse
81
. All 
three investors discussed in this case study joined the engagement group. The aim was to 
„not only seek an improvement in the company‟s management of environmental and social 
issues, but to also improve governance at the company generally, especially in terms of 
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 The Clearinghouse is an opt-in online platform for investors who are signatories of the PRI to propose and 
be involved in collaborative engagements. 
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responsiveness to the concerns of minority investors‟ [Fieldwork Interview, CoE, 2013] and 
the expectation was that adding more financial muscle to engagement would help achieve 
change. 
Considering the role of organisations such as the PRI and their Clearinghouse platform for 
enabling collective action, Gond and Piani (2012) argue that they facilitate collective action 
emergence, diminish incentives to free ride, enhance the processes of investors‟ influence, 
and maintain conditions for constructive dialogue, among other benefits. Interviewees have 
mentioned two main advantages of the collaborative action undertaken via the 
Clearinghouse, namely, exchange of information that facilitated the sharing of different 
members‟ engagement experiences and increased access to the company: „it did help 
provide some further access to the people we weren‟t speaking to at the company through 
other channels‟ [Fieldwork Interview, CoE, 2013]. However, the Clearinghouse platform 
does not help alleviate one of the main problems of collaborative investor engagement 
mentioned above – the difficulty of reaching a consensus and united view, given the variety 
of shareholders and interests involved: 
One of the things we struggled with with the Clearinghouse engagement was the 
fact that, because UNPRI has so many different members all having very different 
approaches, it isn‟t possible to get a consensus on a position through UNPRI. (…) 
And we found over the years that where we worked with a smaller number of 
investors, that could be much more effective, because you can get aligned much 
more easily, you can get a consensus of opinion which then can be articulated to the 
company [Fieldwork Interview, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2013]. 
After undertaking collaborative engagement through the Principles for Responsible 
Investment, the next step for some investors such as the CoE and the JRCT was to divest 
from Vedanta. Their decision to sell their shares in the company, following a seven months 
(CoE) and six months (JRCT) long process of engagement, attracted a lot of media 
attention (see The Economic Times, 2010; Hopkins, 2010a; Hopkins, 2010b, Dawber, 
2010b; The Indian Express, 2007). This decision in both cases was motivated by the same 
two main reasons. First, it was felt that the engagement process wasn‟t yielding any results: 
„our sense was that the company wasn‟t really up for engagement‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2013]; „we felt that we did not achieve anything with 
the engagement that we conducted and we didn‟t think we were likely to achieve anything 
by continuing to engage‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Church of England, 2013]. Second, the 
investors decided that Vedanta‟s behaviour was incongruent with their ethical investment 
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criteria: „We did not want to remain invested in a company if we think it‟s not ethical to 
keep our capital invested with that company‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Church of England, 
2013]; „Our objective was to reposition our portfolio in a way that we felt represented our 
ethical values‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2013]. By the 
words of one investor, the campaigning groups were very helpful in maximising the 
publicity around the divestment decision and gave advice on the press release and its 
timing.  
However, some critics of divestment contend that this tactic is much less effective than 
adopting an active ownership approach. For example, Statman (2000) claims that any 
significant effects on the cost of capital of organisations are only possible in conditions of 
inelastic capital supply – in other words – when there are not numerous other investors 
ready to buy the shares of the unethical company. However, as Statman‟s (2000) empirical 
observations reveal, capital supply functions are almost perfectly elastic. Statman‟s 
viewpoint is shared by a member of Amnesty International who disapproves of the 
approach of some NGOs who have encouraged Vedanta‟s shareholders to sell their shares: 
„I think some NGOs don‟t necessarily understand finance very well. Some NGOs, or their 
own supporters, think that if someone sells their shares in Vedanta, for example, then that 
reduces Vedanta‟s money, but it doesn‟t, because all you are doing is selling a second hand 
ownership certificate‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2013].  
Even investors seem to favour the approach of Amnesty International, i.e. calling for 
shareholder activism and dialogue with the company: „Amnesty – their approach is more 
nuanced. They‟ve got more experience in focusing on shareholders. I think they were just 
trying to get the issues addressed. (…) I don‟t think Survival International particularly 
understood how investors work‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 2013]. The decision of some 
investors to sell rather than to engage can be explained by the cultural aversion towards 
public engagement mentioned above, which is extensively recognised as existing in the 
corporate governance literature (see Solomon, 2007):  
Also, many investors, if they try to engage with the company and the company pays 
no attention to them, they have no further strategy to escalate their engagement 
process, so often there may just not be the mechanisms within the investor 
engagement toolbox that enable something to go beyond a dialogue. And that is 
potentially a failing of the way investors work. There are the barriers in terms of 
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what they are prepared to do to rock the boat or not [Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty 
International, 2013]. 
Nevertheless, the divestments did play their role in securing the success of the campaign in 
this case, because they were numerous and involved high-profile shareholders (Norwegian 
State Pension Fund (NSPF, hereafter), Church of England, PGGM
82
, JRCT). Their 
importance can be seen when we consider an article written in The Indian Express in 2007, 
following the divestment of the NSPF. On 24 November 2007, the Supreme Court said it 
could not take „the risk‟ of handing such a national asset – the Hills – to the company and 
demanded that Vedanta came up with a new proposal along with the Orissa government.   
The article suggests that, in its judgement, the Supreme Court referred to the decision of the 
NSPF to sell its shares. Therefore, shareholder action undertaken in the UK has had an 
effect on the legal and political processes in India.  
Following the divestment, banks started reassessing their lending to the company and 
Standard Chartered, on behalf of Vedanta‟s lenders, appointed Scott Wilson Ltd. to review 
the company‟s strategic approach to sustainable development and to assess the social and 
environmental issues in relation to the alumina refinery in Lanjigarh and its proposed 
expansion (Scott Wilson, 2010). Vedanta was to provide its lenders with implementation 
progress reports every six months until all the recommendations in the report were met and 
all the problems mitigated.   
The Tax Justice Campaign 
Overall, the empirical evidence unequivocally suggests that, over the last couple of years, 
investors have come to recognise the material importance of tax as an issue. As a result, 
they have started engaging with investee companies, have established a dialogue with the 
NGO community, and have come to regard tax as an important responsible investment 
issue:  
Both SRI and mainstream investors started to look at tax more seriously. (…) They 
have acknowledged that irresponsible tax practices pose risks to investors 
[Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2014a]. 
Tax is now something investors realise they need to get their heads around 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2014]. 
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I don‟t think the investment community is surprised to see tax turning up on the 
agenda when we talk about responsible investment anymore [Fieldwork Interview, 
ActionAid, 2014]. 
Since what happened with Starbucks
83
, we have seen investors thinking there is a 
reputational risk here. This does mean tax could have material impact on our 
investments and so we‟ve seen those conversations develop a bit more. We are 
finding there‟s more people who want to have the conversations now, whereas 
before we were knocking on the doors and saying: „Can we please come and talk to 
you?‟. We are finding a lot more people are getting in touch with us and saying: 
„We are looking into this area now, can you come and please have a chat to us and 
tell us what your thinking around this is?‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 
2014b]. 
Tax has occupied its rightful place in the repertoire of responsible investment topics and 
this is exemplified by the increased frequency of investor events on tax (see events 11, 14, 
24, and 27 from Table 6), as well as by the fact that, when attending SRI events and RI 
conferences, tax usually has its own panel discussion (an example is the 2013 RI summit, 
see event 10 from Table 6). However, there is more to be achieved since tax has not been 
mainstreamed into investment processes and priorities: 
If you go and talk to the more responsible mainstream players, they tell you that 
women‟s rights, ethical supply chains and water management have been identified 
as three strategic priorities for the year. I haven‟t heard any investor tell me that tax 
has been identified as a strategic priority, so there is much more distance to cover, 
but it is certain that tax and responsibility are now quite interlinked issues 
[Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2014]. 
Two main reasons can explain the upsurge of investor activism in the area – namely – 
media and public interest, and these factors have already been discussed in relation to the 
previous two case studies. To begin with, the existing regulatory reforms in the area of tax, 
as well as the fear of further government intervention in the future, have been identified as 
factors driving investor engagement.  
Anecdotally it appears that investors are beginning to ask more questions and a 
chunk of that is because of both the fear of further regulatory change and the 
knowledge that there will be some regulatory change [Fieldwork Interview, 
ChristianAid, 2014b].  
When explaining the criteria for engagement with companies, an analyst from Standard 
Life argues that one of the factors taken into account is the materiality of an issue, in other 
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 After the news broke that Starbucks had been avoiding taxes in the UK, the company‟s sales fell drastically, 
and Starbucks made an agreement to pay £20 million in tax to the UK. 
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words, „whether there is regulatory pressure from government‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
Standard Life, 2014]. As mentioned earlier, NGOs have been involved in the public policy 
debate around tax and have been lobbying politicians at both national and international 
level for the introduction of changes to the current tax system. Therefore, similarly to the 
Vedanta campaign, by the words of one analyst working for a big UK institutional investor, 
NGOs‟ efforts in the public policy arena have served as an indirect trigger of shareholder 
engagement by investors:  
The efforts of NGOs have been important to a certain degree. They have an indirect 
effect whereby, for example, EU regulation on tax is influenced by an NGO and I 
am influenced by EU legislation. A point in case is the recently introduced directive 
on extractive companies [Fieldwork Interview, Standard Life, 2014]. 
The second reason behind investor activism has to do with the media and public interest 
generated around tax: 
The media interest has made investors begin to shift their views a little bit 
[Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2014b]. 
One of the reasons why we started engaging was because the tax practices of 
companies have come under increased scrutiny from the public [Fieldwork 
Interview, Standard Life, 2014]. 
NGOs have raised the issue in terms of getting it in the media and educating the 
consumer more broadly about this being a meaningful issue, particularly as we see it 
in emerging markets [Fieldwork Interview, Arisaig Partners, 2013]. 
The paragraphs above suggest that regulatory reform, alongside with media and public 
interest in tax, have incited investor action on the topic. Furthermore, campaigning NGOs 
have played an instrumental role in generating this public attention and in pushing for 
government legislation in relation to tax. However, much like it was the case with the 
Vedanta campaign (see previous section), according to an investment analyst at Arisaig 
Partners, third sector organisations have played a role in educating the investor community 
and providing valuable information:  
When we were looking at the issue we read a number of their reports that had 
highlighted this as a social development issue. So, some of the work from 
ChristianAid was some of the research that we read. The reports were very useful in 
quantifying the impact on emerging markets, because our interest wasn‟t company 
specific. They had done some quite tangible research. They seem to have done a 
good job of identifying some of the financial impacts at a country level [Fieldwork 
Interview, Arisaig Partners, 2013].  
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ShareAction‟s (2014) most recent investor briefing on tax also serves an educational 
purpose as it not only summarises the key developments in terms of legislative changes, but 
it makes the issue of tax less complicated for investors by providing them with a set of 
sample questions to ask companies: 
Investors previously would be like „If I ask a tax question and they give me a really 
detailed PowerPoint with numbers, how do I know if that‟s good or bad?‟. Whereas 
now if you look at the briefing, the questions are much more towards the lines of „If 
this rule changed, what‟s your plan, what would that do?‟. And an investor can ask 
that question, the answer they will get on that topic would give them an insight into 
governance and into risk assessment, it won‟t be a numbers answer. You don‟t need 
to be an accountant to know whether that‟s a good answer or a bad answer 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2014]. 
In summary, the findings reveal that investor engagement in the area of tax has increased 
over the past years and shareholders have recognised the regulatory, financial and 
reputational risks associated with aggressive tax planning. NGOs have played a role for 
inciting and keeping alive the public interest in the topic, campaigning for changes in 
legislation, and facilitating engagement through providing information to investors. The 
next step is for the campaign to become more solutions-focused and there are signs of that 
beginning to happen:  
Businesses have been called out on the problem, investors have now been told this 
is an issue they should be worried about, NGOs having raised the problem, now 
everyone involved is sitting down thinking „what is next, what is the answer, what 
can we do?‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2014]. 
Having discussed the impact of NGO activity on the investor community, the following 
section considers what influence have NGO actions had on the behaviour of the targeted 
companies.  
10.2. Company Impact  
A discussion of changes taking place at company level is another prerequisite for a 
comprehensive assessment of the overall impact of campaign activities. Companies‟ 
responses to activists could be examined through the use of legitimacy theory as a 
theoretical lens. Since 1995, the body of research on legitimacy has grown rapidly and in a 
variety of directions. Weber (1987) is most widely credited as the author to introduce 
legitimacy into sociological theory and organisation studies (Johnson et al., 2006; Ruef and 
Scott, 1998). Suchman (1995, p. 574) offers the following broad-based definition of 
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legitimacy as „a generalised perception or assumption that the action of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions”. The strategic, rather than the institutional, perspective on 
legitimacy advanced by Suchman (1995) is of relevance to this study as it emphasises how 
organisations manage legitimacy to help achieve their goals. Legitimacy is a resource that a 
business requires in order to operate and certain actions and events either decrease or 
increase that legitimacy. 
Legitimacy theory could be adopted as a theoretical basis for understanding voluntary 
social and environmental disclosures made by corporations and a number of different 
models can help explain the targeted companies‟ responses in the current study. For 
example, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) distinguish between two general approaches by which 
organisations seek legitimacy – substantive management and symbolic management. The 
first entails real, material change in organisational goals and processes, whereas the second 
results in the organisation symbolically managing or portraying its actions so as to appear 
consistent with social values and expectations. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) further subdivide 
these two broad categories into a total of ten specific actions, or legitimising practices 
adopted by companies. One of these practices is role performance, or meeting the 
performance expectations of those societal actors upon which the organisation depends. To 
give an example with the case studies discussed here, Vedanta adopted a human rights 
policy and a new sustainability framework in 2011 and 2012 as a result of pressure by its 
lenders. The company also engaged in the denial and concealment tactic (Ashforth and 
Gibbs (1990), which aims to suppress information about activities which are likely to 
undermine legitimacy. Coercive isomorphism, or conformity to the values, norms and 
expectations of constituents can be observed in the behaviour of Lloyds and HSBC which 
announced that they are in the process of reviewing their tax haven business structures and 
are closing subsidiary companies operating in tax haven countries (see Table 27).  
Apart from Ashforth and Gibbs‟ (1990) classification discussed above, Suchman (1995) 
advances another theoretical framework that could be used to examine the targeted 
companies‟ responses to campaigning NGOs. Suchman (1995) distinguishes between three 
types of legitimacy (pragmatic, moral and cognitive) and a number of subtypes within each 
major category. Pragmatic legitimacy relies on the self-interested calculations of an 
organisation‟s immediate constituents, moral legitimacy translates into a positive moral 
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evaluation of the organisation and it activities and cognitive legitimacy involves either 
backing for an organisation or acceptance of the organisation as necessary based on some 
taken-for-granted cultural account. Legitimacy based on the taken-for-granted principles is 
regarded by Suchman (1995) as the most subtle and powerful form of legitimacy. The 
author went on to incorporate two cross-cutting dimensions into this basic framework – the 
first of which reflects the focus of legitimation (organisational actions versus organisational 
essence) and the second captures the temporal aspect of legitimation (episodic versus 
continual). 
Despite the relevance of legitimacy theory, Zadek‟s (2004) five stages of organisational 
learning model was adopted to assess the targeted companies‟ response to activists because 
of its layered organisational schema which provided a coherent narrative structure for 
analysing the vast empirical material that was gathered across the three key case studies of 
NGO-led shareholder activism. Zadek‟s (2004) framework provides a closer fit with the 
context of the study. It is specifically designed to explore how companies address CSR 
challenges, depicting the various steps through which an organisation passes when handling 
corporate responsibility. In addition, this model is of particular relevance for exploring the 
Tax Justice campaign as it was originally used for tracing changes in corporate behaviour in 
the context of the sweatshop movement which, as suggested earlier in the thesis (see p.118) 
bears resemblance to the tax justice movement. The advantage of this theoretical 
framework lies in its ability to trace a company‟s journey through not only the 
organisational dimension of learning, but also the societal dimension, assessing whether 
organisations have engaged in civil learning and evaluating the specific stage of issue 
maturity. In comparison to legitimacy theory, Zadek‟s model provides an effective way of 
measuring the impact of a campaign in a qualitative way. The framework is applied to each 
of the three case studies, with the aim of determining the extent to which a campaign has 
been successful in triggering changes in corporate behaviour.    
Shell and the Niger Delta 
Zadek (2004) believes that, when it comes to social responsibility, organisations pass 
through five stages as they progress along the learning curve. These stages are shown in the 
table below and Shell‟s progress is evaluated based on evidence from interviews, company 
reports, and adopted practices. 
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Table 24: Zadek’s (2004) Framework Applied to the Case of Shell 
Stage  
(What Organisations Do 
and Think?) 
Shell Being 
At That 
Stage? 
When? 
Evidence 
Defensive  
 
Deny practices, outcomes, or 
responsibilities. „It‟s not our 
job to fix that‟. 
Yes, until 
present. 
Numerous references in all Shell‟s 
annual reports, as well as during the 
company‟s AGMs in 2013 and 2014, 
citing the difficult operational 
environment as the main culprit.  
Shell maintains that between 2010-
2012 85 per cent of the volume of oil 
spilled from SPDC facilities was the 
result of sabotage and theft (Shell, 
2012b).
84
 
A common theme summarised in the 
following sentence is reiterated in 
Shell‟s annual reports – „SPDC is 
responding positively to the findings 
of the UNEP report. But there are 
multiple parties involved in 
Ogoniland… (Shell, 2011b, p.20). In 
the words of an interviewee: „Shell is 
claiming that they want to clean up, 
but that they are waiting for the 
government‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
FoE Netherlands, 2013]. 
Compliance  
 
Adopt a policy-based 
compliance approach. „We 
will do just as much as we 
have to‟. 
Limited 
evidence, but 
largely not 
addressed 
SPDC has supported and adopted the 
Voluntary Principles of Security and 
Human Rights in Nigeria. It has done 
so in order to address in some way the 
allegations regarding armed security 
forces discussed above. 
Managerial  
 
Embed the societal issue in 
their core management 
processes. „It‟s the business, 
stupid‟. 
No ShareAction‟s briefing (2012a) urges 
investors to ask Shell whether the 
remuneration of SPDC‟s middle and 
senior managers is linked to spill 
reduction in the delta. However, no 
known improvements regarding this 
point are made. 
Strategic  
 
Integrate the societal issue 
into their core business 
strategies. „It gives us a 
No There is no evidence to suggest that 
Shell has integrated the issue into its 
core business strategies. 
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cause, lies with the company. 
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competitive edge‟. 
Civil 
 
 Promote broad industry 
participation in corporate 
responsibility. „We need to 
make sure everybody does it‟. 
No Shell has not urged other companies 
operating in the Delta to take action 
on the issue. 
 
Source: Adapted from Zadek (2004) 
The results from Table 24 suggest that Shell occupies predominantly the defensive stage of 
organisational learning – there is no noticeable shift in company stance and no progress up 
the hierarchy invented by Zadek (2004). The motivation for Shell‟s firmly adopted 
defensive position can be inferred when the context in Nigeria is considered. As one 
interviewee argues:   
In the Nigerian context it is extremely easy for Shell to present itself as being the 
victim, being at the mercy of corrupt Nigerian government and military, and being 
at the mercy of people who live there, making it impossible for them to work in the 
way that they would like to. Now, I don‟t think at all that that is the case (…) 
they‟ve basically run, they‟ve had a major hand in running that state. But they were 
able to present themselves as the victim in that situation (…) [Fieldwork Interview, 
Platform, 2013]. 
Another reason for the apparent lack of progress might have to do with the fact that the 
strategy of targeting and engaging with investors was introduced by NGOs comparatively 
recently – in late 2009 by Amnesty International. ShareAction was enlisted to help with 
their expertise in 2012. As has been mentioned before, investor work is time consuming 
and it might take years of engagement before the objectives of a campaign are realised. 
However, in the case of the Niger Delta, there are a lot of challenges that make this difficult 
(see Chapters 11 and 12 for details).  
Some other changes in corporate practice which cannot be categorised under the headings 
of Zadek‟s model deserve mentioning. To begin with, interviewees have claimed that, as a 
result of the increase in investor scrutiny, Shell‟s transparency and disclosure of 
information had improved, as well as the company‟s readiness to answer questions. For 
example, in 2011 Shell launched a website that enables people to track details of oil spills 
and how SPDC deals with them. Similarly, according to Shell‟s 2010 sustainability report, 
SPDC published the impact assessments of its main projects on its website. Second, in 2011 
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SPDC began a programme to reduce flaring of associated gas and started investing in the 
acquisition of more gas gathering equipment. During its 2013 AGM, the company‟s CEO 
said that, by 2014-2015, the company should be either at, or below the current worldwide 
industry average flaring intensity which is at some 1.5 per cent of production [Fieldwork 
Notes(8), 2013]. 
Third, in March 2012 Shell commissioned Bureau Veritas
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 to review SPDC‟s spill 
response and initial clean-up procedures. However, as the second briefing of ShareAction 
reveals (ShareAction, 2012b), there are still a lot of questions left unanswered surrounding 
the process and findings of this review. Fourth, seeking to address the recommendations 
made by the UNEP report, Shell announced that SPDC and the IUCN would set up an 
independent scientific panel to advise the organisation. The first report of the IUCN – Niger 
Delta panel was published in July 2013 (IUCN, 2013).  
Shortly after, the managing director of SPDC announced that the company is to pull out of 
its oil activities in the Delta. CEO Peter Voser also mentioned „divestment‟ in Nigeria 
during a presentation of Shell‟s second quarter results and stated that the focus will now be 
placed on gas drilling in Nigeria and oil drilling off shore (Dutch News, 2013). In 
summary, although there are some welcomed steps in the right direction such as increased 
transparency and a reduction in gas flaring, the problems in the Niger Delta are historic, 
persistent and deep-rooted, and the prospects of Shell taking action to alleviate the 
environmental and social damage caused are unclear, with the company still adopting a 
defensive position when confronted by activists.  
Vedanta  
Similarly to the campaign against Shell discussed above, the impact the NGOs have had on 
Vedanta is evaluated by applying Zadek‟s (2004) five stages of organisational learning 
framework. That being said, drawing on interviews, reports and participant observation, the 
table below assesses the extent to which Vedanta‟s behaviour has changed as a result of the 
campaign. All interviewees seem to agree that it was initially very difficult to engage with 
the company, as it refused to have a dialogue with both NGOs and investors. The former 
could not convince the company to comment on drafts of their written reports (for example, 
Amnesty International), and the latter found it challenging to arrange a private meeting with 
                                                 
85
 An independent international standards verification agency. 
220 
company officials: „With the Vedanta case we weren‟t able to get a private meeting with 
the company‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Aviva, 2013].  Therefore, to reflect Vedanta‟s unique 
situation, another category is added to the model – „the unresponsive‟ stage, which precedes 
the defensive one: 
Table 25: Zadek’s Framework Applied to the Vedanta Case 
Stage  
(What 
Organisations Do 
and Think?) 
Vedanta Being 
At That Stage? 
When? 
Evidence 
Unresponsive  
 
Fail to respond to 
letters, emails and 
calls for meetings in 
relation to 
allegations. „If we 
keep quite it will just 
blow over‟. 
Yes – between 
2006 and 2009. 
EIRIS wrote to the company on 24 May 
2006 and on 15 November 2006. Vedanta 
responded on 15 April 2009. 
In 2009 Amnesty wrote to Vedanta to 
request an interview, seeking answers to 
allegations and comments on their first 
report – no response received. 
Investors unable to schedule a meeting with 
company officials. 
Defensive  
 
Deny practices, 
outcomes, or 
responsibilities. „It‟s 
not our job to fix 
that‟. 
Yes – between 
2007 and 2012. 
„Contrary to these allegations which we 
know to be baseless‟ (Vedanta, 2007, p.1). 
„We disagree with the suggestion that the 
company has infringed the rights of 
indigenous tribal people‟ (Vedanta, 2009 
cited in EIRIS, 2010, p.7). 
„There are factual errors in the report and we 
do not agree with the insinuations made…‟ 
(Vedanta, 2012a, p.1). 
Compliance  
 
Adopt a policy-
based compliance 
approach. „We will 
do just as much as 
we have to‟. 
Yes – 2010 till 
present. 
„They‟d written back and we got the 
impression that, because what they were 
doing was legal within the definitions of 
legality, they felt justifying what they were 
doing‟ [Fieldwork Interview, JRCT, 2013]. 
„Our processes, planning and consultation 
have been in line with all Indian national 
laws‟ (Vedanta, 2012b, p.11). 
Managerial  
 
Embed the societal 
issue in their core 
management 
processes. „It‟s the 
business, stupid‟. 
Yes – 2010 till 
present. 
„They are much more responsive to 
questions about having proper oversight of 
these issues at board level and senior 
management level‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
EIRIS, 2013]. 
Vedanta appointed a chief sustainability 
officer in 2010 who „certainly improved the 
dialogue with investors and also Vedanta‟s 
responsiveness to stakeholders in terms of 
seeing NGOs‟ [Fieldwork Interview, Church 
of England, 2013]. 
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Strategic 
 
 Integrate the 
societal issue into 
their core business 
strategies. „It gives 
us a competitive 
edge‟. 
No – maybe some 
early signs but the 
company is far 
from adopting 
this approach. 
Pressured by its lenders, Vedanta adopted a 
human rights policy and a new sustainability 
framework during 2011 and 2012. 
 
Civil  
 
Promote broad 
industry 
participation in 
corporate 
responsibility. „We 
need to make sure 
everybody does it‟. 
No No evidence to suggest that Vedanta 
promotes broad industry participation in 
corporate responsibility. 
 
Source: Adapted from Zadek (2004) 
The table reveals that a company‟s attitude towards CSR does not shift in a straightforward 
and uniform way as suggested by Zadek (2004), as there is an overlap between the various 
stages – while exhibiting progress in its approach to CSR, Vedanta has also continued to 
show signs of adhering to the defensive and compliance stages of organisational learning. 
Altogether the company has passed through four of the six stages – a result that can be 
considered to some extent satisfactory given its initial position. However, for the 
transformation to be complete, there has to be a full transition away from the defensive and 
compliance approaches and a higher emphasis on the strategic approach. One of the most 
significant changes that occurred was, in the words of an EIRIS official, that Vedanta 
became much more willing to talk to investors and „the communication with the company 
improved significantly in quantity, quality and frequency‟ [Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 
2013a]. In summary, the application of Zadek‟s (2004) model reveals that Vedanta has 
gone a long way from how it used to behave initially, but there is still scope for change.  
Another way of assessing the impact of the campaign on the company would entail looking 
at EIRIS‟ final report on the progress made against its seven recommendations which was 
published in July 2013. Below is a summary table of Vedanta‟s performance during the 
four years since the initial report in 2010: 
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 Table 26: Summary Results – Vedanta’s Progress (2010 – 2013) 
Recommendation Initial 
Report 
2010 
EIRIS 
Assessment 
Jul-11 
EIRIS 
Assessment 
Jun-12 
EIRIS 
Assessment 
Jul-13 
1. Board level oversight Red Amber Light green Light green 
2. Board responsibility and 
training 
Red Amber Amber Light green 
3. Remuneration link to ESG 
performance 
Red Amber Light green Light green 
4. Grievance mechanisms Red Amber Amber Light green 
5. Risk management Red Red Light green Light green 
6. International Norms Red Amber Light green Light green 
7. Monitoring compliance Red Amber Light green Light green 
 
Unaddressed     Fully Addressed 
 
Source: EIRIS (2013) 
The table above suggests that Vedanta has made progress and has undertaken steps to 
address each of the seven recommendations. However, not one of the seven 
recommendations is assessed as „green‟ (fully addressed), indicating that there are still 
issues that need to be addressed across all recommendations. Positive developments during 
the 2012-13 financial year include training on sustainability issues and on grievance 
mechanisms at board level, as well as strengthening systems for overseeing compliance 
with ESG issues. However, the report claims that: „Vedanta is still to set up a panel of 
external experts to assess its operations in Orissa against international standards; its EIAs 
may not identify all indigenous communities as impacted by its operations; its grievance 
mechanisms (and especially the one in Lanjigarh) are lagging behind best practice 
standards‟ (EIRIS, 2013).  A representative of Aviva uses the following words to 
summarise Vedanta‟s progress over the years:  
They are going in the right direction but not at the right speed. I would far rather 
they were much quicker at dealing with some of the things that we have highlighted. 
For example, they still haven‟t properly dealt with our request for them to have a 
complaints process and an arbitration mechanism. These things take only a matter 
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of weeks to implement, so I am irritated that that hasn‟t happened. But they are 
going in the right direction [Fieldwork Interview, Aviva, 2013]. 
Nevertheless, all the developments mentioned in EIRIS‟ report relate to changes in the way 
Vedanta governs itself. The question remains as to whether the changes at company level 
have been translated on the ground with real impacts for local communities and the 
environment. Interviewees from EIRIS, ActionAid and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable 
Trust remain sceptical: 
This doesn‟t mean the company is perfect, it doesn‟t mean there aren‟t any risks 
involved, on the ground it still has better things to do. In performance terms on the 
ground it‟s hard to know, some of this stuff is historical stuff, it‟s legacy stuff, you 
can‟t really undo the damage that has been done. There should be slightly better 
dialogue with local communities… [Fieldwork Interview, EIRIS, 2013a]. 
My suspicion is that they haven‟t changed much [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 
2013a]. 
As far as I am aware Vedanta is still doing what it is doing. In terms of the position 
of the people and the environment being affected, I suspect that, by applying that 
pressure on the company, it would have had an impact, but I am not sure how great 
an impact [Fieldwork Interview, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2013]. 
In its latest briefing paper entitled „Vedanta‟s Perspective Uncovered: Policies Cannot 
Mask Practices In Orissa‟ (2012), Amnesty International alleges that the shortcomings of 
the environmental impact assessments have still not been addressed, that Vedanta has failed 
to address the risks posed by the refinery‟s red mud ponds and to disclose relevant 
information to local communities on the impacts of pollution. Furthermore, no remedial 
action has been taken with respect to the contamination already caused by the refinery 
operations and Vedanta has still to recognise the rights of the indigenous communities and 
to respect the views of the Dongria Kondhs. The report argues that the company „has 
wrongfully assumed that it knows better than the Dongria Kondh what is in their best 
interests‟ (Amnesty International, 2012, p.9).  
However, ultimately, on the 18
th
 April 2013, the Supreme Court gave a verdict that the 
gram sabhas (the assemblies consisting of all adult voters) are to decide whether they are 
against the building of the mine or not. The verdict delayed once again the opening of the 
mine. In August 2013, all twelve gram sabhas unanimously opposed mining in the hills 
(Patnaik, 2013). Following their decision, in January 2014, the MoEF rejected Vedanta‟s 
proposal for bauxite mining in Orissa. The refinery, which relied on the bauxite supplies 
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from the mine to function, stopped operating on the 5th December 2012 as a result of 
inadequate supply of raw material. It resumed operations at sixty per cent capacity on 11 
July 2013 after a gap of seven months. Based on these events, the campaign can be 
classified as being successful.  
The reasons behind this success are varied and complex and cannot be attributed to the 
actions of one organisation, one investor, or one newspaper article. Rather, what made the 
campaign so effective was the fact that it was an international campaign with pressure from 
the UK, as well as within India; there was sustained criticism over a long period of time 
coming from different NGOs and high-profile investors; the campaigning organisations 
have used a variety of different tactics – detailed research, targeting of investors, attendance 
at AGMs, telling the personal stories of the Dongria Kondh, creating media attention, and 
others. All these tactics which were well documented in the media (both in the UK and in 
India) helped create the right political environment for the Indian government to intervene. 
One of the interviewees gives an interesting explanation of what might have been the 
reason behind the Supreme Court‟s judgement: 
You have to remember that, in India, the Supreme Court was very aware of every 
investor that was pulling out, of every press release and every article that was being 
published about Vedanta, and how it was affecting, not just the community, but the 
image of India as a place to do business. I think there was a political dynamic to it 
as well – it became a lightning rod for how development was trampling over human 
rights in India, and that sits uncomfortably with a country‟s image of a modern 
democracy, so that was quite an important aspect of it as well [Fieldwork Interview, 
ActionAid, 2013b]. 
Due to the complexity of the Vedanta campaign  and the fact that it span over a number of 
years, involving a variety of different actors and campaign tactics, shareholder activism by 
NGOs and investors should be seen as a piece of the overall puzzle, but nevertheless a 
significant one, as suggested by a former campaigner from ActionAid: 
You could argue that shareholder activism by NGOs and the media and publicity 
around what was going on did have an indirect impact that ultimately forced 
Vedanta to at least pay more attention to its policies on corporate and social 
responsibility in a way that it may not have done otherwise [Fieldwork Interview, 
ActionAid, 2013b]. 
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The Tax Justice Campaign 
As the tax campaign is a broad campaign that targets all FTSE 100 corporations, there 
should be a general discussion of how they have addressed NGOs‟ demands. Specific 
examples of companies which can be categorised under one of Zadek‟s five stages of 
organisational learning are provided in the table below. The data gathered is based on 
fieldwork interviews, live documents, company documents, and analysis of firms‟ 
responses to the AGM questions asked over the years. These responses are publicly 
available and are published on ShareAction‟s website.  
Table 27: Zadek’s Framework Applied to the Tax Case Study 
Stage  
(What 
Organisations 
Do and Think?) 
Examples of 
Companies 
Being At 
That Stage? 
When? 
Evidence 
Unresponsive  
 
Fail to respond 
to letters, emails 
and calls for 
meetings in 
relation to 
allegations. „If 
we keep quite it 
will just blow 
over‟. 
AstraZeneca  
2012 
 
 
 
Shire – 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
When asked during its 2012 AGM of the possibility 
for reporting taxes on a country-by-country basis, the 
company said it had no plans to provide more detailed 
reporting. 
 
When asked about the reputational risks of aggressive 
tax practices such as moving your headquarters in 
Dublin for tax purposes, Shire responded „by saying,  
first of all, that they were not Starbucks, and then said 
they did not think it had a reputational impact‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2014].  
Defensive 
  
Deny practices, 
outcomes or 
responsibilities. 
„It‟s not our job 
to fix that‟. 
BP – 2012 
and 2013 
 
 
In General 
At both AGMs, the company mentioned that in some 
countries BP‟s desire to report on tax was hampered 
by the law. 
 
„We asked a question about country-by-country 
reporting (during the 2014 AGM season) and the 
general tenor of those answers was „We don‟t have to 
so we are not going to‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
ShareAction, 2014] 
 
Some companies „would fundamentally disagree with 
our analysis and suggest that, while there might be 
some companies that are causing problems in 
developing countries, that wasn‟t them and the 
discussions we were having were irrelevant to the 
work that they were doing‟ [Fieldwork Interview, 
ChristianAid, 2013]. 
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Compliance  
 
Adopt a policy-
based 
compliance 
approach. „We 
will do just as 
much as we have 
to‟. 
Schroders 
2012 
 
 
Severn Trent  
2012 
 
 
 
 
British 
American 
Tobacco  
2014 
 
In General 
Asked why it does not report taxes on a country-by-
country basis, the company responded that it complies 
with all statutory requirements. 
 
„We give full disclosure of everything that is required 
of us by the laws applicable in every country in which 
we operate (…) (Michael McKeon, Finance Director 
of Severn Trent) (ShareAction, 2012c). 
 
When asked about undertaking country-by-country 
reporting, the CEO said there is no obligation to report 
globally. 
 
 
„Quite often I would find that tax directors would 
either be accountants or tax lawyers, so they take quite 
a technocratic view to the problem and just say „This 
is the law. We are complying with the law‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, ChristianAid, 2013]. 
Managerial  
 
Embed the 
societal issue in 
their core 
management 
processes. „It‟s 
the business, 
stupid‟. 
Lloyds and 
HSBC 
following 
questions at 
their 2013 
AGMs 
 
HSBC, 
Uniliver, 
Lloyds, RBS, 
GSK – 2014 
 
Tullow Oil  
2014 
Both banks announced that they are in the process of 
reviewing their tax haven business structures and are 
aiming to close subsidiary companies operating in tax 
haven countries (Wilson, 2013; Rankin, 2013). 
 
 
 
All announced that they were closing their operations 
in tax havens. 
 
 
 
„Tullow Oil for the first time this year published a full 
country-by-country report and they are leading in the 
FTSE 100 companies on disclosure now‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, ShareAction, 2014]. 
Strategic 
 
 Integrate the 
societal issue 
into their core 
business 
strategies. „It 
gives us a 
competitive 
edge‟. 
Shell – since 
2011 
 
 
 
 
Stagecoach, 
the Co-
operative, 
Greggs - 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diageo    
May 2013 
 
 
Since 2011 Shell have started to publish a document 
entitled „Revenue Transparency‟ which provides a 
country-by-country breakdown of tax payments made 
to governments in some of the main countries the 
company operates.  
 
A number of companies who have engaged with the 
fair tax mark here in the UK. They‟ve proactively 
chosen to go that way because they see a reputational 
benefit from it‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ChristainAid, 
2014b]. 
 
Published a global tax policy in 2013 detailing 
Diageo‟s approach to tax planning (see Diageo, 2013). 
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Unilever  
2013 
Unilever outlined on their website eight main tax 
principles they abide by (see Unilever, 2013). 
Civil  
 
Promote broad 
industry 
participation in 
corporate 
responsibility. 
„We need to 
make sure 
everybody does 
it‟. 
No No evidence of a FTSE 100 company promoting 
broader industry adoption of responsible tax planning 
practices. 
 
Source: Adapted from Zadek (2004) 
The information provided in the table showcases a true diversity in companies‟ responses to 
the tax campaigners, with examples for almost all of the five stages described by Zadek 
(2004). It is interesting to note that, despite the early stages of the campaign, there are 
already some companies which have realised the potential reputational and competitive 
advantages that could be accrued upon the adoption of a responsible approach to tax, and 
which have become leaders in their field with the creation of their own tax policies and 
principles (for example, Vodafone, SABMiller, Unilever). At the same time, this proactive 
approach contrasts with another group of more conservative companies which state that 
they will change their practices only if legislation demands it. The empirical evidence 
suggests that there is indeed a differing degree of progress across companies: „Some 
companies are trend-setters and are way ahead of the rest of the group, really making an 
effort, while others are laggards‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2014a].  
The main achievement of the campaign so far has been a gradual „shift in corporate 
attitudes to tax‟ which is evident when we consider that „companies‟ responses to the 
questions have improved significantly compared to when the AGM action first began‟ 
[Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2014]. Tax has become a standard campaigning issue 
and more and more companies are starting to publicly recognise in their annual reports that 
tax practices pose a serious risk. Examples include Glaxo-Smith-Kline, RSA and 
AstraZeneca. In addition, some companies such as Tullow Oil (mentioned in Table 27), 
Vodafone and Statoil are already performing well in terms of country-by-country reporting. 
The next steps in the campaign will involve a continuation of the AGM action in 2015, 
training of supporters to attend the AGMs, more engagement with investors, and a 
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collaborative project between ChristianAid and ActionAid aimed at producing a report 
which details a set of tax and business principles for companies to adopt. One of the main 
aims would be to try „to discern what practices lie beneath the principles, how are 
companies implementing the principles‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2014b]. 
Zadek (2004) argues that there are four stages of issue maturity – the first being 
characterised by a largely dismissive position adopted by the business community, a 
position which gradually changes as businesses start to experiment with approaches to 
dealing with the issue and to develop voluntary standards. Ultimately, these new business 
norms become embedded into corporate culture. Similarly to the fair trade movement and 
the living wage movement, with the maturation of the tax campaign, tax justice and 
transparency can also become one of these embedded norms. Only time can tell whether 
this will happen but, as mentioned in the introduction to the study, the outcomes of 
shareholder activism should be regarded in the context of delayed gratification, as opposed 
to the achievement of short-term or immediate goals. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has explored the impact of NGOs‟ shareholder activist strategies on the 
investor community and on company practices and behaviour. In terms of investor impact, 
the main outcome of the campaign against Shell lies in the heightened awareness among the 
investor community regarding the issue and in the increased scrutiny that investors have 
placed on the company as a result of NGO activity. However, as mentioned in Chapter 6, 
Section 6.1., the majority of shareholders engaging with the company are SRI investors, 
raising the question of whether their smaller shareholdings, in comparison to mainstream 
investors, limit their ability to push for actual changes on the ground. In addition, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the lack of flexibility in NGOs‟ campaign arguments and 
approach has meant that some investors felt alienated from the demands of campaigning 
NGOs.  
Similarly to the Niger Delta campaign, investors in Vedanta expressed their concerns via 
engaging in behind the scenes dialogue with the company. However, they also used other 
avenues for action, including asking questions at the AGM, voting against resolutions, 
divesting, and undertaking collaborative engagement via the PRI Clearinghouse. The 
findings revealed that the NGOs played a crucial role in alerting investors to the problem in 
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the first instance and were also a useful source of information for busy shareholders who 
have limited time and resources to dedicate to SEE issues. However, the campaign style of 
some NGOs, who were insisting that investors divest from Vedanta, was regarded as not 
nuanced enough by shareholders who preferred to engage in dialogue.  
When it comes to the tax campaign, NGOs have been instrumental in generating media and 
public attention, as well as in lobbying the government for the introduction of tax reforms. 
The public interest and regulatory reform, in turn, have triggered action by investors in the 
form of engagement with investee companies. NGOs have also played an important role in 
providing information to the investor community through the production of high quality 
reports. So far the campaign has managed to incite more dialogue on the topic, but the issue 
is still not a core engagement priority for shareholders. The next step for ChristianAid and 
ActionAid would be to publish the report detailing the set of tax principles to be adopted by 
companies and to engage with investors based on that information. 
The chapter also explored the impact of campaigns on company behaviour. To facilitate 
and provide structure for the assessment process, Zadek‟s theoretical framework was 
applied. Shell‟s response to campaigners was evaluated first, revealing a predominantly 
defensive approach adopted by the company – an approach characterised by denial of 
responsibility and shifting blame to other parties. The reasons behind this position could be 
various: the complex situation in Nigeria which makes it easy for the company to assume 
the role of a victim; the comparatively recent introduction of investor engagement as a 
tactic and the fact that it takes time for the outcomes of shareholder activism to become 
visible, or some strategic mistakes in the way NGOs have communicated with the investor 
community (see Chapter 12).  
Second, in terms of the Vedanta case, it was concluded that the company‟s progress can be 
considered as satisfactory given its initial unresponsive position. However, there is still a 
lot more to be accomplished and some commentators were sceptical about the existence of 
actual changes on the ground, while investors disapproved of the pace with which Vedanta 
was implementing EIRIS‟ recommendations. Albeit the changes in company behaviour are 
somewhat disputed, some of the campaign goals (not building the mine and delaying the 
refinery expansion) have been achieved as a result of a mixture of campaign tactics that 
include generating  media attention, asking questions at the AGM, targeting investors, and 
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others. The Vedanta case study has enabled the refinement and advancement of Zadek‟s 
model in two distinct ways – by adding an additional stage portraying the „unresponsive‟ 
company attitude and by identifying that the progress through the various stages is not 
sequential, but rather there could be overlap between two, three or more stages at any given 
time. 
Third, the analysis of company responses in relation to tax showed a mixture of different 
positions being adopted, with some companies taking a proactive stance, while others 
expressing a conservative outlook. However, with the maturation and progression of the 
campaign, which is still very much in its early stages, a responsible approach to tax could 
become embedded into corporate culture.  
231 
11. Cross-Case Analysis and External Challenges  
Brick walls are there for a reason. They are not there to 
keep us out. The brick walls are there to give us a chance 
to show how badly we want something. Because the brick 
walls are there to stop the people who don’t want it badly 
enough. They’re there to stop the other people.  
(Randy Pausch, 2008) 
While the previous chapter focused on the intraorganisational levels of analysis, Chapter 11 
and 12 consider the macro institutional phenomena, the structural conditions that have an 
impact on NGOs‟ shareholder activist campaigns. Much of the research and theoretical 
insights on social movement outcomes stem from a focus on state-oriented outcomes. But, 
as Soule (2009) argues, the findings from this prolific literature can be applied to the study 
of the impact of social movements on corporations. The social movement literature 
identifies factors that explain how actors achieve their campaign outcomes and in a seminal 
essay, Zald and Ash (1966) distinguish broadly between environmental factors, or features 
of a movement‟s external environment, and internal organisational characteristics. Chapters 
11 and 12 use the distinction between internal and external factors proposed by Zald and 
Ash (1966) in order to group conceptually the challenges faced by campaigning NGOs with 
reference to the three case studies. Chapter 11 discusses the external challenges (or those 
which are not in the control of voluntary organisations) that threaten to diminish the impact 
of NGO shareholder activist tactics. Drawing on examples from the three case studies, the 
present research identified four main external challenges: short-termism among investors, 
misinterpretation of fiduciary duty, the ownership structure of companies, and dispersed 
ownership. It should be noted that, notwithstanding the context-specific nature of the 
campaigns, most of the challenges outlined are also applicable to other NGO-investor 
interactions. Prior to analysing the external challenges, the chapter brings together the 
findings from the three case studies and opens with a section which compares and contrasts 
the interventions, as well as their relative success. Such analysis facilitates an exploration of 
the factors that have contributed to the effective realisation of campaign goals.  
11.1. Overall Comparison of the Case Studies  
The three case studies incorporate a variety of different shareholder activist tactics and were 
chosen to provide a range of examples of tactical approaches. The interventions were a 
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small minority of the overall capital markets campaigns underway at the time the present 
study was begun. While a small sample, the interventions were representative of strategies 
typical of NGOs and there is therefore sufficient evidence to enable insights to be derived 
based on the comparison of the chosen campaigns. 
When it comes to the campaigns against Vedanta and Shell, both targets were large FTSE 
100 companies. However, the predisposition of investors towards these two firms appears 
to be different. Shell is an established presence in the market and prides itself on being 
considered as a pillar of the establishment, one of the great British companies, loved and 
respected by shareholders. Meanwhile, Vedanta is a newcomer to the stock exchange (listed 
in 2003) and, as an Indian company with very different cultural and corporate governance 
traditions, it faces more of a challenge in convincing UK investors of its reliability and 
status. The way the two companies have responded to allegations has also been quite 
different. Shell, on the one hand, having previous experience with campaigning 
organisations, has been very polite and professional during its AGMs, and has managed to 
sway investors‟ opinion in its favour by emphasising the existing problems in the Niger 
Delta. Vedanta, on the other hand, has initially been unresponsive to allegations and has 
adopted a dismissive and confrontational attitude during its AGMs, demonstrating a 
reluctance to meet and discuss the issue with investors.   
In terms of campaign objectives, the Vedanta intervention was always about one single, 
uncomplicated issue – to stop the building of the mine and prevent the expansion of the 
alumina refinery. By contrast, the campaign against Shell was all-encompassing, consisting 
of a multitude of complex environmental and social problems that needed to be addressed. 
Vedanta is an example of a proactive campaign which is trying to prevent something from 
happening, while Shell is an example of a reactive campaign which is attempting to address 
environmental pollution which has been occurring for more than five decades. The 
campaigning organisations targeting Vedanta have managed to generate considerable media 
and public attention both in the UK and in India. This, however, has not been the case for 
campaigners against Shell where, the dangerous security situation in the Delta, and a low 
level of public interest in the topic, might explain the lack of television cameras and news 
reports. Media and public interest in the Vedanta case have in turn played a role in sparking 
regulatory pressure from India, which ultimately contributed significantly to achieving the 
campaign aims. By contrast, the UK and Dutch governments have made no attempts to help 
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alleviate the situation in the Delta. It should be noted that the UK and Dutch governments‟ 
powers in this case were more restricted because the Indian government was regulating in 
India in connection with an Indian firm. While the UK and Dutch governments probably 
exercise a great deal of influence behind the scenes, there may be limits to what they can 
achieve due to the fact that they have no direct regulatory power in the Niger Delta. 
The tax campaign was quite different from either the Vedanta or Shell cases, being focused 
on all FTSE 100 companies as opposed to just one corporation, and involving the 
comparatively recent introduction of shareholder activism as a tactic (since 2010). Media 
attention and public interest in tax justice has become increasingly apparent, especially 
following the controversies around companies such as Google and Amazon who have been 
accused of aggressively avoiding taxes in the UK. Although there has been news coverage 
of ActionAid and ChristianAid‟s reports which deal with the development angle of the 
problem
86
, the media and public interest has been predominantly focused on tax avoidance 
in the UK, and regulatory pressure has been partly driven by the policy work of NGOs.  
Thus, both UK and international politicians have expressed an interest in tackling 
aggressive tax management. For example, in 1998 the OECD initiated a project aimed at 
eliminating harmful preferential tax regimes in member countries – the progress report 
concluded that out of 47 preferential tax regimes identified as potentially harmful, 18 had 
been abolished, 14 have been amended and 13 were found not to be harmful when analysed 
further (OECD, 2006). In addition, there has been a recent initiative at the OECD on 
reconsidering international corporate tax rules (the so called Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting project). What is more, following discussions at the meeting of the G8 nations in 
June 2013, tax havens have committed to being more transparent through signing 
instruments like the multilateral convention on mutual administrative assistance on tax 
matters. Having noted all these factors which distinguish the tax campaign from the other 
two campaigns, it nevertheless bears one key similarity to the Vedanta campaign in the 
sense that it revolves around a single, uncomplicated issue – namely – embedding tax 
justice in the CSR agenda and increasing tax transparency.  
The use of information provision strategies (discussed in Chapter 5), which form the basis 
for each campaign, is present in all three case studies. However, each of the three 
campaigns has placed an emphasis on the various shareholder activist tactics to a different 
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extent. The Vedanta intervention has relied on a mixture of both indirect and direct 
strategies; the Shell intervention, although having an element of direct action, has 
predominantly been focused on indirect investor engagement and the tax campaign, to date, 
has utilised the direct route of the AGM as a main strategy.  
The cases can also be compared by considering their impact on the investor community and 
the targeted companies. Based on data from Chapter 10, the following table presents the 
investor and company impact, as well as the overall outcome of each of the case studies. 
Table 28: Overall Comparison of the Impact of the Case Studies 
 
Intervention 
 
Investor Impact 
 
Company Impact 
 
Overall Outcome 
 
Shell in the 
Niger Delta 
 
Investors started to put 
pressure on the 
company and ask 
questions as a result of 
NGO activity. 
However, NGOs‟ 
strategy and response 
has not been flexible 
enough in view of the 
elaborate strategies via 
which Shell has 
defended itself. Instead, 
NGOs have tended to 
reiterate their initial 
position. 
 
The company notably 
increased its 
transparency and 
accountability. 
Progress has been 
made in the area of 
gas flaring. However, 
Shell is still in the 
defensive stage of 
organisational 
learning and historic 
oil pollution and 
social problems are 
not adequately 
addressed. 
 
Although progress 
has been made over 
the recent years 
since shareholder 
activism was 
introduced as a 
tactic, there are no 
concrete solutions 
and considerable 
change in the 
situation in the 
Delta. Overall, it 
could be argued that 
the campaign is less 
successful compared 
to the Vedanta case. 
 
Vedanta 
Resources in 
India 
 
Numerous investors 
engaged with Vedanta 
both publicly and 
privately, individually 
and collaboratively. 
NGOs have been 
instrumental in alerting 
shareowners to the 
problem and have been 
the reason for them 
taking action. NGOs 
were also a useful 
source of information 
once the engagement 
process had begun and 
 
Vedanta has gone a 
long way – from 
refusing to have a 
dialogue with 
investors and NGOs, 
to exhibiting signs of 
being at the strategic 
phase of 
organisational 
learning. Although it 
has implemented 
strategies at the 
governance level, it is 
early to say how these 
will translate on the 
 
Considerable change 
in company practices 
and policies. 
Regulatory 
intervention, sparked 
in part by investor 
and NGO activism, 
has led to the 
decision for the mine 
not to be built. It is 
still unclear whether 
the refinery 
expansion will go 
ahead or not. 
Overall, given the 
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have helped maximise 
media impact. 
However, some 
investors were critical 
of NGOs‟ call for 
divestment as opposed 
to continued 
engagement. 
ground. Problems with 
existing pollution 
related to the refinery 
still persist. 
changes Vedanta has 
introduced as a result 
of the campaign, and 
the fact that the 
construction of the 
mine was ultimately 
rejected, the 
intervention can be 
considered as 
successful. 
 
Tax Justice 
Across 
FTSE 100 
companies 
 
Over the recent years, 
investors have begun to 
engage more with 
companies on tax. They 
have also become more 
open to speaking with 
NGOs on the topic. 
Their interest has been 
sparked by public 
attention and regulatory 
pressure, which in turn 
have been driven by 
NGO activity. 
Voluntary organisations 
have played a crucial 
role in informing and 
educating shareholders 
through detailed reports 
and company exposés. 
 
There has been a 
mixture of divergent 
company responses. 
However, the overall 
opinion is that 
companies have come 
to recognise the risk 
associated with 
aggressive tax 
planning and have 
started addressing it  
through being more 
transparent, engaging 
with NGOs, 
publishing their tax 
principles and 
committing to closing 
tax haven operations. 
 
There have been 
some notable 
changes in both the 
corporate and 
investor world but, 
since the campaign 
is in its early stages, 
it would be 
premature to make 
conclusions about its 
overall outcome.  
In summary, it could be argued that the NGO intervention that has achieved the greatest 
overall impact is the campaign against Vedanta. The campaign against Shell has been 
successful in persuading investors to engage with the company, although there is no 
evidence of considerable changes taking place on the ground. The tax campaign has been 
marked by a gradual shift in corporate approach to tax and an increasing investor interest in 
the area, but it would be hasty to make judgements about the overall effectiveness of the 
intervention.  
The next section considers the external challenges encountered by NGOs who engage in 
shareholder activism. Such external challenges can shed light on the variability of outcomes 
observed under the three campaigns. Section 11.3. discusses what constitutes a successful 
engagement according to the literature and proposes an alternative way of thinking about 
the impact and effectiveness of shareholder activism.  
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11.2. External NGO Challenges 
The barriers to building an effective shareholder activist campaign are numerous and some 
of them are inherent in any form of capital markets campaigning. These include, but are not 
limited to, internal factors (or those related to the strategic choices and organisational 
characteristics of NGOs) over which NGOs could perhaps exert control, such as unrealistic 
expectations, short-termism and lack of collaboration – all discussed in the next chapter. 
Nevertheless, some of the barriers stem from external factors that are beyond the control of 
NGOs. The empirical findings reveal that the effectiveness of a shareholder activist 
campaign is greatly diminished in the presence of four external barriers: short-termist 
investor behaviour, misinterpretation of fiduciary duty, the ownership structure of a 
company, and dispersed ownership. These factors are all discussed in turn in the sections 
that follow. 
Short-Termism 
Two opposing views of institutional investors exist in the literature. For lack of a better 
terminology, they can be broadly labelled as monitoring on the one hand, and short-
termism on the other. Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) argue that the large shareholdings 
of institutional investors serve as an incentive for them to gather information and discipline 
management as their potential gains from monitoring the organisation are far greater than 
those of minority owners. Similarly, according to Dobrzynski (1993) and Monks and 
Minow (1995), institutions tend to monitor management with the view of ensuring that a 
company‟s investment strategy reflects the objective of maximising long-term value, as 
opposed to generating short-term gains.  
However, there are those who believe that, in cases when monitoring is costly or time 
consuming, institutional investors would respond to a poor performance by just selling their 
shares instead of engaging in activism (Coffee, 1991; Manconi et al., 2012). The recent 
financial crisis is an example of such behaviour. Callen and Fang (2013) suggest that the 
strategy adopted by many institutional investors in the US is to invest in a large variety of 
different equities in order to diversify risk. However, as many critics claim, by exhibiting 
such trading behaviour, a great number of investors place emphasis on short-term 
performance, causing managers to be concerned that earning decreases in the immediate 
future will lead to stock selling by investors (Graves and Waddock, 1990; Bushee, 2001; 
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Jacobs, 1991). The empirical evidence suggests that such a fixation on trading is 
characteristic of UK equity markets as well. According to a senior member of staff at 
ShareAction: 
Investment portfolios are very high turnover and investors can‟t be bothered to take 
the trouble to have a whole interaction and engagement with a company. They‟d 
rather just think: „Well, if it‟s a big enough problem, then let‟s just not hold that 
company anymore‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013a]. 
The case study analysis has revealed that short-termism can be identified as one of the most 
important factors deterring investors from engaging actively with Shell: 
Investors think they will sell their shares in Shell on time [Fieldwork Interview, 
Amnesty International, 2013]. 
Short-termism, on the part of investors, as a barrier to engagement exists when it comes to 
the tax campaign as well and it is being acknowledged as an issue by both NGOs and some 
investors active in the area of tax justice: 
We are very long-term minded in our approach for many of these companies, but if 
you are a short-term investor, then you would not necessarily think this is an issue 
that you should be engaging with companies on [Fieldwork Interview, Arisaig 
Partners, 2013]. 
However, the problem extends beyond the immediate remits of these particular case studies 
as short-termism is a general characteristic of investor behaviour: 
I used to think that the whole concept of risk ought to be able to bring long-term 
thinking into how financial institutions behave (…).What I have realised is that the 
expectation of the financial institutions is that, as the long-term becomes the short-
term, if they see something very likely to happen in the immediate future, they will 
be able to divest [Fieldwork Interview, Forum for the Future, 2013]. 
Despite the widespread adoption of short-termism in the capital markets, there is evidence 
in the literature which suggests that institutional stewardship in the form of shareholder 
activism has an effect on corporations and enhances shareholder value (Gillan and Starks, 
2000, 2007; Klein and Zur, 2009; Helwege et al., 2012). In a recent study conducted by 
Callen and Fang (2013), the authors evaluate the monitoring versus short-termism 
hypotheses by reference to stock price crash risk. They conclude that stable institutional 
investors who play a monitoring role pre-empt managerial bad news hoarding behaviour, 
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which in turn leads to a reduction in future stock price crash risk. By contrast, short-
termism has an adverse impact on public firms as it increases the risk of stock price crash. 
Transient institutional investor ownership is a barrier to NGO shareholder activist 
campaigns, because it results in shareholders who are less willing to listen to the concerns 
of the third sector, it makes it harder for charities to know who to target from the investor 
community, and it creates a market very much focused on short-term financial performance 
at the expense of wider factors such as the environment and society. In response to the 
problem, some NGOs have already started campaigning on the issue. Examples include 
Forum for the Future and their „Overcoming the Barriers to Long-term Thinking in 
Financial Markets‟ report (Forum for the Future, 2011a), as well as ShareAction‟s „Our 
Money, Our Business‟ report (2013b). The former explains why short-term thinking is a 
problem and proposes steps for tackling it. The latter makes the case that creating short-
term gains through high-risk financial engineering or through discarding the costs of 
environmental damage serves ultimate owners (the pension savers) worse than generating 
sustainable wealth. This type of campaigns target the public policy makers and aim to 
transform the financial system through information provision and advocacy (the reports), 
roundtables with industry leaders, meetings with government officials, and submission of 
responses to government reviews (for example, „The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets 
and Long-Term Decision Making‟ (2012)). 
Fiduciary Duty As A Strategic Barrier  
There is a body of law stating that trustees have a „fiduciary duty‟ – in other words – a legal 
obligation to act in the best interest of the people whose money they are managing 
(beneficiaries). However, it has traditionally been regarded that investors are in breach of 
their fiduciary duty if they consider social, environmental and ethical issues as these are 
thought to undermine investment returns. Acting in the best interests of beneficiaries is 
often taken to mean their best financial interests (Sandberg, 2013). The empirical findings 
substantiate this assertion. As observed in Chapter 6, in 2009, Wandsworth Borough 
Council, one of the local authorities targeted by ActionAid, refused to engage with Vedanta 
stating that the council has a fiduciary duty to obtain the best possible financial return on its 
pension fund investments (see Stewart, 2009). As has been revealed by the empirical 
evidence, investors who, for various reasons, do not wish to engage with a company, use 
the term „fiduciary duty‟ as an excuse not to, posing challenges for campaigning NGOs. 
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Commentators, from both academia and the SRI movement, have struggled to find a way 
around the problem of fiduciary duty. One proposed solution has been to reinterpret 
fiduciary duty by making reference to the financial relevance of social and environmental 
considerations (for a review of the literature on the link between CSP and financial returns, 
see Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003). The report by leading UK law firm Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer (2005) has advocated this view. The paper concludes by refuting the 
proposition that the incorporation of SEE issues in investment decisions does not 
necessarily breach trustees‟ fiduciary duty: „Integrating ESG considerations into an 
investment analysis so as to more reliably predict financial performance is clearly 
permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions‟ (Freshfields, 2005, p.13). 
Proponents of the reinterpretation of fiduciary duty have advanced a second solution – 
focusing on the welfare interests of beneficiaries. For example, Lydenberg (2014) and Joly 
(2002) insist that institutional investors should perform their duties in such a way that they 
attend to the „broader welfare interests of their principals‟ (Joly, 2002, p.294), interests 
such as the state of the natural environment, the cost of healthcare, and the prospects of 
security and peace abroad (Lydenberg, 2014). 
ShareAction has embraced the findings of the Freshfields report, alongside with the 
theoretical ideas mentioned above, and has built a policy campaign centred on lobbying the 
government to introduce statutory clarification of the role of institutional investors. The 
main aim is to ensure that trustees, when deciding on issues such as where to invest or 
whether to engage with a company, are not strictly confined to taking into account only 
financial returns, but they also have the legal right to consider environmental and social 
impacts as long as they are in the best interest of savers (ShareAction, 2012d). The 
organisation is trying to achieve its campaign aims through research (two reports on the 
issue published to date – „Protecting our Best Interests: Rediscovering Fiduciary 
Obligation‟ (2011b) and „The Enlightened Shareholder: Clarifying Investors‟ Fiduciary 
Duties‟ (2012d)) and advocacy (attending Party Conferences, holding roundtables with 
ministers, lobbying key policy figures, responding to consultations). Professor Kay‟s 
review of UK equity markets took on board ShareAction‟s concern that the inadequate 
interpretation of fiduciary duties hinders responsible investment and recommended that a 
Law Commission review be carried out. The report summarising the findings of the Law 
Commission confirmed that fiduciaries are free to consider all factors that influence the 
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financial performance of a firm, but denied there is a need for statutory codification of this 
principle (The Law Commission, 2014). 
The Tax Justice Network has also done work on fiduciary duties in relation to the tax 
campaign. In 2013, they commissioned legal firm Farrer and Co to advise whether failure 
to engage in tax avoidance constitutes a breach of fiduciary duties. The legal assessment 
states: „The proposition that there might be a strictly fiduciary duty to avoid tax is wholly 
misconceived‟ (Farrer and Co, 2013).  The Tax Justice Network also dispatched a copy of 
the legal opinion to the CEO of every FTSE 100 company (Macalister, 2013). 
However, Sandberg (2013) contends that none of the two above mentioned solutions for 
reinterpreting fiduciary duty with a view of justifying shareholder engagement would work.  
Relying on the results of a comprehensive study by Margolis et al. (2009) which compares 
192 statements in 167 previous papers on the link between CSP and corporate financial 
performance (CFP, hereafter)
87
, Sandberg (2013) argues that, in the majority of cases, there 
is no clear evidence that social and environmental considerations have financial relevance. 
The author concludes by stating that, although according to the justification proposed by 
the Freshfields report some pension funds may be allowed to act based on social and 
environmental  considerations under certain circumstances, they have no lawful right to do 
so continuously and, therefore, will not embrace wholeheartedly SRI and shareholder 
activism. Sandberg (2013) continues by claiming that the beneficiaries‟ welfare thesis is 
flawed due to the heterogeneity of beneficiaries who all have different welfare needs and 
due to the fact that doing the right thing will not always be in the interests of pension fund 
members. Based on these criticisms, it can be concluded that, although necessary, a legal 
clarification of fiduciary duties alone may not be sufficient for encouraging shareholder 
activism. What follows is a discussion of the implications that the ownership structure of a 
company and its dispersed shareholder base can have for NGO shareholder activism. 
The Ownership Structure of A Company 
A significant majority of interviewees have cited the ownership structure of Vedanta as a 
major challenge for the campaign. Vedanta has a dominant shareholder – fifty one per cent 
of the company is owned by the Agarwal family. As such, Anil Agarwal – its founder, acts 
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studies found no statistically significant relationship between CSP and CFP (Margolis et al., 2009). 
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as Chairman and „the views and values of that family do govern the firm‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, Aviva, 2013]. This meant that, as mentioned before, it was difficult for both 
NGOs and investors to engage with the company. Having Mr. Anil Agarwal as a majority 
shareholder also played a role in Vedanta‟s resistance to change and the company‟s 
propensity to deny allegations of wrongdoing: 
They were so so unconcerned and so unmoved by any social, environmental, or 
human rights issue. That family was in no way, shape, or form inclined to really pay 
attention to what the Kondh
88
 were saying or what NGOs were saying and so that 
was the brick wall [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013b]. 
The biggest challenge was the lack of appetite from the company for dialogue with 
minority shareholders and the lack of appetite of the company to change [Fieldwork 
Interview, Church of England, 2013]. 
In a study that investigates the impact of controlling owners
89
 on CSR, Rees and Rodionova 
(2013) suggests that rather than institutions, which are attracting greatest attention in terms 
of responsible investment, other types of owners such as families have a stronger negative 
impact on CSR projects as they are found to actively oppose those. Similarly, Mackenzie 
and Rees (2011) analyse the FTSE4Good CSR scores of 1,825 firms in 25 countries and 
hypothesise that CSR imposes costs on the firm‟s owners. Their findings reveal that firms 
with controlling employee/family groups (who hold more than 10 per cent of the shares) 
perform significantly worse in a number of indicators such as corporate governance, 
environmental management and human rights. Overall, the impact of entrenched ownership 
is regarded as being strongly and significantly negative. The results are consistent with the 
current study‟s findings which demonstrate that the excessive influence of one family has 
had forestalling effects on the campaigning efforts of both NGOs and investors. 
It should be noted that the governance structure of Vedanta is very typical for India where 
family owned companies are more common. However, interviewees spoken to in the course 
of this research seemed to regard it as somewhat peculiar for the UK context. This goes to 
show that factors such as the corporate governance system and the legal environment within 
a country can bear a great impact on shareholder engagement. Corporate governance can be 
defined as „the structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a stake in the 
firm‟ (Aoki, 2001, p.11). The Anglo-American model of corporate governance (the UK 
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being an example of a country that adopts it), is often contrasted to the Continental 
European corporate governance model (Becht and Roell, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001, La 
Porta et al., 1998). The former is depicted in terms of financing through equity, active 
markets for corporate control and dispersed ownership, while the latter in terms of long-
term debt finance, weak markets for corporate control and concentrated ownership by large 
block-holders. Goergen (2007) reports that only about two per cent of listed US and UK 
companies have a majority shareholder compared to Australian, German and Italian firms 
where the percentage is 68, 64 and 54, respectively. 
The case study suggests that the stark divergence in norms and culture is not only evident 
when we compare the Anglo-American and Continental models, but also when we look at 
UK and Indian companies. Therefore, for UK investors and NGOs, who are accustomed to 
engaging with UK companies, Vedanta‟s ownership structure and culture posed a 
challenge.  Despite these problems, the campaign against Vedanta was very successful and 
paradoxically, the reason behind this success can be partly explained by the company‟s 
cultural and corporate governance differences. These differences stirred investor action 
against the company and made shareholders sympathetic to listening to the arguments of 
NGOs. 
Dispersed Ownership  
As mentioned above, dispersed ownership is one of the characteristics of the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance. Drawing on the idea of resource dependency as a 
critical lever of power, Useem (1993) argues that the greater the reliance of company A on 
the resources of organisation B, the greater the power of B over A. Therefore, in a situation 
of dispersed ownership, there are so many shareholders that the corporation is dependent on 
no one in particular.  
Bakan (2005) explains how large publicly traded corporations came into being at the end of 
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century when New Jersey and Delaware 
sought to attract business by removing unpopular restrictions from their corporate laws.
90
 
This resulted in the absorption of a considerable number of small and medium-sized 
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specified purposes, to exist for limited periods of time, to operate in particular locations, and loosened 
controls on mergers and acquisitions. 
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corporations into a relatively few big ones, each owned by many shareholders. Bakan 
(2005) argues that, in these large corporations, the thousands, or even hundreds of 
thousands of shareholders, have little influence and control over managerial decisions. As 
individuals, their power is diluted and their broad dispersion also precludes them from 
acting collectively. The latter statement is substantiated by the empirical findings of the 
study – for example, the problem of finding a common ground when engaging with 
Vedanta Resources as part of a broader investor coalition was discussed in Chapter 10, 
Section 10.1. 
Similarly to any other company in the UK, minority shareholders in Vedanta hold only a 
fraction of the total shares. Consequently, dispersed ownership can pose other hurdles, 
apart from problems with collective action, to both campaigning NGOs and engaged 
investors.  For example, in the Vedanta case, securing the support of a large number of 
dispersed investors for tabling a resolution has proven a more challenging endeavour and 
Aviva chose the AGM as a preferred option for expressing its discontent. Furthermore, 
shareholders in Vedanta confessed that the effect they could have had on the company has 
been diminished by their small amounts of shareholdings: 
But  we as minority shareholders, even if we come together with all the other 
shareholders, we can only own a third of the company or thereabouts. So there‟s 
that challenge [Fieldwork Interview, Aviva, 2013]. 
The level of share dispersal at Shell also emphasises the challenges associated with 
minority control: 
Investors also always tell us that, while they speak with Shell, they are, even as a 
big investor, just small investor from the viewpoint of Shell. It‟s difficult to find 
enough shareholders to really have an impact on Shell, because the company has so 
many shareholders in many different countries [Fieldwork Interview, FoE 
Netherlands, 2013]. 
In summary, the phenomenon of dispersed ownership has implications for NGO 
shareholder activism as it dilutes the influence of shareholders and makes it more difficult 
for the voluntary sector to organise a critical mass of owners who can trigger change. 
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11.3. Discussion 
At first sight, the findings in this chapter might give the impression of shareholder activism 
as a rather ineffectual exercise. Here the question, at a philosophical level, revolves around 
how does one judge success and what constitutes success. In attempting to tackle these 
questions, the academic literature tends to be very goal-orientated and, while there are a lot 
of NGO shareholder campaigns running at any given time, evidence of success in terms of 
ultimate achievement of desired outcomes is often not apparent. Such academic scepticism, 
demonstrated more often than not, towards the ability of third sector organisations to effect 
change in corporate behaviour, has been met with an ever more growing uptake of 
shareholder activism as a tactic. The situation can be metaphorically compared to 
Gramsci‟s (1978) famous remark – „pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will‟. 
Harvey (2000) argues that precisely the inability to find an „optimism of the intellect‟ has 
become a powerful inhibitor to action and a serious barrier to progressive politics. He calls 
for a reinvention of the phrase in such a way as to „seek an optimism of the intellect that, 
properly coupled with an optimism of the will, might produce a better future … and open 
up ways of thinking that have for too long remained foreclosed‟ (p.17). According to one 
staff member of a large charitable foundation, academia has a role to play in encouraging 
investors to recognise the benefits of taking a long-term responsible approach to their 
shareholdings: 
My sense is academia hasn‟t really embraced responsible investment as a way 
forward and sometimes I am not sure that the academia or some of the academics 
are the best advocates for responsible investment. I think that there could be a lot 
more work done in terms of supporting the arguments for responsible investment 
from a financial perspective [Fieldwork Interview, Joseph Rowntree Charitable 
Trust, 2013]. 
Despite its many challenges (some of which are being tackled by NGOs which run 
campaigns aimed at changing the regulatory and cultural environment), a more practical 
way of thinking about shareholder activism is to perceive it as a form of delayed 
gratification in the sense of delayed achievement of goals. As has been previously 
discussed in the introduction, an effective shareholder activist campaign takes a long time 
to be realised due to the need for building strong, long-term relationships with the investor 
community and the need for sustaining pressure over an extended period. Before this can 
happen, the NGO community needs to fully realise and embrace the enormous potential of 
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share activism – a process which, judging by the increased use of the tactic throughout the 
past decade (see Chapter 4), is already underway, albeit uncompleted.  
Another important point to mention is that, even when a campaign such as the one against 
Shell seems quite ineffective overall, there are still changes being implemented as a result 
of it – albeit small and incremental, they do alter the world as we know it in a positive way. 
And here comes a philosophical dilemma – should activism be discarded as ineffective due 
to its inability to, at times, lead to the predefined goals, or should we account for the fact 
that, even when it results in small changes, it still makes the world a better place than it 
would have been if engagement did not exist at all? The study argues for the adoption of 
the latter perspective, suggesting that shareholder activism is about delayed gratification 
and the achievement of incremental change as opposed to meeting short-term campaign 
objectives. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored two important issues. To begin with, it has compared and 
contrasted the three case studies, evaluating their impact on the investor community and the 
targeted companies. It has been revealed that the campaigning NGOs have played a crucial 
role in alerting investors to the problem, inciting them to act, providing them with up-to-
date relevant information, and helping them to maximise the media impact of divestment. 
However, there are certain strategic mistakes encountered in both the Niger Delta and 
Vedanta campaigns, stemming from the sometimes inflexible positions adopted by NGOs. 
The interventions have led to changes in corporate behaviour when it comes to both Shell 
and Vedanta, albeit more actions are needed for a discernible impact on the ground. The tax 
campaign has also seen mixed results, with some companies becoming leaders in 
responsible tax practices, while others resisting change. Overall, the Vedanta campaign is 
deemed as being more successful than the campaign against Shell as it has resulted in the 
realisation of campaign objectives. The tax campaign, on the other hand, is in its infancy 
and it is still early to make overarching conclusions about its impact. 
Second, the chapter has examined the main external challenges to shareholder activism 
encountered in each of the three campaigns and has grouped them into four themes. It has 
been discovered that short-term attitude among investors, a narrow focus on equating 
fiduciary duties with maximising returns, an ownership structure characterised by one 
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controlling family, and dispersed ownership of corporations, are all conditions which 
diminish the ability of NGOs to run successful shareholder activist campaigns. 
Finally, the chapter has provided a more nuanced interpretation of the answer to the 
philosophical question „What is understood by success?‟. It has been argued that what is 
lacking in academic writing is an optimism of the intellect which can shift opinions in the 
NGO and investor worlds and can open new avenues for shareholder activism. Often 
hastily dismissed as ineffective, shareholder activism needs to be regarded as a form of 
delayed gratification. The Vedanta campaign has resulted in a successful outcome 
following years of campaigning and the tax campaign, although in its nascence, is already 
showing signs of favourable outcomes. The important point to consider is that small and 
incremental changes should not be neglected as they still make a difference. 
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12. Internal Challenges and Campaigning for Change 
…the power of large corporations is far from unchecked. At the very 
heart of organisational life is the ongoing struggle between those in 
the corporation who seek to assert power and those who seek to 
resist and perhaps destroy this power.  
 (Fleming and Spicer, 2007, p.3) 
To begin with, this chapter explores the internal challenges faced by third sector 
organisations and groups them into two broad categories – organisational impediments (to 
do with the characteristics of an NGO) and strategic impediments (relate to the strategic 
choices made by NGOs). Six main organisational and strategic impediments are identified: 
insufficient resources, internal inconsistency, unrealistic expectations, short-termism, the 
potentially negative consequences of relying on an instrumental case for action, and lack of 
collaboration (this point about lack of collaboration is specifically discussed in Chapter 5). 
These challenges are ranked and discussed according to their importance, starting with the 
one that deserves most attention. Second, based on the cross-case analysis and the 
examination of both external and internal challenges to NGO shareholder activism, the 
chapter advances an explanatory theoretical framework, developed with the aim of 
highlighting the causal mechanisms at play in the researched campaigns. When explaining 
the effectiveness of a campaign, two set of factors are considered and depicted in the 
framework – namely – NGO factors (for example, approach to engagement, behaviour at 
AGMs, level of resources) and campaign-specific factors (for example, the nature of 
campaign issue, the type of campaign and others). Finally, since campaigns do not unfold 
in a vacuum, the influence that the broader economic and political environment can have on 
them is briefly discussed.   
12.1. Organisational Impediments 
What makes the exploration of internal challenges worthwhile is the fact that they are 
within the control of the campaigning organisations and, as such, NGOs can take steps to 
address them. Academic analysis of social movements often considers the internal 
characteristics of the movement itself, such as the structure of the organisation, its tactics 
and strategies, the use of collective action frames, and the level of resources, when 
evaluating the outcomes of a particular campaign (Soule, 2009). For example, Gamson 
(1975) analysed a historical sample of challenging groups active between 1800 and 1945 in 
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order to identify factors contributing to movement success or failure and concluded that a 
movement‟s choice of tactics, goals and organisation all had a significant effect on the 
probability of success (see also McCarthy and Zald, 1987). The empirical findings of the 
current study reveal that the effectiveness of a shareholder activist campaign is greatly 
diminished in the presence of three organisational impediments: insufficient resources, 
internal inconsistency, and unrealistic expectations. These factors are discussed in turn in 
this section.  
Insufficient Resources  
To begin with, as has been discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.5., when campaigning, NGOs 
have tended to dedicate insufficient financial resources, staff and time to their shareholder 
activist endeavours. Money, along with human time and effort, are the most widely 
appreciated kinds of resources available to collective actors (Snow et al., 2004) and 
precisely these types of resources lie at the heart of the analysis presented here. 
Contemporary analysts of social movements (see Zald, 1992; Cress and Snow, 1996) are 
unanimous in their view that the first and foremost precondition associated with the 
enhanced likelihood of collective action and success is resource availability. 
Although the topic of NGO resource allocation for CM campaigning has been scarcely 
explored in the academic literature, there are studies which reveal a similar lack of adequate 
resources when it comes to other campaigns. For example, analysing the case study of 
Friends of the Earth‟s opposition against the operations of Freeport – McMoRan Copper 
and Gold, Emel (2002) reports that only one person, Michele Chan-Fishel, ran the 
campaign for FoE. The paper argues that shareholder activist strategies put an enormous 
strain on the scarce resources of NGOs and such tactics can only be expanded as a result of 
a considerable increase in the capacity of the NGO community. Fitzduff and Church (2004) 
stress the importance of securing sufficient resources as their scarcity creates numerous 
problems such as frustration and demoralisation of personnel, missed opportunities and 
negative impact on the overall dynamic of the campaign.  
For small NGOs which are poorly funded, the need to prioritise limited resources means 
that a strategic decision to restrict aspects of activity such as shareholder activism is 
understandable. However, even big organisations such as Greenpeace and WWF have 
refrained from dedicating cash and capacity to shareholder activist tactics. Respondents to 
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the present study – such as an interviewee at ChristianAid – confirmed that it was difficult 
to gain internal support from within the organisation for the idea of using the AGM as a 
central tactic of the corporate tax campaign:  
The challenge was getting internal buy in for something that basically you are going 
to a room to ask a Chairman a question about tax and for some people internally 
they found that quite difficult. (…) Being a big organisation and having to manage 
risks, that‟s what it was really. I‟ve done a lot of lobbying work internally to get 
people to see how incredibly valuable this project is [Fieldwork Interview, 
ChristianAid, 2013]. 
The quote suggests that the value of the AGM as a powerful device for getting access to 
and initiating a dialogue with company directors had not been widely recognised, despite 
the already established successes of previous campaigns such as the „Living Wage‟ 
campaign (see Ivanova, 2012) which have relied almost exclusively on the AGM tactic. 
One could go as far as to argue that the value of shareholder activism itself as a 
campaigning tactic has not been acknowledged by large international NGOs. However, 
considering the external challenges discussed in the previous section, it could be concluded 
that there are huge pressures against all third sector organisations engaging in shareholder 
activism. Therefore, the fact that they are not investing enough resources in the tactic 
should always be considered in the context of the numerous setbacks they face. It can be 
argued that the odds against NGOs are so great that they need a „repertoire of opposition‟ 
(Tarrow, 2001). The possibility that not engaging in more shareholder activism is a rational 
decision on the part of campaigning organisations should be considered.  
Internal Inconsistency 
Second, it is hard to deny that nothing tarnishes more the reputation of an NGO and, most 
importantly, the credibility of its campaign, than the realisation that the charities‟ internal 
procedures and behaviour are at odds with its ethos and campaign demands. As an example, 
in 2013, at a time when media and public attention was fixated on high executive pay in the 
UK and when NGOs such as the Fair Pay Network, Oxfam, ShareAction, and the High Pay 
Commission were campaigning against excessive executive compensation, the NGO 
community‟s pay practices at the top were exposed and criticised in the media (see Hope, 
2013; Jennings, 2013). As the empirical data suggests, inconsistencies also occur when the 
investment strategy of the NGO is at odds with its campaigns and policy work: 
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Often charities and NGOs are made up of the mission side of the business that does 
all of the good work, then the administration and finance side of the initiative, and a 
lot of the time they don‟t talk to each other. What you can find is that someone from 
the mission side of the charity is saying that something in particular is immoral and 
then you will find that the finance side of the charity has actually invested in that 
thing, which creates this contradiction between what the charity is trying to achieve, 
and what the charity is doing with its money. There are lots and lots of examples of 
issues where charities have caused themselves embarrassment, because they are 
invested in things that they shouldn‟t have been when you take into account the 
mission of the organisation [Fieldwork Interview, CCLA, 2013]. 
However, the data implies that there is huge potential for those charities which manage to 
harmonise the actions of their different departments and to draw upon the capital market 
expertise of financial professionals within the organisation: 
It‟s much more productive to be able to have that holistic conversation between 
what the charity is trying to achieve and what the investments are there to do and 
make sure the two are together. The charities that are doing that are the most leading 
organisations, they are few and far between but really special [Fieldwork Interview, 
CCLA, 2013]. 
We have all the policy staff that just use the money that comes out of the finance 
team and all the finance team that helped do the fundraising, but they never really 
look together and say: „Ok, how do we use your knowledge of finance to help move 
our programmes further forwards?‟. So I think there is an internal consistency 
question within many NGOs [Fieldwork Interview, Aviva, 2013]. 
The existence of internal inconsistency cannot only result in what could have been an easily 
avoided undermining of campaign efforts, but it is a missed opportunity for the NGO to put 
its pension savings or equity investments to good use by gaining more leverage via talking 
to companies and pension funds as an investor (see Chapter 9, Section 9.3.). 
Unrealistic Expectations 
Third, a number of interviewees have expressed concern that the NGO-investor relationship 
is being damaged by the lack of consensus about what constitutes a successful engagement 
with a company: 
Most investors‟ definition of what success means is very different from what an 
NGO might see as success. A lot of investors believe that success in terms of 
engagement, is achieving a good conversation with the company and, if they are 
having a good conversation and are able to make their feelings or concerns known, 
then that gets the big tick and they have succeeded, irrespective of whether or not 
there is any change, whereas from an NGO's point of view, that's nothing 
[Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2014]. 
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According to Logsdon and Van Buren (2009), as a method of engagement, the dialogue 
between a shareholder activist group and a company is more nuanced and predicated upon a 
willingness to seek incremental change, without which the dialogue will end. The authors 
suggest that dialogue plays a crucial role in changing corporate policies and practices. 
Although this shareholder activist strategy has not received much attention in the academic 
literature, some authors argue that, in many cases, dialogue and collaboration can prove to 
be more effective than confrontation for achieving activist goals (see Calton and Lad, 1995 
and Calton and Payne, 2003). The dissonance in views stems from a robust debate among 
shareholder activists with regard to dialogue. Logsdon and Van Buren (2009) argue that, 
while some activists (in this case the NGOs) believe that a more confrontational approach is 
more likely to lead to long-term change, others (in this case investors) are in favour of a 
more incremental approach, which makes use of dialogue as a tool for pushing some 
companies to change their behaviour. 
The reluctance of some NGOs to adopt a more conciliatory approach could stem from their 
fear of becoming captured or incorporated by the other negotiating party. However, the 
main argument here is that, in the context of shareholder activism and engagement with 
investors, my research suggests that an oppositional approach would not necessarily 
achieve the desired results. In order for NGOs to retain their credibility with their 
supporters, it is important that their actions are driven by an underlying moral imperative to 
initiate change. However, this does not preclude the possibility of them being more flexible 
and nuanced in their approach to investors because, as has been suggested earlier in the 
present study, those campaigning organisations who talk on the market‟s terms are more 
likely to be successful with their shareholder activist tactics. 
The reason behind the investor preference in relying on the dialogue tactic has been 
discussed in Chapter 9, Section 9.2. This tendency has been attributed to the culture of UK 
shareholders which favours behind-the-scenes intervention as opposed to more 
confrontational and public action. However, the empirical data reveals another crucial 
factor driving this tendency – namely – the existence of the British „establishment‟, or what 
Useem (1984) labels „the inner circle‟91:  
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 Useem (1984, p. 13) defines the „establishment‟ as: „a social network of established wealthy families, 
sharing a distinct culture, occupying a common social status, and unified through inter-marriage and common 
experience in exclusive settings, ranging from boarding schools to private clubs‟.  
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Many large investors in the UK are themselves a part of the establishment and are 
therefore much less willing to be critical of a company like Shell than they would be 
of Vedanta [Fieldwork Interview, Amnesty International, 2013]. 
The findings suggest, however, that NGOs need to be cautious when it comes to the 
demands they put forward to shareholders. Having very high expectations can jeopardise an 
NGO‟s intent to leverage the power of institutional shareholders invested in a targeted 
company, because they will be more reluctant to engage, as one interviewee explains: 
There is an incredible frustration between NGOs and investors. There is a sense that 
the most passionate people sometimes are the most demoralising people, because no 
matter what you do for them, because their standards are so high, you can never 
achieve that. And that gives you the sense of „Why do I even bother?‟. That can 
come down to some of the frustration between investors and NGOs – that NGOs 
think investors are looking for excuses and not doing enough and investors feel that 
no matter what they do, NGOs won‟t be happy, because it‟s not got to where they 
want to be. It is about having that realism and understanding what is a genuine effort 
and trying to realise that anything is better than nothing [Fieldwork Interview, 
CCLA, 2013]. 
McCabe‟s (2000) paper, which analyses four shareholder resolutions reported by the IRRC 
regarding international workplace and labour standards, emphasises the importance of 
having realistic expectations for the ultimate achievement of campaign goals. Relying on 
direct quotes from the resolutions to exemplify his findings, McCabe (2000) concludes that 
activists‟ demands are often discarded by the executive board, because they call for 
multinational companies to have complex HRM policies investigated and reported back to 
shareholders in a short-period of time. 
12.2. Strategic Impediments 
Apart from organisational challenges, NGOs also face strategic impediments to do with the 
campaign choices they make. Three main strategic impediments to NGO shareholder 
activist campaigns can be identified. These are: short-term attitude towards campaigning, 
the limits of using an instrumental case for action, and lack of collaboration between civil 
society organisations. 
Short-Termism  
It is interesting to note that, while NGOs often campaign against, or simply criticise the 
short-term attitude to investment adopted by many shareholders, they fail to realise that 
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they too inadvertently fall prey to the same behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 6, Section 
6.5., NGOs have tended to adopt a short-term approach to their shareholder activist 
strategies, focusing on merely delivering a message to the investor community, as opposed 
to engaging in dialogue and proposing long lasting solutions. When it comes to the Vedanta 
campaign, the chapter has identified inefficiencies in the NGO-investor engagement 
process, which have led to one investor deciding to discriminate between NGOs with which 
it is worthwhile to have a sustained dialogue and those with which it is not. Furthermore, 
the empirical data has revealed that, across the board, charities, for a variety of reasons (see 
Chapter 6 for possible explanations), are often reluctant to invest the time necessary to 
understand the capital markets and develop relationships with fund managers and 
institutional investors. In addition, the chronology (see Chapter 4) shows that the majority 
of NGO capital markets interventions have been in the form of short-term instrumental use 
of shareholder activism for corporate campaigning. Such results are similar to the situation 
a decade earlier, as revealed by Waygood‟s (2006) chronology. However, there is evidence 
of things starting to change, with campaigns aimed at long lasting public policy change 
growing in popularity.   
Based on the data from the two subsections on short-termism and lack of resources, it could 
be concluded that NGOs tend to treat shareholder activism as an add-on to pre-existing 
campaigns, without giving due consideration to the possibility of developing the 
relationships and the networks that are absolutely essential for long-term change
92
. If things 
are to change for the better, third sector organisations should reconsider the way they 
perceive shareholder activism and the way they use the tactic. Numerous success stories 
have shown that shareholder activism, as a tool in the arsenal of NGOs‟ campaigning 
strategies, holds great potential. However, the third sector community needs to first 
recognise and embrace this potential. It then needs to dedicate more resources to it, be 
prepared to sustain engagement with investors and build relationships over a long term, and 
finally let it occupy an honorary place in the repertoire of strategies, alongside the well-
known boycotts, stunts and demonstrations. 
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 ShareAction is a pioneer in this area and has developed long lasting relationships with the investor 
community. Due to its expertise, it is treated with enormous respect by both the investor community and other 
campaigning NGOs. Its relational approach to engagement has delivered some notable successes, including: 
the Patents v. Patients successful campaign against Novartis, 19 FTSE 100 companies committed to paying all 
their workers the living wage, Shell announcing that it will „pause‟ its Arctic drilling operations for 2013, 
overwhelming shareholder support for a climate change resolution at BP‟s 2015 AGM, among others. 
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The Paradoxical Limits of the Instrumental Case  
Waygood (2006) has criticised the overreliance of NGOs on stripping an issue of its moral 
dimension and transforming it into a financial matter as this signals to companies that they 
only have to rectify ills when it is in their best interests to do so. However, the current case 
study findings have so far refuted Waygood‟s assertion and instead suggest that business 
case arguments are quintessential for moving mainstream powerful investors who will most 
certainly not be persuaded to take action based on the moral story. Gifford‟s (2010) study,  
which examines the factors that enhance shareholder salience, confirms this idea by 
concluding that a strong business case is one of the two most important contributors to 
salience. An increased use of business case arguments by NGOs over the last decade (see 
the chronology in Chapter 4) demonstrates that NGOs have realised the power that this 
tactic can yield.  
However, Sullivan (2003) suggests that getting human rights onto the business agenda may, 
in the long-term, result in weakening of the moral force of NGOs‟ arguments and in an 
altogether reduced likelihood that corporations would address human rights concerns as 
these are seen as part of a cost-benefit calculus. What is more, Sjostrom (2007) expresses 
concern that third sector organisations may find themselves confined to addressing only 
SEE issues that can be translated into profitability risks at the expense of other moral issues 
that do not have a financial dimension. 
The case studies in this paper refute Sjostrom‟s (2007) assertion and reveal that NGOs still 
campaign on SEE issues which do not pose clear financial risks for investors. To take an 
example with the Niger Delta campaign, the voluntary sector has experienced difficulties in 
persuading investors to engage as it has resulted problematic to highlight the business case 
for action:  
It hasn‟t really affected Shell financially so the Niger Delta isn‟t a priority issue for 
mainstream investors who are really busy [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 
2013b]. 
When an issue does not pose a straightforward financial risk, NGOs can attempt to incur 
damage on the company‟s reputation as a proxy way of diminishing share prices, or they 
can mobilise pension savers to write to their pension funds asking them to take action. 
However, as observed by a commentator from Greenpeace, even this method has failed:  
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Fundamentally, what happens in Africa to Africans, if it doesn‟t have a significant 
effect financially on shareholders around the world – it has no leverage. And Shell 
has done a very good job at limiting the reputational impact which has therefore 
isolated the economic impact and so they have basically been able to work through 
the challenges they face there [Fieldwork Interview, Greenpeace, 2013]. 
Similarly, gaining the support of investors in relation to the tax campaign has proven more 
difficult compared to other ESG issues because of the general perception among the 
investor community that clever tax practices equate with more profit for the company and 
more dividends for shareholders. Although NGOs have started emphasising the various 
advantages of an enlightened approach to tax, all while warning against the consequences 
of tax avoidance (see Chapter 5), shareholders initially were reluctant to embrace a view 
that goes beyond the simple maxim that less tax equals more dividends:  
Many investors merely see tax as something that companies pay and there has been 
a discussion about the fact that you maximise profits and minimise tax in the 
interest of your shareholders [Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2013]. 
It‟s a problematic issue for investors because, arguably, it is in investors‟ interests 
that companies minimise their tax payments [Fieldwork Interview, Scottish Widows 
Investment Partnership, 2013]. 
Therefore, if an investor was to engage with a company on the issue, it would be more 
difficult to talk using the rhetoric of business risk.  Apart from the lack of a financial 
incentive to act, there was another hindrance to investor engagement – namely – a lack of 
investor expertise in tax matters, which hinders their communication with companies: 
Shareholders felt that tax was very, very complicated, that they weren‟t experts in 
neither tax planning, nor accountancy and therefore if they raised questions, they 
might get back an answer that they wouldn‟t be able to rebut because of its 
complexity and mathematical basis [Fieldwork Interview, ShareAction, 2013b]. 
Both mainstream investors and SRI investors are reported to be facing this problem: 
One of the biggest challenges in terms of investors who work in the SRI space is 
that tax is quite a technical and complicated issue in comparison to some other SRI 
issues. So often the teams that are responsible for ethical investment engagement 
and screening are not tax specialists, feel a bit uncertain about engaging with 
companies on tax [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013c]. 
What renders making the business case for action when it comes to the tax campaign 
challenging, is the fact that tax planning is very much embedded within the business 
models of many MNCs. As one interviewee actively involved in the campaign explains: 
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We have always seen tax as an issue that is very difficult to get rapid and sustained 
behaviour change out of companies. This might be because it is a more fundamental 
part of many companies‟ business models than say human rights and labour in the 
supply chain, or environmental issues. (…) We are talking about a set of behaviours 
that is core business practice for almost all companies and for that reason it‟s very 
difficult to split the pack when everybody is doing it and the opportunity costs of 
doing it don‟t seem to be very high [Fieldwork Interview, ActionAid, 2013c].  
Any realistic analysis of the outcomes achieved by a campaign has to consider the 
campaign goal and position it in the context of a company‟s business model. For example, 
it will be unrealistic to expect a tobacco company to stop selling cigarettes or an arms 
company to stop producing weapons – these asks are at odds with their core business 
strategy. Therefore, whilst NGOs certainly campaign against companies when the financial 
motive for action is not so clear, the case studies reveal the limits of making an 
instrumental case for shareholder activism in cases when company profitability is not 
affected by its moral wrongdoings (the Niger Delta campaign) and when the campaign 
topic contradicts the core business model of an organisation (the tax case study).   
To sum up, the five NGO dependent factors that preclude civil society organisations from 
maximising their impact are: insufficient resources dedicated to shareholder activism, 
internal inconsistency between values and practices, unrealistic expectations, short-term 
approach to investor engagement and campaigning, and the limitations of the instrumental 
case for action noticeable under certain circumstances. We can add to these a very crucial 
sixth challenge discussed in earlier chapters (see Chapter 5) which relates to the lack of 
collaboration between the voluntary sector when it comes to campaigns – many 
organisations often campaign on the same issue, but have their own agenda, communicating 
divergent demands to investors and companies. The empirical data suggests that they are 
also missing an opportunity in not making use of one another‟s vast pool of supporters 
when launching an e-action tool or a petition. As Edwards and McCarthy (2004) argue, the 
co-optation of social-organisational resources is one of the most effective ways for 
accomplishing mass mobilisation. The idea is to exploit existing relationships with 
organisations that were not formed for specific campaigning purposes, but „whose 
memberships include a large number of adherents who can aid in mobilising their own 
constituents‟ (2004, p.141; see also Gerhards and Rucht (1992)). 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 have explored the external and internal challenges faced by 
NGOs who use shareholder activism as a campaign tactic. The following section draws on 
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the insights discussed so far and creates a theoretical model which aims to shed light on 
how can third sector organisations overcome these challenges and maximise their campaign 
impact.  
12.3. Building A Theoretical Model That Explains Campaign 
Effectiveness 
To this date, numerous empirical studies have made a passing reference to one or two 
issues which, based on research observations, have served to enhance the influence of 
campaigners vis-a-vis companies. However, the literature on shareholder activism has made 
no attempt to systematically analyse and consolidate the factors which explain campaign 
effectiveness. The current section aims to expand the knowledge in this area by 
summarising and grouping all the insights discussed previously in the thesis to create a 
theoretical model aimed at shedding light on the factors which have contributed to a 
successful intervention when it comes to the case studies. The model (see Figure 12 below) 
comprises of two sets of factors – namely – issues to do with the NGO‟s strategy and issues 
related to the nature of the campaign. 
Figure 12: The Effect of Different Factors on the Overall Impact of A Campaign 
 
NGO 
Factors 
•Approach to engagement with 
investors 
•Level of resources and time 
dedicated to a campaign 
•  Flexibility 
•Behaviour at AGMs 
•Being solution-oriented as 
opposed to just flaging up issues 
Campaign-
Specific 
Factors 
•Nature of issue 
•Proactive V. reactive campaign 
•Nature of arguments 
•Employing diverse strategies 
•Media Interest 
•Public Interest 
Campaign Impact 
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To begin with, if the first set of factors is considered, the framework suggests that the 
approach to engagement with investors adopted by the campaigning civil society 
organisations has an effect on the ultimate success of the interventions. Both investors and 
some members of NGOs felt that a relational, long-term approach to engagement would 
yield better results than a sporadic, short-term interaction. At the same time, the higher 
level of resources and time dedicated to a specific campaign were also associated with 
improved chances of success. These results are substantiated by a study which analyses the 
attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency to determine those factors that enhance 
shareholder salience (see Gifford, 2010). Gifford (2010) argues that a high level of intensity 
in the engagement process, characterised by a high degree of persistence (with actors 
engaging with companies over a number of years) and by significant resources dedicated to 
the engagement process (most notably in the form of staff time), is associated with 
enhanced shareholder salience.  
Second, the flexibility of NGOs, in terms of their readiness to change their strategy and to 
adopt a more nuanced view regarding the problem at hand, is also an important factor in 
securing success (see analysis of the Niger Delta case study). Van Cranenburgh et al.‟s 
(2013) paper, which presents findings from a longitudinal case of managerial responses to 
NGO social activism targeted at Heineken
93
, showcases how an entrenched position on the 
part of the campaigning organisation can stall both the dialogue with the company and the 
overall development of the campaign. The authors argue that, driven by activist pressure, 
Heineken sough to promote field level change involving multiple other competitors as it 
thought that the problem was stemming from the field and societal levels. However, the 
focus of the campaigning NGO Sirchesi was not changed as a result of these actions and 
Heineken remained the main campaign target. The ultimate outcome was that company and 
NGO diverged more and more from each other in terms of the way they framed and 
responded to the issues. A similar process can be observed if the campaign against Shell is 
considered (see Chapter 10, Section 10.1 where it is discussed how NGO and investor 
opinions began to differ significantly following an investor trip to Nigeria organised by 
Shell). Van Cranenburgh et al. (2013) highlight the fact that there are studies on disputes 
between companies and the opponents of infrastructure projects which reveal that, on 
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 Heineken was targeted by the Cambodia-based NGO Sirchesi over the often precarious working conditions 
of beer promoters selling Heineken beer in Cambodia. The main argument was that alcohol over-consumption 
fuelled by competition between promoters of different brands led to serious health risks, including contraction 
of HIV.  
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certain occasions, the activists do not seek to converge on mutually agreed solutions and 
instead become „entrenched‟ (Lewicki et al., 2003). The authors suggest that such a 
phenomenon may occur because the identities of the NGOs are shaped by their opposition 
to the company as a result of considerable time and resources spent on building knowledge 
on the issue and the opponent. 
Furthermore, going back to the model, it has been discovered that the way voluntary 
organisations act at AGMs can have an effect on how they are perceived by the company 
and the investor community – in that sense, there is a need for a higher rate of adoption of 
the „pragmatic‟ approach to AGM attendance (see Chapter 8). The final factor, when it 
comes to NGO strategy, refers to the ability of third sector organisations to propose 
solutions and clear steps that investors need to follow, as opposed to being inclined to just 
flag up an issue they are concerned with. This solution-oriented approach to tackling 
problems is favoured by shareholders and secures their attention much more easily.   
The second category in the model comprises of factors related to the campaign per se which 
also have a significant effect on campaign outcomes. To begin with, the nature of an issue 
is of relevance – the simpler, single issue campaigns such as the living wage, the tax and 
the Vedanta ones have a greater chance of realising their goals. Not without importance is 
also whether the intervention is proactive (i.e. trying to prevent an event from happening, 
much like the building of the mine in Orissa) or reactive (i.e. trying to address and remedy 
a situation which has already happened, for example, the historic oil pollution in the Delta). 
In the latter case, as the research has revealed, the situation is more complicated as activists 
are faced with historic problems and the unwillingness of Shell to address these.  
The nature of arguments put forward by the NGOs is another element of the puzzle and 
evidence suggests that shaping the concerns in financial and business case terms is more 
effective at attracting the attention of investors.  Although the importance of business case 
arguments for enhancing the salience of campaigners has been documented (see Gifford, 
2010), some academics remain sceptical about the potential of this tactic for realising 
campaign goals (see Waygood, 2006, Sullivan, 2003 and Sjostrom, 2007 discussed in 
Chapter 12).  
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What is more, as evidenced by the Vedanta campaign, the use of many diverse strategies 
such as targeting policy makers, the company, investors, and consumers all at the same 
time, increases the overall pressure and the chances of success. One of the main themes in 
Soule‟s (2009) book aims to emphasise the importance for scholars to focus on the full 
repertoire of tactics used by anti-corporate activists, because the tendency in the literature is 
to focus solely on boycotts, or solely on protest, or solely on shareholder resolutions. The 
thesis has gone some way towards addressing this point by looking at a wide range of 
different shareholder activist tactics. 
Finally, the model suggests that campaign effectiveness is maximised when a topic is able 
to attract substantial media and public interest. Various studies from the secondary 
literature confirm the idea that media and public attention are instrumental for realising 
campaign goals. For example, Anderson et al. (2007) discuss a number of shareholder 
resolutions put forward by Australian trade unions. The findings suggest that, although the 
resolutions were not passed, they played a crucial role as they managed to exert influence 
on the targeted companies by drawing public and media attention to the issues that were of 
concern to the unions. In another study conducted by Gifford (2010), the use of the media 
by activists is considered as a strong contributor to shareholder salience as the results reveal 
that companies would take steps to avoid negative publicity. The link between publicity and 
corporate actions is explored by Zyglidopoulos et al. (2012) who investigate the impact of 
media attention on the CSR behaviour of firms and concludes that a heightened media 
awareness of an issue is positively associated with an increase in a firm‟s CSR-strengths 
(the additional benefits that a company provides to its stakeholders beyond those required 
by law). Evidence of the validity of this claim can be found when we consider the Tax 
Justice campaign. As one interviewee explains: 
Generally what you see is those companies who rely on reputation and have had 
adverse publicity have gotten very engaged on this. Companies that have had 
adverse publicity but don‟t really rely on reputation have not really engaged. 
Glencore is a good example – they‟ve had all kinds of questions raised about their 
tax affairs, but the man on the street does not decide: „I am going to buy some stuff 
from Glencore‟, so Glencore‟s approach is „We don‟t really need to get engaged in 
this. The public could think what they like of us, but they are not the ones who buy 
from us, so it doesn‟t really matter‟ [Fieldwork Interview, ChristianAid, 2014b]. 
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The Importance of the Wider Economic and Political Context 
However, despite all the factors summarised above, any discussion of success as seen in the 
three case studies, would be incomplete without a consideration of the impact of the 
broader environment in which the campaigns take place. Probably the most crucial macro-
environmental consideration to be taken into account is the state of the economy at the time 
of a given campaign. The financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent austerity measures 
provided fertile ground for the development of non-environmental related interventions 
such as the tax and high executive pay campaigns. At the same time, the start of the 
recession marked the demise of many other campaigns: 
You always need a bit of luck in campaigning. To win a campaign, you can do 
everything right, but if the timing is wrong or something else happens, there is a 
tsunami, or something financial crisis kind of thing… Trust me, a lot of campaigns 
sunk when the financial crisis hit [Fieldwork Interview, 2013b, ActionAid]. 
Another important macro-environmental factor, commonly cited in the social movement 
literature as shaping the chances of success for mobilising actors, is the political 
environment, or the political opportunity structure. Tarrow (1994, p.85) defines the political 
opportunity structure as the „consistent…dimensions of the political environment that 
provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations 
for success or failure‟. For example, an interviewee from ActionAid argues that, in the case 
of Vedanta, „it was a good time, because my personal belief is that the Supreme Court was 
wanting to try and set an example about India being a modern democracy where the rule of 
law respected the rights of people and not just favoured big companies‟ [Fieldwork 
Interview, 2013b, ActionAid]. In a case study where the Amoco Corporation is faced with a 
coalition of shareholders demanding the adoption of a number of environmental principles, 
Hoffman (1996) also highlights that the probability of a successful shareholder campaign 
depends upon the political environment in which the intervention takes place. At the time 
of the campaign, the political climate was such that some of the NGO‟s demands could be 
expected to be interjected into the policy debate. Seeking to forestall regulation, Amoco 
was prompted to act by establishing internal structural changes and an external programme 
designed to gain broad support for its own initiatives. Similarly, researching the 
prerequisites for shareholder salience, Gifford (2010) concludes that a supportive political 
environment for a certain campaign is a crucial factor. Altogether, the factors explored in 
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this section all make up the model that attempts to explain the conditions under which 
campaigns thrive.  
Conclusion 
Six NGO organisational and strategic impediments have been identified, which impact 
negatively on the realisation of campaign goals – namely – allocation of insufficient 
resources to projects, internal inconsistency between campaign ethos and actual internal 
practices, unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved, a short-term attitude towards 
campaigns, limitations of using business case arguments, and lack of sufficient 
collaboration between organisations. Based on these factors, it could be concluded that, at 
the time of conducting the research, NGOs (with the exception of ShareAction) were using 
shareholder activism as an auxiliary tool for pre-existing, broader campaigns and the tactic 
has not yet occupied its deserved place in the repertoires of contention, alongside well-
established mechanisms such as boycotts, demonstrations and picketing.  
An explanatory theoretical framework is presented, based on the findings from the three 
case studies. The framework consists of two sets of factors – NGO factors, or those which 
relate to the internal characteristics of a third sector organisation, and campaign-specific 
factors. The impact of the broader economic and political environment on campaign 
outcomes has also been analysed. It is hoped that the exploration of the factors that 
contribute to campaign effectiveness in the context of NGO shareholder activism will 
provide additional explanatory power for those striving to improve corporate social and 
environmental performance through leveraging the influence of investors and engaging in 
shareholder activism.    
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13. Conclusion 
When we are trapped by the wellness syndrome, we 
become what Simon Critchley calls passive 
nihilists.‘Rather than acting in the world and trying to 
transform it,’ he explains, ‘the passive nihilist simply 
focuses on himself and his particular pleasures and 
projects for perfecting himself’ (…) instead of forever 
dwelling on our own sickness, we would do better to 
look at and act on the sickness of the world’. 
(Cederstrӧm and Spicer, 2015, p.8, p.135) 
13.1. Main Findings  
What the current study set out to achieve was to explore a relatively new and under-
researched type of NGO strategy – shareholder activism – and to determine whether it 
provides an alternative method for effective corporate campaigning. It was discovered that 
shareholder activism is potentially a very effective tool, which has been underused and 
under resourced by NGOs. 
When evaluating the impact of the interventions (Chapter 10), it was revealed that NGOs 
raised investor awareness of certain issues when it comes to all three case studies, which 
led to an increased investor scrutiny placed on the targeted companies. On certain occasions 
such as, for example, the Vedanta case study, campaigning organisations were directly 
responsible for investors‟ decision to engage with the company in the first instance as 
NGOs alerted shareholders to the existing problems on the ground. Once investors had 
started engaging with the targeted companies, third sector organisations served as a useful 
source of information and advice, as well as a point of additional leverage. When it comes 
to company impact, Shell has increased its transparency and disclosure of information and 
has undertaken steps to reduce gas flaring. Vedanta, in turn, has significantly improved the 
way it deals with investors and NGOs, has introduced new policies addressing EIRIS‟ 
seven recommendations, as well as the Scott Wilson report‟s requirements and has 
committed to respecting the opinion of the Dongria Kondh in relation to the mine. The tax 
campaign has had an impact on company culture which has slowly began to shift as more 
and more companies have started to recognise tax as a risk and to address the problem 
(Chapter 10). All the above mentioned changes in company and investor behaviour suggest 
that NGO shareholder activism has the potential to serve as an effective strategic tool in 
activists‟ campaigns.  
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Despite this potential, the study discovered that shareholder activism has been under-
resourced by NGOs, which have also regarded it as a short-term strategy, neglecting the 
need to focus on building relationships with key actors and on sustaining dialogue. Internal 
inconsistency between NGOs‟ beliefs and their actions, high demands being placed on 
investors and a lack of sufficient collaboration between campaigning organisations are all 
factors which have impeded the progress of share activist interventions (Chapter 12). 
However, the study argued that the efforts of NGOs in the shareholder activist arena should 
be considered in the context of a number of broader external challenges such as short-term 
thinking among investors, misinterpretation of fiduciary duty, the ownership structure of a 
company, and dispersed ownership, which also have a negative impact on the realisation of 
campaign goals (Chapter 11). Based on the empirical findings from the three case studies, 
the researcher created a model encompassing those factors that explain campaign 
effectiveness (see Chapter 12).  The model suggests that an impactful intervention is 
characterised by the ability of NGOs to: adopt a long-term approach to investor 
engagement, dedicate sufficient time and resources to shareholder activist campaigns, be 
flexible in their campaign strategy, propose solutions to problems, work on proactive 
campaigns, use predominantly business case arguments and a range of diverse strategies, 
adopt the „pragmatic‟ approach to AGM attendance (see Fig. 11), and generate media and 
public interest in a topic. 
To put these NGO-led campaigns in context, one of the main contributions of the study was 
the creation of a chronology of NGO shareholder activist interventions between the years 
1990 and 2013, which traced the scale and nature of NGO share campaigns, outlining any 
changes in strategy throughout the years. An analysis of this chronology revealed that NGO 
activity in the sphere of shareholder activism more than doubled between 2003 and 2013 
compared to 1990-2002 and that NGOs have used a broad range of strategies. Three 
important trends deserve mentioning: a move from indirect towards direct strategies, a 
continuation of the growth in long-term public policy campaigns, and a move towards 
business case arguments. The main campaign topics were also explored, placing the 
environment, human rights, and capital markets and public policy reform at the top of the 
list of NGO preferences.  
The thesis also discussed the various strategies used by NGOs, grouping them into indirect 
and direct. It was discovered that using business case arguments, involving members of 
265 
affected communities in the campaign, adopting a relational approach to engagement with 
investors and gathering the support of the public, the media and governing political parties 
can facilitate the achievement of campaign goals. However, the long-term impact of NGO 
share activism depends on targeting more mainstream investors who, through their 
shareholdings, have a greater stake in companies. The empirical findings suggest there is 
great potential in leveraging the power of pension savers as fund managers tend to listen to 
their demands. In addition, through acting in collaboration and combining their equity 
investments, charity organisations can use the influence they have as investors in 
companies to bring about change. However, the full potential of these two strategies is not 
yet realised by the majority of the NGO community in the UK. 
The interaction between NGOs and corporate representatives was observed first hand via 
attending the AGMs of a number of companies. Based on the findings, a model was 
created, which groups NGOs in three categories according to their behaviour at AGMs. The 
evidence suggests that a great number of voluntary organisations regard the AGM as an 
opportunity to express their moral stance („the morality advocates‟ category) and attract 
media attention („the media-focused campaigners‟), as opposed to assume the role of 
shareholders and speak in business case terms in order to gain the attention of directors and 
investors („the pragmatics‟ category). However, the pragmatic approach is considered to be 
more effective at generating results and a shift towards its adoption is beginning to emerge 
as NGOs become more experienced in the AGM arena. The chapter on shareholder 
resolutions considered the 1997 and 2006 proposals filed at Shell‟s AGMs regarding the 
devastation in the Niger Delta and summarised some of the main challenges experienced by 
third sector organisations who file resolutions: difficulty of identifying the owners of a 
corporation, high support threshold necessary to submit a resolution, high threshold of 
share ownership and challenges associated with gathering investor support for the proposal. 
The next section outlines the contribution of the present research to the literature. What 
follows is an examination of the broader implications of the study, first for NGOs and then 
for society as a whole. Last but not least, the chapter discusses avenues for future research.  
13.2. Contribution To The Literature 
Shareholder activism is a topic which is not only of academic and theoretical interest, but 
has a wider significance. Conducting research on shareholder activism means exploring the 
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origins of a movement, whose importance and relevance is set to grow in the future. 
Evidence of this assertion can already be found in newspaper articles which talk at length 
about attending an AGM with the aim of „taking on the big boys‟ and letting „the genie out 
of the bottle‟ (Williams, 2014). The Guardian‟s „Keep it in the Ground‟ campaign is a 
recent example of activists trying to encourage action by actors who have a stake in 
companies‟ affairs through their investments. The campaign on divestment from fossil fuels 
calls for the Welcome Trust and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (the two largest 
charitable funds in the world) to move their money out of fossil fuels (The Guardian, 2015).  
There is also evidence to suggest that pension funds are increasingly interested in 
responsible investment and the integration of ESG issues in their investment portfolios. In 
January 2015, sixteen of the UK‟s largest pension funds94, responsible for more than 
£200bn of assets, jointly published a guide to ensure fund managers deliver on the 
responsible investment promises they make when they are awarded a mandate. The main 
aim of the guide was to improve fund managers‟ reporting on the way they integrate ESG 
factors into their investment decisions (Newlands and Dines, 2015).  
However, academic social scientists are not always adept at addressing issues of emerging 
signficance to society. For example, Wilner (1985) conducted a content analysis of major 
social science journals in America over a period of 46 years and found that most of them 
failed to address important political and economic issues such as the Cold War, or the 
Nuclear Arms Race. Part of the reason, Wilner (1985) argues, stems from the fact that the 
social science disciplines were becoming very narrow. What this research has achieved is to 
counteract this trend by developing a cross disciplinary analysis which brings attention to 
an issue that is important not just to academics, but to a broader public as well – an issue 
that cannot be neatly categorised as being part of the management discipline, as it also takes 
into account politics, sociology, corporate governance, psychology, and others.  
This section discusses how the thesis contributes to the existing literature. The academic 
contribution can be subdivided into insights which engage with the existing literature to 
expand, refute or provide a new perspective on it, and insights which draw on the empirical 
evidence to create new conceptual and intellectual insights.  
                                                 
94
 Including BT Pension Scheme, the Unilever Pension Fund, the Environment Agency Pension Fund, BBC 
Pension Trust, USS Investment Management and Railpen.  
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Expanding, Refuting and Providing A Novel View on the Existing Literature 
The study has made a number of significant contributions to the existing literature. To 
begin with, it has enriched the literature on NGOs by analysing a comparatively new, 
increasingly popular and scarcely studied in the UK, campaign tactic – namely – 
shareholder activism.  
Second, the thesis has relied on the problematisation technique discussed by Alvesson and 
Sandberg (2011) (see Chapter 1, Section 1.5.) to challenge the existing literature which has 
been, by and large, critical of the ability of various NGO strategies to alter corporate 
behaviour. In view of this, the study has examined the propensity of shareholder activism 
for being a suitable avenue for achieving NGOs‟ goals. It has been concluded that, previous 
literature criticising the impact of NGOs‟ campaign tactics on business has relied mainly on 
quantitative methods and has been too quick to reach conclusions about success or failure, 
without taking account of time horizons. Based on the findings, it can be argued that, if 
used more consistently by the NGO community (i.e. more resources and time are dedicated 
to the tactic), shareholder activism has the potential to offer new and exciting opportunities 
for third sector organisations to achieve their aims.  
Third, the thesis has elaborated on some of the existing literature. For example, in light of 
the context of one of the case studies, it has reworked Zadek‟s (2004) five stages of 
organisational learning framework to include a sixth stage characteristic of the behaviour of 
Vedanta at the beginning of the campaign – namely – the „unresponsive‟ stage (see Chapter 
10, Section 10.2.). What is more, the paper has criticised the rather linear approach to 
progressing through the stages proposed by Zadek, pointing to the fact that it is not unusual 
for a company to be at various different stages simultaneously.   
The research has also contributed to the existing literature by building upon Waygood‟s 
(2006) chronology of NGO capital markets interventions. The study has extended the 
chronology, documenting the cases of NGO shareholder activist campaigns between the 
years 2003 and 2013. It has established the extent to which shareholder activist intervention 
has increased in the last decade and in comparison to the period between 1992 – 2002, it 
has analysed the evolution of the divergent shareholder activist strategies adopted and 
discussed the underlying trends.  
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Moreover, the thesis has created a refined version of Waygood‟s theoretical model, devised 
to provide a conceptual framework for classifying NGO strategies. The new version offers 
a more nuanced and more detailed view of campaigns. First, instead of dividing the 
category „primary audience‟ into „CM institutions‟ and „public policy‟ as originally 
proposed by Waygood, the study proposes a new categorisation that breaks down „CM 
institutions‟ into „companies‟ and „investors‟. Thus, under the new model, the „primary 
audience‟ of a campaign can be „public policy‟ and/or „companies‟ and/or „investors‟. 
Second, the most recent chronology has revealed that NGOs use a mixture of both direct 
and indirect tactics to influence their targets. Thus, the original classification of the „route 
of influence‟ category as either „direct‟ or „indirect‟ has been reconsidered to  include a 
third possibility – namely – a mixture of „both direct and indirect‟ approaches. Third, based 
on the empirical evidence, the assertion of Waygood that relying on a mixture of both 
moral and business case arguments would enhance the chances of success, has been 
questioned. The findings have suggested that, instead, a greater reliance on pursuing moral 
crusades through using only business case arguments would leave campaigners with better 
chances of influencing investors.  
The study has also cast doubt on Waygood‟s methodology used to draw conclusions as to 
the relationship between success and route of influence and success and primary audience. 
Due to the unreliable nature of his approach, the assertions, stating that the adoption of an 
indirect route of influence and the targeting of CM institutions as primary audience lead to 
greater chances of success, have been discarded. The current paper‟s empirical findings 
have highlighted the advantages of adopting a direct approach and have shown that it can 
sometimes lead to a desired change in corporate behaviour when other indirect methods are 
unsuccessful (see the Vedanta case).  
Last but not least, the thesis has also contributed to the literature methodologically. As 
opposed to the predominantly quantitative accounts of shareholder activism on SEE issues, 
it has adopted a detailed, qualitative case studies approach which enables the in-depth 
exploration of different factors and variables. The participant observation element of data 
collection is also unique in that it involves attending actual company AGMs and training 
events organised by the researched NGOs. This approach provides a close, insider view of 
the dynamics of NGO-company interaction, as well as rich and contextual data. 
Furthermore, rather than providing an account of a short snapshot of campaign activity 
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around a specific tactic such as a resolution or an AGM, the researcher has incorporated a 
longitudinal element in the methodology, facilitating a more accurate and detailed 
representation of shareholder activist tactics. 
Insights About How NGO Shareholder Activism Operates in Practice  
The thesis has also sought to make a contribution in terms of creating new theoretical 
insights. Two points can be mentioned in this respect. First, in Chapter 8, a model 
classifying the different types of NGOs according to their behaviour at AGMs has been 
created. Based on the participant observation undertaken, it distinguishes between „the 
morality advocates‟, „the media-focused campaigners‟ and „the pragmatics‟. The section 
discusses the characteristics of each of these three types, which one of them tends to 
predominate and which one is best suited if NGOs are to seize all the opportunities 
associated with attending an AGM.  
Second, Chapter 11 compares the effectiveness of the three campaigns and reflects on the 
similarities and differences between them. Based on this data, as well as on the analysis of 
external and internal challenges faced by NGOs, Chapter 12 advances a theoretical model 
which attempts to explain the causal mechanisms which have served to enhance the 
campaign impact of the three case studies. The model explores the significance of different 
variables related to an NGO‟s internal characteristics and to the nature of a campaign itself. 
A discussion of the macro-environmental factors at play during the campaigns 
contextualises the research. The model provides a novel and worthwhile contribution to the 
field of NGO shareholder activist interventions not least because, to this date, no other 
systematic attempt to explain the antecedents of campaign impact has been made in the 
literature. The conclusions from the model can be taken forward by campaigners when they 
embark upon their forthcoming interactions with investors and companies. The next section 
looks at the broader implications of the research. 
13.3. Shareholder Activism and the Democratisation of               
Corporate Governance   
Apart from the theoretical implications discussed above, the findings of the thesis have 
implications about the nature of corporate governance and the democratisation of business. 
These are discussed in the current section.  
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Implications for NGOs’ Shareholder Activist Campaigns/Strategies  
The findings of the study also have normative implications for NGOs‟ shareholder activist 
strategies – these will be discussed in this section. To begin with, the case studies have been 
carefully chosen to reflect a situation where one of the three main routes of influence has 
predominated– i.e. in the Shell case this is the indirect route, in the tax justice campaign 
case – the direct route and, when it comes to Vedanta, both the direct and indirect routes. 
Considering the fact that the Vedanta campaign has been characterised as the most effective 
of all three case studies and that, throughout the thesis, the importance of adopting a variety 
of different tactics has been an important message, it could be argued that NGOs which 
engage in a mixture of direct and indirect strategies have a higher likelihood of success as 
they are approaching the problem from different angles. 
Second, the chronology in Chapter 4 has revealed that interventions with policy makers as 
the primary audience have increased significantly, albeit their numbers are still low 
compared to campaigns targeting CM institutions. This raises the question of whether, in 
the future, a focus on more long-term, structural change in the financial markets would 
yield better results.  
Third, the thesis has portrayed a picture of a fragmented NGO community whereby each 
NGO competes for the limited attention of investors by flagging up its own concerns and, 
even when various NGOs campaign on the same topic, they often approach the problem 
from different angles. The findings suggest that there is a lack of sufficient collaboration 
between third sector organisations and that addressing this issue could change the power 
dynamic and place them in a better position to engage with investors, because a unified 
NGO community cannot be easily ignored by asset owners.  
Fourth, it has been discovered that many civil society organisations target SRI and ethical 
investors as opposed to also dedicating their attention to mainstream shareholders who have 
the power and influence to trigger change. Fifth, many NGOs have adopted shareholder 
activism as a short-term strategy, hoping for quick results and establishing non lasting 
relationships with fund managers and investors, the aim of which is to only make them 
aware of a problem, as opposed to engage in productive dialogue. The lack of relational 
approach to their engagement with the shareholder community has been highlighted as a 
drawback by both investors and NGO members alike. The way forward would be to 
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dedicate more resources and time to shareholder activist tactics and to make them a 
legitimate part of the broader strategies of an organisation. This action would no doubt 
enhance their effectiveness. Sixth, it has been discovered that it is essential for NGOs to 
know how to capture the media and the public‟s attention since they can trigger company, 
governmental and investor response.  
Moreover, the findings of the present study suggest that, NGOs which adopt a pragmatic 
style of engagement
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 with company directors and investors at an AGM might be more 
successful at achieving their objectives. In addition, seven recommendations designed to 
further maximise NGOs‟ impact at AGMs have been proposed in Chapter 8. These 
conclusions can serve to initiate a reflection and reconsideration of current practices 
employed by NGOs attending annual meetings.  
What is more, in Chapter 9, the thesis has explored the various hurdles associated with 
filing a resolution. These insights could be useful for civil society organisations who have 
not used this tactic before, but who nevertheless consider the possibility of filing a 
resolution in the near future. The study has also developed a theoretical model (see Chapter 
12) which aims to explain the relationship between different variables and campaign 
success and has explored the various challenges faced by NGOs as part of their shareholder 
activist campaigns. It is hoped that looking at this model and the challenges discussed 
would enable NGOs to better understand the prerequisites for an effective action.  
Finally, it has been identified that UK NGOs collectively own considerable assets under 
management in equity (Chapter 9). As a consequence, they should consider the influence 
that the pulling together of their combined investment reserves could bring as this 
collective NGO capital is potentially powerful. The findings have shown signs that some 
NGOs are beginning to think about this possibility as they have organised themselves into 
the Charities Responsible Investment Network under the patronage of ShareAction, but the 
movement is still in its infancy and it is early to predict any future outcomes. 
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 Those NGOs aiming to gain the sympathy of investors and company executives by delivering clear, 
concise, financial-oriented questions and by speaking from the point of view of a shareholder in the company. 
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Implications for Society 
At the moment, corporate governance is essentially undemocratic as control over 
companies is in the hands of those who have the most shares. In addition, unlike 
governments where ruling parties and MPs get elected by the general public, multinational 
corporations, which have a great impact on society, the economy and the environment, are 
run by CEOs and board of directors with no democratic representation or accountability 
with regard to how they use their power. Through various pieces of legislation and 
commissioned reports (for example, the Cadbury Report (1992), the Stewardship Code 
(2010, 2012), the Kay Review (2012), governments in recent years have strived to enhance 
the powers and influence of investors to counteract the power of companies. The study has 
argued that shares are concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, but they are also 
controlled by the trustees and guardians for a large number of individual savers who are the 
ultimate beneficiaries. As evidenced by the consequences of the Enron scandal and the 
2008 banking crisis, beneficiaries should be able to participate more fully in the running of 
the corporation (Scott, 2008). If this was to happen, it could lead to a democratisation of the 
corporation and of corporate governance and create a future reality in which disasters such 
as the BP oil spills are avoided as the interests of a broader range of stakeholders 
(employees, community, environment) are taken into account to a greater extent.  
Germany is an example of a country where stakeholders have a greater say in the running 
of the corporations as, by law, companies have a two-tiered board structure which consists 
of the management board and the supervisory board. The latter is responsible for 
overseeing the management board, appointing members to it, approving financial 
statements, and making decisions with regard to mergers and acquisitions, capital 
investments, dividends and others. The law requires that the supervisory board has 
employee representation. In a company with at least five hundred employees, this means 
that one third of the supervisory board seats are allocated to labour representatives and, in a 
company with at least two thousand employees, the number grows to half the board‟s seats 
being allocated to employees (Larcker and Tayan, 2011). 
However, the thesis has discovered that the main problem lies in the passivity of individual 
savers, because a very small proportion of them are prepared to ask the tough questions to 
their pension funds or financial institutions and to encourage them to engage in dialogue 
with investee companies on issues of interest to beneficiaries. According to Scott (2008), 
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the general reluctance of savers to participate in corporate governance stems from the lack 
of knowledge about their rights and responsibilities, as well as a lack of understanding 
about how the investment world works. The empirical findings from the case studies 
substantiate this assertion.  
The study has also provided an explanation of the way through which this problem is being 
tackled – namely – by the actions of some NGOs such as ShareAction who have begun a 
process of educating the public about their potential as shareholders through a variety of 
training events and seminars. This could mark the beginning of a bigger and powerful 
movement that transforms the way we view modern corporations today. In a time of 
increasing inequality, the demise of free education and healthcare, and in the context of 
numerous scandals around big and reputable companies, people might be more prone to 
embracing the potential that shareholder democracy could bring.  
13.4. Future Research 
There are potentially a great number of future avenues for research that could be identified. 
To begin with, the thesis has demonstrated that the engagement practices, as well as legal 
frameworks and cultural expectations in the UK and the US differ greatly. Therefore, it 
would be beneficial to pursue a comparative study which examines the differences in 
shareholder activist strategies across countries with divergent corporate governance models.  
Another valuable area for further study would be to explore the engagement practices of 
different institutional shareholders and analyse how their internal structures and 
organisational characteristics impact on the approach to shareholder activism they take and 
the outcomes they achieve. As has been mentioned in the study, pension funds have a large 
potential for contributing positively to the engagement agenda and it would also be of 
interest to explore the role of foreign institutions and hedge funds, which hold an increasing 
amount of equities in the UK market.  
Since the present research has expanded Waygood‟s (2006) chronology, thereby providing 
a continuous record of all NGO shareholder activist interventions between 1990 and 2013, 
future research has the possibility to update the existing chronology and to continue with its 
expansion. The refinements to Waygood‟s classification advanced in this study can be 
applied during the process of extending the chronology.  
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Finally, the research has demonstrated that NGO interventions in the public policy domain 
have increased steadily in recent years, with third sector organisations beginning to lobby 
the government in an attempt to introduce changes to the financial market which will 
facilitate shareholder engagement. These changes involve tackling short-termism, clarifying 
fiduciary duties, introducing mandatory voting disclosure, among others. In view of this, 
there needs to be further research into public policy interventions in the context of 
campaigns for the removal of the barriers to investor engagement.  
Summary 
„The Star Thrower‟ story recounted at the beginning of the thesis carries an important 
message for the nature of NGO shareholder activist campaigns. One of the main arguments 
of the study is that successful shareholder activism should not be equated to the 
achievement of strict, pre-defined movement goals and objectives (see Section 1.8.). 
Rather, it should be seen in the context of delayed gratification, or even symbolic action, as 
running a campaign always makes a difference in more than one ways – from the small and 
incremental changes to the radical and norm defying ones. There are a lot of examples in 
history where those who spearheaded campaigns did not live to see their dreams become a 
reality – Emmeline Pankhurst and her fight for universal votes, William Wilberforce and 
his work on abolishing slavery throughout the British Empire, Rachel Carson‟s profound 
impact on the environmental movement and her campaign to ban the use of certain harmful 
pesticides in the US. 
Shareholder activism should also be viewed in the broader context of the search for 
alternatives, the search for meaning, or as Mason (2013, p.261) labels it the „change of 
consciousness‟ post 2010 – the realisation among people that „something big is possible; 
that a great change in the world‟s priorities is within people‟s grasp‟. Shareholder activism 
is a piece of the puzzle towards a new stage of post capitalism and the creation of 
alternative economic practices which would help advance the wellbeing of people. 
However, the thesis also emphasises the importance of considering shareholder activism as 
an exercise of cooperation, as opposed to a movement of contention, as an act of winning 
hearts and not fighting against a perceived enemy, using imagination and creativity to 
create better solutions to the social problems of today. Some organisations, such as Forum 
for the Future, ShareAction, and the New Economics Foundation, have already started 
walking down the path towards this brave new world. 
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LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of Interviewees (in the chronological order in which the interviews were conducted, 2012 – 2014) 
 Organisation Position 
1. EIRIS Senior staff member working in the area of responsible investment. 
2.  EIRIS Senior research analyst. 
3.  ShareAction Senior staff member responsible for the overall strategy of the organisation and closely involved in the 
campaigns work. 
4.  ShareAction Staff member responsible for the policy work of the organisation. 
5.  ShareAction Staff member responsible for the outreach strategy of the organisation. 
6.  Amnesty International UK Staff member of the organisation involved in the Vedanta and Niger Delta campaigns; responsible for 
engagement with investors. 
7. Forum for the Future Former senior staff member working in the area of sustainable financial markets. 
8. Platform London Writer and researcher at Platform London. 
9. CDP Senior staff member looking after CDP‟s investor relations. 
10. EIRIS Follow-up interview (see number 1). 
11. Friends of the Earth 
Holland 
Staff member working closely on the Niger Delta campaign. 
12. ShareAction Staff member responsible for investor engagement and the running of campaigns. 
13. Fairfood International Follow-up interview (see number 5). Former staff member of ShareAction and current member of Fairfood 
International. 
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14. Aviva Investors Senior staff member leading the engagement activities of Aviva Investors. 
15. Citizens UK and The 
Living Wage Foundation 
Senior staff member closely involved in the Living Wage campaign. 
16. ChristianAid Senior staff member responsible for shaping the strategy of the tax campaign and introducing shareholder 
activism as a tactic. 
17. ActionAid Former senior staff member involved in the later stages of the Vedanta campaign (2008-2013). Involved in 
advocacy and campaigns on private sector issues. 
18. UCLA Professor at the School of Management with research interests in the area of shareholder activism. 
19. ECCR Senior staff member, overseeing the strategy of the organisation. 
20. WWF-UK Staff member working in the area of sustainable finance. 
21. ECCR Former staff member of ECCR, involved in the Niger Delta campaign and the resolution filed in 2006. 
22. Church of England (CoE) Staff member involved in the engagement of the EIAG with Vedanta. 
23. Greenpeace UK Staff member working in the area of capital markets and involved in shareholder activist campaigns. 
24. ShareAction Follow-up interview (see number 3). 
25. Independent policy and 
campaign strategy advisor 
Former senior staff member of ActionAid involved in the earlier stages of the Vedanta campaign (2004 – 2008). 
Participated in the formulation of the campaign strategy. 
26. ECCR supporter Supporter of the organisation involved in the Niger Delta campaign for many years. Presented the 2006 
resolution at Shell‟s AGM. 
27. ActionAid Staff member involved in the tax justice campaign. 
28. Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust 
A member of staff responsible for the trust‟s investment strategy and involved in the engagement with Vedanta. 
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29. Arisaig Partners An investment analyst working in the area of ESG issues. 
30. CCLA A member of staff responsible for corporate governance and ethics. 
31.  Scottish Widows 
Investment Partnership 
A specialist in active ownership and engagement. 
32. CCLA Follow-up interview (see number 30). 
33. University of Edinburgh A member of staff with research interests in corporate governance, active ownership and engagement on ESG 
issues. 
34.  Amnesty International UK Follow-up interview (see number 6). 
35. Save the Children Former employee of ChristianAid involved in strategy formulation and the early stages of the tax campaign. 
36. ChristianAid Follow-up interview (see number 16). 
37. Standard Life Responsible investment analyst. 
38.  ChristianAid Staff member involved in the policy work of the organisation and the tax campaign.  
39. ActionAid Staff member working in the area of tax justice and advocacy. 
40. ShareAction Follow-up interview (see number 12). 
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Appendix 2: Consent Form 
 
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL 
RESEARCH ETHICS 
– Consent Form –  
The aim of this research is to examine the role of NGOs in the shareholder activist arena 
and the strategies they use to advance their goals via the financial market. 
I understand that my participation in this project will involve a semi-structured, tape-
recorded interview, which will last no longer than an hour.  
I understand that participation in this project is entirely voluntary and that I can withdraw 
from the study at any time without giving a reason. 
I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. If for any reason I have second 
thoughts about my participation in this project, I am free to withdraw or discuss my 
concerns with Dr. Mike Marinetto (MarinettoM@cardiff.ac.uk). 
I understand that the information provided by me will be held confidentially and securely, 
such that only the researcher can trace this information back to me individually. The 
information will be retained for up to six months and will then be anonymised, deleted or 
destroyed. I understand that if I withdraw my consent I can ask for the information I have 
provided to be anonymised/deleted/destroyed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998.   
I, __________________________________(NAME) consent to participate in the study 
conducted by Mila Ivanova (IvanovaMR@cardiff.ac.uk), PhD of Cardiff Business School, 
Cardiff University, under the supervision of Dr. Mike Marinetto. 
Signed:………………………..   Date:…………………………. 
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Appendix 3: Chronology of NGO Shareholder Activist Campaigns (2003 – 2013) 
Number Date NGO(s) Campaign Issue Aim Nature of Intervention Classification 
1. 15 April 
2003 
The Burma 
Campaign, 
Friends of the 
Earth (FoE) 
Business activities 
of British American 
Tobacco (BAT, 
hereafter) in Burma 
and use of pesticides 
in Brazil 
To put the company‟s 
social and environmental 
record in the spotlight.  
Putting pressure on directors to 
justify their activities to 
shareholders by asking 
questions at BAT‟s AGM about 
the effects of pesticides on 
tobacco workers‟ health. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
2. 29 April 
2003 
Landmine 
Action, 
Campaign 
Against the 
Arms Trade 
(CAAT) and 
FoE 
Corporate 
responsibility and 
UK arms export 
rules 
To question BAE 
System‟s executive 
directors about the 
company‟s general ethics 
and its sales of military 
equipment to Saudi 
Arabia, Indonesia, 
Zimambwe and Qatar, as 
well as bomb-guidance 
instruments and avionics 
components to Israel.  
 Staged a protest outside the 
AGM at the Queen Elizabeth 
II Conference Centre. 
 Asked questions inside. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
3. 2003 Friends of the 
Earth 
 
Putting people and 
the environment 
before profits 
To question directors 
about their companies‟ 
environmental impacts. 
To push for changes to 
UK company law to 
require companies to 
consider their wider 
FoE bought shares and attended 
the AGMs of 18 British 
companies, alongside 
representatives of local 
communities.  
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
 Moral 
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responsibilities and to 
provide affected 
community members with 
a means of redress when 
companies fail to do so. 
4. 2003 – on-
going 
Carbon 
Disclosure 
Project 
(CDP) 
Managing climate 
change and water 
risks 
To gather self-reported 
climate change and water 
information on a global 
scale with the aim of 
driving emissions 
reductions and improving 
water management. 
 Gathering the support of 
investors who become 
signatories of the initiative. 
The organisation sends 
information requests to 
thousands of the world‟s 
largest companies each year 
on behalf of these investors. 
 CDP co-ordinates a request 
from a group of investors 
asking companies in high 
emitting sectors to 
implement emissions 
reductions. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
5. 2003-2006 Corporate 
Responsibilit
y Coalition 
(CORE), 
Christian 
Aid, 
Amnesty 
International 
Reform of the UK 
Companies Act 
To demand improvements 
to corporate law so that: 
- Companies are legally 
required to report on 
their social and 
environmental impacts. 
- Directors are obliged to 
minimise any damage 
 CORE urged supporters to 
contact their MP. Over 
100,000 voters took the 
action. 
 Launched a Parliamentary 
Petition signed by over 225 
MPs. 
 Gathered support for the 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 Public Policy 
 Business and 
Moral case 
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UK, FoE, 
New 
Economics 
Foundation, 
Traidcraft. 
caused to people and the 
environment.  
- Members of affected 
communities overseas 
can take action against 
UK companies in a UK 
court. 
campaign from fund 
managers and ethical 
investors. 
 Generated extensive media 
coverage. 
6. 5 May 
2004 
CAAT BAE Systems  To highlight BAE 
System‟s influence on 
government policy and to 
address allegations of 
institutional corruption. 
Buying shares and attending the 
AGM to challenge the board. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
7. 12 July 
2004 
Friends of the 
Earth 
Fair returns and 
ethical treatment of 
farmers  
To put forward the 
argument that Sainsbury‟s 
should focus on quality 
and fairness instead of 
entering into price wars 
with its competitors.  
Attended the company‟s AGM 
and asked a question. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
8. Late 2004 People and 
Planet, 
Amnesty 
International, 
EIRIS, War 
on Want 
Pension fund 
engagement on SEE 
issues 
To replicate the success of 
the Ethics for USS 
campaign by creating an 
organisation that can 
promote responsible 
investment by other large 
pension funds. 
Set up a working group of 
different people from the 
participating NGOs and created 
a new organisation – 
FairPensions (what is now 
known as ShareAction). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
9. 2004 – on-
going 
ActionAid, 
Amnesty 
Mining company 
Vedanta Resources‟ 
To prevent the expansion 
of an aluminium refinery 
 Attendance at AGMs. 
 Extensive media campaign. 
 Both Direct 
and Indirect 
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International 
UK, EIRIS 
operations in India in Orissa and the 
construction of a bauxite 
mine in Niyamgiri, 
situated on top of a sacred 
hill populated by 
indigenous people. 
 Lobbied shareholders to 
engage and divest.  
 Report writing. 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
10. 2005 EIRIS Telecoms Industry 
and phone-related 
health concerns  
„This series of SEE risk 
briefings seeks  
to identify areas of 
potential social,  
environmental and ethical 
(SEE) risk,  
analyse the ways in which 
these risks  
may materialise and 
highlight how  
companies can manage 
these issues‟ (EIRIS, 
2005a). 
Published „Mobile Phone 
Health Concerns and the 
Telecom Industry‟ – an ESG 
Risk Briefing for investors. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
11. 2005 EIRIS Access to medicines 
in the developing 
world 
„This series of SEE risk 
briefings seeks  
to identify areas of 
potential social,  
environmental and ethical 
(SEE) risk,  
analyse the ways in which 
these risks  
may materialise and 
highlight how  
companies can manage 
Published „Access to Medicines 
for the Developing World and 
the Pharmaceutical Industry‟ – 
an ESG Risk Briefing for 
investors. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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these issues‟ (EIRIS, 
2005b). 
12. 2005 Friends of the 
Earth 
British American 
Tobacco 
To highlight problems 
with corporate power. 
 FoE attended the AGM of 
the company. 
 Outside the AGM 
campaigners informed 
BAT‟s shareholders about 
the recently published report 
„BAT In Its Own Words‟ 
(FoE, 2005a) which exposes 
how the company uses CSR 
to distort research on second 
hand smoking, fund lobby 
groups to promote 
„voluntary initiatives‟ and 
increase profits at the 
expense of people and the 
environment. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
 
13. 2005 FoE Tesco and its 
marketplace share 
To call for a stop of the 
Tesco takeover. 
 Attended the AGM of Tesco. 
 Argued for the need of 
regulation to ensure Tesco‟s 
power is not abused. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
 
14. 2005 – 16 
May 2006 
FoE Shell‟s 
environmental and 
social performance 
To highlight „the need for 
oil companies to clean up 
their act‟ (FoE, 2005b). 
To enable people who live 
2005 – 2006 - FoE sponsored 
the visit to the UK of 
neighbours of Shell‟s global 
operations who attended Shell‟s 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
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next to Shell installations 
and projects to put their 
concerns to the company. 
AGM, alongside campaigners 
from FoE and questioned the 
company on its failure to 
address its environmental and 
social impacts. 
 
15. 16 May 
2006 
ECCR Shell‟s operations in 
Nigeria 
The resolution asked that 
directors: 1.) institute and 
enforce „rigorous policies 
in risk assessment and 
community consultation‟; 
2.) conduct transparent, 
independent social and 
environmental impact 
assessments of business 
operations (ECCR, 
2006a). 
Filed a shareholder resolution at 
the 2006 AGM. Sought support 
from investors for tabling the 
resolution. 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral and 
Business Case 
 
16. 2006 EIRIS Obesity To identify the areas of 
potential business risk 
associated with obesity. 
Published „Obesity Concerns in 
the Food and Beverage 
Industry‟ – an ESG risk briefing 
for investors (EIRIS, 2006a). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
17. 2006 EIRIS Chemical safety and 
sustainability 
To highlight the potential 
SEE risks and 
opportunities associated 
with chemical products. 
Published „Beyond REACH – 
Chemical Safety and 
Sustainability Concerns‟ - ESG 
risk briefing for investors 
(EIRIS, 2006b). 
 Indirect  
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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18. 2006 – 
2007 
ShareAction UK Pension 
Schemes and 
Engagement 
To examine and rank the 
responsible investment 
performance of UK 
pension funds during 2006 
and 2007. To raise public 
awareness of responsible 
investment, to encourage 
peer comparison and to 
highlight areas for 
improvement. 
 The 2006 survey 
(ShareAction, 2006) reveals 
poor results with lack of 
substantive reference to 
responsible investment in 
many pension funds‟ 
documents; divergence 
across different schemes; 
lack of transparency. 
 The 2007 survey argues that: 
„engagement on ESG issues 
improves financial returns 
for funds. (…) Responsible 
investment and engagement 
can therefore be seen to be 
as much a financial 
imperative as they are a 
moral one, and are therefore 
integral to the overall 
fiduciary responsibilities of 
pension fund trustees' 
(ShareAction, 2007). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
19. 2006 – 
2007 
Oxfam, 
ShareAction 
Novartis‟ legal 
battle to stop India 
from producing 
copies of an anti-
To secure access to 
affordable generic 
medicines in the 
developing world. 
 Online action tool – pension 
savers contact their pension 
funds asking them to exert 
their influence as 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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cancer medicine shareholders and demand 
from Novartis to drop its 
claim. 
 Extensive media coverage. 
 Briefing investors.   
 
20. 2006 – 
2007 
Catholic 
Agency for 
Overseas 
Development 
(CAFOD), 
ShareAction 
Mining practices in 
the developing 
world 
To highlight the 
environmental, human 
rights and investment 
risks of mining operations.  
 Briefings sent to almost 400 
large UK pension funds and 
asset managers. 
 Mobilising supporters to 
urge their pension funds to 
take action. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
21. 9 May 
2007 
CAAT BAE Systems and 
the dropping of the 
serious fraud 
office‟s 
investigation into 
bribery allegations 
relating to an arms 
contract between the 
UK and Saudi 
Arabia 
To challenge the company 
on allegations of 
corruption and bribery. 
 Around 50 CAAT supporters 
and members bought token 
shares in the company and 
attended the AGM to ask 
questions. 
 Towards the end of the Q&A 
session five members of 
CAAT pulled out judge‟s 
wigs and stood in front of 
the board, calling out „we 
find you guilty‟. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
22. 29 June 
2007 
War on Want Decent pay and 
conditions for 
workers in Tesco‟s 
supply chain  
To demand that supplier 
factories undergo 
independent auditing to 
ensure decent pay and 
working conditions for 
A resolution put forward to 
Tesco‟s AGM proposed by the 
company secretary of War on 
Want and backed by 
shareholders representing over 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
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workers making clothes 
for Tesco. 
400 million shares.  
23. 2007 ActionAid Fair treatment and 
fair wages for 
supermarket 
suppliers 
To prevent supermarkets 
from exploiting their 
suppliers. To establish an 
independent watchdog 
with the power to fine. 
 Hosted a South African farm 
worker in the UK to attend 
Tesco‟s AGM and speak to 
the Board and the Chief 
Executive. 
 Handed in a 25,000 
signature petition to the 
Competition Commission. 
 Campaigners bombard 
Tesco with 5p pieces – the 
amount needed per kilo to 
ensure workers are paid a 
fair wage. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions  
 Moral Case 
 
24. 2007 – 
2011 
The UK 
Sustainable 
Investment 
and Finance 
Association 
(UKSIF) 
Sustainable 
Pensions Project 
To identify and recognise 
leading practice. To 
measure the extent to 
which responsible 
investment policies are 
adopted with the aim of 
tracking change over time. 
Published three reports 
summarising the results of three 
surveys (UKSIF, 2007, 2009, 
2011) into the responsible 
investment practices of UK 
corporate pension schemes. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
25. 27 June 
2008 
War on 
Want, Labour 
Behind the 
Label 
Living wages for 
garment workers 
supplying big UK 
supermarkets 
To ask Tesco to provide 
garment workers in 
Bangalore with a living 
wage. 
 Attended Tesco‟s AGM and 
asked a question. 
 Funded a speaking tour for 
Suhasini Singh (a researcher 
from the India-based NGO 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
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Cividep) who also attended 
the AGM and spoke to Sir 
Terry Leahy, the CEO. 
26. 27 June 
2008 
Compassion 
in World 
Farming and 
Hugh 
Fearnley-
Whittingstall 
The Chicken Out! 
Campaign – better 
standards for broiler 
chickens 
To urge Tesco to adopt 
higher minimum standards 
for the chickens it 
purchases. 
A resolution calling on Tesco to 
adopt the RSPCA‟s freedom 
farm standards on the way 
chickens are fed, exercised and 
transported. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
27. 17 July 
2008 
People for 
the Ethical 
Treatment of 
Animals 
(PETA) 
Animal Welfare To challenge Burberry 
about their use of fur 
products in stores. 
PETA‟s vice president Bruce 
Friedrich wanted to attend 
Burberry‟s AGM in London and 
ask: „When will Burberry stop 
supporting cruelty to 
animals...and respect the will of 
93% of the British public by 
removing all fur products from 
your stores?‟ (PETA, 2008). 
Friedrich was denied access to 
the AGM. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions  
 Moral Case 
 
28. July 2008 ECCR – co-
sponsored by 
EIRIS and 
Ethical 
Screening  
Responsible 
investors – 
engagement with 
companies 
To support faith 
communities and 
responsible investors in 
influencing companies.  
Published a 30-page guide – 
„Investment and Engaging with 
Companies: A Guide for Faith 
Communities‟ (ECCR, 2008a). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral and 
Business Case 
 
29. October Oxfam – Poverty Alleviation To bring investors‟  Carried out in collaboration  Indirect 
330 
2008 – 
November 
2010 
„Better 
Returns in A 
Better World‟ 
project 
attention to the 
importance of poverty 
alleviation as a corporate 
responsibility issue. To 
consider the potential of 
shareholders for 
influencing the practices 
of their investee 
companies.  
with the investment industry. 
 Published two papers – one 
that launched the project 
(Oxfam, 2008) and a project 
completion report (Oxfam, 
2010). 
 Seven workshops, in-depth 
one-to-one interviews with 
investment experts, 
continuous engagement with 
over 80 investors across 
Europe and the US. 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
30. 2008 EIRIS Corporate responses 
to HIV/AIDS 
To analyse the corporate 
response to HIV/AIDS of 
the top 40 South African 
companies on the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 index 
and to convince investors 
to further encourage the 
uptake of strategies for 
addressing the issue. 
Published „Positive Corporate 
Responses to HIV/AIDS: A 
Snapshot of Large Cap South 
African Companies‟ – ESG risk 
briefing for investors (EIRIS, 
2008). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
31. 2008 ECCR Water Sustainability To help individual and 
institutional investors and 
other stakeholders to 
encourage companies to 
use water more 
sustainably.  
Published the report „Water 
Sustainability: Meeting the 
Challenge, Taking Action‟. It 
proposes ideas of how investors 
can engage with companies, 
provides a model letter they can 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral and 
Business Case 
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send to companies alongside 
with their contact details, 
suggests that individual 
shareholders can attend AGMs 
and ask a question (ECCR, 
2008b).  
32. 2008-2010 WWF and 
the Institute 
of Chartered 
Accountants 
in England 
and Wales 
(ICAEW) 
have created 
the Finance 
Innovation 
Lab (FIL) 
Changing the 
financial system 
To bring about change 
through finance. To 
rethink the current system 
and take action to 
stimulate change so that 
the interests of society and 
the environment are 
accounted for by finance.  
Series of workshops, events and 
open days in July 2009 which 
bring together people from 
finance and business, academia, 
civil society and government 
with the aim to stimulate 
discussion and highlight key 
issues that must be addressed in 
order to ensure the future 
sustainability of the system. In 
the following months and years 
the FIL has worked on 
initiatives designed to tackle the 
problems uncovered in these 
sessions. 
 Indirect 
 Public Policy 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
33. 15 April 
2009 
Philippine 
Indigenous 
Peoples 
Links, 
London 
Mining 
Rio Tinto – 
indigenous peoples‟ 
rights, climate 
change 
To make their concerns 
known to the board and 
the chairman. 
Attended the AGM and asked 
questions. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
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Network 
(LMN, 
hereafter) 
34. May 2009 EIRIS and 
Survival 
International 
Indigenous rights  To direct shareholders‟ 
attention to the rights of 
indigenous people. 
Published the report 
„Indigenous Rights: Risks and 
Opportunities for Investors‟ 
which describes the rights of 
indigenous people as key 
human rights issue which 
should be carefully considered 
by shareholders and companies 
as „strong commitments and 
effective engagement processes 
will undoubtedly benefit in an 
environment where access to 
land and resources is becoming 
increasingly restricted‟ (EIRIS, 
2009a, p.2). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business case 
 
35. May 2009 ECCR Vulnerable migrant 
workers 
To encourage individual 
and institutional investors 
to engage with companies 
so that they implement 
practices that ensure equal 
treatment of migrant 
workers employed in the 
UK. 
Published „Vulnerable Migrant 
Workers: The Responsibility of 
Business‟ (ECCR, 2009).  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
36. September PIRC, The Walker Review To submit evidence to the Submitted written evidence to  Direct 
333 
2009 ShareAction Walker Review of 
Corporate Governance in 
UK Banks and other 
Financial Industry Entities 
– the review also 
discusses the role of 
institutional investors 
the consultation. The review 
concludes that: „...there is a 
need for better engagement 
between fund managers acting 
on behalf of their clients as 
beneficial owners, and the 
boards of investee companies. 
Experience in the recent crisis 
phase has forcefully illustrated 
that while shareholders enjoy 
limited liability in respect of 
their investee companies, in the 
case of major banks the 
taxpayer has been obliged to 
assume effectively unlimited 
liability. This further underlines 
the importance of discharge of 
the responsibility of 
shareholders as owners, which 
has been inadequately 
acknowledged in the past...‟ 
(Walker, 2009, p. 12). 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
 
37. 29 
October 
2009 
London 
Mining 
Network 
(LMN) 
BHP Billiton – the 
environment and 
human rights 
To highlight current 
failings of the company. 
 Activists attended the AGM 
and asked questions. 
 An alternative annual report 
„BHP Undermining the 
Future‟ written by a group of 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
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NGOs was distributed to 
shareholders attending the 
AGM (LMN, 2009). 
38. December 
2009 
EIRIS Labour Standards in 
supply chains 
To identify how well 
companies are managing 
the risk of breaches of the 
core ILO labour standards 
and to highlight the 
importance of the issue to 
investors. 
Published „A Risky Business? 
Managing Core Labour 
Standards in Company Supply 
Chains‟ - ESG risk briefing for 
investors that provides a list of 
key engagement 
recommendations and questions 
(EIRIS, 2009b). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
39. December 
2009 
War on Want Labour conditions To shame Primark and 
urge it to take action on 
sweatshop labour. 
Attended the AGM of 
Associated British Foods – the 
parent company of Primark and 
delivered a letter signed by 
2,250 supporters to the CEO. 
The letter demanded prompt 
action to solve the scandal of 
sweatshops. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
40. 2009-2012 WWF-UK, 
Christian 
Aid, The 
Cooperative 
Bank, the 
Aldersgate 
Group 
Mandatory Green 
House Gas 
Reporting 
Launched the Toxic Fuels 
Campaign whose aim is to 
ensure that companies 
disclose their carbon 
emissions in detail so that 
investors can make 
informed decisions with 
regard to the risks and 
 WWF-UK has called on the 
UK government to introduce 
legislation that will make it 
mandatory for FTSE 100 
companies to disclose their 
carbon emissions. 
 Published a report: „Toxic 
Fuels, Toxic Investments‟ 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
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potential future liabilities 
involved in holding shares 
in a high polluting 
company. 
(WWF, 2010). 
 Wrote „The Costs and 
Benefits of Mandatory 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting‟ 
(WWF, 2011a) which was a 
response to Defra‟s impact 
assessment and revealed 
significant overstatement of 
the costs and understatement 
of the benefits for companies 
of introducing mandatory 
GHG reporting. 
 Thousands of supporter 
letters sent to the 
government. 
 Early Day Motion 799. 
 Mobilised companies and 
organisations to express their 
support for the cause. 
41. 2009 – on-
going 
Amnesty 
International, 
ShareAction, 
Platform 
London, 
ECCR 
Shell‟s operations in 
the Niger Delta 
To encourage investors to 
engage with Shell with the 
aim of determining its 
plans for addressing the 
problems discussed in the 
UNEP report. To seek 
greater disclosure of 
information by Shell 
 Writing of investor briefings 
and detailed reports 
explaining the situation on 
the ground.  
 Engagement with investors. 
 Raising questions at the 
AGM over a number of 
years. 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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regarding potential 
financial liabilities for 
clean-up.  
42. January 
2010 
PIRC, 
UKSIF, 
ShareAction 
Consultation on the 
creation of a 
Stewardship Code 
for institutional 
investors 
The Stewardship Code – 
designed to encourage a 
more engaged approach to 
ownership by institutional 
investors. 
Submitted a written response to 
the consultation. 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
 
43. 15 April 
2010 
Partizans, 
Down to 
Earth, 
Indigenous 
People Links 
Rio Tinto –
environmental and 
human rights 
concerns 
A number of NGOs 
expressing concerns about 
Rio Tinto‟s operations in 
different parts of the 
world during its AGM. 
 Partizans – asked a question 
about the Rossing uranium 
mine in Namibia – plans for 
expansion and  studies on 
environmental and health 
impacts. 
 Down to Earth – coal and 
nickel mining in Indonesia 
and allegations of bribery. 
 Indigenous People Links – 
called for independent 
monitoring of indigenous 
people‟s right to free, prior 
and informed consent. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
44. 22 April 
2010 
London 
Mining 
Network 
Human Rights – 
Anglo American 
To express concerns over 
Anglo American‟s human 
rights record in South 
Africa 
Attended the AGM and accused 
the company of failing to 
protect South African gold 
miners from the life threatening 
lung disease silicosis. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
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45. 22 April 
2010, 22 
April 
2011, 19 
April 2012 
Colombia 
Solidarity 
Campaign 
(CSC) 
Community 
relocations in 
Colombia 
To question Cerrejon 
Coal‟s (of which Anglo 
American has one third 
share) process of 
negotiation and 
compensation of 
involuntarily relocated 
communities in Colombia. 
A member of the Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign attended 
the AGM and asked questions 
about the process of community 
relocations. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
46. 28 April 
2010 
A coalition of 
NGOs 
including: 
Amnesty 
International, 
Platform, 
Rainforest 
Action 
Network, 
World 
Development 
Movement, 
People and 
Planet, etc. 
 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) 
investments 
To put pressure on RBS in 
relation to its investments 
in fossil fuel and mining 
companies such as 
Vedanta. 
 A member of the Rainforest 
Action Network and Simon 
Chambers (a documentary 
maker) attended RBS‟ AGM 
and asked how the company 
would justify its investments 
in companies with a bad 
human rights and 
environmental record. 
 A coalition of NGOs met 
with the Chairmen following 
the AGM and wrote a letter 
to the board detailing their 
concerns. One of the points 
from the letter states: 
„Engagement practices: 
RBS should commit to active 
engagement with its 
corporate and project 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
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finance clients wherever 
evidence emerges of a lack 
of compliance with EP or 
equivalent standards. The 
bank should use its leverage 
as a financier to seek rapid 
and appropriate 
rectification, remediation 
and compensation‟ 
(Platform, 2010). 
47. April 2010 Greenpeace Indonesia‟s 
rainforests – 
deforestation, 
greenhouse gas 
emissions and 
biodiversity loss 
To protect Indonesia‟s 
rainforests. 
 Disruption at Nestle‟s AGM 
– a couple of climbers 
dropped a banner with the 
message „Nestle give the 
orangutans a break!‟ and a 
cascade of leaflets from the 
ceiling of the room. 
 Encouraged supporters to 
send a message to Nestle‟s 
shareholders at the AGM – 
Greenpeace campaigners at 
the meeting were directing 
shareholders to see the 
messages on the website. 
 Activists dressed as 
orangutans protested outside 
the AGM as well. 
 Direct  
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
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48. April/May 
2010 
Greenpeace, 
WWF and 
Platform who 
approached 
ShareAction 
to organise 
the drafting 
and filing of 
two 
resolutions 
forming the 
basis of the 
campaign 
Shell and BP: tar 
sands in Canada 
To pressure the companies 
to publish details of the 
environmental, social and 
financial risks associated 
with their tar sands 
projects. 
 Two shareholder resolutions 
tabled at the AGMs of BP 
and Shell. 
 An online action tool which 
enables pension savers to 
contact their pension funds 
and urge them to engage in 
dialogue with the companies 
and support the resolutions. 
 Writing of investor 
briefings. 
 Extensive media campaign. 
 Holding meetings with 
investors to gather their 
support for the resolutions. 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
49. June 2010 ShareAction Current pension 
fund regulations 
Stricter government 
regulation of pension 
funds, which requires 
them to state how they act 
on environmental and 
social risks. 
Published a briefing which 
incorporates policy 
recommendations and specific 
regulatory changes that need to 
be made.  
 Direct  
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
 
50. August 
2010 
EIRIS, 
ShareAction 
Strengthening 
corporate 
governance 
arrangements in 
banks and financial 
institutions 
To respond to the 
European Commission‟s 
Green Paper on 
„Corporate governance in 
financial institutions and 
remuneration policies‟ 
Submitted a written response to 
the consultation (ShareAction, 
2010a; EIRIS, 2010b). 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
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51. October 
2010 – 
September 
2011 
Ekkleisa, 
London‟s 
Voluntary 
and 
Community 
Sector, One 
Society & 
Church 
Action on 
Poverty (joint 
response) 
ShareAction, 
WWF-UK, 
EIRIS, 
UKSIF 
 
Narrative reporting  To express their views on 
the proposed revisions to 
the nature of narrative 
reporting. 
Submitted a response to the 
Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) Committee‟s consultation 
on narrative reporting (BIS, 
2011). 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
52. 2010 Greenpeace, 
ShareAction 
Moving oil 
companies beyond 
oil 
To ask pension funds to 
question oil companies‟ 
risky business and ensure 
that their invested money 
is used to encourage both 
environmentally and 
financially responsible 
company behaviour. 
 Investor briefing aimed at 
alerting investors to the 
potential catastrophic 
financial and environmental 
impacts of unconventional 
oil projects post the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
 Online action tool via which 
pension savers can send a 
letter to their pension fund. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
53. 2010 Eurosif, Remuneration To demonstrate the Published „Remuneration‟ – a  Indirect 
341 
EIRIS challenges and 
opportunities to 
companies in relation to 
remuneration. 
report that puts forward 
recommendations for 
companies, policy-makers and 
responsible shareholders on this 
issue (Eurosif, 2010). 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
 Business Case 
 
54. 2010 EIRIS  Biodiversity loss To help investors 
understand the financial 
risks associated with 
biodiversity loss. 
Published  a report – 
„Biodiversity‟ (EIRIS, 2010c) 
which urges shareholders to: 
understand the risk that 
biodiversity loss introduces to 
their investments; use their 
influence to demand that 
businesses participate in 
voluntary stewardship schemes; 
collaborate with other 
shareholders to maximise the 
effect of the engagement 
process. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
55. 2010- 
2013 
UK Tar 
Sands 
Network 
BP‟s tar sands 
operations in 
Canada 
To challenge the board of 
BP with regard to the 
company‟s tar sands 
business. 
A combination of questions 
asked at the AGM (i.e. whether 
tar sands extraction can be 
classified as ecocide, the 
measures BP is taking to lobby 
against the EU Fuel Quality 
Directive, etc.) and protests. For 
example, in 2012, nine 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
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protestors were „killed by 
climate change‟, lying in 
various locations around the 
conference hall. 
56. February 
2011-2013 
Palestine 
Solidarity 
Campaign 
(PSC) 
Justice for the 
Palestinians 
To ask UK supermarkets 
to „end trade with any 
company exporting goods 
from illegal Israeli 
settlements‟ (PSC, 2012).  
For the cost of £1 PCS activists 
have become members of Co-op 
which has given them the right 
to vote on motions and 
company policy. They have 
aimed to force a company-wide 
boycott of Israeli companies 
producing in occupied 
territories through attending the 
meetings of Co-op‟s seven 
regional constituencies and also 
Co-op‟s national AGM in 
Manchester. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
57. March 
2011 
ShareAction 
and Client 
Earth (joint 
submission), 
EIRIS, 
UKSIF 
Corporate reporting To respond to the 
Financial Reporting 
Council‟s (FRC) 
consultation entitled 
„Effective Company 
Stewardship‟ (FRC, 
2011). 
Submitted a written response to 
the consultation. Suggested 
areas for improvement include 
strengthening reporting 
regulations on social and 
environmental issues that are 
material to companies and thus 
providing investors with high 
quality information. 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
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58. 14 April 
2011 
Greenpeace, 
Platform 
London, No 
Tar Sands, 
ShareAction 
BP and the Gulf of 
Mexico Oil Spill 
To voice concerns over 
the company‟s abysmal 
handling of the disaster. 
Different NGOs attended the 
AGM and confronted the 
company about the Gulf of 
Mexico Oil Spill. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
59. 15 April 
2011 – 12 
April 2012 
Indigenous 
Environment
al Network 
Beaver Lake Cree 
First Nation in 
Canada 
To challenge BP‟s board 
of directors at the AGM. 
 2011 – Read out a statement 
from Fort McKay Cree First 
Nation community members 
who are affected by BP‟s 
„Sunrise‟ project. 
 2012 – Asked a question 
about the legal challenge by 
the Beaver Lake Cree First 
Nation which could make tar 
sands extraction across large 
parts of Canada illegal. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
60. 03 May 
2011 – on-
going 
ShareAction 
in 
conjunction 
with: Citizens 
UK, Fair Pay 
Network, 
Public and 
Commercial 
Services 
Union, 
Living wages across 
the UK 
„To permanently embed 
Living Wage standards in 
the UK's private sector, 
beginning with the biggest 
companies on the London 
Stock Exchange, namely 
the FTSE 100‟ 
(ShareAction, 2011c). 
 
 Getting investors to co-sign 
a letter sent to the CEOs of 
the FTSE 100 urging them to 
adopt living wage standards. 
 Buying shares, attending 
company AGMs and raising 
a question about living wage 
policies. 
 Engaging in subsequent 
discussions with companies.  
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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Prospect, 
Unison, 
Unite 
61. May 
2011-2012 
The Finance 
Innovation 
Lab 
Social Finance  To support the 
development of the social 
finance marketplace. 
Hosted a variety of workshops 
at different organisations 
throughout 2011 and 2012, 
including one for the Social 
Finance team at the Cabinet 
Office. 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
62. May 2011 CORE Corporate Reporting 
on Environmental 
and Social Issues 
Clarification and 
strengthening of the rules 
on corporate reporting. 
Published „Simply Put: Towards 
an Effective Regime for 
Environmental and Social 
Reporting by Companies‟ which 
suggests amendments to the 
Companies Act. Reporting is 
seen as vital for encouraging 
long-termism in finance and for 
informing shareholders about 
company operations and 
associated risks (CORE, 2011).  
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
 
63. July 2011 Access, 
ShareAction  
Telecoms and 
Human Rights 
Following the aftermath 
of Vodafone‟s decision to 
comply with the Egyptian 
government‟s order to 
shut down its mobile and 
internet services in order 
to prevent mass 
 The executive director of 
Access attended Vodafone‟s 
AGM. 
 SA prepared and distributed 
an investor briefing 
highlighting risks and 
suggesting a series of 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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demonstrations in the 
country, SA and Access 
wanted to raise the issue 
of telecommunication 
companies and human 
rights abuses among 
investors.  Investors had 
to confront telecoms on 
whether they have learned 
from Vodafone‟s 
experience. 
questions for shareholders to 
ask. 
 Discussions with UK and 
international investors about 
the issue. 
 Extensive media coverage. 
64. September 
2011 
Forum for the 
Future 
Sustainable 
Economy 
To show investors how 
they can create a 
„resilient, stable and 
sustainable‟ economy 
(Forum for the Future, 
2011b). 
Published a report – 
„Sustainable Economy in 2040‟ 
(Forum for the Future, 2011b). 
 Both Direct 
and Indirect 
 Public Policy 
and CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
65. October 
2011 – 
December 
2012 
The Finance 
Innovation 
Lab 
The role of policy 
for the shift towards 
a sustainable 
economy 
 A project called the 
„Disruptive Finance 
Policy‟ which aims to 
uncover the most 
promising policy ideas 
that can challenge the 
current financial system to 
overcome some of the 
biggest barriers to a 
sustainable economy. 
 Conducting in-depth 
dialogues with key figures 
from a wide spectrum of 
sectors to map the main 
disruptive policy ideas being 
debated. 
 A workshop presenting the 
findings and discussing 
which policy ideas can be 
championed by the FIL; 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
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holding a peer-to-peer 
Finance Policy Summit in 
2012. 
 Members of the FIL are 
working on a business plan 
on how to scale up creating a 
movement for policy change 
in finance. 
66. November 
2011 
WWF-UK in 
collaboration 
with Doughty 
Hanson & Co 
The role of the 
private equity 
industry for driving 
sustainability 
 To highlight the increased 
return that private equity 
firms can accrue if they 
manage actively their 
portfolio companies. 
Consideration of ESG 
issues and responsible 
investment can mitigate 
reputational and financial 
risks. 
Published a report ‘Private 
Equity and Responsible 
Investment: An Opportunity for 
Value Creation‟ (WWF-UK, 
2011b). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
67. November 
2011 – 
January 
2013 
ShareAction Kay Review of UK 
Equity Markets 
 To respond to the call for 
evidence. 
 Submitted „Kay Review Call 
for Evidence: Response from 
ShareAction‟ (ShareAction, 
2011d) – a document 
highlighting the main policy 
positions and objectives of 
the organisation. 
 Submitted „Kay Review of 
Equity Markets: 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
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Supplementary Evidence 
from ShareAction‟ 
(ShareAction, 2012e). 
 Wrote „Final Report of the 
Kay Review of UK Equity 
Markets & Long-termism‟ 
(ShareAction, 2012f) – an 
official response to the 
document. 
68. 2011 Forum for the 
Future 
Long-term Thinking 
in Financial Markets 
To identify the main 
barriers to long-term 
thinking and outline 
practical ways of 
overcoming them. 
Published a report – 
„Overcoming the Barriers to 
Long-term Thinking in 
Financial Markets‟ (Forum for 
the Future, 2011a). 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
and CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
69. 2011 EIRIS Water scarcity To outline the short time 
frame within which water 
scarcity will start to have 
unwanted financial 
impacts for shareholders 
and companies. 
Published „Water Risk Report‟ 
– an ESG risk briefing for 
investors. The paper offers 
recommendations for investors 
and urges them to: demand 
better corporate reporting on 
water; encourage evaluation of 
managing or not managing 
water risk at company level; 
encourage companies to make 
water management a core part 
of their environmental strategy 
(EIRIS, 2011b). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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70. 27 April 
2011 
World 
Development 
Movement 
(WDM)  
Commodity 
speculation: bank‟s 
role in the food 
crisis 
To stop speculating on 
food prices by banks and 
big financial institutions. 
Attended Barclay‟s AGM to ask 
questions about commodities.  
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral case 
71. 2011 ECCR, 
ShareAction 
Sex trafficking and 
the Olympics 
To urge FTSE 100 
companies to mitigate the 
risks of their facilities 
being used for sex 
trafficking during the 
London Olympic Games. 
To outline how ethical 
shareholders can address 
this issue prior to the 
Olympics. 
 Published an investor 
briefing – „Hotels, Sex 
Trafficking and London 
2012‟ (ECCR, 2011). 
 Engaged with shareholders. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Both Moral 
and Business 
Case 
 
72. 2011 – on-
going 
ShareAction Fiduciary Duty To seek specific statutory 
clarification of what 
fiduciary duty entails. 
 Two reports published: 
Protecting Our Best Interests 
(ShareAction, 2011b) and 
The Enlightened 
Shareholder: Clarifying 
Investors‟ Fiduciary Duties 
(ShareAction, 2012d). 
 Attending Party 
Conferences. 
 Consultation Submissions. 
 Organising roundtables 
where ministers and policy 
makers can discuss and 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
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comment on the issue. 
 A letter marshalled by SA 
and signed by investors, 
campaigners and academics 
published in The Times on 
March 2012. 
73. 2011 – on-
going 
CDP Carbon Action „To accelerate company 
action on carbon reduction 
and energy efficiency 
activities which deliver a 
satisfactory return on 
investment‟ (CDP, 2012). 
Each year CDP coordinates and 
sends a request on behalf of 190 
investors with $18 trillion in 
assets under management to 
companies in high emitting 
industries, asking them to cut 
emissions and publicly disclose 
targets. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
74. 2011 ShareAction, 
ChristianAid, 
ActionAid 
Corporate Tax 
Practices 
„To get companies 
treating tax as part of their 
wider responsibility to the 
societies in which they 
operate‟ (SA, 2012c). 
 Attending the AGMs of 
FTSE 100 companies and 
asking questions about their 
tax policies. 
 ActionAid and ShareAction 
(2011) published an investor 
briefing – „Tax 
Responsibility: The Business 
Case‟. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
75. March 
2012 
The Carbon 
Tracker 
Initiative 
(CTI) 
Unburnable Carbon To manage the transition 
to a low-carbon economy 
and to initiate reforms to 
key aspects of financial 
 Published „Unburnable 
Carbon – Are the World‟s 
Financial Markets Carrying 
A Carbon Bubble?‟ (CTI, 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
350 
regulation with the aim of 
acknowledging the risks 
inherent in fossil fuel 
assets and taking action to 
reduce these risks.  
2011). 
 Engaging with institutional 
shareholders to stress the 
risks they face if fossil fuel 
assets become stranded. 
 Engaging with regulators to 
propose practical measure to 
minimise the risks to market 
stability associated with the 
imminent carbon bubble.  
and Public 
Policy 
 Business Case 
 
76. April 2012 ShareAction Responsible 
investment practices 
in contract-based 
pension providers 
To facilitate a comparison 
between the leading UK 
pension providers in the 
wake of auto-enrolment. 
Published „The Stewardship 
Lottery: The Governance Gap 
in Contract-Based Pensions‟ 
(ShareAction, 2012g) which 
recommends that insurance 
companies should: demonstrate 
their commitment to responsible 
investment by disclosing a 
policy on how they deal with 
ESG issues; monitor the voting 
and engagement activities of 
their fund managers and 
disclose records on their 
websites; issue a statement of 
compliance with the UK 
Stewardship Code and become 
signatories of the UN PRI. The 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
 Business Case 
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report also makes policy 
recommendations to the 
Department for Work and 
Pensions. 
77. 2 May 
2012 
CAAT, 
Ekklesia 
BAE Systems 
selling arms which 
are used to suppress 
pro-democracy 
protests to Saudi 
Arabia. Corruption 
allegations. 
To challenge the board at 
the company‟s AGM. 
Staff members of CAAT and 
Ekklesia bought single shares 
and challenged BAE about its 
operations in Saudi Arabia and 
the corruption investigations. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
78. 22 May 
2012 
UK Tar 
Sands 
Network 
Climate Change To question Shell about its 
unrealistic future energy 
demand predictions 
which, if achieved, will 
lead to CO2 levels that are 
50% higher than the 
scientific threshold. 
Members of the UK Tar Sands 
Network attended the AGM and 
confronted the company about 
its short-term profit maximising 
approach which neglects any 
climate change repercussions 
that may happen in the near 
future. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
79. May 2012 Green 
Alliance 
Public benefit from 
UK tax relief 
Creating a new policy 
agenda that would „restore 
the savings and 
investment cycle as an 
engine for economic 
stability, social innovation 
and low carbon economic 
transition. The foundation 
Published the paper „Saving for 
a Sustainable Future‟ (Hewett, 
2012). One of the three building 
blocks relates to the need for 
finding ways for incentivising 
and encouraging long-term 
focus for investments.  Some of 
the proposed reforms include: 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
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of this new agenda needs 
three important building 
blocks‟ (Hewett, 2012, p. 
4). 
granting a tax subsidy to 
pension funds on the condition 
that the long-term social, 
economic and environmental 
interests of the saver and 
taxpayers are considered; 
linking tax breaks to long-term 
and responsible investment, and 
increasing the period for which 
pension funds hold equities by 
offering tax incentives. 
80. May 2012 
– on-going 
Platform, 
Greenpeace, 
ShareAction 
Shell and Arctic 
Drilling 
To outline the risks 
investors may face and to 
encourage them to discuss 
the issues with Shell. 
 Published a report – „Out in 
the Cold: Investor Risk in 
Shell‟s Arctic Exploration‟ 
which alerts investors that 
„oil spill risks, high 
extraction costs, doubts over 
the amount of commercially 
recoverable reserves, and a 
precedent of cost overruns 
and delay combine to raise 
questions about the 
commercial viability‟ of 
Shell‟s planned drilling 
operations in the Arctic 
(Greenpeace, 2012).  
 ShareAction produced a 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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series of briefing documents 
for investors which were 
aimed at: highlighting the 
risks of oil spills, suggesting 
questions on Arctic drilling 
that investors can ask Shell 
and keeping shareholders 
up-to-date with the 
company‟s operations in the 
Arctic.  
 Attendance at Shell‟s 
AGMs. 
81. May 2012 ShareAction High Executive Pay To push major 
shareholders to vote 
against excessive pay at 
their investee companies. 
 Supporters and members of 
SA attended AGMs of 
companies to raise the issue 
of high pay. 
 Briefing for pension fund 
trustees encouraging them to 
ask their asset managers 
questions related to 
executive pay. 
 Launched an online action 
tool through which people 
can ask their pension or ISA 
provider to vote against 
excessive pay. 
 Submitted evidence to 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
 Business Case 
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„Executive Pay: 
Consultation on Enhanced 
Shareholder Voting Rights‟ 
(BIS, 2012). 
82. May 2012 Global 
Witness 
Corruption – 
Glencore  
Calling on Glencore to 
explain potentially corrupt 
deals in Congo. 
 Published a briefing for 
shareholders – „Secrecy 
Surrounding Glencore‟s 
Business Deals in the 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo: Risks Exposing 
Shareholders to Corrupt 
Practices‟ (Global Witness, 
2012a). 
 Attended the company‟s 
AGM. 
 Indirect and 
Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral and 
Business Case 
 
83. June 2012 ShareAction, 
High Pay 
Centre, PIRC 
Corporate 
governance and 
remuneration 
To express their position 
with respect to the 
Treasury Committee‟ call 
for evidence on corporate 
governance and 
remunerations in the 
financial services sector. 
Submitted evidence to the 
Treasury. Points of interest 
include: an outline of the main 
barriers to shareholder 
engagement, the role of 
shareholders (ShareAction), 
information asymmetry between 
the board and shareholders, 
more transparency needed with 
respect to the extent to which 
investment funds scrutinise 
corporate governance issues 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
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(High Pay Centre), etc. 
84. 12 June 
2012 
Global 
Witness 
Corruption - ENRC Calling on ENRC to 
address corruption 
allegations in Congo. 
Published a memo for ENRC‟ 
shareholders which outlines in 
detail five mining deals 
involving ENRC (Global 
Witness, 2012b). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral and 
Business Case 
85. July 2012 UKSIF, 
ShareAction 
Stewardship Code – 
revisions 
To respond to the FRC‟s 
consultation of the UK 
Stewardship Code. 
 UKSIF submitted a 
document to the FRC which 
calls for: 
- The Pension Regulator 
to encourage adoption of the 
code by pension funds. 
- The consideration of 
ESG risks to be seen as an 
essential part of good 
stewardship. 
- Stronger wording of the 
code (UKSIF, 2012). 
 ShareAction submitted a 
document to the FRC which 
calls for: 
- A clarification of what 
„stewardship‟ means – whom 
stewardship obligations are 
owed to, what is being 
„stewarded‟. 
- Making specific 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
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reference to fiduciary duty and 
reaffirming that applying the 
Code is consistent with 
investors‟ fiduciary duties. 
- Clarifying the difference 
between stewardship and 
responsible investment 
(ShareAction, 2012h). 
86. 20 
September 
2012 
UKSIF Responsible 
Investment 
To urge the Parliamentary 
Contributory Pension 
Fund (PCPF) to sign up to 
the UK Stewardship Code 
which aims to enhance 
engagement between 
shareholders and 
companies. 
UKSIF have written a letter to 
the Chairmen of the Board of 
Trustees of the PCPF requesting 
a meeting to discuss the issue. 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
and Moral 
Case 
 
87. September 
2012 
ShareAction Chevron‟s response 
to a court decision 
regarding the 
dumping of toxic 
waste in Ecuador 
To review, together with 
investors, Chevron‟s 
aggressive and much 
criticised handling of a 
lawsuit about the dumping 
of toxic waste in Ecuador.  
 Two investor briefings 
published in September and 
November of 2012. 
 Meetings and engagement 
with investors aimed at 
raising awareness of the 
risks that they face with 
regard to the litigation. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
88. 25 
October 
2012 
War on 
Want, 
Columbia 
BHP Billiton To highlight issues 
around: community 
displacements and decent 
A number of representatives 
from different NGOs attended 
the AGM and asked questions 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
357 
Solidarity 
Campaign, 
London 
Mining 
Network, 
Down to 
Earth, 
Indigenous 
Peoples‟ 
Links (IPL) 
compensation in 
Colombia (CSC), poor 
health and poverty in 
communities close to the 
company‟s Cerro Matoso 
nickel mine (War on 
Want), river diversion, the 
company‟s attitude to 
climate change (LMN), 
free prior and informed 
consent (IPL). 
regarding their concerns.  Business and 
Moral Case 
 
89. 21 
December 
2012 
World 
Development 
Movement, 
London 
Mining 
Network 
Coal mine in 
Phulbari, 
Bangladesh – GCM 
Resources 
To express concerns about 
what would happen if the 
construction of the 
proposed mine goes 
ahead. 
 At GCM Resources‟ AGM 
an activist dressed like Santa 
gave Gerard Holden 
(company Chairman) a 
present for Christmas – a 
stocking of coal. 
 Activists questioned the 
company‟s decision to build 
the coal mine without 
securing the free, prior and 
informed consent of 
Bangladeshi people. Other 
concerns included water and 
food security for displaced 
families. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
 
90. December ShareAction UK Ethical Funds To rank ethical funds on Published a survey – „Ethically  Indirect 
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2012 and the extent to 
which they are 
acting as responsible 
owners 
how responsive and 
responsible they are.  
Engaged? A Survey of UK 
Ethical Funds' (SA, 2012i). 
Scoring was based on three 
criteria: transparency, screening 
processes and stewardship and 
engagement (i.e. the extent to 
which funds use their 
shareholder rights to engage 
with companies). 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
91. 2012-2013 WWF UK in 
association 
with Carbon 
Tracker 
Initiative, 
Trucost, 
SinCo and 
the 
Government 
Employee 
Pension 
Fund. 
Climate Change and 
Freshwater Risks 
The main argument is that 
institutional investors are 
failing to systematically 
consider climate change 
and freshwater risks when 
making investment 
decisions. This poses high 
risks for investors as it can 
lead to the bonds and 
equities of certain 
companies in high carbon 
sectors being mispriced. 
Suggestions for 
governments on how to 
scale up carbon and water 
responsible investments. 
Published the „Navigating 
Muddy Waters‟ series of five 
reports that attempt to address 
these questions. The 
recommendations suggest that: 
„there are significant 
opportunities for responsible 
investors to use engagement 
strategies to promote water 
stewardship in investee 
companies‟ (WWF-UK, 2012, 
p. 8). They also consider ways 
of aligning short-term 
investment strategies with long-
term investment horizons 
through government legislation.   
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
 Business case 
 
92. January 
2013 
ShareAction Mandatory Voting 
Disclosure 
To summarise the main 
lessons from the 
Published „The Missing Link: 
Lessons from the Shareholder 
 Direct 
 Public Policy 
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Shareholder Spring in 
2012 – the revolt against 
companies‟ remuneration 
policies. 
Spring‟ (ShareAction, 2013c) 
which analysed the responses 
savers got from their pension 
funds with respect to their 
voting intentions on executive 
pay. The report concludes that 
institutional investors should be 
much more accountable to the 
individuals whose money they 
are managing. It recommends to 
government that it exercises its 
power to require institutional 
investors to mandatory disclose 
their voting activities. 
 Moral and 
Business case 
 
93. 19 
February 
2013 
Friends of the 
Earth, 
ShareAction 
Pension funds and 
land acquisitions in 
the world‟ poorest 
countries  
To encourage FoE 
supporters to write to their 
pension funds (who are 
the largest investors in 
farmland worldwide) and: 
1.) ask them if they are 
investing in land grabs; 2.) 
emphasise the risk of 
investing in agricultural 
land. 
 Published a sample letter on 
their website for pension 
fund members to send to 
their pension funds. 
 Together with ShareAction 
published an investor 
briefing in April 2013 which 
highlights the risks 
associated with land 
investment (ShareAction, 
2013d). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
94. 21 
February 
London 
Mining 
Bumi plc and coal 
mining 
To question the company 
about the impacts of its 
 Attended the company‟s 
AGM to ask questions. 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
360 
2013 Network, 
Down to 
Earth, War 
on Want 
coal-mining operations in 
Kalimantan, Indonesia. 
 London Mining Network co-
ordinator Richard Solly 
urged investors to engage on 
the issue: „Investors 
concerned about Bumi‟s 
share price and the dodgy 
dealing would do well to 
show similar interest in the 
way the company deals with 
human rights and 
environmental issues‟. 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
95. 05 March-
April 2013 
ShareAction Transparency in 
relation to entities 
(such as contract-
based workplace or 
personal pension 
providers and asset 
managers) regulated 
by the Financial 
Conduct Authority 
(FCA) 
To address key issues 
impeding responsible 
investment such as 
conflicts of interest in the 
asset management 
industry and to call for 
greater transparency in 
terms of investment 
policies, voting activities 
and investors‟ holdings. 
Submitted a response to FCA‟s 
Discussion Paper 13/1 on 
transparency. 
 Direct  
 Public Policy 
 Business Case 
 
96. 12 March 
2013 
UKSIF Ownership Day A new national initiative 
launched by UKSIF and 
its partners to increase the 
demand for active 
ownership and to raise 
awareness of its benefits 
UKSIF has gathered support 
from other NGOs and 
institutional investors and on 
the 12
th
 March has: 
- Highlighted the financial 
benefits for investors from 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
361 
across the UK. active ownership. 
- Called on shareholders 
such as pension fund members 
and retail investors to ask their 
trustees and fund managers 
whether their portfolio is 
actively managed. 
- Held a parliamentary 
reception and discussed the role 
of active ownership in 
contributing to sustainable 
growth. 
 Business Case 
 
97. 15 March 
2013 
People and 
Planet 
Adidas‟ failure to 
pay severance to 
Indonesian factory 
workers 
To outline the background 
of the case and highlight 
actions that investors 
could take. 
Published an investor briefing 
which summarises the main 
business risks of Adidas‟ refusal 
to pay the $1.8 million owed to 
workers and urges investors to 
engage with the company by 
asking a list of suggested 
questions.  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
 
98. 18 April 
2013 
London 
Mining 
Network 
Rio Tinto and the 
construction of a 
gold and copper 
mine in the Gobi 
Desert in Mongolia 
To question the board 
about Rio Tinto‟s plans to 
build the mine in 
Mongolia. To include 
measures that protect the 
biodiversity, climate and 
water for local people. 
 Attended the company‟s 
AGM and asked a question. 
 Organised a demonstration 
outside the AGM.  
 Arranged for activists from 
affected communities in 
Colombia, Mongolia, South 
 Direct  
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
362 
Africa, and the USA to come 
and speak at the AGM. 
99. 19 April 
2013 
London 
Mining 
Network, 
War on Want 
Anglo American – 
environmental 
concerns 
To challenge the board 
over their disregard of 
human rights and the 
environment. 
 Attended the company‟s 
AGM. 
 Organised a demonstration 
outside the AGM. 
 Arranged for activists from 
affected communities in 
Colombia, Mongolia, South 
Africa and the USA to come 
and speak at the AGM. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
100. 24 April 
2013 
Biofuel 
Watch 
Biomass Burning – 
carbon emissions, 
human rights 
To protest Drax‟s recent 
decision to convert half of 
their coal power station to 
burning biomass, most of 
which will be in the form 
of imported wood. 
Attended the company‟s AGM 
with the aim of protesting 
against the company‟s decision.  
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
101. April 2013 
– on-going 
ShareAction  Climate change Keeping climate change to 
a minimum by lobbying 
pension funds and FTSE 
100 companies to support 
a low carbon economy. 
 Developed an online action 
tool via which people can 
contact their pension 
providers and ask what they 
are doing to protect their 
savings. 
 Challenged FTSE 100 
companies at their AGMs 
asking them how are they 
addressing climate change 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Both Moral 
and Business 
Case 
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risks. 
102. 10 May 
2013 
FoE, the New 
Economics 
Foundation, 
Civitas, 
ResPublica, 
WDM, 
Positive 
Money, The 
Finance 
Innovation 
Lab, WWF – 
UK, 
ShareAction. 
Transforming 
Finance Conference 
To facilitate 
understanding and 
encourage debate around a 
range of positive 
proposals designed to: 1.) 
prevent debt crises, asset 
price bubbles, and state 
bailouts; 2.) make finance 
work for the long-term 
interests of people and 
planet. 
A full-day conference that 
brings together academics, 
campaigners, economists and 
policy makers. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
 Moral and 
Business Case 
 
103. 13 May 
2013 
Fuel Poverty 
Action 
The price of heating, 
climate change 
To express concerns about 
British Gas‟ policies, 
actions and significant 
power. 
Campaigners from Fuel Poverty 
Action attended the AGM of 
British Gas and critiqued the 
company for not doing enough 
to tackle fuel poverty which 
causes starvation and deaths and 
for actively lobbying the 
government for investment in 
gas which exacerbates climate 
change. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral Case 
 
104. 24 May 
2013 
Global 
Witness 
Forests To put HSBC‟s directors 
under the spotlight for the 
bank‟s role in subsidising 
Attended the company‟s AGM 
and asked a question. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
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companies responsible for 
the destruction and 
deforestation of Borneo‟s 
forests in Malaysia caused 
by palm oil plantations 
and logging.   
 Moral Case 
 
105. September 
2013 
ChristianAid, 
ECCR, 
CAFOD, 
ShareAction, 
Oxfam and 
others 
 
Company ownership To respond to an open 
consultation by the BIS 
Committee entitled 
„Company Ownership: 
Transparency and Trust 
Discussion Paper‟ (BIS, 
2013) which considers a 
range of proposals to 
enhance the ability to 
know who owns and 
controls UK companies. 
Submitted a joint response to 
the consultation paper (UKSIF, 
2013). 
 Indirect 
 Public Policy 
 Business and 
Moral case 
 
106. 7 October 
2013 
WWF-UK, 
ShareAction 
Biodiversity impacts 
of oil extraction 
To highlight the 
reputational and financial 
risks faced by investors 
who have a stake in the 
UK oil company Soco 
which intends to explore 
for oil in Virunga National 
Park, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. 
The two organisations published 
an investor briefing on the 
potential impacts of Soco‟s 
planned exploration activities 
(WWF-UK, 2013). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
Moral case 
107. 30 ShareAction, Climate change and To embed climate  Direct engagement with  Direct and 
365 
October 
2013 
supported by 
Greenpeace, 
FoE, WWF, 
Oxfam, 
Unison and 
Unite 
pension fund 
investors 
awareness into the 
investment decisions, into 
dialogue with companies 
and into policy advocacy 
undertaken by pension 
providers. 
pension funds and trustee 
training sessions. 
 E-action for pension savers. 
 Report writing – „The Green 
Light Report – Resilient 
Portfolios in an Uncertain 
World‟ (ShareAction, 
2013d). 
 Training sessions for 
pension savers to campaign 
on the issue. 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
108. 19 
November 
2013 
ShareAction Building a more 
accountable 
investment system 
To outline the steps 
needed for pension 
schemes to increase 
transparency and 
accountability and give 
savers a voice when it 
comes to ESG issues. 
Published a report entitled „Our 
Money, Our Business‟ 
(ShareAction, 2013b) and a best 
practice guide with the same 
name. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
 Business and 
Moral Case 
109. 2013 The Carbon 
Tracker 
Initiative 
Climate change „Calls for regulators, 
governments and investors 
to re-evaluate energy 
business models against 
carbon budgets, to prevent 
$6trillion carbon bubble in 
the next decade‟ (Carbon 
Tracker Initiative, 2013). 
Published a report – 
„Unburnable Carbon 2013: 
Wasted Capital and Stranded 
Assets‟ which argues that 
between 60 – 80 per cent of the 
oil, gas and coal reserves of 
listed companies will not have a 
value in the future (will be 
stranded assets) if the world is 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
and Public 
Policy 
 Business Case 
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to not exceed the current target 
of global warming of 2
0
 C 
(Carbon Tracker Initiative, 
2013). 
110. 2013 ShareAction 
 
Lobbying and 
political spending 
To increase the level of 
transparency of UK 
companies to their 
investors when it comes to 
their political spending. 
 Working with other 
investors, the organisation 
coordinates international 
investor action on the topic. 
 Sent letters to the CEOs of 
FTSE 100 companies who 
have potential connections 
with organisations such as 
ALEC or the Heartland 
Institution. 
 Attendance at AGMs and 
asking of questions. 
 Direct and 
Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business Case 
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Appendix 4: Waygood’s (2006) Chronology of NGO Shareholder Activist Campaigns (1990 – 2002)  
Number  Date NGO(s) Aim Nature of Intervention Classification 
1. April 1990 Surfers Against 
Sewage 
To change South West Water‟s 
sewage disposal policy. 
Brought a bag of sewage related detritus to 
the 1990 AGM and questioned the board 
about its policy in relation to marine dumping 
of sewage. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
2. March 
1991 
Minewatch – a 
global coalition of 
NGOs 
campaigning on 
mining issues. 
To prevent Hanson plc. from 
developing mineral deposits 
found in Navajo Native 
American reserves. 
Purchased shares in order to attend AGM 
along with four Navajo Native Americans 
who questioned the board about their plans in 
this area. 
 Direct  
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
3. April 1991 Greenpeace To stop ICI manufacturing 
ozone depleting chemicals. 
Campaigners took briefcases containing a 
hidden public address system into the ICI 
AGM so that they could play messages about 
ICI‟s continual production of ozone depleting 
chemicals. A further 80 activists 
demonstrated outside, holding placards 
declaring „ICI – world class ozone destroyer‟. 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
4. 1991 Forests Monitor To persuade James Latham plc. 
(then one of Britain‟s largest 
timber merchants) to source 
sustainable timber. 
Wrote to investors encouraging them to put 
pressure on the board to source sustainable 
timber. Media work naming and shaming 
investors in James Latham. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
5. April 1992 Surfers Against 
Sewage 
Change South West Water‟s 
sewage disposal policy. 
Presentation at James Capel (then a large City 
sell-side broker), concerning the 
environmental performance of South West 
Water plc. Surfers Against Sewage made a 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
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presentation encouraging investors to raise 
questions at the AGM.  
6. 1992 The Royal Society 
for the Protection 
of Birds (RSPB) 
To stop Fisons extracting peat 
from Sites of Special Scientific 
Interest. 
RSPB chief executive writes to the Financial 
Times criticising Fisons board for describing 
peat extraction as „environmental issue of 
small commercial significance‟, encouraging 
shareholders to urge Fisons to „reach a 
solution which does not damage the 
remaining peat bogs and secures a larger 
share of the peat alternatives market‟. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Both 
business and 
moral case 
7. 1992 WWF-UK To improve MFI 
Environmental Policy and 
encourage endorsement of 
sustainable timber furniture. 
Provided critique of MFI Environmental 
Policy with support of Institutional Investor 
(NPI). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
8. 1992 PARTiZANZ To prevent RTZ from mining 
in land sacred for indigenous 
people.  
Invited Australian aborigines and people from 
the Philippines to RTZ‟s AGMs, as well as 
local British people affected by the operations 
of the company. 
 Direct  
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
9. 1995-1997 Various NGO 
groups including 
Friends of the 
Earth, The 
Ecologist, The 
Berne Declaration, 
Global Witness and 
the Sarawak 
Solidarity 
Campaign. 
To stop the Asea Brown 
Boveri (ABB), the Bakun 
Hydroelectric Corporation and 
Ekran Berhad from building 
the controversial Bakun Dam 
in Malaysia. 
Broad-ranging campaign including joint letter 
with some investors in ABB to its president 
encouraging ABB to withdraw from Bakun 
Dam (successfully). Bakun Dam postponed 
indefinitely. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Both 
business and 
moral 
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10. 1997 PIRC (in 
conjunction with 
Greenpeace, 
Amnesty and 
WWF-UK) 
„The directors [of Shell] are 
requested to designate 
responsibility for the 
implementation of 
environmental and corporate 
responsibility policies to a 
named…director; establish 
effective internal procedures 
for the implementation and 
monitoring of such policies; 
establish an independent 
external review and audit 
procedure for such policies; 
report to shareholders regularly 
on the implementation of such 
policies; publish a report to 
shareholders on the 
implementation of such 
policies in relation to the 
company‟s operations in 
Nigeria by the end of 1997‟ 
(PIRC, 1998, p.8). 
PIRC coordinated a shareholder resolution 
submitted to Shell‟s AGM on behalf of the 
Local Authority Pension Fund Forum „with 
the support of ECCR who have also been in 
dialogue with the company over an extended 
period, WWF and Amnesty International 
(UK). The requisitionists included eighteen 
institutional investors and a large number of 
private investors…PIRC held an Investor 
Briefing on 6 May 1997 which was addressed 
by Clive Wicks, Head of International 
Programmes, World Wide Fund for Nature; 
Sir Geoffrey Chandler, Chair of the Business 
Group and member of the Board of Amnesty 
International UK and Anne Simpson, joint 
Managing Director of PIRC. It was attended 
by over twenty-five shareholders‟ (PIRC, 
1998, p.8). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Both 
business and 
moral 
11. October 
1998 
Traidcraft 
Exchange 
To explore the potential 
between development NGOs 
and ethical investment funds 
„for greater collaboration to 
press for behaviour by UK 
companies that benefits the 
poor and local communities in 
the developing world‟ 
Ran seminar looking into this question hosted 
by Friends Provident to bring Albert E Sharp, 
AXA Sun Life, Friends Provident, Henderson 
Global Investors, Jupiter Asset Management, 
NPI Global Care, Scottish Equitable, Standard 
Life together with Amnesty International, 
CAFOD, ChristianAid, Oxfam, Save the 
Children, Tradecraft, War on Want, Water 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral 
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(Traidcraft Exchange, 1998, 
p.1).  
Aid and the World Development Movement 
for a debate. 
12. Nov. 1998 FoE To set FoE policy in relation to 
investment. To question the 
extent to which ethical 
investment funds „can shift the 
behaviour of the large 
corporate powerhouses‟ 
(UKSIF, 1998, p.8).  
Campaigns director of FoE spoke to UK 
Social Investment Forum‟s AGM: „by 
screening all of the large companies that 
create harm out of their portfolios, how do 
ethical funds add pressure for change?‟; 
announced the promotion of a bill to put in 
place a „legal requirement for IFAs to ask 
potential purchasers of financial products 
what, if any, ethical criteria customers wish to 
have reflected in the financial products they 
purchase‟; and called for a „requirement for 
pension fund trustees to publish a progressive 
investment statement that sets out the firm‟s 
approach to environmental and social issues‟ 
(UKSIF, 1998, pp.2-4).  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Both 
business and 
moral case 
13. Jan. 1999 WWF-UK To promote investment in more 
sustainable companies; to work 
on a formal basis with a 
financial institution to lobby 
and negotiate with the 
management of listed 
companies to improve their 
environmental performance; to 
raise funds for conservation 
work. 
Launched the NPI/WWF investment fund. 
„WWF and NPI believe that this fund and 
partnership can further persuade companies 
that environmental sense makes business 
sense too, while helping WWF fund its work 
on issues such as climate change and marine 
pollution. WWF and NPI‟s Global Care 
Investment Team will encourage all 
companies within the fund to continually 
improve their environmental programme 
through regular monitoring and dialogue. 
Companies will be excluded if they fail the 
„inherent sustainability test‟ (WWF and NPI 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
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Press Release, 1999, pp.1-3). 
14. 1999 Forum for the 
Future 
„To catalyse the incorporation 
of environmental 
considerations into the 
investment analysis and 
decision-making processes of 
mainstream financial 
institutions in the UK.‟ (Forum 
for the Future, 1999, p.1). 
Published first Capital Futures Project Report: 
„Blind to Sustainability? Stock Markets and 
the Environment?‟ Argued that the obstacles 
hindering uptake of environmental 
information by investment analysts include 
„1. Availability – the fundamental inadequacy 
of environment-related information provided 
by the corporate sector; 2. Recognition of 
relevance – the current perception of the 
environment as not being relevant to 
investment analysis and decisions; and 3. 
Capacity – investment professionals‟ lack of 
capability to accurately evaluate 
environmental information‟ (Forum for the 
Future, 1999, p.iv).  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
15. 1999 War on Want To reduce the effect of 
globalisation on the working 
poor by promoting 
international codes of conduct 
for labour standards in the 
supply chain.  
Launched Invest in Freedom Campaign aimed 
at union members, requesting support for the 
promotion of engagement with their 
occupational pension fund. The report „does 
not advocate disinvestments in those 
companies that have violated workers‟ rights. 
Rather, we encourage and organise pension 
fund holders and their trustees to use their 
combined financial might to pressure 
companies to [establish and implement] a 
code of conduct enshrining ILO Core Labour 
Standards‟ (War on Want, 1999, p.1).  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral case 
16. Feb. 1999 UKSIF in To support the proposal for the Responded to the DSS „Strengthening the  Indirect 
372 
conjunction with 
Traidcraft 
Exchange, FoE, 
War on Want and 
WWF UK 
forthcoming Statement of 
Investment Principles to 
include a disclosure clause 
setting out the degree to which 
pension funds incorporate SEE 
issues. 
Pensions Framework‟ consultation document. 
Supported the proposal for SEE disclosure in 
the SIP and suggested stronger wording. Also 
argued that „trustees should incorporate 
certain environmental considerations as part 
of their financial considerations‟ (WWF-UK, 
1999, p.2). 
 Public policy 
 Business and 
moral case 
17. Oct. 1999 Ethics for USS The initial goal to convince the 
USS to adopt a „negative 
screening‟ SRI policy failed 
due to the Megarry judgement. 
Ethics for USS updated its 
tactic to call for responsible 
ownership.  
Produced a report „Meeting the 
Responsibilities of Ownership‟ which 
advocated that USS adopt a policy of „active 
investment‟ involving USS „using its 
influence as a major shareholder to encourage 
socially and environmentally responsible 
corporate behaviour… An active investment 
policy would appear to be financially prudent, 
requiring as it does the provision by 
companies of more thorough information 
about their activities, which can only add to 
the understanding of USS‟ investment 
managers. It would therefore enable USS to 
fulfil both its moral and its legal 
responsibilities‟ (Ethics for USS, 1999).  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
moral case 
18. 1999-2000 Greenpeace (and to 
some extent, 
WWF-UK) 
To persuade BP to:  
1. Stop the expenditure of any 
funds…for the development of 
the Northstar project; 
2. Make capital freed up by the 
cancellation of Northstar 
available to BP Solarex to 
Submitted a resolution to BP‟s AGM in 2000 
which used business case arguments in 
support of its position that „BP Amoco has a 
real investment choice on renewable energy 
which it is missing. It has invested in solar 
power but not to the level that really expands 
the market or really makes the group money‟. 
Lobbied investors to support the resolution 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
moral case 
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upscale substantially its solar 
manufacturing capacity (BP, 
2000). To distribute 
Greenpeace climate change 
messages to BP shareholders. 
through seminars and direct communications 
(BP, 2000). 
19. 1999-2002 WWF-UK „to persuade BP Amoco to 
publicly withdraw its interest 
in developing the Arctic 
Refuge and publicly support 
permanent protection of the 
Refuge for its wilderness 
values‟ (WWF-UK, 2000). 
Filed a resolution at BP‟s AGM in 2000, 2001 
and 2002. Included some collaboration with 
Greenpeace and other NGOs in US. Took a 
quarter-page advertisement in the FT 
highlighting the rationale for BP not to enter 
the Arctic Refuge. Published „Challenging the 
Economic Myth: Oil & Gas in the Arctic 
Refuge, Alaska‟ (WWF-UK, 2000). 
Commissioned „Brand Risk and Sustainability 
– is shareholder value at risk in the new BP? 
Environmental Performance, brand equity and 
shareholder value‟ (Innovest Strategic Value 
Advisors, 2002). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case and 
moral case 
20. January 
2000 
Friends of the 
Earth (UK) 
„Capital Punishment‟ report – 
reviews the holdings of the 
fund management arms of the 
Top 15 insurance companies in 
controversial companies 
including Monsanto, ICI, 
Exxon, Elf Aquitaine, Rio 
Tinto and UPM Kymmene 
Corporation in order to 
„stimulate debate around the 
environmental consequences of 
the investment strategies of 
Argued that the financial sector has „a vital 
role to play in promoting sustainable 
development: it could potentially bring 
massive leverage to bear on other economic 
players to encourage them to integrate 
environmental and social with economic 
aims. There are powerful moral and economic 
reasons why it must now do so.‟ (Friends of 
the Earth, 2000a, p.4).  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case and 
moral case 
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institutional investors‟. 
21. February 
2000 
„Just Pensions‟ – a 
coalition between 
War on Want and 
Traidcraft 
Exchange, in a 
partnership 
including the 
Prince of Wales‟ 
Business Leaders 
Forum, Oxfam, 
WWF and 
Amnesty 
International. 
„The project‟s objective is to 
bring about changes in 
business practices that will 
benefit the poor.‟ (Traidcraft 
Exchange/War on Want,    
2000, p.1).  
Submitted business plan to International 
Grants Programme of the National Lottery 
Charities Board for £140k funding for Just 
Pensions. The project aimed to:  
„1. Produce guidance materials for pension 
fund trustees, fund managers and pension 
funds‟ advisors on development-related issues 
and their links with investment. 
2. Communicate this guidance to the 
investment community through a programme 
of seminars, briefings, one-to-one meetings, 
etc.‟ Included a number of financial 
insitutions on the Advisory Committee 
(Traidcraft Exchange/War on Want, 2000, 
p.1).  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case and 
moral case 
22. March to 
June 2000 
FoE „Targeting pension companies 
and the Norwich Union, 
demanding greener investment 
policies‟ (FoE, 2000b, p.1). 
Following on from the „Capital Punishment‟ 
report, FoE distributed an information pack to 
its „Campaign Express Network‟. Aimed to 
persuade Norwich Union to adopt a socially 
responsible engagement policy on all money 
under management. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
moral case 
23. June 2000 WWF-UK, 
Traidcarft, War on 
Want 
To promote mandatory 
reporting of SEE issues in the 
Company Law Review. 
A number of NGOs and some Financial 
Institutions co-signed a letter to the DTI 
Company Law Review encouraging greater 
corporate disclosure on key social, ethical and 
environmental issues.  
 Indirect 
 Public Policy  
 Business and 
moral case 
375 
24. July 2000 Amnesty 
International, 
WWF UK 
„To mobilise Amnesty 
members to take individual 
action on SRI by encouraging 
them to lobby their pension 
fund trustees to adopt 
Statements of Investment 
Principles (SIPs) that included 
consideration of social, 
environmental and ethical 
issues‟ (Amnesty, 2000, p.1).  
To encourage WWF members 
to bring pressure to bear on 
their pension fund managers to 
adopt positive SIPs. 
Produced „Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pension Fund Trustees to educate trustees 
about forms of SRI, particularly engagement 
policies‟ and an „Individual Action‟ campaign 
which encouraged members to contact the AI 
office to request a pensions campaign packet, 
which included information about the type of 
pension funds, general information on 
socially responsible investment and especially 
human rights, and explained the difference 
between screening and engagement‟ 
(Amnesty, 2000, p.1).  
WWF published model letter on website for 
pension fund members to send to pension 
funds.  
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case and 
moral case 
25. 3 July 
2000 
WWF-UK in 
conjunction with 
Traidcraft, AI, 
Forum for the 
Future and Friends 
of the Earth. 
To promote mandatory 
reporting of CSR information 
by listed companies and to 
promote the adoption of 
positive Statements of 
Investment Principles. 
Co-write a letter to top 100 UK pension 
schemes asking them „to engage in the DTI 
Company Law Review consultation process 
and support a mandatory requirement for 
companies to report on their environmental 
and social performance.‟ Enclosed best 
practice model SIP for pension to consider.  
 Indirect 
 Both public 
policy and 
CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
26. Nov. 2000 WWF-UK To promote mandatory 
reporting of CSR information 
by listed companies. 
Spoke at All Party Parliamentary Group on 
SRI. Argued that „access to comparable and 
reliable environmental and social 
performance information is currently a 
problem for investors‟. Welcomed Tony 
Blair‟s challenge to the top 350 companies to 
publish annual environmental reports by the 
 Direct 
 Public policy 
audience 
 Business 
case 
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end of 2001 but suggested that the 
„government would need to move towards a 
mandatory requirement to avoid losing 
credibility‟ if deadline is missed (UKSIF, 
2000). 
27. 2000-2001 An NGO coalition 
including FoE UK, 
the Corner House, 
the Kurdish Human 
Rights Project 
(UK) and the Ilisu 
Dam Campaign 
(UK) 
Balfour Beatty and Ilisu Dam Submitted resolution to 2011 AGM. Produced 
Counter-Annual Report „2000: Balfour 
Beatty‟s annus horribilus‟. Circulated NGO 
fact-finding mission report to investors. 
Argued that Balfour mismanaged the Ilisu 
dam project and had not properly assessed the 
company‟s reputation risk damage. Used 
Turnbull listing requirements to suggest that 
investors ask for reassurances that any 
reputational risks are justified financially. 
Targeted Socially Responsible Investors. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case and 
moral case 
28. March 
2001 
Friends of the 
Earth 
To prevent Shell from 
exploring for gas in Kirthar 
National Park, Pakistan. 
Friends of the Earth England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland encouraged investors in 
Shell to raise concerns regarding allegations 
that Shell intended to explore for gas in the 
Kirthar National Park. This was in support of 
a legal case that Friends of the Earth 
International was pursuing against Shell in the 
Pakistani courts. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
moral case 
29. April 2001 WWF-UK To promote inclusion of SEE 
issues into the venture capital 
due diligence investment 
process. The report aims to 
„identify to what extent this 
Commissioned Ecsponent to conduct a review 
of the members of the British Venture Capital 
Association. Published „BVCA 
Environmental Investment Survey Report‟. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
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key sector of the UK financial 
services community is 
addressing its wider 
responsibility to the 
environment and the eco-
systems in which it fosters 
economic growth‟ (Ecsponent, 
2001, p.1). 
30. May 2001 Just Pensions To provide „practical guidance 
to pension fund trustees and 
fund managers on how to 
address…development issues 
in their approach to socially 
responsible investment.‟ And 
„sets out the case for positive 
engagement [by fund 
managers]… to encourage 
companies to improve their 
performance on social 
responsibility issues‟ (Just 
Pensions, 2001, p.2-3). 
September 2001, 10,000 copies had been sent 
to funds and trustees, „generating interest‟ 
from the Radio Authority, Kings Fund, AWG 
(previously Anglian Water), Fiat and Coal 
Pensions Funds (Just Pensions, 2001, p.3). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case and 
moral case 
31. 2001-2002 Corner House To motivate other NGOs to 
engage in CM intervention and 
educate them in how best to do 
it. 
Published „The Campaigner‟s Guide to the 
Financial Markets‟. Focus was on sharing 
lessons learned from specific examples of 
NGO CM intervention – especially Bakun 
Dam and Ilisu Dam. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
Case 
32. 2001 FoE To promote best practice 
„Statements of Investment 
Principles‟ by the top 100 
Published „Top 100 Pension Funds – How 
Ethical Are They?‟ Concluded that „although 
most funds now include SRI in their 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
378 
Pension Schemes. investment strategy, many are putting few or 
no obligations on fund managers to engage 
actively with the firms in which they invest to 
ensure ethical standards. Also…most have no 
means for monitoring whether trustees and 
fund managers are meeting their stated ethical 
policies‟. FoE called on trustees to „raise their 
game‟ and listed measures they wish to see 
introduced by all pension funds (UKSIF, 
2001, p.4). 
 Business and 
moral case 
33. 2001 Free Tibet/Tear 
Fund 
To persuade BP to divest 
holding in Petrochina in order 
to embarrass the Chinese 
government‟s „Western 
Development Plan‟ and draw 
attention to human rights 
infringements in Tibet. 
Free Tibet, with support from Tear Fund, filed 
a resolution at the 2002 AGM calling on BP 
to divest its holding. Follow-up media work 
and letter-writing campaign to institutional 
investors. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral case 
34. 2001 WWF-UK To reduce investment in 
unsustainable forestry practices 
and promote the Forest 
Stewardship Council as an 
investment criterion. 
ISIS became the first financial services 
company to join WWF‟s 95+ group. The 95+ 
group was formed in 1993 to increase demand 
for, and trade in, Forest Stewardship Council 
certified timber, and to support companies in 
developing and implementing sustainable 
timber sourcing policies. ISIS „committed to 
use its influence with companies in which it 
invests to encourage them to adopt 
sustainable wood sourcing policies, and also 
to become members of the WWF 95+ group‟ 
(ISIS, 2003). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
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35. Dec. 2001 WWF-UK To create a „lasting relationship 
between shareholders and 
corporations with regard to the 
potential risks and 
opportunities presented to 
investment portfolios by 
actions stemming from the 
perception of climate change‟ 
(Carbon Disclosure Project, 
2001). 
Main funder of CDP and member of the 
Advisory Board. CDP aims to „a. help 
investors better understand climate change in 
the context of their portfolios; and b. help the 
corporate community provide better quality 
information to shareholders on climate change 
related risks‟ (CDP, 2001). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
36. January 
2002 
Amnesty UK + 
IBLF (with support 
from ISIS and 
Insight 
Investment). 
To raise companies‟ awareness 
of the human rights contexts of 
their activities and to 
encourage them to develop 
appropriate practices and 
procedures.  
Published a study linking human rights to 
corporate risk. The publication, „Business and 
Human Rights: A Geography of Corporate 
Risk‟, illustrated areas of the world where 
companies are most vulnerable to the costs 
and reputational risks associated with human 
rights violations. The findings are presented 
in seven annotated world maps covering 11 
industry sectors (UKSIF, 2002a). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
37. 2002 War on Want To reduce the effect of 
globalisation on the working 
poor by promoting 
international codes of conduct 
for labour standards in the 
supply chain. 
Re-launched a more focused version of the 
Invest in Freedom Campaign. Focused on 
„encouraging the 10 million people who are 
occupational pension scheme members to find 
out where their money is invested. The Invest 
in Freedom campaign offers ideas on how 
members should lobby trustees, who are 
nominated by employees and so ideally 
placed to question whether companies in 
which the scheme invests respect workers‟ 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
moral case. 
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rights‟ (EIRIS, 2002, p.2). 
38. 2002 Transparency 
International 
To promote the transparency of 
facilitation payments by 
multinationals to governments 
for large-scale investment 
projects in order to increase 
government accountability and 
curb corruption. 
Approached ISIS Asset Management to join 
Transparency International UK‟s Corporate 
Supporters‟ Forum. Collaborated in the 
development of Business Principles for 
Countering Bribery. ISIS becomes an 
Observer on the Steering Committee of this 
working group. Following its launch in the 
autumn of 2002, ISIS committed to engaging 
with the companies in its portfolios to 
promote the Business Principles.  
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
39. July 2002 Just Pensions To ascertain how much 
difference the amendment to 
the 1995 Pensions Act, which 
came into force in July 2000, 
has had on the way individual 
pension funds conduct their 
affairs. To urge pension funds 
to take „steps to improve their 
implementation of socially 
responsible investment 
strategies‟ (Just Pensions, 
2002, p.2). 
Published „Socially Responsible Investment 
and International Development. Do UK 
Pension Funds Invest Responsibly?‟ a survey 
of current practice on Socially Responsible 
Investment‟. Found that poor practice in 
relation to SRI was the norm. Included 
recommendations for best practice SRI 
implementation. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
moral case 
40. 2002 War on Want and 
Communication 
Workers Union 
To encourage fund trustees 
managing pensions for staff at 
BT and Consignia to engage 
with investee companies to 
improve working conditions in 
the developing world. 
Aimed to mobilise pressure from supporters 
and members to engage more with companies 
in which they invest. „Harnessing the power 
of these huge pension funds can make a real 
difference to workers in the developing world. 
With the CWU‟s support we hope to move 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Moral case 
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corporate engagement to a new level‟, said 
War on Want campaigns director Rob 
Cartridge. The campaign will concentrate on 
engaging with companies to improve 
workers‟ rights in the developing world, such 
as eradicating child labour and forced work, 
and ensuring the right to join a trade union‟ 
(EIRIS, 2002, p.2).  
41. July 2002 FoE  To persuade the FSA to 
impose sanctions on Xstrata 
over its failure to include 
full environmental risk 
information in its UK 
listing share prospectus. 
 To change the FSA listing 
requirements. 
 
 Produced an analysis of climate risks and 
the degree to which the Xstrata share 
prospectus neglected to include sufficient 
information in this area. Submitted to the 
FSA in support of their argument. 
Requested support for their position from 
institutional investors.  
 Used Xstrata case study to encourage the 
FSA to review the Listing Rules to ensure 
that they fully reflect the changing needs 
of investors with regard to social and 
environmental issues. Recommended that 
the QABI Guidelines should be formally 
added to the UK Stock Exchange Listing 
Requirements. Requested support for its 
position from the institutional investors. 
 Indirect 
 Public policy  
 Business 
case 
42. Sept. 2002 Forum for the 
Future 
To promote engagement on 
SEE issues by mainstream 
investors.  
Published a survey of mainstream fund 
managers, „Engaging the Mainstream with 
Sustainability – a survey of investor 
engagement on corporate social, ethical and 
environmental performance‟ (Pearce and 
Ganzi, 2002). „Revealed the increasing 
 Direct 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
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importance of social, environmental and 
ethical (SEE) issues. The majority of fund 
managers interviewed are integrating 
engagement on SEE issues into their 
mainstream Corporate Governance process 
because they believe that significant SEE 
risks facing their investments should be 
managed‟ (UKSIF, 2002b).  
 
43. 2002 Oxfam To help coffee producers in 
developing countries get a fair 
price for their crop. 
Launched the „What‟s that in your coffee?‟ 
campaign and published „Mugged: Poverty in 
your coffee cup‟. Met large financial 
institutions in the UK, Europe and the US to 
discuss its campaign and „called on investors 
to engage with the world‟s biggest coffee 
marketing firms – Nestle, Kraft, Procter & 
Gamble and Sarah Lee – to improve their 
supply chain management and pricing 
policies‟ (EIRIS, 2002, p.2). Claimed that the 
fact that „only 5 per cent‟ of the retail price 
reaches the farmer represented a „risky 
business strategy‟ for the companies, because 
unfair business practices damage brand 
reputation and can affect sales (Oxfam, 
2002a). 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business 
case 
44. 2002 Oxfam, Save the 
Children and 
Voluntary Services 
Overseas  
To encourage drugs companies 
to do more to improve access 
to life-saving medicines.  
 Published „Beyond Philanthropy‟ (Oxfam, 
2002b) which included a set of 
benchmarks for investors concerned about 
access to life-saving drugs in the 
developing world to enable the 
comparison policies of drugs companies. 
 Indirect 
 CM 
Institutions 
 Business and 
moral case 
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Promoted to investors at UK Social 
Investment Forum members‟ event. The 
benchmarks measure how far drugs 
companies are working to improve access 
to cheap drugs for HIV and other 
infectious diseases, by lowering prices or 
opening up patents. They also measure 
how far drugs companies provide effective 
and appropriate drugs in developing 
countries, and how far they monitor drug 
safety and side effects. „Drugs companies 
can and should do more. Investors too 
have a vital role to play, as how they 
invest their money can have a positive 
influence on people‟s lives‟, said a 
spokesperson for the three development 
charities. Also „encouraged investors to 
hold companies to account in a systematic 
and comparable way‟ (EIRIS, 2002, p.2). 
 Oxfam published a briefing paper calling 
on investors to use their influence to 
encourage GSK to develop a policy setting 
out how it would meet its commitment to 
„maximising affordable access…within the 
first three months of the company‟s 
existence‟ (Oxfam, op cit). Launched its 
„Cut the Cost‟ campaign at a briefing for 
City investors. Considerable follow-up 
dialogue with City institutions in support 
of Investors Advocacy Engagement. 
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45. November 
2002 
Forum for the 
Future 
To strengthen the SRI SIP 
policy requirement in the 
Reform of the 1995 Pensions 
Act, by lobbying for an annual 
report in support of the SIP in 
order to improve the extent and 
quality of the engagement 
underlying these claims. 
Publishes „Government‟s Business‟ (Cowe 
and Porritt, 2002) which, among a series of 
recommendations, urges the government to 
require pension fund trustees to report to 
members on how they implement any SRI 
policies. 
 Direct 
 Public policy 
 Business and 
moral case 
46. Dec. 2002 The Corporate 
Responsibility 
Coalition: Amnesty 
International UK, 
CAFOD, FoE, New 
Economics 
Foundation and 
Save the Children 
UK. 
To build support for the reform 
of UK Company Law. CORE‟s 
goal was to improve the 
environmental, social and 
economic performance of 
companies by requiring greater 
disclosure and accountability 
to stakeholders. 
CORE called on ethical investors to help it 
promote legislation to make it a legal 
requirement for UK companies to report on 
their social, environmental and ethical 
performance, and on Corporate Governance 
issues such as directors‟ salaries. Presented to 
Fund Managers at UKSIF member event. 
 Indirect 
 Public policy 
 Business and 
moral case 
 
Source: Waygood (2006) 
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Appendix 5: A Profile of the Campaigning NGOs 
 
Organisation 
 
Mission 
 
Geographical 
Focus 
 
Income 
 
Staff/supporters 
 
Corporate 
Campaigning 
Approach 
 
Frequency of Use of 
Shareholder Activism 
ActionAid 
UK –  
Founded in 
1972 as 
Action in 
Distress by 
British 
businessman 
Cecil Jackson-
Cole and was 
originally a 
child 
sponsorship 
charity. 
„To work with 
poor and 
excluded people 
to eradicate 
poverty and 
injustice‟ 
(ActionAid, no 
date). 
Works in 45 
countries in 
Africa, Asia, 
the Americas 
and Europe. 
The total 
fundraising 
income for the 
2013 financial 
year was £63.7 
million 
(ActionAid, 
2013c). 
ActionAid-UK 
has 135, 225 
supporters who 
make a regular 
donation as well 
as 157 staff in the 
UK (ActionAid, 
2013c). 
In 2013 ActionAid had 
not established a 
specific strategy in the 
area of corporate 
campaigning but was 
recruiting a private 
sector advocacy advisor 
whose main 
responsibilities are to 
shape its strategic 
approach to private 
sector engagement, 
build influence with 
companies and the 
business community, 
and increase the profile 
of the organisation with 
companies. 
Reference to the 
chronology (Appendix 3) 
demonstrates that 
ActionAid has participated 
in at least three 
interventions between 
2003 and 2013. The 
organisation has not 
deployed a shareholder 
activist strategy as often as 
some NGOs with a focus 
on responsible investment, 
or some environmental 
NGOs, but it has used such 
a tactic more often than 
most development NGOs. 
Since there is no reference 
to ActionAid in 
Waygood‟s chronology, its 
first shareholder activist 
intervention dates back to 
2007 and advocates for 
fair treatment and wages  
for supermarket suppliers. 
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 EIRIS differs from the other NGOs as, rather than being a campaigning organisation, it is a provider of research services to investors. However, since it has been 
extensively involved in the Vedanta campaign and has engaged with investors on the topic, its actions form part of the case study analysis. 
Amnesty 
International 
UK –  
Established in 
1961 after 
British lawyer 
Peter 
Benenson 
wrote an 
article in The 
Observer 
which 
launched the 
worldwide 
campaign 
„Appeal for 
Amnesty 
1961‟. 
„A world in 
which every 
person enjoys 
all of the human 
rights enshrined 
in the Universal 
Declaration of 
Human Rights 
and other 
international 
human rights 
instruments. In 
pursuit of this 
vision, Amnesty 
International‟s 
mission is to 
undertake 
research and 
action focused 
on preventing 
and ending 
grave abuses of 
these rights‟ 
(AI, 2014).   
The 
International 
Secretariat of 
AI is based in 
London and 
the 
organisation 
has offices in 
further 80 
countries 
worldwide. 
Total 
fundraising 
income for 
2013 was 
£24.8 million 
(Amnesty 
International, 
2013b). 
 
More than 3 
million 
supporters, 
members and 
subscribers 
globally and 
232,252 
supporters in the 
UK. The UK 
section employs 
154 staff in 
offices based in 
London, 
Edinburgh and 
Belfast (Amnesty 
International, 
2013b). 
The corporate-sector 
relevant work includes 
campaigns to ensure 
that companies respect 
and are accountable for 
the human rights 
impacts of their 
operations. 
Reference to the 
chronology reveals that AI 
has been moderately 
active, with 5 significant 
interventions between 
2003 and 2013. The same 
number of interventions 
for the NGO is 
documented in Waygood‟s 
chronology between 1990 
and 2002. 
 
EIRIS
96
  –
Established in 
1983 as the 
first 
„To empower 
responsible 
investors with 
independent 
Works with 
over 200 asset 
managers and 
asset owners 
- Employs over 60 
staff at offices 
around the globe. 
EIRIS runs a Global 
Engagement Service 
which helps investors 
prioritise their 
The chronology of NGO 
intervention suggests that 
EIRIS has been highly 
active, with 16 
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 A charity which supports the development of a more sustainable global financial system. 
independent 
research 
service for 
ethical 
investors in 
the UK. A not-
for-profit 
organisation, 
its revenues 
are gift-aided 
to the EIRIS 
Foundation
97
.  
 
assessments of 
companies and 
advice on 
integrating them 
with investment 
decisions‟ 
(EIRIS, 2015). 
across Europe, 
USA and Asia 
and researches 
over 3,300 
FTSE-100 
companies 
worldwide 
(EIRIS, 2015). 
engagements across 
their global portfolios 
and has a specifically 
outlined strategy for 
engaging with the 
private sector which 
consists of six steps: 
determining which 
companies should be 
targeted based on 
research, setting clear 
engagement objectives, 
establishing dialogue, 
analysing the response 
from companies, 
recommending next 
steps, and reporting on 
results. 
interventions between 
2003 and 2013. However, 
it should be taken into 
account that this result is 
to be expected since the 
main purpose of the 
organisation is to work 
with and advise investors. 
ShareAction 
(formerly 
FairPensions) 
–  ShareAction 
grew out of 
the highly 
successful 
Ethics for USS 
campaign in 
the late 1990s. 
„The promotion 
of investment 
for the public 
benefit in order 
to advance: the 
relief of poverty, 
protection of the 
environment, 
promotion of 
human rights, 
ShareAction‟s 
work focuses 
on institutional 
investors, 
mainly in the 
UK, although 
it is expanding 
fast. 
Total incoming 
resources for 
2013 were 
£542,696 
(ShareAction, 
2014). 
Sixteen staff (full-
time and part-
time) based in 
London 
(ShareAction, 
2014). 
The work of the 
organisation revolves 
around four key areas - 
campaigning (single 
issue campaigns aimed 
at mobilising the 
financial power of 
shareholders to create 
change in corporations); 
policy and public 
Shareholder activism 
constitutes the focus of 
ShareAction‟s 
campaigning strategy. 
Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that the 
organisation has been very 
active in this sphere since 
its inception – the 
chronology reveals that 
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The 
organisation 
was founded 
in 2005 under 
the name of 
Fairshare 
Educational 
Foundation. 
sustainable 
development, 
and compliance 
with the law and 
ethical standards 
of conduct‟ 
(ShareAction, 
2010b).  
 
affairs (engagement 
with government and 
policy makers to 
remove regulatory 
barriers to the 
encouragement of 
activism); research and 
publications (pension 
fund surveys, fund 
managers surveys and 
others); and 
encouraging pension 
savers to take action by 
writing to their pension 
fund and demanding 
responsible investment. 
ShareAction has 
participated in 36 
interventions between 
2006 and 2013. 
Platform 
London –  
Platform was 
formed in 
1983 as a 
place where 
activists and 
artists can act 
together on 
social and 
environmental 
issues. 
Core values of 
the organisation 
– justice, 
solidarity, 
creativity and 
democracy. 
Platform‟s 
current 
campaigns 
focus on the 
environmental, 
social and 
economic 
impact of 
global oil 
companies.  
The work of 
the 
organisation is 
supported by 
funds, trusts, 
individuals and 
earned income 
from 
performances, 
exhibitions, 
courses and 
others. No 
information 
about total 
Twelve staff 
members, two 
research 
associates and an 
advisory group of 
six people. The 
advisory group 
comprised of 
artists, academics 
and activists 
meets twice a 
year to discuss 
how to improve 
the quality and 
The organisation 
combines art, research, 
activism and education 
as part of its activities. 
When it comes to 
activism, one strand of 
its work has to do with 
attending AGMs and 
talking with investors. 
The chronology reveals 
that Platform has 
participated in five 
interventions throughout 
the years related to the 
Niger Delta, tar sands, the 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill, 
fossil fuel finance and, 
most recently, Arctic 
drilling with a 
predominant focus on BP 
and Shell‟s operations. 
389 
incoming 
resources 
provided. 
effectiveness of 
Platform‟s work. 
ChristianAid 
–  Founded in 
the 1940s 
during the 
aftermath of 
World War II 
after British 
and Irish 
church leaders 
met with the 
aim of helping 
European 
refugees who 
had lost 
everything. 
ChristianAid‟s 
purpose is to: 
„expose the 
scandal of 
poverty, help in 
practical ways to 
root it out from 
the world, 
change 
structures and 
systems that 
favour the rich 
and powerful 
over the poor 
and 
marginalised‟ 
(ChristianAid, 
no date). 
Working with 
more than 650 
overseas 
partners in 
around 50 
countries 
across Europe, 
Asia, Latin 
America, 
Africa and the 
Middle East. 
Total income 
for the period 
2012 – 2013 
was £103.6 
million of 
which 
donations 
accounted for 
£59.1 million 
(ChristianAid, 
2014). 
In 2013/2014, CA 
had 483 Britain, 
Ireland and 
Spain-based staff 
(ChristianAid, 
2014). 
No specific policy on 
corporate campaigning, 
but the organisation has 
a senior private sector 
adviser position.  
Reference to the 
chronology reveals that the 
organisation has 
participated in three 
interventions between 
2003 and 2013. Only one 
intervention by CA is 
documented in Waygood‟s 
chronology during 2001 
but it calls for divestment 
rather than engagement. 
Shareholder activism 
appears to be not so 
familiar tactic to the 
organisation but one which 
is growing in popularity as 
it is being extensively used 
as part of their tax 
campaign. 
ECCR –  A 
registered 
charity, 
investor 
coalition and 
membership 
organisation, 
ECCR was 
„Working for 
economic 
justice, human 
rights and 
environmental 
sustainability‟ 
(ECCR, no 
ECCR works 
with global 
NGO and 
investor 
partners to 
influence the 
policies and 
practices of 
Total incoming 
resources for 
2012 
amounted to 
£77,430 of 
which £76,282 
comes from 
voluntary 
ECCR comprises 
of four members 
of the secretariat 
team, a treasurer 
and a company 
secretary. 
ECCR‟s work has three 
main strands: research, 
engagement with 
companies to encourage 
them to adopt high 
standards of business 
ethics and engagement 
with church investors 
The organisation has taken 
part in five interventions 
throughout the studied 
period. It is not cited in 
Waygood‟s chronology; 
however, there is no 
question that it has been 
active in the field of 
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formed in 
1989 by a 
group of 
people active 
in Industrial 
Mission as a 
response to 
allegations of 
malpractice of 
a UK 
company in 
the 
Philippines. 
date).   multinational 
companies 
which are UK 
or Ireland-
listed. 
income 
(ECCR, 
2013b). 
and other investors to 
advocate active investor 
engagement with the 
said companies. 
shareholder activism 
before 2003 as well (for 
example, it has 
participated in tabling the 
resolution at Shell‟s AGM 
in 1997 and has attended 
companies‟ AGMs). 
Friends of the 
Earth 
International 
and FoE 
Netherlands 
(Milieudefens
ie) –  FoEI 
was founded 
in 1971when a 
group of 
environmental 
activists from 
France, the 
UK, Sweden 
and the US 
came together 
to discuss 
„Our vision is of 
a peaceful and 
sustainable 
world based on 
societies living 
in harmony with 
nature‟ (FoEI, 
no date).  
FoE is the 
world‟s largest 
grassroots 
environmental 
network. 
Highly 
decentralised, 
it is made up 
of 74 
autonomous 
national 
member 
groups and 
5,000 local 
activist groups 
on each 
continent 
FoEI‟s income 
for 2013/14 
was £10.2 
million (FoE, 
2015). 
Milieudefensie – 
the Netherlands‟ 
member group –  
has more than 
80,000 members 
and supporters. 
Milieudefensie 
campaigns for clean air, 
ecologically sound and 
animal-friendly 
agriculture, 
conservation of forests 
and takes actions 
against Dutch 
companies that cause 
environmental 
destruction in other 
countries. 
As the chronology 
encompasses NGOs 
operating in the UK, only 
the shareholder activist 
actions of FoE UK can be 
examined. It has been 
active in the arena with 11 
interventions between 
1990-2002 and 11 
interventions between 
2003-2013. While FoE UK 
has campaigned in the past 
against Shell‟s actions in 
the Niger Delta, in recent 
years it has been 
Milieudefensie that has 
continued putting pressure 
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strategies for 
tackling 
environmental 
problems. 
which comply 
with the 
guidelines 
established by 
the federation. 
Milieudefensie 
is FoEI‟s 
member group 
in the 
Netherlands – 
a national 
organisation 
with 80 local 
groups which 
joined FoEI in 
1972. 
on the company. That is 
why, it is Milieudefensie‟s 
involvement in the 
campaign that has been 
documented in the case 
study analysis.  
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Appendix 6: Failings in Vedanta’s EIAs to Meet India’s Regulatory Requirements 
 
Failing in EIAs 
 
Requirement Breached 
No substantive discussion of alternative sites 
for the mine and the refinery. 
EIA Notifications 1994 and 2006 
No consideration of the cumulative impacts 
of the two projects. 
EIA Notification 2006 
Not all sources of emissions and pollutants 
are clearly identified. 
EIA Notifications 1994 and 2006; MoEF‟s 
2008 Terms of Reference for refinery 
expansion 
Dust and odour are not acknowledged as 
potential sources of pollution. 
EIA Notifications 1994 and 2006 
No ongoing monitoring of dust or mitigation 
measures is proposed. 
MoEF‟s 2004 Terms of Reference for 
refinery 
There is insufficient discussion and 
justification of design criteria for the red 
mud and fly ash ponds, and the exact 
location of expanded ponds is not specified. 
MoEF‟s 2008 Terms of Reference for 
refinery expansion 
No means are suggested for monitoring 
continuous and incremental pollution. 
EIA Notification 2006 
No detailed hydrological maps are provided 
to show information about surface water. 
MoEF‟s 2008 Terms of Reference for 
refinery expansion 
No adequate information is provided on 
water usage. 
EIA Notifications 1994 and 2006 
No acknowledgement is given of the 
impacts caused by transportation of bauxite 
from other mines to the refinery or the 
impacts of the conveyor belt used to 
transport ore from Niyamgiri to the refinery. 
EIA Notification 2006; MoEF‟s 2008 Terms 
of Reference for refinery expansion 
No detailed and specific information is 
given on land use by local communities and 
numbers of villages and population to be 
displaced. 
EIA Notifications 1994 and 2006; MoEF‟s 
2008 Terms of Reference for refinery 
expansion 
There is no reference to the cultural 
significance of the Niyamgiri Hills to the 
Dongria Kondh. 
EIA Notifications 1994 and 2006 
 
Source: Amnesty International (2011) 
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Appendix 7: Zambia Sugar’s Tax Avoidance Practices 
Type of Tax Dodge Revenue Foregone 
Mystery Management: 
Zambia Sugar pays large sums of money for purchasing 
and management fees to a sister company in Ireland. The 
Irish company‟s accounts consistently state that it has no 
employees, while providing Zambia Sugar with 
management services worth $2.6mn each year. Similar 
payments are made for export agency services to a 
subsidiary registered in Mauritius. This lowers the 
company‟s taxable profits in Zambia while accumulating 
profits outside of the country
98
. 
Zambia Sugar‟s operating 
profit is estimated to have been 
reduced by 20 per cent. 
Payments to the sister company 
in Ireland which have reduced 
Zambia Sugar‟s taxable profits 
and avoided 15-20 per cent 
Zambian withholding tax, have 
reduced the company‟s tax bill 
by $1.2mn a year, or $7.4mn 
between 2007 and 2013.  
A Dublin dog-leg: 
In 2007 Zambia Sugar borrowed $70mn from two banks 
– the US Citibank and South Africa‟s Standard Bank to 
expand its sugar estate. By law Zambia levies a 15 per 
cent withholding tax on all cross-border interest 
payments and that would have increased the interest 
charge for Zambia Sugar. That is why, the loan has been 
sent on paper on a „dog-leg‟ via Ireland with the money 
being lended to Illovo Sugar Ireland which in turn loans 
the money to its sister company Zambia Sugar. In this 
case, due to the Zambia-Ireland tax treaty, no tax is liable 
on interest payments from Zambia to Ireland, cancelling 
Zambian withholding tax on the payments. 
The estimated loss to the 
exchequer is calculated at up to 
$3mn in withholding taxes. 
Tax-free Takeaway 
Most countries levy a withholding tax on dividends paid 
to overseas shareholders or on profits paid to parent 
companies. The normal rate for Zambia is 15 per cent. 
However, by changing the ownership of Zambia Sugar 
between different European tax havens, the tax liability 
on its dividends is reduced significantly – from 20 per 
cent to 5 per cent
99
.  
As much as $7.4mn of 
Zambian withholding tax may 
have been avoided since 2007. 
                                                 
98
 Fees paid overseas for high value services such as management, consultancy and others can be taxed in 
Zambia in the form of a 15 per cent withholding tax. However, by paying these fees to or via an Irish 
company, Zambia Sugar takes advantage of an old treaty between Zambia and Ireland which cancels all 
withholding taxes. Such kinds of tax avoidance strategies are often called „treaty shopping‟. 
99
 Illovo Sugar Ireland was Zambia Sugar‟s immediate holding company until 2007. The tax treaty between 
Zambia and Ireland denies Zambia of the ability to tax any dividends distributed by Zambian to Irish 
companies. When transferring the profits from Ireland to the parent company Illovo Sugar Ltd. in South 
Africa, the only problem might be the Irish withholding tax of 20 per cent. However, then the ownership of 
Zambia Sugar is transferred from an Irish to a Dutch subsidiary to take advantage of the Dutch cooperative – 
a legal entity whereby shareholders are classified as „members‟ of the cooperative and profits automatically 
become owned by its members. Profits received by a cooperative leave the Netherlands tax-free and a treaty 
between Zambia and the Netherlands denies Zambia the ability to levy more than 5 per cent taxes on 
dividends paid out to Dutch companies.  
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Get Your Own Tax Haven 
Tax incentives aimed at attracting foreign investment at 
any cost have meant that Zambia Sugar has paid just 15 
per cent tax on all its profit, instead of the standard tax 
rate of 35 per cent. This rate was secured after the 
company‟s tax advisers argued that its income should be 
considered as „farming income‟, which qualifies for the 
special rate. In 2012, the farming tax rate was further 
decreased to 10 per cent, pushing it closer to some of 
Zambia Sugar‟s sister companies in tax havens. 
The rate change loses Zambian 
authorities some $3.6mn a 
year, a figure that could rise 
with rising profits. 
 
Source: ActionAid (2013a) 
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Appendix 8: SABMiller’s Tax Avoidance Tactics 
 
Type of Tax Dodge 
 
Losses in Tax Revenue 
Tax Dodge 1: Going Dutch  
Many of the local beer brands which were invented and are 
sold and consumed in developing countries, are not owned 
by the country in which they were invented. Rather they 
are owned by a subsidiary of SABMiller based in the 
Netherlands. This allows the company to take advantage of 
a set of tax rules offered by the Netherlands that makes it 
possible for companies to pay next to no tax on the 
royalties earned.  
The Netherlands based 
subsidiary received 
£25mn in royalties for 
2009 from six 
SABMiller companies 
in Africa. The total 
payments from all the 
company‟s African 
operations could be 
expected to be £43mn, 
corresponding to an 
estimated tax loss to 
African countries of 
£10mn. 
Tax Dodge 2: The Swiss Role SABMiller‟s subsidiaries in 
India and Africa pay inflated service management fees to 
sister companies in European tax havens, most notably 
Switzerland, where tax rates are lower. In India, these fees 
are sufficient to wipe out taxable profits entirely.  
Altogether, these fees 
amount to £47mn each 
year, depriving the 
governments of 
countries in India and 
Africa of £9.5mn of tax 
revenue. 
Tax Dodge 3: Take A Trip to Mauritius  
By 2009-10 Accra Brewery was buying 50 per cent of its 
supplies from Mubex – a company in Mauritius. 
ActionAid‟s estimates Mubex‟s income from other group 
companies to be £150mn per year. Centralising the 
procurement function in a tax haven such as Mauritius 
means that profits will be taxed at the Mauritian rate of 
three per cent which is much lower than that in South 
Africa and Ghana. SABMiller determines the prices paid 
by Accra Brewery and others to Mubex and the incentive 
is for Mubex to make as much profit as possible.  
The annual cost to 
Ghana is estimated to 
be £670,000. 
Tax Dodge 4: Thinning on Top  
Accra Brewery borrows a large sum of money from a 
subsidiary in Mauritius, making it „thinly capitalised‟. 
According to Ghanaian tax law, if a company reaches a 
certain debt-equity ratio, losses from interest costs cannot 
be counted against future taxable profits. The accounts of 
Accra Brewery reveal that it is claiming the full tax benefit 
from the interest costs. 
The annual interest 
costs amount to 
£445,000. This wipes 
out £76,000 of future 
tax payments per year. 
 
Source: ActionAid (2010)
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Appendix 9: Main Findings from ECCR’s 2010 Report 
 
Organisation 
writing the 
case study 
 
Issue 
 
Diagnostic Framing            
(type of injustice) 
 
Prognostic Framing 
(articulating a solution) 
Movement for 
the Survival of 
the Ogoni 
People 
(MOSOP) 
Shell‟s social 
license to 
operate in 
Ogoniland. 
Environmental insecurity, 
frequent oil spills and 
improper clean-up process, 
unfair compensation, 
devaluation of community 
opinion and culture, failure 
of community 
development initiatives, 
and militarisation. All 
these have led to a sense of 
betrayed trust. 
 A new approach to 
dialogue should be 
adopted – one that 
embraces principles 
such as informed 
consent.  
 Clean-up of oil 
pollution should be 
carried out in 
compliance with 
international 
standards.  
 An end to gas flaring. 
Centre for 
Social and 
Corporate 
Responsibility 
The Gbarain-
Ubie 
integrated oil 
and gas 
project in the 
Bayelsa state 
on which 
Shell started 
working in 
2005 and 
completed in 
2010. 
Inaccurate scope and 
content of the EIAs 
conducted for the project, 
lack of transparency in 
compensation 
arrangements for 
relocation, inadequate 
community development. 
A call for more 
transparent and credible 
participation by the 
public in future EIAs, 
independent monitoring 
and verification and a 
community led approach 
to development 
programmes. 
Stakeholder 
Democracy 
Network 
Three key 
challenges 
that Shell 
faces in the 
delta. 
 Reliance on security-
focused surveillance 
contracts. 
 An ageing pipeline 
network means oil 
spills still occur and 
give opportunity for 
exploitation by actors. 
 Gas flaring. 
Reconsider the approach 
to security, apply Shell‟s 
General Business 
Principles, end gas 
flaring, and enhance 
operational transparency.  
Trans-Border 
Missionaries 
Interface 
Initiative 
Conducted a 
survey to 
determine 
communities‟ 
living 
conditions.  
Common problems 
identified were: poverty 
and hunger, environmental 
destruction, 
unemployment, high child 
mortality and 
underdevelopment. 
An end to gas flaring, the 
establishment of a 
rehabilitation 
programme, retraining of 
field staff, the 
establishment of 
community-level peace 
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centres. 
Pro-Natura 
International 
Considers the 
current 
Global 
Memorandu
m of 
Understandin
g (GMoU) 
model to 
community 
development. 
Far reaching shortcomings 
in in the implementation 
process. Rushed roll-out 
means the essential 
participatory principles of 
GMoU have been 
neglected. 
Training courses for 
SPDC implementation 
staff, removal of staff 
with no competence in 
sustainable development, 
take action to address the 
marginalisation of 
women from the 
programme. 
  
Source: ECCR (2010a) 
398 
Appendix 10: A Full Version of the Questions Asked at Shell’s AGM (2013, 2014) 
 
Organisation 
 
Question 
 
 
 
 
 
ShareAction 
(2013) 
My name is … and I am a shareholder. My question relates to contractor 
oversight within the Shell group. The annual report itself mentions that 
contractor oversight and the activities of contractors presents a risk to the 
company – something BP knows all about following the Deepwater 
disaster. So therefore it is quite concerning to see issues about contractor 
oversight being raised repeatedly in relation to the Shell group. The US 
department of the interior in its review of your Alaskan operations in 2012 
said that the most significant shortcomings in Shell‟s management systems 
were in the area of contractor management and oversight. The executive 
summary from the IUCN scientific panel which was established by Shell 
said that stricter monitoring of contractors carrying out remediation in the 
Niger Delta is required. Peter Voser himself at last year AGM when asked 
about remediation in the Niger Delta referred to contractors being at fault. 
So my question is: „What specific steps are Shell currently taking to 
address the shortcomings that Peter Voser himself referred to, that the US 
department of the interior report refers to and that the IUCN scientific 
panel‟s executive summary of their report refers to?‟  
 
 
 
 
 
Amnesty 
International 
(2013) 
My name is… I am a shareholder and also a member of AI in the UK. I am 
concerned to understand exactly where accountability for group wide 
environmental standards and their performance lies. From a stakeholder 
and a shareholder viewpoint this is a very important question and I am 
personally finding it increasingly difficult to accept our company‟s 
assurances that the highest standards are applied group wide when for 
example we see the diff in the arctic, last week‟s concerns in terms of 
antitrust and the IUCN report that has already been referenced. That again, 
contrary to Shell‟s assurances says that clean-up and remediation is not 
satisfactory in the Niger delta. When I look at group literature – most 
recently the 2012 sustainability report where on page 5 in terms of 
accountability it states „overall accountability for sustainable development 
rests with our chief executive and the executive committee and there are 
group-wide standards that are set and are expected to be adhered to across 
our group‟. Now this seems very clear but then it also is directly 
contradicted by legal statements that our company has made in court most 
recently in Holland where it states categorically that Royal Dutch Shell 
and its directors are in no way accountable for the actions of subsidiaries 
and are certainly not obliged to act even if they are aware of issues of 
concern at subsidiary levels, whether these are environmental or otherwise. 
So I am sure that this certainly leaves me and also other stakeholders and 
shareholders confused on this vital issue and I‟d appreciate clarification 
regarding where accountability for group-wide standards actually lies and 
if this accountability isn‟t with the CEO and board executive committee, 
then is group literature somewhat misleading on this point? Thank you! 
 
 
FoE 
Good afternoon! My name is… I work for FoE Netherlands. I am happy to 
see that gas flaring is going down but still gas flaring is contributing highly 
to the climate emissions by the Shell group and therefore I have some 
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Netherlands 
(2013) 
questions about gas flaring in Nigeria and Iraq and elsewhere. For Nigeria 
we are fairly curious which project would be built over the coming years 
and what the results would be and if zero flaring is still the objective? The 
same question is for Iraq – anew country with a lot of flaring where we are 
a bit astonished to see that Shell starts in a new country where there is a lot 
of flaring that is still not finished…Thank you! 
 
 
 
 
 
Platform 
(2013) 
I am not only speaking here for myself but on behalf of a colleague – 
Peter. He lives in Pour Harcourt and he was eager, desperately keen to 
come to this shareholder meeting to be able to present to the board. 
Unfortunately, he couldn‟t get the visa to get into the Netherlands despite a 
great deal of trying. It interests me that Chad Holliday has been twice to 
Peter‟s homeland over the last 24 months or so and Peter can‟t come here. 
It makes it very difficult to have a level playing field. It‟s very difficult for 
him to travel here as it is. But let me get to the point that he asked me to 
ask you („A question please!‟, the chairman interrupts)… He works with 
the villagers in Ogoniland, it‟s now two years since the UNEP plan for the 
cleaning of the environment in the Ogoniland was agreed and it‟s awaiting 
the go ahead of Shell, as far as he understands, to go ahead and push 
forward. The finances are there, why isn‟t it going forward? And the 
question is why is Shell not going ahead with this? I think this is an 
important question in relation to this changing security situation. Over the 
last two years there has been a better security situation in Nigeria and the 
opportunity wasn‟t taken up to push forward with the UNEP plan. Why not 
and when is it going to go forward? 
The Dutch 
Association of 
Investors for 
Sustainable 
Development 
(VBDO, 
hereafter) 
(2013) 
My name is … I am from the Dutch association of investors for sustainable 
development. I have three short questions – one about C02 emissions, the 
other for sustainable supply chain and the last for Nigerian oil clean-ups. If 
I remember well last year Mr. Voser told here „If there is a spill in Nigeria 
whatever the cause, we will clean it up‟ so I ask if you are still committed 
to it. I saw in your presentation that 70 per cent or something like this of 
the spills are cleaned up last year. This is my last question. 
Dutch 
Shareholder 
(2013) 
My name is… I am Dutch and I am a shareholder. My question is 
concerned with the communication about and publicity regarding the role 
of Shell in the Niger Delta. I for one have been very upset and very 
uncomfortable with the role Shell has been playing, as well as uninformed. 
I would like to address the question to the board – does the board feel 
comfortable with the way we have been, the Dutch public and international 
public, have been informed about the role of Shell in the tragedy in the 
Niger Delta? 
Representative 
of a number of 
pension funds 
in the 
Netherlands 
(2013) 
As institutional investors we were also invited to visit the Niger Delta and 
some of us did. It provided new insight into the challenges that Shell faces 
over there and the observation of the extent of illegal refining activities oil 
pollution of the delta still remains. We see that complexity despite the 
progress Shell has with remediation of oil spills. We have some questions 
left on this issue for example on the UNEP report and further progress on 
how Shell intends to cooperate with the UNEP going forward and we also 
have questions about highprep which is responsible for the delta wide 
clean-up and how soon Shell is going to start, together with them, the 
wider clean-up. But we will follow-up on these questions later on, if I may 
chairmen. 
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Platform 
(2014) 
My name is… I am a shareholder and I also work for a group called 
Platform. We have been engaged in questions related to Nigeria for twenty 
years now, we have a long experience with the situation in the Delta. I 
want to raise questions in relation to your reference to transparency which 
I herald and I think it is a good thing but also in relation to the United 
Nations environmental study on the pollution in the Delta. I would like to 
emphasise the fact that although, in your presentation, you refer a great 
deal to the oil theft that takes place in the Delta, we should also remember 
exactly the scale of the pollution that has taken place there, as is identified 
by the United Nations in their study published in 2011. The area that is 
covered in the study is a huge area. In that enormous area, the place is 
dominated by oil pollution. Some part of that oil pollution is 5 metres deep 
– that‟s the depth of a double decker bus, into the soil, into farmland which 
people attempt to farm. And the water in the area is polluted at a level 
which means that people have to drink water imported by truck. This is an 
area which is one of the world‟s great wetlands and because of oil 
exploration by this company, and others, over the last 50 years, it has 
become so polluted that people can‟t actually drink the water. The report 
emphasises in detail what needs to be done to remediate this destruction. It 
was published in 2011 as I said and tragically little has been done about 
that. You did identify some small amount of what the company is doing 
but very little has been done about that. What is interesting to me (Can we 
have the question please?). Yes, I am coming to the question…  The 
description is that the company is unable to move because of the 
government not making a first move on this. I believe that this is 
untransparent – it is a smoke screen which you would not apply if the 
pollution has taken place in another area. Behind that smoke screen, I want 
to ask a very simple question – who is it who is responsible for the 
decision not to act on the UNEP report? Who is on the committee that 
makes that decision? Is it Mr. van Beurden, is it Mr. Ollila, is it the head of 
Shell Nigeria – who is on that committee? We as shareholders and other 
people would like to know who is it who is responsible for that action or 
failure to act and should be held responsible for that? Thank you! 
Source: Fieldwork Notes (2013)
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Appendix 11: A Full Version of the Questions Asked at Vedanta’s AGM  
(2013, 2014) 
 
Organisation 
 
Question 
 
 
 
 
 
Bianca Jagger 
(2013) 
After the ruling by the Supreme Court and the decision of the gram sabhas, 
what are the lessons learnt by Vedanta from the Niyamgiri experience 
which will be applied to all other projects with regard to issues of 
consultation and impact assessment? My second question is, does Vedanta 
now accept the need to gain the free, prior and informed consent of 
Adivasi
100
 people before embarking on any future projects? Thirdly, has 
Vedanta conducted an internal investigation into the charges by the Indian 
National Human Rights Commission (INHRC, hereafter) that the company 
was fabricating evidence against opponents of its Lanjigarh operation who 
were targeted by the company and falsely imprisoned as a result? If so, 
will those Vedanta officials responsible be held accountable? If no internal 
investigation has been conducted, may I continue by suggesting that this is 
a disgrace given the serious nature of the offenses that the INHRC an 
independent watch dog has drawn attention to. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephanie Meier 
– Aviva (2013) 
Since the beginning of 2010, Vedanta‟s share price has underperformed in 
relation to its mining peers by 25 per cent. We consider that a proportion 
of this can be attributed to mismanagement of sustainability issues. This 
year we have commissioned an independent report assessing progress 
against the seven recommendations we outlined in 2010. We are pleased to 
note that progress has been made putting in place a framework to manage 
sustainability issues and the remaining recommendations have now been 
met at a basic level. While we very much welcome this progress, we note 
that it has taken the board four years to get to this point. The progress has 
been slower than expected, suggesting a lack of appropriate focus by the 
board and there are still some gaps remaining. We are still to see the 
evidence that these policies and practices are being comprehensively 
embedded in the culture of the company and translated into action on the 
ground. This cultural change should be driven by the board and 
appropriately trained and experienced board is therefore crucial. We are 
disappointed, therefore, to see another director [Deepak Parekh] appointed 
without a credible track record in mining or sustainability issues and we 
withhold support for all non-executive directors as we do not consider that 
there is sufficiently robust and independent challenge and oversight at 
board level. We want to make sure that these good policies are translated 
into good practice. A focus on sustainability will help the board deliver 
value to Vedanta and its shareholders. 
 
 
Amnesty 
International 
You give a very strong emphasis on your commitment to sustainability. In 
your sustainability report you say that you follow the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights and these principles put a very 
strong emphasis on the need for companies to do human rights impact 
assessments proactively before their embark on projects. And the whole 
point of these impact assessments is to avoid problems in the first place. 
                                                 
100
 The term Adivasi is used to describe India‟s indigenous communities. 
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(2013) That seems to be the root of the problem, you are creating so many 
problems across your operations because you don‟t do proper impact 
assessments, this is at the essence of these guiding principles. My question 
to you is are you prepared to make a commitment that in any future 
projects you will undertake human rights impact assessments at the outset 
and that the decision whether to go ahead with the project will depend on 
these impact assessments that will address the full socio-economic and 
human rights impacts and that these assessments will be shared with 
affected communities so that they can take a view on whether they want 
the project to go ahead or not. Are you willing to make that commitment? 
 
A Dongria 
Kondh 
Representative 
(2013) 
Last year you said you will delete that part of your report where you say 
the Dongria Kondh are backward. In the „Vedanta Perspective‟ report you 
have made racist comments about the Dongria Kondh… [Here the person 
asking the question is interrupted by the Chairman, Anil Agarwal who 
speaks in Indian and they briefly exchange words that are not translated to 
the rest of the attendees in the room]. Then, the tribal representative stands 
up and says he wants to sing a song on behalf of the Dongria Kondh, the 
main message of which is that Vedanta is not welcomed in Niyamgiri. The 
song is in Indian but the man slips in a few sentences in English while 
singing: „We won‟t leave Niyamgiri. We won‟t leave, we won‟t give‟. 
Amnesty 
International 
(2014) 
Good afternoon, I am…from AI UK and I have been to quite a lot of 
Vedanta‟s AGMs – we have been following Vedanta over the years. My 
question is to Mr. Tom Albanese. Having visited most, if not all of the 
company‟s assets, do you believe that a fundamental shift in the corporate 
culture of Vedanta is required in order for the company to be able to 
improve significantly its human rights and environmental impacts? From 
AI‟s perspective there appears to have been over the years a culture of 
misinformation and concealment of information. We believe that the CSO 
have done everything they could to uncover what is happening in the 
business units but we think that they have been kept in the dark and 
occasionally they have come to us asking us for information that is not 
available internally. My question is to what extent do you feel confident 
that you are going to receive comprehensive and accurate information 
across all the companies‟ business units to make sure that the approved 
policies are being properly implemented. I think a test case of that relates 
to the public hearing in Lanjigarh where the majority of people supported 
the refinery expansion. I think the three questions you might want to 
investigate are: Was it really an open meeting as far as the affected 
communities had sufficient advanced notice and were not subject to any 
harassment or intimidation in order to attend the meeting. Our contacts at 
the meeting tell us that those who were opposed to the refinery expansion 
were either not invited to speak or were cut short and at the end of the 
meeting there was no summary of the proceedings and views expressed 
according to the standards required by Indian law. 
A Shareholder 
(2014) 
I‟ve got a question…I wonder about your role and your relationship with 
the board because you came from a company with some difficulties. I 
wonder how much of your future performance is relying on a 600% 
expansion in Lanjigarh and whether there is a real rigorous economic 
evaluation of that and whether you‟d make that public? 
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Appendix 12: List of all FTSE 100 Companies whose AGMs were attended by 
Members and Supporters of ShareAction/ChristianAid with the Aim of Asking a 
Question on Tax 
2013 AGM Season 
Company Industry 
Aviva Financial Services 
Barclays Financial Services 
(Banking) 
BP Oil and Gas 
Lloyds Financial Services 
(Banking) 
RBS Financial Services 
(Banking) 
Resolution Investments 
Rio Tinto Metals and Mining 
Smith and 
Nephew 
Healthcare 
Equipment and 
Services 
Standard Life Financial Services 
Tate & Lyle Food Processing 
Tesco Retailing 
WPP Advertising and 
Public Relations 
2012 AGM Season 
 Company Industry 
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
Barclays Financial Services 
(Banking) 
BP Oil and Gas 
BT Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
Diageo Beverages 
Glencore Commodities (Metal 
and Mining) 
Man Group plc. Financial Services 
Marks and 
Spencer 
Retailing 
Petrofac Engineering, 
Procurement and 
Construction, Oil 
and Gas 
Rio Tinto Metals and Mining 
Standard 
Chartered 
Financial Services 
(Banking) 
Schroders Investment 
Management 
Severn Trent Utility 
Shell Oil and Gas 
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2014 AGM Season 
Company Industry 
Admiral Insurance 
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
Aviva Financial Services 
BAE Systems Aerospace, 
Defence, 
Information 
Security 
Barclays Financial Services 
(Banking) 
British American 
Tobacco 
Tobacco 
BG Group Oil and gas 
Fresnillo Mining 
GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceutical, 
Biotechnology 
Intercontinental 
Hotels Group 
Hospitality 
Lloyds Financial Services 
Morrisons Retailing 
Rio Tinto Metals and Mining 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
Financial services 
Reckitt 
Benckizer 
Consumer goods 
RSA Insurance 
Shire Pharmaceuticals 
Tullow Oil Oil and gas 
exploration 
Unilever Consumer goods 
Severn Trent Water  
Whitbread  Leisure and 
Hospitality 
 
